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SUMMARY: Petitioner Nixon, represented by private counsel, 
moves for expedited consideration of his petition· for 
certiorari. The petition presents the issue whether a President 
is absolutely immune from civil damage liability. 




FACTS: The facts as set forth in the petition are as 
follows: In 1968, respondent Fitzgerald blew the whistle on 
cost overruns in the C-5A transport program. Thereafter, his 
civil service status was terminated. These events occurred 
during the closing days of the Johnson administration. A year 
later, respondent's employment with the government was 
terminated as part of a general reorganization. Mr. Nixon was 
questioned about the matter at a press conference and promised 
to look into~it. He then requested that respondent be given a 
Bureau of the Budget position. The BOB director, howeve 0 
counselled against such an appointment because respondent was a 
"pipeline to Senator Proxmire." Nixon did not push the matter, 
but requested his staff to pursue other alternatives. None was 
2 found. In 1970 respondent left the government. 
In 1973 respondent was ordered reinstated by the civil 
service commission and awarded back pay. In 1974 he commenced 
this civil action against various federal officials, claiming 
(1) that his First Amendment rights v1ere violated by the 
dismissal and (2) under implied causes of action pursuant to ~ 
federal statutes protecting Congressional witnesses. See 5 
U.S.C. § 7211; 18 u.s.c. § 1505. The suit was dismissed as 
TRespondent--paints the President as an active con..sElrator, 
citing this taped statements: 
I said get rid of that son of a bitch. You know 'cause he 
is, he is doin' this two or three times. 
Mr. Nixon says that he had some other person (a Mr. Gordon Rule 
who had criticized Roy Ash) in mind when he made this statement. 
The district court found "genuine issues of fact as to the 
scope of each defendant's responsibilities." 
I -/ I \ 
~ 
time barred. On appeal CADC reversed as to White House 
personnel concluding that prior to 1973 respondent had no 
reason to know of White House involvement in the dismissal. 553 
F. 2d 220 (1977). On remand, respondent amended his complaint 
to add Nixon as a defendant. 
HOLDINGS BELO~: Following his joinder, Nixon moved to 
dismiss on grounds of absolute immunity and qualified immunity. 
The District Court (Gessell) denied the absolute immunity 
motion on the authority of Halperin v. Kissinger, No. 79-880, 
and the qualified immunity request because of disputed facts. 
Nixon appealed as to absolute immunity. Respondent then moved 
to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or in the 
alternative for summary affirmance. By order, CADC granted the 
motion to dismiss. 
CONTENTIONS: Nixon raises two issues: (1) that he is 
entitled to absolute immunity for the reasons stated by the SG 
in Halperin and (2) that the district court's order was an 
appealable collateral order. He moves for expedited 
consideration of his petition advising the Court that trial is 
scheduled in this case for June 4 and that the District Court 
has "already refused to stay proceedings below even until this 
Court announces its action with regard to [Hal~in v.] 
Kissinger." He argues that this case provides an excellent 
example of the perils of applying Butz to a President: it 
arises "out of the kind of activities that confronts a 
President daily ... and demonstrates that mistaken judgments on 
what may seem a trivial matter -- indeed, an internal executive 
( 
o..../ 
branch personnel dispute -- can later threaten a President's 
personal estate." Finally, he asserts, correctly, that the 
decision on appealability is directly contrary to Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 79-1120 (CA 3}, and in tension with g~l§toski v. 
Meanor--- u.s. --- (1979}. 
RESPONSE: The response argues that CADC correctly decided 
the appealability question and that in any event the petition 
should be denied because: ( 1} But~. is controlling; ( 2} even if 
the President is absolutely immune on the constituional issues, 
the statutory claims will go to trial; and (3} this motion is 
filed solely as a delay-tactic. 
DISCUSSION: I would grant Mr. Nixon's motion for expedited 
consideration. And if H~~rin is gran~ed, I would think this 
petition should be held. 3 It is important to recognize that 
the principal issue here is appealability. CADC dismissed the 
appeal; it did not summarily affirm. CADC's decision, however, -
may have been strongly colored by Hal~in. A circuit that 
does not recognize presidential claims of absolute immunity is 
not likely to look kindly on interlocutory appeals of such 
claims. See Community Broadc9.sti!!9. v. F.c.g.~, 546 F. 2d 1022, 
1025 (D.C. Cir. 1976} (one criterion for appealibility is 
presence of "a serious and unsettled question"} . . Hence, if 
Halperin were reversed and this case remanded in its light, 
CADC might alter its ruling. This Court's decision in 
Helstoski provides strong precedent for appealability: absolute 
immunity like the speech-or-debate-clause privilege protects 
"not only from the consequences of litigation's results but 
also from the burdens of defending." 
On the immunity issue, I continue to believe that Butz 
makes this a very hard case for the President to win. 
\"'"h.e~ c. ·~ o.... 'reta ~~~e. 
Shechtman order in petn. 
3 Some argument could be made for granting this petition with 
Halperin. Nixon has private counsel in this case who may raise 
points not made by the SG; and the conduct here arguably is 
less egregious than the !lalper in wiretapping. (Though 
retaliation against a congressional witness is quite a serious 
charge.) A grant, however, would complicate matters by putting 
appeaJ.ability in issue. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 





A. ERNEST FITZGERALD, 
Respondent. 
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
RECEIVED 
"JUN 1 0 1980 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
Petitioner Richard Nixon and respondent A. Ernest 
Fitzgerald, by their undersigned counsel, jointly submit this 
statement to inform the Court concerning certain matters that 
have been the subject of erroneous news reports, which may have 
come to this Court's attention, and which concern the status of 
this case. The parties have learned that, following the 
announcement of this Court's May 19, 1980, action grapting 
the petition for writ of certiorari in Halperin v. Kissinger, 
No. 79-880, some news agencies speculated that the instant 
action had been settled. This is incorrect. The parties 
continue vigorously to dispute whether the petitioner can be 
held liable to respondent in this case, a question presented 
-2-
to this Court by 'the instant petition. The parties have 
agreed at this stage to fix the amount of payments to which 
respondent would be entitled in this case, but the amount of 
payment depends upon this Court's disposition of the instant 
petition and subsequent proceedings in the District Court. 
Therefore, the case has not been settled and is not moot. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin 
2555 M Street, N. W., Suite 500 
Washington, D. C. 20037 
(202) 293-6400 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Richard Nixon 
Peter Raven-Hansen 
Hogan & Hartson 
815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20006 
(202) 331-4500 
Counsel for Respondent 
A. Ernest Fitzgerald 
i • ~ ,, 
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.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
June 2, 1981 
79-880 Kissinger v. Halperin 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This refers to Thurgood's memorandum of May 27, 
and to what action the Court should take in this important 
case • 
We now are deadlocked 4-4 on the centra¥' issue of 
presidential immunity. Having completed his review of the 
historical evidence, Thurgood no longer would accord 
absolute immunity to a President. Nor would he hold that a 
President is immune from a Bivens-type action. 
Thurgood could "join a majority" to grant 
reargument, consolidated with Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow 
v. Fitz~erald. For the reasons indicated in my memorandum 
of May 6, I do not think reargument would serve a useful 
purpose. 
With the exception of the Nixon Tapes Case, I have 
taken part in no case that has received as careful and 
exhaustive (and exhausting!) consideration as this one. 
Between us, Byron and I have circulated, and several times 
revised and recirculated, memoranda that now total nearly 
100 printed pages in their latest versions. Historical 
research also has been thorough, with Thurgood completing 
his only recently. The careful consideration we have given 
this case was against the background of lengthy opinions by 
the DC and CADC, and thorough briefing by competent counsel. 
I think it fair to say that the only realistic 
chance of resolving the present deadlock is to have a full 
Court. Bill Rehnquist's memo of May 27 reaffirms that 
Mitchell's presence as a party in the Kissinger case is the 
only reason he has been a "bystander". Presumably, he 
therefore would be able to participate in the Fitzferald 
cases, as Mitchell is not involved in either. On he other 
hand, I assume - unless Bill advises us to the contrary -
that if we set Kissinger for reargument and also granted the 
Fitzgerald cases, Bill still would be "out" - at least with 
respect to any issue that might affect Mitchell. We 
therefore in all probability would find ourselves again 
without a full Court. Also we would have assumed the 
unnecessary burden of a reargument and the parties would 
bear the burden of the consequent delay. 
2. 
Although no course of action is without some 
negatives, I recommend that we affirm CADC by our present 
4-4 vote, and at the same time grant certiorari in the two 
Fitzgerald cases. As Mitchell no longer will be a party 
before this Court, Bill Rehnquist could sit and thereby give 
us a full Court. 
An affirmance would result, I suppose, in the 
Kissinger case being remanded to the District Court for 
trial on the basis of CADC's opinion - the reasoning of 
which has not been fully accepted either in Byron ~§ 
memorandum or mine. This is not a desirable situation, but 
there are several possibilities. The Kissinger case may not 
come to trial in the DC before we decide the Fitzgerald 
cases. If the DC case is tried to judgment, we can only 
speculate as to the outcome. Depending on the evidence, it 
could be mooted. In any event, it seems to me that we would 
be free to decide the Fitzgerald cases without regard to a 
case that no longer was pending before this Court. 
I have had my clerk, Paul Smith, review carefully 
the Fitzgerald cases to make sure that we could reach the 
merits, and that some - if not all - of the major questions 
presented in Kissinger are squarely presented. As the 
enclosed memorandum indicates, there is no serious 
procedural question - at least none for me. The issues with 
respect to the President - both absolute immunity and Bivens 
- are clearly presented. With respect to Harlow and 
Butterfield, we also could decide whether a Bivens suit lies 
against them, and the type of immunity available. The Title 
III issue is not presented, as these are not wiretapping 
cases. That issue may now be less important because the new 
1978 Act would control in future cases involving foreign 
intelligence. In any event, in Fitzgerald we should be able 





Memo re: The Fitzgerald Cases: Nos. 79-1738, and 80-945 
Background 
In 1968, Fitzgerald, a Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Air Force, testified before Congress concerning the 
cost overruns accompanying manufacture of the C5A aircraft. 
About a year later, his employment was terminated in what 
was described as a reorganization at the Department of the 
Air Force. He obtained reinstatement administratively, but 
is seeking damages in court under the First Amendment, some 
federal statutes, and D.C. common law. The Air Force 
defendants were dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds, 
but the White House defendants (Nixon, Harlow and 
Butterfield) were not. The CADC reasoned that Fitzgerald 
had no reason to know of White House involvement for several 
years, and the statute therefore was tolled . 
. . 
.. ·~ 
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The allegations made by Fitzgerald are based on 
the argument that he was terminated in retaliation for his 
testimony before Congress. He alleges that this decision 
was made in the White House itself. In addition to a First 
Amendment claim, he asserts implied rights of action under 5 
U.S.C. § 7211 (employees' right to petition Congress) and 18 
u.s.c. § 1505 (criminalizing the act of injuring a 
congressional witness), as well as two common-law tort 
claims: intentional infliction of mental dis~ess and 
intentional inteference wiht economic advantage. 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment on 
immunity grounds were denied by Judge Gesell. He rejected 
absolute immunity on the authority of the CADC opinion in 
Kissinger. He refused to grant judgment on qualified-
immunity grounds, finding disputed issues of fact. Petrs 
brought an immediate appeal to the CADC, which dismissed the 
appeal. Petrs then sought cert in this Court. 
Possible Procedural Problems 
The petitions in these cases were timely. The 
only possible procedural problem involves the appealability 
of the DC's denial of summary judgment. Petrs brought 
immediate appeals on the theory that the availability of 
absolute immunity is a collateral issue that may be appealed 
as soon as it is decided. They argue that the purpose of 






go through a trial before appealing. They point to 
Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 u.s. 500 (1979), in which the Court 
held that a Congressman may bring an immediate appeal from 
denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on Speech or 
Debate Clause grounds. The Court relied on an analogy to 
Abney v. United States, 431 u.s. 651 (1977) (immediate 
appeals of denials of double jeopardy motions) , holding that 
the immunity of the Speech or Debate Clause includes the 
right to avoid undergoing a trial. / 
Helstoski provides strong support for petitioners' 
right to appeal from the denial of their motion for summary 
judgment on grounds of absolute immunity. A Third Circuit 
decision, also being held for Kissinger, supports this view. 
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1208-09 (1979), cert. 
pending sub nom. Mitchell v. Forsyth, No. 79-1120. The CA2 
has recently denied a motion to dismiss an appeal in a 
similar situation. Clark v. United States, 624 F.2d 3, 4 
(1980). 
In dismissing the appeal, the CADC may have 
concluded that the issue of absolute immunity was 
sufficiently settled after its decision in Kissinger to 
render the appeal frivolous. But the availability of 
absolute immunity could not have been cons ide red settled, 
even in the DC Circuit, as long as Kissinger remained in 
this Court. Thus, the Court can decide that the CADC 






remand for a decision on the merits of the immunity defense, 
there would be no requirement that it do so. The CADC 
dismissed the appeal--presumably based on its view that it 
presented no substantial issue. This view could be 
corrected by this Court in the present cases. I see no 
reason why the Court could not reach the merits. 
The only other argument against granting these 
cases would be that they are at a pretrial stage, so that 
there is little factual development. But the ; claim of 
absolute immunity does not require findings of fact. The 
Court could assume the truth of Fitzgerald's allegations and 
decide the immunity question on that basis. 
Issues Presented 
These cases would present the basic issues the 
Court sought to decide in Kissinger, plus several others. 
Nixon has been sued under the Constitution, federal 
statutes, and common law. The First Amendment claim 
therefore raises the issue whether a Bivens action can be 
brought against a President. It also presents the issue of 
absolute Presidential immunity from constitutional suits. 
In addition, 
Presidential 
the Nixon case involves 
immunity from suits under the 
the scope of 
common law and 
implied under federal statutes. The last decision of this 
Court to discuss common-law immunity--Barr v. Matteo, 360 
U.S. 564 (1959)--held that federal officials performing 
4. 
.,} . .. ,, 
,t. 
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5. 
their official duties are absolutely immune from state tort 
claims. 
Harlow and Butterfield claim absolute immunity 
derivative of the President's, and thus this quest ion is 
common to one presented in Kissinger. The issue of absolute 





June 15, 1981 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
B0-9a~ Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
I•' 
In light of our discussion of the Kissinger case 
last Thursday, I will draft and send to the Justices a brief 
Per Curiam that we can approve finally at next Thursday's 
Conference. 
Meanwhile, with your approval, I am requesting Al 
Stevas to put the two Fitzgerald cases on the list for next 
Thursday. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr. Justice Stevens 










Ct-!AM BERS 0 F I 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 16, 1981 
~~~~. 
~thu..~~c: 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and 
No. 80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
If, as is quite likely, certiorari is granted in these 
two cases, it is possible that there will be different 
rulings with respect to the President and the other 
petitioners, i.e., it may be that the President will be held 
to have absolute immunity but the advisors only qualified 
immuity. Under their third question presented, the advisors 
assert that even if they are entitled to only qualified 
immunity, they should not have been sent to trial. 
I write this memorandum to indicate that I remain of 
the view expressed in the early circulations in Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), that qualified immunity in 
cases like this should turn on objective factors, rather 
than malice or bad faith, whatever these latter 
considerations may involve. If when the challenged act ion 
is taken, it did not contravene a settled law -- that is, it 
was reasonable for the official to believe that his action 
J 
was within the law -- I would hold the official immune, 
whether state or federal, absent some congressional guidance 
mandating a different result . Turning immunity on objective y 
factors would make far better sense and would go far to 
avoid needless trials and possibly inaccurate results . 
Perhaps this issue is subsumed in the third questipn in M~ 
Harlow and Butterfield's pe!:ff1on out it might be advisable q ~ 
to address the question . 
6/16/81 
79-880 KISSINGER v. HALPERIN 
PER CURIAM 
The judgment with respect to petitioners, 
Kissinger, Nixon and Mitchell is affirmed by an equally 
divided Court. With respect to petitioner Haldeman, the 
writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. 
Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case . 
.. 
PS 06/16/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: Nos. 79-1738, 80-945 (Fitzgeral 
I do not see why Justice White would find it 
necessary to frame a separate question for the parties in 
order to reach his view of the nature of qualified immunity. 
The t!;j.rd ques~n presented in No. 80-945 is whether the 3 ,...-/ 
lower courts have "in routinely requii ing a trial upon the 6J 
defense of qualified immunity, thereby vitiated the 
defense and thwarted this Court's decision in Butz v. ~~ 
Economou." Thus the issue of the nature of qualified 
~~e.~ 
immunity as applied to Harlow and Butterfield is presented. 
With respect to the issues you wish to decide, it 
is unnecessary to frame any new question with respect to 
absolute immunity. Question 1 in No. 79-1738 asks whether 
2. 
"a President is absolutely immune from civil damage 
liability for actions taken, or for failures to act, while 
President of the United States." Question 2 in No. 80-945 
asks whether "petitioners [Harlow and Butterfield], as 
senior adviers to the President of the United States, should 
be subject to the risk of trial and civil damages from a 
person claiming injury from an adverse personnel decision of 
a federal executive department." 
As you suggest, however, it might be useful to 
pose a question regarding the availability of a Bivens 
action. The Court could as~the par~ies to address whether ~ 
"a right of action for damages exists against a President of 
the United States and his senior advisers for an alleged 
violation of First Amendment rights." Perhaps you should 
press this point only if Justice White already has convinced 
the Conference to pose a question for him. 
,, 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 79-17 38 
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PS 07/17/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: Immunity Issues in Fitzgerald and Kissinger 
In Justice White's opinions in Kissinger, he 
criticized our proposed disposition with respect to Mitchell 
and Kissinger on the ground that absolute immunity for 
national security actions was "absolute" in name only. He 
argued that this immunity depended on a showing of 
subjective purpose on the part of a defendant, and thus is 
little different from a qualified immunity standard--which 
premises liability on a showing of subjective malice or 
objectively unreasonable conduct. As you remember, Justice 
Stevens had the same basic object ion to the proposed rule, 
but was unable to produce an alternate proposal that would 
offer protection for national security actions without 
2. 
immunizing officials like Kissinger and Mitchell across the 
board, regardless of the purpose of their actions. 
In his opinion, Version II, 2d draft, at 35, 
Justice White suggests that he has argued in the past for a 
purely objective standard for qualified immunity. Such a 
standard would grant immunity unless it can be said that 
conduct viola ted clearly established constitutional rights 
of which an official should have been aware. This standard 
is not the one established in Justice White's opinions in 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975), and Butz v. 
Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978). There he held that liability 
can be premised either on objective unreasonableness or on 
subjective bad faith. In your separate opinion on Wood, 420 
u.s., at 327, you also adopted a two-part test. You were 
concerned that Justice White had gone too far in requiring 
officials to be aware of "established" constitutional norms. 
But you too would have allowed liability whenever there was 
actual bad faith or unreasonable conduct. 
The attractiveness of a purely objective test is 
that it makes the immunity issue basically legal: was the 
constitutional law in this area sufficiently established to 
expect knowledge on the part of this official in these 
circumstances. Therefore it would be easier with an 
objective standard for a defendant to win summary judgment 
when faced with a frivolous claim. The same is not true 
~ when a plaintiff alleges a violation of constitutional 
. ( 
3. 
rights in an area of legal uncertainty, but alleges 
subjective bad faith. An intent to deprive someone of 
constitutional rights is hard to disprove prior to a full 
trial. Thus, an objective test might be a way to allow 
greater strictness of the part of courts faced with suits 
against officials. As you know, both the Butz opinion, 438 
u.s. at 508, and Judge Gesell's concurrence in Kissinger 
expressed the hope that courts can dismiss most such cases 
at an early stage. 
As a result, if the Court ultimately decides not 
to grant absolute immunity to the President in Fitzgerald, 
at the very least you might seek to apply an objective 
standard allowing the President to gain dismissal of cases 
involving areas of constitutional uncertainty. The only 
problem with such an approach in Fitzgerald is the potential 
conflict with our reasoning in Kissinger, as discussed 
above. As I said, we sought to apply a subjective test in 
Kissinger in deciding whether the aides possessed absolute 
immunity. Fitzgerald will not require you to repeat this 
argument, since the actions plainly do not involve national 
security. But an emphasis on objective tests in Fitzgeral~ 
might make it difficult to make such an argument in the 
future. If, on the other hand, you can win absolute 
immunity for the President in Fitzgerald, while applying 
normal qualified immunity principles to the aides, the case 
•. 
4. 
will not prevent a future decision authorizing absolute 
immunity for aides acting to protect national security. 
I'm afraid this is all the wisdom I can offer at 
this point. Perhaps the infusion of a new clerk's point of 
view will help with these intractable problems. I've 
briefed Dick, and tried to arrange the file to make it 
useful next Term. 
l·: 
August 24, 1981 
Subject: Fitzgerald Cases 
Dear Chief, 
As you will remember, th~se two cases present most 
of the immunity issues that were before us in Rissinger. 
When we granted them in ~une, I believe we planned 
on having them set in October so that there would be a chance 
to decide them before the Kissinger case is tried by the 
District Court. 
To avoid another 4/4 spl~t, it is essential that 
we have a full Court. I understand that Judge O'Connor's 
confirmation hearing commences about September 9. If she is 
confirmed promptly, as I would expect, she should be ready 
to participate in the October cases. 
However, in view of the ~omplexity of the issues 
(the memos that Byron and I circulated totalled almost 100 
pages ! ), it may be desirable to defer the Fitzgerald cases 
until November. This would assure that Judge O'Connor has 
an opportunity to prepare herself. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 




TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Dick Fallon 
DATE: November 25, 1981 
RE: Nos. 79-1738 and 80-945, Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald 
Question Presented 
The main question in this case involves the scope of a 
President's immunity from a private suit for damages arising 
from his actions as President of the United States. The 
immunity of presidential aides is also in issue. In addition, 
2. 
there are jurisdictional questions. One concerns the 
"contingent settlement" negotiated by Nixon and Fitzgerald. 
Another involves the claim that this suit for damages is barred 




The events underlying this suit occurred during the waning 
days of the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. The 
respondent Ernest Fitzgerald was at that time a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Management Systems of the Department of 
the Air Force. Late in 1968 Fitzgerald met with members of 
Senator William Proxmire' s Subcommittee for Economy in 
Government of the Joint Economic Committee. Fitzgerald 
disclosed a pattern of cost over-runs involving the C-SA 
transport aircraft. On November 13, 1968 he testified publicly 
that cost overruns on the plane could approximate $2 billion. 
At this juncture the facts become subject to dispute. For 
purposes of this Court's analysis, however, all of Fitzgerald's 
allegations should be taken as true. 
Fitzgerald claims that his testimony caused a 
deterioration in his relationship with officials of the Johnson 
Administration. Shortly after his testimony Fitzgerald 
received notice that his career civil service status--given to 
him only shortly before the date of his congressional 
testimony--was being revoked. (The Civil Service Commission 
3. 
found that the revocation constitu~ed the correction of a bona 
fide administrative error. JA 74a, 82a. Fitzgerald 
characterizes it as retaliation for his truthful testimony.) 
In addition, Fitzgerald alleges that Johnson's Air Force 
Secretary, Harold Brown, advised his successor, Robert Seamans, 
that Fitzgerald could not be trusted and should not be 
retained. 
According to Fitzgerald, Secretary Seamans had scarcely 
assumed office before he began to consider schemes to discharge 
Fitzgerald pursuant to an "office reorganization." With this 
in mind Seamans consulted White House aide Bryce Harlow in May 
and November 1969. White House aide Alexander Butterfield also 
wrote a memorandum in May 1969, in which he reported to his 
White House superior John Ehrlichman that Fitzgerald was "about 
to blow the whistle on the Navy." JA 274a. Butterfield said 7 
that he understood the matter to have been reported to the FBI. 
He apprised Ehrlichman in case other action might be 
appropriate. 
Allegedly as a result of White House hostility, 
Fitzgerald's job was abolished as part of a reorganization that 
took effect on January 5, 1970. Secretary Seamans signed the 
reorganization order on November 3, 1969, and the decision was 
announced the following day. 
Fitzgerald's firing attracted considerable publicity. In 
order to advise the President how to respond, at least one 
member of the White House staff, Clark Mollenhoff, telephoned 
Secretary Seamans to determine the basis for Fitzgerald's 
4. 
discharge. In addition, Secretary Seamans consulted with White 
House aide Bryce Harlow on November 4, the day that 
Fitzgerald's firing was announced. White House staff included 
a summary of developments in the 11 br ief ing book 11 prepared in 
anticipation of a presidential press conference scheduled for 
December 8, 1969. In the book, staffer Patrick Buchanan urged 
the President to adopt Mollenhoff's recommendation and retain 
Fitzgerald. JA 267a. When queried at the press conference, 
however, President Nixon stated only that he would look into 
the matter. (According to a subsequently released White House 
tape, the President recalled that Harlow was 11 all for canning 11 
Fitzgerald. JA 282a. Ronald Ziegler's recollection was 
different, and he so advised the President. Id.} 
White House interest in the Fitzgerald case continued at 
least through January 1970. Butterfield was delegated to 
prepare a memorandum for the press office. In addition, 
Butterfield reported privately to Haldeman, to whom he 
recommended that Fitzgerald should not be reemployed. 
Following his firing, Fitzgerald initiated an 
administrative proceeding before the Civil Service Commission 
(CSC} seeking reinstatement and backpay. He filed his claim on 
January 20, 1970. After three yea~s .of litigation, the case 
finally came up for public hearing i~ January 1973. On January 
30, 1973, Secretary Seamans testified that he had "never 
received any instruction" from the White House regarding the 
Fitzgerald matter. But Seamans refused to answer further 
questions about his communications with the White House. 
5. 
Seamans repeatedly invoked Executive Privilege. 
As a result of the publicity attending the Fitzgerald 
hearings, President Nixon was again asked about the matter at a 
press conference of January 31, 1973. The President on this 
occasion took full responsibility for the termination of 
Fitzgerald's federal employment: "I was totally aware that Mr. 
Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to resign. I 
Seamans must have been talking to someone 
had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case 
of some person down the line deciding he should go. It was a 
decision that was submitted to me, and I stick by it." JA 
185a. 
, The following day, however, the White Huse issued a 
~~ retraction of the President's statement. 
/ ~r' White House press office, the President had confused Fitzgerald 




with another civilian employee of the Defense Department. As 
reported by press secretary Ronald Ziegler, "[The President] 
indicated to me after reading the transcript of yesterday's 
press conference that he was mistaken in his reference to Mr. 
Fitzgerald and that the fact of the matter is that the 
President did not, as indicated yesterday in the press 
conference, have put before h~he decision regarding Mr. 
Fitzgerald." JA 196a. 
The Civil Service Commission issued its ruling on the 
Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. The esc found that "the 
evidence of record does not support the allegation that his 
position was abolished in retaliation for his 
... 
6. 
[Congressional] testimony. II JA 8la. But the esc also ruled 
' 
that the abolttion of Fitzgerald's job "resulted from reasons 
purely personal to" him. JA 86a-87a. It therefore violated 
the governing statute, which established that reductions in 
force should be implemented without regard to the persons 
holding the affected positions. Id. On this basis the CSC 
ordered Fitzgerald reinstated, either to his old job or an 
equivalent position, with backpay. JA 87a-88a. The -
administrative award included no provision for interest or for 
punitive damages. 
In January 1974 Fitzgerald ir:sti tuted tbe present action 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He 
sought $3.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages from 
eight Air Force and Defense Department officials and from 
Alexander Butterfield. The district court dismissed the suit 
based on the district of Columbia's three-year statute of 
limitations. 384 F. Supp. 688 (1974). The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal as to all defendants except Butterfield. 
Finding that Fitzgerald had no reason to know of Butterfield's 
involvement until 1973, the court permitted the suit against 
him to go forward. 553 F.2d 220 (1977). 
Following the remand to the District Court, Fitzgerald 
filed a second amended complaint. It was only at this late 
date in the litigation that the petitioners Nixon and Harlow 
-------------~--------~---------------------------were added as defendants. The complaint alleged generally that 
they, together with unnamed others, had conspired to retaliate 
for Butterfield's testimony on the C-5A transport plane. The 
{p 
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complaint as~ eight causes of actio@ arising under the 
constitution~ederal statutes, and the common law of the 
District of Columbia. Of these, only thr'ee remain. One is 
based on the First Amendment; one on 18 u.s.c. § 1505, a 
criminal statute proscribing retaliation against anyone for 
testimony given to a congressional committee; and one on 5 
u.s.c. § 7211, which provides that the right of employees to 
furnish information to Congress "may not be interfered with or 
denied." 
Upon Richard Nixon's being named as a defendant, the 
Justice Department moved on his behalf to dismiss the complaint 
on the ground that he was entitled to absolute immunity from 
civil liability for the actions alleged. Judge Gesell 
initially denied the motion based on the state of the record. 
After extensive discoveryq~in denied a motion to dismiss. 
~------------
The Court of Appeals had by then rendered its decision in 
Halperin v. Kissinger, which found that the President did not 
enjoy absolute immunity from suits for civil damages. The 
various defendants in the action sought to appeal the denial of 
their immunity claims to the Court of Appeals. They claimed 
the right to do so pursuant to the collateral order doctrice. 
But the court of appeals summarily dismissed the appeal, 
apparently on the basis of Halperin v. Kissinger. 
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Contingently, Ni~agr~ __ t_:>_P~~~~oo if _!wo 
conditions were satisfied: (a) if this court should grant the 
pending petition for cert and (b) if it should give a decision 
that would result in the District Court's dismissal of the case 
against Nixon "without additional adjudication of the facts, 
other than upon the record as i t presently stands." On June ?? 
10, 1980, the parties filed a "Joint Statement" in this Court. 
The Statement asserted that "The parties have agreed at this 
stage to fix the amount of payments to which respondent would 
be entitled in this case, but the amount of payments depends 
upon this Court's disposition of the instant petition and 
subsequent proceedings in the District Court. Therefore the 
case has not been settled and is not moot." 
The Court granted the petition on June 22, 1981. Shortly 
thereafter Morton Halperin filed papers seeking to intervene. 
Calling attention to the contingent settlement agreement, he 
alleged that the parties could not be trusted to contest the 
issues with all appropriate vigor. This Court denied the 
motion. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
are three possible jurisdictional barriers to a 
of this case on the merits: (a) the possibility that 
and Fitzgerald has "mooted" the 
controversy between them or otherwise deprived them of the 
"concrete adversity" needed for them to invoke the jurisdiction 
of this Court; (b) the claim of petitioners Harlow and 
; . 
9. 
Butterfield that Fitzgerald's administrative remedies before 
the esc were intended by Congress to be exclusive and thus '--, __ ________ 
deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear this suit; 
and (c) the argument that the district court's denial of 
absolute immunity is not an appealable "final order." 
Although I do not regard any as a likely bar to reaching 
merits, each deserves discussion. 
A. The Settlement Agreement: Mootness Question 
As a result of the settlement agreement between Nixon and 
Fitzgerald, there will never be a trial on the merits in the 
District Court. If this Court gives a decision in favor of 
Fitzgerald, he has agreed--in return for consideration of 
$28,000--to move in the District Court for dismissal. If this 
Court gives a decision in favor of Nixon on the question of 
"absolute immunity," then again there will be no trial. 
On one view of Article III, this Court's only 
justification for deciding constitutional issues is to permit 
the adjudication of actual cases and controversies in the 
district courts • As a result of the settlement agreement, it 
can be argued that this case has ceased to be justiciable, 
because the parties have indicated that they do not wish to 
proceed to judgment in the district court--only to get an 
answer to the "absolute immunity" question, on which they have 
9 
a "bet." / -:) ~
I find the "settlement agreement" troubling, because it -------gives the appearance that the parties--who have settled their 
main financial dispute--may nonetheless "buy" a decision of 
10. 
this Court. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify a 
jurisdictional doctrine under which dismissal would be 
required. 
Mootness. The case is not moot. Both parties retain a 
financial stake in the outcome; and their interests continue to 
be adverse. It does not matter, I think, that there will be no 
trial in the district court. There would similarly be no trial 
in cases in which a purely legal issue was presented to this 
Court in a suit for a declaratory judgment--e.g., a case 
turning solely on the constitutionality of a state statute, 
under which a crimina! prosecution was threatened. If this 
Court upholds the statute, the declaratory judgment issues 
without further trial. If the Court voids the statute, there 
will still be no further trial. In addition, the so-called 
"bet" in this case has not entirely replaced an interest in 
judicial resolution. It is obvious that both parties plan to 
return to the district court for the entry of a judgment, 
regardless of this Court's decision. 
way to assess the mootness argument is to compare this 
[ 
One 
case to one in which the parties have bought "insurance" 
against an adverse judgment. Assume there were no agreement 
between Nixon and Fitzgerald, but that both sought to buy 
insurance in a private market. Nixon pays a private insurer 
$142,000, in return for which the insurer agrees to pay any 
judgment against him, less $28,000--i.e., Nixon would pay no 
more money if he won in this Court, and could pay no more than 
$28,000 if he lost. This is exactly where he stands under the 
11. 
present contract. It is also possible to imagine Fitzgerald, 
through a private "insurance" of his financial interest in the 
outcome of the suit, getting into the same position in which he 
now stands. A contract of this kind--which resembles the sale 
of an interest in litigation--might offend public policy in 
some circumstances. But I would not think always. This is one 
way to analyze a plaintiff's agreement to pay a lawyer a 
"contingent fee." 
Finally, I am told that private litigants not infrequently 
make "contingent settlement" agreements similar to that 
negotiated here. In private litigation, I am told (by another 
clerk), the parties sometimes agree to settle, with the amount 
of liability to depend on the district court's ruling on a 
particular pretrial motion--a discovery motion for example. It 
is easy to imagine cases in which the scope of permissible 
discovery would determine the settlement value of a claim. And 
it is hard to imagine a public policy against promoting 
settlements in such cases. 
~ I am at 
~ ~_.vi~_Jther the 
~ 'v~~itigation. 
a loss, however, to know how to investigate 
~ 
use of "contingent settlements" in private 
If I discover anything, I shall inform you. 
Feigned and Collusive Cases 
This Court has consistently refused to hear cases in which 
the parties, although formally independent, are cooperating to 
achieve the same result, e.g., Lord v. Veazie, 49 u.s. 251 
(1850) (sale and suit on contract arranged in order to procure 
judgment on navigation rights on public river), and where the 
12. 
interests of the parties, though formally adverse, are not 
adverse in fact, e.g., South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. 
Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892) (pending 
appeal, ownership of both plaintiff and defendant corporations 
came into hands of same persons) . 
It is easy to distinguish the current case from cases of 
this kind. Nixon and Fitzgerald have adverse legal interests 
cognizable in a federal court--i.e., their interests in a 
resolution of the immunity question, which may be crucial to 
----------~---------------------the outcome of a suit for damages. Their interests are adverse 
------------------~ 
in fact: each stands to gain or lose financially, depending on 
how this Court decides the case. It is true that Nixon and 
Fitzgerald have structured their relationship in a way that 
most adverse parties do not. But this alone would not seem to 
defeat justiciability. The Court has permitted parties to go 
so far as purposely to create an adversary relationship solely 
in order frame a "test case." E.g., Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 
202 (1958) (although the negro plaintiff had ridden bus only 
once, and did so in order to provoke an order to sit in the 
back, the controversy that resulted was still "real"). Here, 
there is no doubt that Nixon and Fitzgerald began in a 
concretely adverse relationship. If parties can deliberately 
create such a relationship in order to frame a justiciable 
controversy--and Evers v. Dwyer holds that they can--then, by 
the same logic, the par ties here should be able to structure 
their relationship so that it would continue to be adverse. 
Nonadversity With Regard to Granting of Cert 
13. 
For a while it seemed to me to be troublesome that, 
' 
following the conclusion of their contingent settlement 
agreement, Fitzgerald no longer held an interest adverse to 
Nixon's interest--asserted in his cert petition--in having this 
Court take the case on certiorari. Fitzgerald, though formally 
opposing a grant of cert, could collect an additional $28,000 
only if this Court both granted cert and decided the issue 
favorably to him. It is disturbing that he did not confess 
this candidly. Nonetheless, his posture would not seem 
ultimately to defeat justiciability. The rules of this Court 
do not require a party to oppose a petition for cert. And it 
is easy to imagine cases--e.g., cases involving a split among 
the Circuits--in which both parties would be eager for this 
Court to resolve the split. Thus, from Fitzgerald's side, lack 
of adversity would not seem to be troublesome. 
Nixon's stake in the cert petition is less easy to fit 
into a traditional legal category. Following his settlement 
agreement with Fitzgerald, in a financial sense Nixon no longer 
stood to gain anything if the Court took the case~ under no 
circumstances would Fitzgerald be required to pay Nixon 
anything. On the other hand, a grant of cert put Nixon in a 
position where he could lose up to $28,000. Yet he was the 
petitioner. 
After he entered the settlement agreement, I do not think 
that Nixon had a legally cognizable interest, of the kind 
needed to support "standing" to bring a suit, in having this 
Court grant certiorari. His financial interest lay in 
14. 
dismissal. Any other interest was "abstract" in the sense of 
being unrelated to his conflict with Fitzgerald. But I am not 
sure that this matters. At every stage of judicial decision--
from decision in the district court through decision by this 
Court--there would be concrete adversity between the parties. 
It is adversity at these stages that is needed to frame issues 
in a proper light for judicial resolution. 
Integrity of the Judicial Process 
As the commentators have often noted, it is hard to 
reconcile all of this Court's justiciability decisions. 
Curiously, the decisions most difficult to fathom are several 
of those in which the Court has denied justiciability. Of the 
seeming anomalies, two seem to me to require some passing 
mention. They are Muskrat v.' United States, 219 u.s. 346 
(1911) and United States v. Johnson, 319 u.s. 302 (1943). 
£uskrat involved .· ~ dispute over entitlement to share in 
money and lands due to the Cherokee Nation. By a legislative 
act of 1906, Congress expanded the class of those entitled to 
claim as Cherokees. By legislative act of 1907, Congress then 
conferred federal jurisdiction to hear a suit by those 
Cherokees disadvantaged by the 1906 act, by which they were 
required to divide their settlement into more, smaller shares. 
Muskrat sued under the 1907 jurisdictional act. Naming the 
United States as defendant, he argued that the 1906 act was 
unconstitutional because it deprived him of a property interest 
without just compensation. This Court held there was no 
Article III jurisdiction, on the ground that Congress had 
15. 
effectively asked the Court to render an advisory opinion. 
In the other case, United States v. Johnson, the Court 
dismissed a suit in which the plaintiff was not in fact 
adverse. Though the plaintiff did have an actionable claim 
that the rent he was forced to pay rent in excess of the limit 
imposed by a federal rent control statute, the plaintiff was in 
fact paid to bring the suit by the defendant in the action, who 
wanted to litigate the constitutionality of the federal 
statute. The Court explained that "Such a suit is collusive 
because it is not in any real sense adversary. It does not 
assume the 'honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' 
to be adjudicated--a safeguard essential to the integrity of 
the judicial process, and one which we have held to be 
indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions by 
this Court." This was held to be so even though the United 
States had intervened and stood prepared to defend the 
constitutionality of the challenged statute. With the 
government in the case, adversar iness was patent. Nor could 
there be any question of the adequacy of the representation. 
It is easy to cite cases in conflict with both Muskrat and 
) 
United States v. Johnson. 
on this case. But both 
And neither of course bears directly 
can be best explained, I think, by 
reference to this Court's concern to maintain the integrity of 
,; 
judicial form. Both cases involved justiciable "issues," if ----- ("'" 
they had been framed by parties to a "real" lawsuit. And there 
was adversary representation in both. But litigants in both--
the United States in Muskrat and the collusive private 
16. 
plaintiffs in Johnson--had conspicuously asked the Court to 
decide questions merely because they wanted them answered. 
Though an appropriately adversary posture was developed, that 
adversity bore insufficient resemblance to the kind of real-
world adversity that courts exist to resolve. It smacked of 
manipulation. 
It is hard to extract a legal principle. But I think the 
Court should be bothered about what Nixon and Fitzgerald have 
done, for essentially the same reasons that I think troubled 
the Court in Muskrat and in United States v. Johnson. If it 
decides to reach the merits--as I have no doubt that it can--! 
think that there may still be an unfortunate devaluation of the 
integrity of judicial form. If so, this cost should be faced. 
B. Allegedly Exclusive Administrative Remedies 
The petitioners Harlow and Butterfield invite this Court 
to avoid the immunity question by ruling that Fitzgerald has no 
federal cause of action. 
clear that this issue need not bar 




"cause of action" question itself need not be reached, as it 
- - -----was not among those raised in the / cert petition. This case is 
~ '"' I under the "collateral order" doctrine for a decision of 
v-Y V"" J th~ t! .!!s!!.. The "cause of action" question can still 
~ ~ be raised following a final judgment. 
~ pAY~ Nor does Fitzgerald's pursuit of administrative remedies--
/)!- r :::: :::::;n :a:n: imb::::a:e:: ::g t::r ec ~:~~ 1::: v ~:: i::::i:: ~:::~ 
-~ j);v 
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Where an agency possesses "primary jurisdiction" over the 
subject matter of a dispute, a plaintiff must ordinarily take 
his grievance there in the first instance. The Court has 
enforced this rule even in cases where the administrative 
agency can give only partial relief. See, e.g. , Far East 
Conference v. United States, 342 u.s. 570 {1952). Resort to a 
judicial forum is subsequently barred only when Congress 
intended an alternative remedy to be exclusive. See New York 
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 u.s. 54, 66 {1980). 
In this context it seems clear that Congress intended to 
impose no special limits on remedies that would otherwise be 
' ----- ~---------------------------------------available. {This is not, of course, to say that Congress 
---------affirmatively intended that judicial relief would be available. 
See infra.) Fitzgerald was a member of the unclassified civil 
service. He was able to challenge his dismissal only because 
of his veterans' status: Congress has provided veterans with 
this special benefit. Thus, if Fitzgerald were not a veteran, 
he would have had no administrative relief whatsoever. The 
question thus becomes: Did Congress, in giving veterans a 
special right to administrative relief before the esc' intend 
to preempt a cause of action for damages that would otherwise 
exist under federal statutes or the Constitution? Without 
doing extensive research in the legislative history, the 
question answers itself. Congress intended to favor veterans, 
not to deprive them of a benefit that they would otherwise have 
enjoyed. 
But would Fitzgerald, otherwise, have had a cause of 
18. 
action for damages? Although it need not be reached, I point 
' 
to this questibn now, for the following reason. In last year's 
draft opinions in Halperin v. Kissinger, your "second version" 
would have held that Halperin had no Bivens claim against the 
President, due to the "special factors" attaching to the 
President's constitutional status. In this case, by contrast, 
Fitzgerald claims three causes of action: two "implied" rights 
._____ --
.,_ 
under federal statutes as well as a Bivens action under the 
It is in many ways attractive to deal with 
~~ ,~ the immunity issue on Bivens grounds: no cause of action 
~ 1 :::::stw
0
:h1: P:::~:en:~isein u:;::s c:::· :::re:era~s:hehe::u:~:: 
First Amendment. 
l ""/'? Fitzgerald had no cause of act ion under either of the federal 
~~ s~atutes. It seems to me entirely plausible to argue that he 
~~~uld not. In light of the decision in the recent implication 
~ ~ case involving the CFTC, however, it seems doubtful that this 
~--~~would be a winning argument. 
;v<P ~ I shall return to this issue in the discussion •on the 
~ ~merits." 
Although 
c. Appealable Collateral Order (~) 
a question is raised, I think the objection is 
Immunity "was designed to protect [officials] not 
?:t 
.,~~ frivolous. 
• ~-- only from the consequences of litigation's results, but also 
~ ~ :::m 0~:~ :::~e:0:f ~:~:~~in;u::;~se~~=:~~w::~s:~s::s:~a::~n::: 
t-v: (J;.P'' u.s. 82, 85 (1967). In order to protect the interests that 
~v immunity serves, this Court has at least twice allowed 
' . 
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interlocutory appeals of immunity defenses under the Cohen 
"collateral order" doctrine. Helstoski, supra {denial of claim 
of immunity under Speech and Debate Clause) ; Abney v. United 
States, 431 u.s. 651 {1977) {denial of immunity claimed under 
double jeopardy clause). Before the D.C. Circuit's decision in 
this case, all courts of appeals to consider the issue had 
agreed: denials of claims of executive immunity are similarly 
appealable. Although the Court of Appeals did not explain its 
summary denial in this case, it seems most reasonable to think 
that there was no colorably appealable issue under the law of 
the Circuit, established by Kissinger v. Halper in, 606 F. 2d 
1192 {CADC 1979). 
III. MERITS: CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
I do not think that the parties add much to the arguments 
exhaustively rehearsed in Kissinger v. Halperin. As I 
understand the cases, there are two main differences, both 
probably more relevant to the arguments developed by Justice 
~White than to those presented in your circulated drafts. 
tflA--~ ~' there is no federal statute, involved here, that 
~· ~ directly creates a cause of action arguably enforceable against 
~~ the Pres1'dent.  Fitzgerald's cause of action, if any, arises by 
~~-/'~~implication from one of two narrower statutes or from the 
~~· Constitution itself. Your "absolute immunity" position permits 
11; r1_ ~ /~ y
1
. onufertroedbyupnadsesr the question whether a cause of action can be 
~-- either of those statutes. The cert petitions 
presented no "cause of action" question; this Court can decide 
the immunity question without reaching it. 
20. 
I am uncertain, however, what approach Justice White 
might take. There seem to be two lines open t~ him.~, in 
order to "deconstitutionalize" the issue, Justice White might ~ 
 Jb ~ argue (a) that a cause of action can be inferred under one or 
fJv fJ.; both of those statutes; (b) that the relief available is so 
thorough as to make a decision on the Bivens claim unnecessary; 
and (c) that no "judge-made" immunity is needed under the ?2 
statutes. ~ he could take just the opposite 
approach: He could argue that Fitzgerald simply lacks a cause 
' - -
of action an~ that no immunity issue is therefore presented. 
Accordingly--if my analysis is correct--you might find it 
necessary, in order to show that Justice White must treat 
immunity as a constitutional issue under the First Amendment 
cause of action, to argue that no cause of action can be 
inferred under the statutes. (You need not do so to reach the 
immunity issue as presented by the parties--only if you think 
it expedient to attack the "diversionary" approach adopted last 
year by Justice White.) Again, depending on Justice White's 
approach, you might not. Unfortunately, the parties devote 
little space or energy to analysis of the statutory basis for 
Fitzgerald's claimed cause of action. 
As the briefs are not very helpful, I summarize their 
arguments only briefly. 
A. Arguments of the Petitioners 
1. Arguments of the Petitioner Nixon 
In essence Nixon advances three arguments. First, he 
argues that the President has historically been recognized as 
21. 
immune from civil liability. (The purpose of this argument is 
to respond to the guidelines of Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 
508 (1978): "In each case we have undertaken 'a considered 
inquiry into the immunity historically afforded the relevant 
official at common law and the interests behind it.'") As 
evidence he cites historical practice: For nearly 200 years, 
suits against the President were "exceedingly rare." Brief at 
22. The Federalist Papers and the debates at the 
Constitutional Convention suggest that impeachment was intended 
as an exclusive remedy. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, 
spoke explicitly of the President's "official inviolability." 
Second, a recognition of absolute Presidential Immunity is 
"essential for the conduct of the public business." The 
President is an obvious target for suits by dissatisfied 
citizens and public employees. The costs of such lawsuits--in 
time as well as money--would place an unacceptable drain on the 
presidential office. Discovery is especially burdensome. 
Against these costs must be weighed the largely inconsequential 
benefits of allowing the President to be sued for damages. 
Damages liability adds little to the deterrent effects of 
impeachment and criminal liability. An array of administrative 
and judicial remedies exists under Civil Service statutes and 
the Federal Tort Claims Act. These provide adequate 
compensation to victims of unlawful action. In this regard, it 
must be recognized that 
" ,\ ~~ ti
0
nadequate to its purpose. 
'-~ frivolous pleadings, and 
qualified immunity has proved 
It constructs no effective barrier 
it permits ruinous discovery. 
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Third, absolute immunity is necessary to protect the 
integrity of the executive branch. The possibility of civil 
discovery threatens the confidentiality of presidential 
communications. As this Court has recognized in cases 
implicating the Speech or Debate Clause, "judicial oversight" 
would "realistically threaten to control" the conduct of 
officials of a coordinate branch. Gravel v. United States, 408 
U.S. 606, 617 (1972); see United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 
477, 491 (1979) (purpose of privilege is to "preserve the 
constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent 
branches of government) . 
2. Defendants Harlow and Butterfield 
These defendants offer the argument that Fitzgerald has no 
cause of action, and that the Court should decide the case on 
this basis. Fitzgerald seeks to imply a cause of action under 
two federal statutes and the Constitution. 
(a) The First Federal Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7211. This is 
a section of the ~~ which provides that "The 
right of employees, individually or collectively, to 
furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a 
committee of Member thereof, may not be interfered with or 
denied." It expressly provides no right of action. The 
petitioners advance a variety of reasons why there can be no 
implied action under this provision. First, this court 
established in Davis v. Passman, 442 u.S. 279 (1979) , that 
statutory causes of action would be implied less readily than 
rights to sue under the Constitution. Second, under a statute, 
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the dominant question concerns congressional intent. See Texas 
Industries v. Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. __ , __ {1981). 
Here, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress 
did intend to create a right of action. Finally, Congress's 
provision of a panoply of alternative remedies, available 
through the Civil Service Commission, suggests that it did not 
intend a judicial remedy. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 u.s. 11, 19-21 {1979). 
{b) The Second Federal Statute, 18 u.s.c. § 1505. This is 
a criminal statute, which provides penal ties for interfering 
with witnesses before congressional committees and goverment 
agencies. This Court has been reluctant to imply rights of 
action from criminal statutes. Here, Fitzgerald is not even a 
member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted. Section 1505 was designed to protect the legislative 
process, not to benefit witnesses. Cf. Odell v. Humbel Oil & 
Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 {CA 10), cert denied, 345 U.S. 941 
{1953) {plaintiffs suing for employment discharge allegedly 
caused by grand jury testimony not entitled to any right of 
action under a related statute, § 1503, because it was enacted 
for "protection of the public" rather than for the benefit of 
plaintiffs). 
{c) Bivens Action Under the First Amendment. As this 
Court recently reaffirmed in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 
{1980), a Bivens action "may be defeated in a particular case 
when defendants demonstrate 'special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.'" 
... • ... 
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In this case at least three such ~pecial factors are present. 
First, there is the special status of the defendants: the 
President of the United States and his personal advisers. 
Second, as the Fifth Circuit recently recognized in Bush v. 
Lucas, 64 7 F. 2d S 7 3, S76 (CAS 1981) , affirming on remand S98 
F.2d 9S8 (CAS 1979), the "unique relationship between the 
Federal Government and its civil service employees is a special 
consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens 
remedy," because the federal government should be accorded the 
"widest latitude" in administering its internal affairs. This 
Court has recognized repeatedly that the role of the Government 
as an employer toward its employees is fundamentally different 
from its role as sovereign over private citizens generally. 
E.g., Sampson 
/ 
v. Murray, 41S u.s. 61, 83 (1974) ~ Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 u.s. 134, 168 (Powell, J., 
concurring) ("Government, as an employer, must have wide 
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and 
internal affairs"). Third, the availability of an alternative 
remedial scheme constitutes a special factor counselling 
hesitation. 
On the merits of the immunity question, petitioners argue 
that the public interest requires recognition of absolute 
immunity for the President's closest aides. "Again and again 
the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be 
founded on a mistake in the face of which an official may later 
find himself hard put to satisfy a jury of his good faith." 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d S79, S81 (CA 2 1949), cert denied, 
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339 u.s. 949 (1950). This insight is confirmed by experience, 
which has shown that qualified immunity is inadequate to serve 
its protective purposes. Suits against presidential aides 
result in discovery of documents requiring confidentiality. 
If this Court is unwilling to recognize the absolute 
immunity of presidential aides, it should at least adopt an 
application of the immunity doctrine that better conduces to 
summary disposition of frivolous suits. One possibility was 
ably stated in Judge Gesell's concurring opinion in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, supra, 606 F. 2d at 1215: "[A] plaintiff should be 
required to make a stronger showing on the immunity question 
before being permitted to proceed to trial. I would hold that 
the plaintiff must establish after the completion of discovery 
and before trial commences, not merely the existence of a 
genuine dispute as to some material issue of fact but also, by 
the preponderance of the evidence or through clear and 
convincing evidence, that the official failed to act with 
subjective or objective good faith." 
Finally, petitioners argue that their actions concerning 
Fitzgerald all occurred "within the outer perimeters of their 
line of duty." Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s. 564, 575 (1959). 
Accordingly, they are entitled to claim the full immunity 
attaching to their offices. 
C. Arguments of the Respondent Fitzgerald 
Fitzgerald argues that there is neither a constitutional 
nor a judicial basis adequate to support absolute immunity. 
The Constitution provides Congress with the Speech or Debate 
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Clause, but gives no similar shield to the executive branch. 
The impeachment remedy redresses injuries done to the body 
politic itself. It was not intended as a substitute for civil 
remedies. Thus, when Thomas Jefferson was sued for a trespass 
allegedly occurring while he was President, he invoked a plea 
much more like qualified that like absolute immunity. He 
claimed that the act was "done under a law of congress, and in 
his character of president of the United States, without 
malice." The suit was ultimately dismissed, not because of 
immunity, but because it was brought in the wrong district. 
_L_i_v_i_n.....,g'-s_t_o_n __ v_. _J_e_f_f_e_r_s_o_n_, 15 F . Cas • 6 6 0 ( CCD V a • 1811) (No • 
8,411). 
The modern immunity cases clearly establish that "rank" is 
irrelevant to "immunity." Immunity attaches only to the 
functions for which it is necessary--the prosecutorial and 
judicial functions. 
And the claim to "derivative immunity," which is asserted 
by Harlow and Butterfield, is both bizarre and "ahistorical." 
It would hold "that a Henry Kissinger of a James Schlesinger 
enjoys an absolute immunity while serving in the White House, 
but forfeits this immunity when he assumes the greater 
responsibilities of a Cabinet office." 
Absolute immunity is not needed to protect the performance 
of the presidential office. The White House lawn is not 
swarming with process servers. In any event, Nixon is a 
former, not a sitting, President. If any limitation were 
needed, a limitation of suits against incumbent Presidents 
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would suffice. Yet the courts have not thought this necessary 
with regard to injunctive remedies. See, e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 (1952}. 
Nixon argues that absolute immunity is essential to 
preserve the separation of powers and prevent judicial review 
of presidential motives, thought processes, and communications. 
But this is essentially the same argument twice before 
presented and twice before rejected in Nixon v. Administrator 
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977}, and United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638, 707 (1974}. Moreover, civil 
damage suits--especially after a President has completed his 
term of office--are surely far less intrusive than judicial 
orders commanding of restraining executive action. 
Finally, although he asserts that the "implication" 
question is not properly before the Court, Fitzgerald contends 
that he does in fact have an implied cause of action under two 
federal statutes and under the Constitution. 
(a} First Statutory Basis, 5 u.s.c. § 7211. This statute 
creates rights for the benefit of federal employees, a clearly 
identified class of which Fitzgerald is a member. Congress 
passed the original version in 1912. Its intent, as expressed 
then, was "to protect employees against oppression and in the 
right of free speech and the right to consult their 
Representatives." Nonetheless, Congress did not provide an 
administrative remedy at the time it enacted the provision; 
criminal sanctions were not available until 1940; and there was 
no express provision for backpay until 1948. It thus seems 
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clear that Congress meant to create a right of action in 1912, 
and there is no indication of a subsequent intent to withdraw 
that right. 
(b) The Second Statutory Basis, 18 u.s.c. § 1505. 
Concentrating mostly on the first statutory claim, Fitzgerald's 
brief makes little attempt to justify his claim under this 
criminal statute. 
(c) The Bivens Claim Under the First Amendment. 
Fitzgerald argues that no special factors counsel against a 
---------------------------------------------------Bivens remedy. Lucas v. Bush, supra, the CAS case relied on by 
the petitioners, is distinguishable. Congress had not, as 
here, expressly prohibited the conduct for which the suit was 
brought. To the extent that Bush holds personnel decisions too 
sensitive to be reviewed at all, it is simply wrong. Executive 
discretion in this area is broad, but it is not unreviewable. 
D. Briefs of Amici ~ ~ 
The amici add virtually nothing. The Solicitor General 
has filed precisely the same brief that the Government 
submitted a year ago, not even changing the cover. 
Briefs in support of the respondent have been filed by a 
collection of Members of Congress, ranging from Orrin Hatch to 
Barney Frank; by the Government Accountability Project of the 
Institute for Policy Studies; and by the Mountain States Legal 
Foundation. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The main difference between this case and last Term's 
Kissinger case is that this case involves an attempt to "imply" 
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causes of action under two federal statutes. This could ----- -
complicate the ' case in any of several ways, most of which are 
reflected in what follows. 
A. Last Term: The Powell Approaches 
Last Term in Kissinger v. Halper in you circulated two 
"versions" of an "absolute immunity" opinion. Version I 
assumed the existence of a Bivens cause of action, then held 
the President entitled to abolute immunity. This approach 
remains open on the facts of this case. The main difference is 
that the Court would probably also need to assume--although it 
would not need to hold--that a statutory cause of action also 
exists. 
Version II would have held that no Bivens action could be 
implied against the President. His constitutional stature 
would have counted as a "special factor" counseling hesitation 
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. This approach 
also remains open, but with a caveat. In order to reach the 
Bivens question, the Court would first probably need to decide 
that there was no cause of action under either of the statutes. 
It would seem very, very odd to assume the existence of causes 
of action under the statutes, then inquire whether there was a 
cause of action under the Constitution. 
B. Last Term: The White Approaches 
Justice White also circulated two versions last Term. But 
his differed less than yours. In both he began with the 
assumption that Congress had expressly created a cause of 
action against the President under Title III. His question, 
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which he then answered in the negative, was whether the 
Constitution barred the Congress from subjecting the President 
to damages liability. 
This year the question cannot be framed the same way. The 
statutory cause of action--if it exists at all--must be 
~~implied. I am not sure how Justice White may assess the 
If Congress intended to create ~~ relevance of this difference. 
1'~,~ implied cause of action, there would presumably be no 
~~./! difference. On the other hand--purely as an evidentiary 
~,A; matter--it may be more than usually significant that Congress 
failed to create a cause of action expressly. To subj~ the 
to damages liability is a serious matter. If 
~ 
~~~ngress had intended to do so, wouldn't it have said so 
-~) expressly? I do not know what Justice White would say. Much 
~ ~~ depends on how one views the President--how different he seems 
~ 7 f~from other executive officers. 
~ 1 .~ A~ the_ c3ns~itu~oEa~ level, Justice White took a narrowly 
W c;Y'~ ~~ ~j.~al" approac~ to the immu~~ssue. He argued that 
~ ~· immunity attached to the performance of functions, not the y ~;J.ffic~s of persons who performed them, and that good faith 
~ 1mmun1 ty adequately protected the wiretapping function. This 
ir' year he could take a similar approach, so defining the function 
involved here as not to require absolute immunity. 
One other possibility might be worth mentioning. Justice 
White could conceivably attempt to make the immunity issue 
~~r-disappear altogether, by denying that any cause of action 
'-.,._  exists at all. 
M~~-JYJ?W~ 
~ ~ ~II( t:U-~ 
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My guess, however, is that he will find an implied cause 
of action at least under 5 U.S.C. ~ L211, which provides that -----------------
"The right of employees, individually or collectively, to ••. 
furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a 
committee member thereof, may not be interfered with or 
denied." 
C. The Powell Approaches Compared: Applications to This Case 
To assume a cause of action, proceeding directly to the 
immunity questions, is an "all or nothing" approach--both 
constitutionally and tactically. In taking it you would need 
to hold that Congress cannot, by statute, subject the president 
to damages liability~ and that judges, in construing the 
constitution, may not do so either. This would be a very 
strong holding, which you may find attractive. There is also 
the question whether it could win a Court. 
A subsidiary approach is possible, ~t unattractive. The ----
Court could, as a matter of judicial self-restraint, uphold 
absolute immunity in actions based on the Constitution. At the 
statutory level, however, it could evade the question whether 
Congress could knowingly subject a President to damages 
liability by treating an implied cause of action as one arising 
under "federal common law." By doing so, it could claim the 
authority of cases upholding absolute immunity under the common 
law, e.g., Barr v. Matteo. This approach is unattractive, 
however, because of your views about implied rights of action--
that judges have no common law power to create them, and that 
the central inquiry concerns congressional intent. 
,. 
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Accordingly, the other plausible approach would be to 
examine the causes of action individually. The Court could do 
-----------~-------------------------~ 
this--although it did not grant cert on any "cause of action" 
question--essentially on the theory that the "immunity" 
'- ---------------------------
question necessarily includes the question: Immunity from suit 
under what constitutional provision or what statute? This 
connection is necessary if the Court is not to assume that it 
must answer the immunity question on the broadest possible 
constitutional basis--i.e., that absolute immunity is always 
available to the President, or that it never is. I am sure 
that some justices would dislike addressing the "cause of 
action" question without the benefit of a decision by the Court 
of Appeals. 1 But it should surely be considered, for several 
1There are two interconnected bases on which the Court 
could reach this question. Under Rule 2l.l(a), the Court may 
address any issue "fairly comprised" within the questions 
presented in the cert petitions. In their petition in 80-945, 
Harlow and Butterfield raised as their second question: "Whether 
petitioners, as senior advisers to the President of the United 
States, should be subjected to trial and the risk of civil 
damages from a person claiming injury from an adverse personnel 
decision of a federal executive department?" I think that this 
question can fairly be said to subsume the question whether there 
has been a cause of action stated against them. This basis is 
related to the precedent established by Justice White's opinion 
in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555, 559-60 n.6 (1978). In 
that case the Court granted cert on the question whether the 
respondent had stated a cause of action against prison officials. 
But it then treated this question as "comprising" the question 
"whether petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged 
conduct violated Navarette's constitutional rights." Id. This 
of course was in order to establish whether there was a-factual 
predicate for a decision of the case on immunity grounds; and it 
was on this immunity basis that the Court in fact decided in 
favor the petitioner. Procunier can thus be read as holding that 
the "immunity" and "cause of action" questions are so intimately 
related that a decision of one properly entails a decision of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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reasons. 
(1} With ' respect to the statutory cause of action, this 
approach would exploit the fact that the plaintiff seeks to 
imply his right to sue for damages. The immunity question 
would be hardest, I think, in a case in Congress had said 
clearly that the President would be liable in damages. Here 
P -~~~;J::~ not said this. 
7~~)-s_ gowerful in this 
As I suggested above, I think that 
context. If Congress had intended 
to make the President liable, would it not have said so? 
There are two statutes under which a cause of action could ...._, __ 
be implied. One is a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. I 
think it would be easy to reject the implication attempt under 
.._ 
this statute. The other is 5 U.S.C. § 72ll, ) which provides 
that the right to testify before Congress "may not be 
interfered with." The legislative history is obscure; I intend 
~
to do more research. Provisionally, I would have to say that 
the argument for implication is stronger under this statute. 
other. Finally, if necessary it could (correctly} be argued that 
Rule 21 is not jurisdictional, and that the Court is free to 
dispose of a case on any proper basis, especially where necessary 
to avoid large holdings of constitutional law. The Procunier 
opinion hinted at this: "In any event, our power to decide is not 
limited by the precise terms of the question presented. Blonder-
Ton ue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univeersit Foundation, 402 U.S. 
, n.6." In th1s connect1on 1t appears that the Court's 
celebrated decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 u.s. 64 
(1938}, effectively answered a question--i.e., whether prior 
decisions of the Court should be reversed--that was not presented 
in the petition. As a final resort, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 
establishes the power of this Court to review any aspect of cases 
"in the courts of appeals." 
t • 
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But there are alternative remedies. And, to repeat myself, the 
President is tne President. In his case, surely, I would think 
that unusually persuasive evidence of congressional intent 
would be required. 
A problem with this approach, at the statutory level, 
might arise from the cases of Harlow and Butterfield--with 
regard to whom the implication question might look different. 
However, based on the availability ot_ altern~tie remEt,dies, I 
...... -----
think that you would probably be comfortably in holding that no 
cause of action could fairly be implied. 
(2) Concerning the Bivens action under the Constitution, 
this approach would allow the Court to rely on "special 
factors" counselling hesitation. 
which seem to me to mesh nicely. 
the President. The~ is 
Here there would be two, 
The~ is the ~us of 
the function ,__..__,_ ...--... 
in 
-which the 
President, in this case, was acting (if at all)--that of the 
chief of personnel and organizational structure. It is 
undisputed that Fitzgerald lost his job pursuant to a 
reorganization. 
7;: .... ......... 
Structuring the government is a quintessential 
executive function. Moreover, assuming that it frequently 
results in people losing their jobs, it is one in which the 
President is peculiarly vulnerable to suit: it is also--which I 
think is crucial--one in which the fear of being sued could 
frequently deter the President from acting independently in the 
public interest. A plaintiff should not be able to arouse such 
fear through ingenious pleading that his dismissal constituted 
retaliation for First Amendment activities. 
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Again, however, the non-presidential defendants raise 
inconvenient questions. In which of their functions, if any, 
should they be entitled to absolute immunity in matters of 
personnel selection and organization of the government? I 
would be inclined to answer that, once again, the "special 
factors" defeat Bivens liability--leaving open the question 
what liability Congress could impose by statute, if it 
expressly did so. 
D. The Relevance of Peculiar Facts 
Whichever your "version" of approach, I think that the 
main question is how far to rest on the favorable facts of this 
case--how narrowly to write an opinion. As a matter of - -----------------------------------
constitutional jurisprudence, I would be inclined to put the 
matter on narrow grounds, hinting perhaps that broader grounds 
were available but need not be invoked: Congress did not 
explicitly impose liability on the President and should not be 
presumed to have done so, at least in this delicate area in 
which the President (a) is performing the crucial executive 
function of structuring the government and thereby eliminating 
employees and (b) could easily be deterred from fearless 
performance of that function by the threat of civil suits by 
fired federal employees. These considerations are equally 
powerful in assessing the question of immunity in a suit 
arising under the Constitution. 
The argument involving the sensitivity of the President's 
functions relevant to this particular case could be fashioned 
to fit the approach of either Version I or Version II. 
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Depending on the breadth of an opinion that would hold a Court, 
could be extended across a broader range of functions than I 
have suggested. Alternatively, I suppose it could be used as a 
kind of examplar to justify absolute immunity for a President 
in the exercise of all his functions. I do, however, think 
that some use should be made of it. In my view, Justice 
White's strongest argument last year was that absolute immunity 
~ ~ has traditionally attached to functions, not to officer;- and 
~ that it has been associated especially closely where fear of 
~~fiability could influence an official's decision about how to 
~i.aM behave. Imbler v. Pachtman is illustrative of both points. 
ft1/7- The more that an opinion moves to a clearly "functional" view, 
the better it accords with the tenor of the case law--and thus, 
in my view, the more powerful the legal analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I close with an apology for being somewhat unfocused. 
There are many, many directions that the Court could take. I 
have been somewhat uncertain which to pursue. 
My tentative views: 
(1) The Court has jurisdiction to hear this case, though I 
have prudential doubts--based on the appearance of 
manipulation--about whether it ought to do so. 
(2) Assuming that it exercises its jurisdiction, the Court 
is free to inquire into Fitzgerald's alleged causes of action--
the approach that it would seemingly have to take in order to 
pursue the analytical approach of last Term's Version II. 
(3) The President's functions at issue here can be 
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characterized in very favorable terms, implicating the fear 
that civil liability could deter a President from making 
personnel decisions in the public interest. The more narrowly 
the "immunity net" is cast, more the opinion comes within the 
precedential ambit of Imbler v. Pachtman and other cases in 
which absolute immunity has been upheld. 
equal benefits under the "special 
hesitation" inquiry mandated in the 
Version II approach. 
Narrowness would have 
factors counselling 
Bivens inquiry of the 
Nov. 27, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Fitzgerald: His Implied cause of Action 
1lf- 11~ g 
Fitzgerald's strongest claim to "imply" a cause of action 
arises under 5 u.s.c. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979). The section 
provides that "The right of employees, individually or 
collectively, to petition Congress or provide information to 
either House of Congress, or a committee or a Member thereof, 
shall not be interfered with or denied." 
A strong argument can be made that no private cause of 
action can be implied under this statute. 
Section 7211 was adopted in its present form as part of the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Prior to 1978, similar 
language had been included in 5 u.s.c. § 7102. Like § 7102, § 
7211 applies only to civil servants, who have the full panoply of 
civil service remedies available to them. These include 
administrative review of allegedly improper discharges, with a 
right of appeal to the courts. There is no indication on the 
face of the statute that Congress intended to create a private 
right of action. Fitzgerald admits there are no references to 
implied rights of action in the legislative history--either of 
Section 7211 or of its predecessor statutes. See Brief for 
Respondent, at 44-45. And the availability of alternative 
remedies is strong evidence that Congress did not intend to 
provide the additional remedy of civil damages. See Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 1921: Securities 
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 u.s. 412, 419 (1975). 
In addition, Congress has provided the deterrent of a criminal 
statute to protect the employee rights enumerated in the section. 
See 18 u.s.c. § 1505. Finally, in this case--unlike the Leist 
case under the Commodity Futures Trading Act--there is apparently 
no history of judicially implied rights of action. 
Upon a reading of the briefs, Fitzgerald's strongest 
argument seemed to rest on the history of the first statutory 
predecessor of § 7211, Section 6 of the Post Office 
Appropriations Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539. 
But his claim dissolves in the legislative history. As 
Fitzgerald argues, that section was enacted "to protect employees 
against oppression and in the right of free speech and the right 
to consult their Representatives." H.R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Cong., 
2d Sess. 7 (1912). This protection was thought necessary to 
override the "gag rules" that had been imposed by executive 
orders prior to that time. However, while Fitzgerald seems 
correct that Congress was concerned about the welfare of civil 
servants, there is no indication in the legislative history that 
Congress intended the section to create a private right of action 
for damages. 
Section 6 of the 1912 Act was a general provision providing 
that persons in the classified civil service could not be fired 
except for cause. It provided for at least a "paper hearing" 
within the department seeking to dismiss an employee. Beyond 
that, it required that copies of the records of dismissal cases 
should be annually reported to Congress. In the floor debate in 
the House, at least two members suggested that this congressional 
oversight--not any judicial remedy--would be the bill's principal 
protective mechanism. Representative Calder stated that 
"Supervisory officials will hesitate to trump up charges as 
all cases of removals and reductions will be submitted to 
Congress each year, and if an employee can produce satisfactory 
evidence that he has not received the protection afforded in this 
bill his case can be made the subject of a special inquiry of 
Congress so ddecides." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654. He made no reference 
to a judicial action. Representative Reilly--the only House 
member quoted by Fitzgerald--spoke to similar effect: "Men in 
official position will hesitate to trump up charges against an 
employee for the purpose of satisfying some ••. grudge, as all 
the cases of removals and reductions will be submitted to 
Congress each year .••. " 48 Cong. Rec. 4656. Thus, although the 
section was intended to protect employees, there is no indication 
that the protection was to come through an implied right of 
action. 
Indeed, in the historical context it is entirely implausible 
to think that Congress, in 1912, could have intended to create by 
mere implication a right to sue for damages from an executive 
official performing an official function. Only a relatively few 
years earlier, in 1896, this Court had held explicitly that 
executive officials were absolutely immune from civil suits 
arising from "general matters committed by law to [their] control 
or supervision." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 u.s. 483, 498 (1986). 
The other section from which Fitzgerald would infer a 
statutory cause of action is a criminal statute, 18 u.s.c. § 
1505. It was passed originally in 1940, at a time when civil 
service employees already enjoyed administrative remedies for 
improper discharge. Again there is no indication in the 
legislative history that Congress intended to create a private 
right of action. 
In sum, I think that the argument could be made that 
Fitzgerald has failed to present a statutory claim on which 
relief could be afforded. That would leave him only with his 
constitutional claim--a case in which he could not claim that 
Congress had meant to impose liability to the full extent 
permitted by the Constitution. (Justice White invoked this 
argument in discussing immunity under Title III in last year's 
Halperin case.) 
For now, however, I have no further thoughts on the relative 
desirability of this line of analysis. 
79-1738 NIXON v. FilZGERALD Argued 11/30/81 
'~(P.bl+) . . 
---~.w-f(- .~"'f~~~ 
~· 
~ s~ ~-~JJ"'<;~Ue~~ 
~~. :s-~~,4_~. 





~ 1--z:-J::;::.,w '1 ~ '!!4 f-.-~ ) 9 ?e> 




- /1 2~~ ~,LJ.~ ~~~ /~ ~~.(~~ 
~ ~fw.- )..;r_../2 ~ ~ ~ 
Ysr·· 
~~ tk.~ ~f ~ ~tst1 ~·;6e ~ 
IA~A~ bf/..- ~ ~~~\'pt ~ 
~~ .. ~4-v-TV -u<_~~ --~~~~~)~ 
~~~~~;-/~ 
h_~ t01/J&{~.f~ ~CL~ 
~). 
~h<- ~1~ 1!1r-Fw-t a#--~ .. 
7Wt4:«-{ ~ J ,, - / -. " 








~ h P~a.. ~~k.::i:.e,P-f~ · 
(4~ "-tJA){JAfi q) ~~ 
~P~.~~~~~ 
~ ~  ~~~--,'1~. 
,La JJ?s-) ~~ 
~~/~~~ 
~~I h ~~--- tA,v u-- ~ 
~~-~~4~h-r-
LAA.. ~ c!:~ .-e) 
11L-~~~kd~~ 
--
,;; ~ ~ ~_,. '-r . ~~£.-«.4A-444~./  








~-u~rttt-i.~df~ i (,., J~~~ 
rt- ~-~.a~~(.,. .. ' -~ 
 ~&tlf'--c.' 
1 fJS ~ ~~·~~~~............,~.¥ 
~,,...,_ ~ ~? (~ 
~~ ~"'~~) 
., 
Dec. 1, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Dates of the Nixon-Fitzgerald Agreement 
Yesterday we spoke about the date of the settlement 
agreement in the context of other relevant dates in the Kissinger 
and Fitzgerald cases. 
Nixon and Fitzgerald claim to have reached the agreement in 
the early hours of the morning of May 19, 1980. That is the date 
on which this Court granted the petition in No. 79-880, Kissinger 
v. Halperin. Nixon had previously filed his petition for cert on 
May 2, 1980. Cert was not granted, however, until over a year 
later, on June 22, 1981--the same date on which the Kissinger 
decision was announced. 
Nixon and Fitzgerald have made two claims about the timing 
of their actions that may or may not be crucial to the propriety 
of their behavior. 
(1) They claim to have reached their agreement before this 
Court granted Kissinger. This claim cannot be substantiated by 
the record, aside from the testimony of the parties. That 
testimony is that they reached their agreement some hours before 
the Order List was released on May 19, 1980. I am unclear that 
\ 
this question makes any difference, either practical or ethical, 
to the outcome of the case. However, if Nixon knew that 
Kissinger would be granted, he might have assumed that the 
immunity issue would almost surely be decided in that case. If 
so, he might have expected his settlement agreement with 
Fitzgerald to be dispositive, on the assumption that there would 
be no reason for this Court grant Fitzgerald as well. If he 
meant to preserve the case as a "backup" in the event of a 
Kissinger deadlock, this intent might be relevant to the claims 
that the case was "feigned" or "collusive" in the sense of being 
preserved at all only to get a decision of the immunity issue. 
(2) Nixon and Fitzgerald claim to have filed notice of their 
agreement in this Court on either June 10, 1980. Although the 
Docket Sheet kept by the Clerk fails to record any such filing, a 
search of the files--conducted since our conversation--reveals 
that the statement was in fact filed. For reasons that remain 
unclear, however, it was not circulated. It thus appears that 
the Court was not aware of it at the time it voted to grant the 
case. 
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Honorable Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk of the United States 
Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
December 2, 1981 
Re: Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald, No. 
79-1738; Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, 
No. 80-945 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
TELEX 
89-2343 
This letter is submitted to clarify a response 
which I gave on Monday, November 30, to a question from 
Justice O'Connor during oral argument in the above-referenced 
case. I had intended to offer this clarification during 
my rebuttal, but did not have a rebuttal opportunity. 
Justice O'Connor inquired whether, under the 
liability limitation agreement between Mr. Nixon and Mr. 
Fitzgerald, there would be any adjudication of the facts 
in the court below following the decision in this Court. 
My reply was that there would not be any further adjudication 
of the facts. I meant, thereby, that there would be no 
trial on the merits of the respondent's complaint irrespec-
tive of how the Court decides the case. However, the agree-
ment does contemplate further proceedings below, including 
such additional adjudication of facts and the application 
of the law to the facts as are appropriate in light of this 
Court's decision. For example, were this Court to issue an 
opinion setting forth the standard for determining whether 
a President's actions are within the outer perimeter of his 
duties, this could require the district court, on remand, 
MILLER, CASSIDY, LARROCA Be LEWIN 
Honorable Alexand~r L. Stevas 
December 2, 1981 
Page Two 
to determine either that the record as it now stands establishes 
that Mr. Nixon's actions satisfied or failed to satisfy that 
standard, or that the evidence adduced thus far is in dispute 
and that a trial is required to resolve the factual issue. 
The effect of the agreement's limitation is that any such 
further adjudication of facts must be based upon the existing 
record. In other words, if any factual issues remain out-
standing following this Court's decision, and such issues 
cannot be resolved on the current state of the voluminous 
record (thereby necessitating either additional discovery 
or a trial), Mr. Nixon's obligation to pay $28,000 ripens. 
Such payment will be accepted by the respondent in lieu of 
added liability, and the case will be dismissed. 
I am providing sufficient copies of this letter 
for distribution to the Court and request that you make that 
distribution. 
cc: John E. Nolan, Jr., Esq. 
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq. 
Rex E. Lee, Esquire 
William H. Mellor, III, Esq. 
Louis Allan Clark, Esquire 
John C. Armor, Esquire 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL ~~ ' 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Nos. 79-1738 and 80-945 ~ 
~~~+ 
Jurisdiction Over Fitzgerald's "Implied Causes of Acti~~ 
In his suits against Nixon and Harlow and Butterfield, 
Fitzgerald claims causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment. In the briefs and again in oral argument, 
the question has arisen whether the Court ought to examine the 
bases for Fitzgerald's claim to possess "implied rights of 
action." 
There are really two questions: 
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction to reach the 
"implication" question if it should, for prudential reasons, wish 
to do so? 
(2) Could the Court reach the implication consistently with 
its own rules? 
The Court's Statutory Jurisdiction 
There is no jurisdictional bar to this Court's reaching the 
implication question if it wishes to do so. Fitzgerald's counsel 
conceded this at oral argument. See Transcript at 55-56: 
QUESTION: You are not claiming we don't have jurisdiction 
[to consider the implication question]? 
MR. NOLAN: No, absolutely not. Absolutely not. 
QUESTION: And if we should entertain it, it would, would it 
not, avoid the decision of a constitutional question? ••.• If we 
decided it one way? 
MR. NOLAN: Yes. I mean, it arguably could do that. 
Mr. Nolan had no choice but to make this concession. The 
Court granted cert in this case pursuant to 28 u.s.c. ~ 
This is a jurisdictional statute, which provides for review by 
this Court of "cases"--not "questions"--in the courts of appeals. 
As a matter of self-regulation, the Court has established 
rule that it will generally limit its review to "the questions 
set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein." Rule 
2l.l(a). But the Rule "does not limit our power to decide 
important questions not raised by the parties." vBlonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313, 320 n. 6 (1971). The Court has held repeatedly that it may 
"in exceptional cases" review an issue not raised below or in the 
petition for certiorari. Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 
200; Youakim v. Miller, 425 u.s. 231, 234~ 
Among those cases the Court has considered "exceptional," 
one category consists of cases in which the Court has considered 
issues outside the petition in order to avoid decision of braod 
' constitutional issues. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 u.s. 
454, 457 (1960) (case should be decided, "if it can," on 
statutory rather than "broad consitutional basis~ under the 
circumstances it was "appropriate" to consider issues not raised 
in cert petition)~~ v. United States, 421 u.s. 542, 545 (1975) 
(Court decided statutory issue raised only in amicus briefs 
"rather than decide a constitutional question when there may be 
doubt whether there is any statutory basis for it"). 
This case falls squarely within this "exceptional" category. --------If Congress had enacted a statute specifically imposing liability 
on the President, the "immunity" question would be presented in 
the broadest constitutional terms: Does it lie within the 
constitutional power of Congress deliberately to subject the 
President to liability in a private action for damages? Here, if 
there is no statutory or First Amendment cause of action, the 
broad constitutional issue is avoided. 
Justice White has also argued that the "implication" issue 
is "quasi-jurisdictional." It is clearly established that this 
Court is always free to consider jurisdictional issues, whenever 
raised. See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 
u.s. 193, 197 ) ~Gutierez v. Waterman s.s. Co., 373 u.s. 
206, 209 (1963). Gutierez is analogous to this case in several 
ways. The question there was whether the case actually lay 
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Although "purely" jurisdictional in one sense, this was 
essentially a question whether the court could award relief under 
statute pleaded as the basis for the cause of action. This case 
involves a similar question: whether the plaintiff has stated a 
claim on which relief could be granted. 
Consistency with Court Rules 
There is also an argument that the "cause of action" 
question could be treated as "fairly comprised" within the 
questions presented in the cert petition filed by Harlow and 
Butterfield. In their petition they raised as their second 
=---------.----? 
question: "Whether petitioners, as senior advisers to the 
President of the United States, should be subjected to trial and 
civil damages from a person claiming injury from an adverse 
personnel decision of a federal executive department?" This 
question arguably subsumes the question whether there has been a 
cause of action stated against them. There is strong support in 
Justice White's Court opinion in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 
555, 559-560 n.6 (1978}. In that case the Court granted cert on 
the question whether the respondent had stated a cause of action 
against the petitioner prison officials. But the Court then 
treated this question as "comprising" the question "whether 
petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged conduct 
violated Navarette's constitutional rights." Id. This of course 
was in order to establish whether there was a factual predicate 
for deciding the case on immunity grounds--the basis on which the 
Court in fact held for the petitioners. 
Procunier can be read as holding that the "immunity" and 
"cause of action" questions are so intimately related that one 
"fairly comprises" the other. To establish whether "there is a 
cause of action," the Court must know "a cause of action against 
' 
whom"?--a question that obviously entials the question of 
immunity. Conversely, to know whether an official can be 
"subjected to trial and civil damages," it is necessary to answer 
the question, "trial and civil damages under what statute of 
constitutional provision"? On this reading of Procunier, the 
cause of action question is squarely before the Court because 




1. The Court has clear jurisdiction to address the "cause of 
action" question. 
2. A plausible argument can be made that the "cause of 
action" question is present within the meaning of Rule 2l.l(c), 
because "fairly comprised" within the second question presented 
by Harlow and Butterfield. 
3. Even if the "cause of action" question is not "fairly 
comprised" with the questions presented, it falls within an 
established category of exception to Rule 21--a category of cases 
in which the Court has entertained questions not presented in 
order to avoid unnecessary decisions of large questions of 
constitutional law. 
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No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Second Conference on this case. 
The Chief Justice Reverse 
Absolute immunity - 1st choice. 
Con f . · 12 I 14 I 8 1 
5 
Bivens is 2nd. Absolute immunity for all three. 
Justice Brennan DIG 
As to Nixon, no change (took no part in discussion) 
Justice 'White Reverse 
No Bivens cause of action in any of these cases. 
Justice Marshall Reverse 
With Byron (?) (Not with LFP) 
(not sure TM unde~stands BRW's , position) 
Justice Blackmun D 1 G 
No change (said nothing else). 
Justice Powell /?~ 
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Justice Rehnquist Reverse 
Agree Bivens question may fairly be ~ubsumed, but natat rest 
whether we should reach it. Prefer absolute immunity for all three. 
Justice Stevens Reverse 
There is jurisdiction to address Bivens and favors doing this 
for all three. Still with LFP. 
Justice O'Connor Reverse 
Will go along on implied cause of action if can be satisfied 
it is proper to reach it. 
Absolute immunity for President, but only implied immunity 
for others. 
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__ ~December 14, 1981 
No. <:19~- Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
80-94'5- ·:. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Today's Conference generally confirmed the discussion and 
votes on the above. Unlike you, I regard the issue of absolute 
immunity as the threshold question. I would not reach Bivens 
first for there is nothing to "reach," and no lawsuit at all, if 
there is absolute immunity. Before the Tort Claims Act in 1946, 
for example, a Court would not inquire into "standing" of a 
plaintiff in a suit for negligence by the government. There was 





this setting the assignment is made to 
to state that my view is irrevocble on 
I believe at least Bill Rehnquist and 
at Conference. 
you but I feel 
absolute 
Sandra stated 
I am still unable to understand why we should "duck" that 
issue when the votes ar here Byron can concur in the judgment 
on Bivens grounds. Pu your choice iS my vote or 
Byron's! Among other hi you have a mild (!) headstart, given 
the 5-6 inches of memo, chiefly compiled by you and Byron. All 
of that exploratory development has been valuable. I will at 
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79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
.! 1-*"•' (._a-~ b( ~ 
~~1-o~S~~ 
Dear Chief: ~a_., ~ 
k-~. -~t<J.~ - .. , -.,Lor 
Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached 
~~~~ 
me late yesterday. I respect, of cour~e, -yo~~~iew that 
~~~;t/~ 
absolute immunity is the threshhold question. As you say, 
if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the 
outset. It can be said with equal, if not greater, logic 




A somewhat stronger reason for going the "immunity" 
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order 
doctrine. This is the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra. 
Yet, for reasons stated by Byron, John and me, we have 
jurisdiction to reach the cause of action question 
{"Bivens") and this continues to be my preferred resolution 
of these cases. 
I state at the outset, however, that the importance of 
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal 
president - make it imperative that we endeavor to have a 
Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the judgment as 















Address~ng now what perhaps ' can be called prudential 
reasons for preferring Bivens, I cite the following: 
There could be seven votes for a Bivens resolution of 
both of these cases. You, WHR and SO'C, though preferring 
immunity, also agree with JPS and me on Bivens. Byron, 
however, will write his Bivens analysis narrowly, based 
primarily on the fact that this case involves the 
relationship of employer - employee in the government 
service. Thurgood said he would join Byron on this 
analysis. I would write Bivens broadly, as I did last 
spring, but would leave open whether a president could be 
sued for damages if the congress specifically authorized 
suit. You have agreed in our discussions that the 
likelihood of such a statute being adopted over a 
presidential veto is remote. 
4. 
In sum, , we would have seven votes for a Bivens 
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the 
judgment only. Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages 
in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case. 
Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the 
effect~-the way Nixon is writte~ That case 
presents precisely the same options: a holding of no 
implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the 
immunity issue. 
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the 
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do 
likewise in Harlow. The result would be - if the votes 
remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for 
qualified immunity only, resulting in affirmance. You and 
WHR alone would find absolute immunity. I feel bound 
generally by Scheuer and Butz, and this was the position I 
- 5. 
' 
took last Term with respect to Halderman in the Kissinger 
case. If, however, we decided Harlow on Bivens analysis 
there would be seven votes for reversal. 
Thus, if we all were to remain with our "first choice" 
votes the division in Nixon would be as follows: Three 
votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC)~ two votes for 
a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS) ~ two votes for a 
narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM)~ and WJB and HAB to DIG. 
There would be no Court opinion, but seven votes for 
reversal. If, however, John and I were to defer to your 
views, there would be a Court of five votes for reversal on 
absolute immunity. Byron has said he then would not reach 
the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on 
immunity. This would leave only five votes for the judgment 
of reversal. 
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive. A good deal 
can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's 
6. 
personal liability, for seven votes on the judgment 
' (Bivens). But we would then have a badly fractionated Court 
- a result that none of us would welcome. Indeed, we have -
in this case particularly - a strong institutional reason 
for avoiding fractionalization. I therefore am inclined 
reluctantly, and subject to talking to John, to defer to 
your view. On balance, I think it may be preferable in 
Nixon to have a Court opinion than to end up with seven 
votes for a judgment with no more than three votes for any 
single rationale. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc - Justice Stevens 
December 16, 1981 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached 
me late yesterday. I respect, of course, your view that 
absolute immunity is the threshhold question. As you say, 
if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the 
outset. It can be said with equal, if not greater, logic 
that if there is no cause of action one never reaches the 
immunity question. 
2. 
A somewhat stronger reason for going the "i~munity" 
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order 
doctrine. This is the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra. 
Yet, for reasons stated by Byron, John and me, we have 
jurisdiction to reach the cause of action question 
("Bivens") and this continues to be my preferred resolution 
of these cases. 
I state at the outset, however, that the importance of 
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal 
president - make it imperative that we endeavor to have a 
Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the judgment as 














Addressing 'now what perhaps can be called prudential 
reasons for preferring Bivens, I cite the following: 
There could be seven votes for a Bivens resolution of 
both of these cases. You, WHR and SO'C, though preferring 
immunity, also agree with JPS and me on Bivens. Byron, 
however, will write his Bivens analysis narrowly, based 
primarily on the fact that this case involves the 
relationship of employer - employee in the government 
service. Thurgood said he would join Byron on this 
analysis. I would write Bivens broadly, as I did last 
spring
1
but would leave open whether a president could be 
sued for damages if the congress specifically authorized 
suit. You have agreed in our discussions that the 
likelihood of such a statute being adopted over a 
presidential veto is remote. 
3. 
4. 
In sum, we would have seven votes for a Bivens 
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the 
judgment only. Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages 
in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case. 
Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the 
effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow. That case 
presents precisely the same options: a holding of no 
,-, 
implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the 
immunity issue. 
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Ni.xon on the 
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do 
likewise in Harlow. The result would be - if the votes 
remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for 
~~IAAJ~. 
qualified immunity only; A You and WHR alone would fi.nd 
absolute immunity. I feel bound generally by Scherer and 
Butz, and more particularly by our affirmance last Term of 
( · .. 
5. 
qualified immuni ,ty for Halderman in the Kissinger case. If, 
however, we decided Harlow on Bivens analysis there would be 
seven votes for reversal. 
~ II]l S't2'fQ.., if we all were to remain with our "first 
choice" votes the division in Nixon would be as follows: 
Three votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC): two 
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votes for a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS): two votes 
for a narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM): and WJB and HAB 
to DI~. There would be no Court opinion, but seven votes 
for reversal. If, however, John and I were to defer to your 
views, there would be a Court of five votes for reversal on 
absolute immunity. Byron has said he then would not reach 
the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on 
immunity. This would leave only five votes for the judgment 
of reversal. 
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive. A good deal 
can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's 
personal liability, for seven votes on the judgment 
~~ 
(Bivens). But we ~ have a badly fractionated Court - a 
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6. 
result that none of us would welcome. Indeed, we have - in 
this case particularly - a strong institutional reason for 
avoiding fractionalization. I therefore am inclined 
~~, 
reluctantly, and subject to talking to John, to defer to yetl-
1\ 
~J.A4.~~ 
~On balance, I think it may be . ee-s-t A to have a Court 
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opinion thanAseven votes for a judgment with no more than 
three votes for any single rationale. ~ 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc - Justice Stevens 
... 
December 16, 1981 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached 
me late yesterday. I respect, of course, your view that 
absolute immunity is the threshhold question. As you say, 
if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the 
outset. 
.)~~,~~~ 
It can be said with equa'*l:o_g;l:;C t .,. J..dHmf'u_D 
~ su~eri~le~ that if there is no cause of action one 
~~ 
~ee Ret ~ns,der the immunity question. 
2. 
A somewhat f?tronger reason for going the "immunity" 
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order 
~~e~the ""i:mmuni-t¥ i ssy.e .• This is 
the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra. Yet, for reasons 
stated by Byron, John and me, we have jurisdiction to reach 
the cause of action question ("Bivens") and f.ep ehe re&eoas~ 
of these cases. 
I state~t the outset, however, that the importance of 
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal 
~
president - make it imperative that we ntake ev-ery effort to 
"" 
have a Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the 
judgment as can be mustered. The following "chart" shows 
the votes at Monday's Conference: 
DIGG PREFER "BIVENS" PREFER IMMUNITY 
~ 
WJB BRW CJ 
HAB TM WHR 
LFP SO'C 
JPS 
' Addressing now what perhaps can be called prudential 
reasons for preferring Bivens, I cite the following: 
J--.... _- {..-·· l·:~·~~)rhere could be seven votes for a Bivens J/so1~t ion 
,., _ _......-' 
of both of these cases. You, WHR and SO'C, though 
:TP$~ >~} 




will write his Bivens analysis narrowly, based primarily ~ 
involves the relationship of employer - employee in the 
~~A2-~~'i"d7~ lie=& fer ;, 
government service~ Thurgood said rap9ateoly a~ Uonday' :zJ 
he would join Byron on this analysis. I 
~1 write Bivens broadly, eeeQn~lly as I did last spring 
~ 
but w.i-J..lA.. leave open j:.. a» r-mu-st -t.o ~e~.....Jehn' e 110~ y--' 
whether a president could be sued for damages if the 
~~' 
congress specifically 1\enaetea a Bi-vens £eJRW' a~ lt'i: n:!!t j:fioe 
preeiaeAt. You have agreed in our discussions that the 
likelihood of s~ch a statute being a~opted over a 
presidential veto is remote. 
In sum, we would have seven votes for a Bivens 
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the 
;;;r/J7fiC; 
judgment only. Nevertheless, there are ~t advantages 
in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case. 
~ Again at the prudential level, we must look also to 
the effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow~~ 
-n.,~ 
;J--""'FF:etrant~t""~e"'1rl""f~-i-i.' ,.e-Tl:-A&---.=~QII'l"t'i~ "F :i: t z EJ e r e-W- ~fie i\£1\ case presents 
precisely the same options: a holding of no implied cause 
of action (Bivens) or a resolution of ~ee~e on the 
immunity issue. 
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the 
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do 
likewise in Harlow. The result would be - if the votes 
remain as stated ~t Monday's Conference - seven for 
qualified immunity only. You and WHR alone would find 
absolute immunity. I feel bound generally by Scherer and 
Butz, and more particularly by our affirmance last Term of 
qualified immunity for Halderman in the Kissinger case. 
, ~~ ~ If, however, we decided Harlow on Biv~ysis agaiR]-
there would be~:~~ vot~for revers::;_jWhen I 
the term "prudential" in this connection, I am thinking 
ly ~ability of mustering strong majorities 
cases that ar~~ertain to attract ~ermo~s public 
'"-.., 
...... 
and scrutiny. ~lieving, as I do, that there is 
---~00::::~ ........ 
1-- ---
" e of action against any one b~ these three petitioners, 
I also would like to end the litigation ~s to all three of 
them. If we go the immunity route, Harlow 
will have to undergo a trial on remand. 
rider 
* * * 
In sum, if we all were to remain with our "first 
~d'JA--
choice" votes the division in Atfie."iTh~.s e;st dependifl'J on 
-?L 
......f.iv:e....of--\:\-S-i--n t'R.Q majo£ i ty a<Wpt~ would 1\ as 
fo2 
~ Three votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC)~ 
two votes for a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS) ~ two 
votes for a narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM) ~ and WJB and 
HAB to DIGG. There would be no Court opinion, but seven 
votes 
Joan is-that we 
~~&.e._ 
defer to your views
1
aftd Ma~A a Court of five votes for 
reversal on absolute immunity. 
~~ 
undeLBtanding js tbat jf we sh~ld do th~ Byron ~  
-0-~ 
~would not reach the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would 
n.;_ ~ ~~:;::; ~ 
dissent on immunity:J ~ p ~  
.... 
Neither of ' these "line-ups" is i~ A good deal can 
1\, 
be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's personal 
liability, for seven votes on the judgment (Bivens). But 
~s, 
~ 
we ~ have a badly fractionated Court - a 
result that none of us would welcome. Indeed, we have - in 
this case particularly - a strong institutional reason for 
avoiding fractionalization. ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~~J-4, ~/£.,__,1 ~ 




~ ~~ ~~!frv'~ 
~.e._ . .,,.,,., 0 ~, 
LFP/vde 
December 16, 1981 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached 
me late yesterday. I respect, of course, your view that 
absolute imrnunj. ty is the threshhold quest ton. As you say, 
if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the 
outset. It can be said with equal, if not greater, logic 
that if there is no cause of action one never reaches the 





A somewhat stronger reason for going the "immunity" 
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order 
doctrine. This is the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra. 
Yet, for reasons stated by Byron, John and me, we have 
jurisdiction to reach the cause of action question 
("Bivens") and this continues to be my preferred resolution 
of these cases. 
I state at the outset, however, that the importance of 
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal 
president - make it imperative that we endeavor to have a 
Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the judgment as 
can be mustered. The following "chart" shows the votes at 
Monday's Conference: 
DIGG PREFER "BIVENS" PREFER IMMUNITY 
w.JB BRl'T CJ 





' Addressing now what perhaps can be called prudentlal 
reasons for preferrinq Bivens, I cite the following: 
'T'here could be seven votes for a Bivens resolut i.on of 
both of. these cases. You, WHR and so•c, though preferring 
immunity, also agree with JPS and me on Bivens. Byron, 
however, wilt write his Bivens analysis narrowlv, based 
primarily on the fact that this case involves the 
relationship of employer. - employee in the government 
service. Thurgood said he would join Byron on this 
analysis. I would write Bivens broadly, as I did last 
spring, but would leave open whether a president could be 
sued for damages if the congress specifically authorized 
suit. You have agreed in our discussions that the 
likelihood of such a statute being adopted over a 
presidential veto ts remote. 
---------·-~--------~-- -
4. 
In sum, we would have seven votes for a Bivens 
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the 
judgment only. Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages 
in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case. 
Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the 
effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow. That case 
presents precisely the same options: a holding of no 
implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the 
immunity issue. 
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the 
I 
.' 
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do 
likewise in Harlow. The result would be - if the votes 
remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for 
qualified immunity only, resulting in affirmance. You and 
WHR alone would find absolute immunity. I feel bound 
generally by Scheuer and Butz, and this was the position I 
·• 
5. 
took last Term wtth respect to Halnerman in the Kissinger 
case. Tf, however, WP. decided ~arlow on Bivens analysis 
there would be seven votes for reversal. 
~hus, if we all were to remain with our "first choice" 
votes the division i.n ~axon would be as follows: Three 
votes f.o:r absolute immuni.ty (CJ, ~mR and SOC); two votes for 
a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS) 1 two votes for a 
narrm'l Bivens disposition (BRW, "'M): and W,lB and HAB to DIG . 
~here would he no Court opinion, but seven votes for 
reversal. If, however, John and I were to defer to your 
views, there \'lOuld be a Court of five votes for reversal on 
absolute immunity. J'yron has saic=l he then woul~ not reach 
the ~ivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on 
immunity. 'rhis \"lould leave only five votes for the judgment 
of reversal. 
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive . A good deal 
can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's 
6. 
personal liability, for seven votes on the judgment 
(Bivens). But we would then have a badly fractionated Court 
- a result that none of us would welcome. Indeed, we have -
in this case particularly - a strong institutional reason 
for avoiding fractionalization. I therefore am inclined 
reluctantly, and subject to talking to John, to defer to 
your view. On balance, I think it may be preferable in 
Nixon to have a Court opinion than to end up with seven 
votes for a judgment with no more than three vot~s for any 
single rationale . 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc - Justice Stevens 
~.~--------------~~------
4. 
In sum, w~ would have seven votes for a Bivens 
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the 
judgment only. Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages 
in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case. 
Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the 
effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow. That case 
presents precisely the same options: a holding of no 
implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the 
immunity issue. 
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the 
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do 
likewise in Harlow. The result would be - if the votes 
remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for 
qualified immunity only, resulting in affirmance. You and 
WHR alone would find absolute immunity. I feel bound 
generally by Scheuer and Butz, and m~~,~~~ 
A 
I 
~~t r~ ~~.,Lo 
· · · · /\Halderman in 
5. 
the Kissinger case. If, however, we decided Harlow on 
Bivens analysis there would be seven votes for reversal. 
Thus, if we all were to remain with our "first choice" 
votes the division in Nixon would be as follows: Three 
votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC): two votes for 
a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS): two votes for a 
narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM): and WJB and HAB to DIG. 
There would be no Court opinion, but seven votes for 
reversal. If, however, John and I were to defer to your 
views, there would be a Court of five votes for reversal on 
absolute immunity. Byron has said he then would not reach 
the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on 
immunity. This would leave only five votes for the judgment 
of reversal. 
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive. A good deal 
can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's 
lfp/ss 12/17/81 NIXONl SALLY-POW 
78-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
My understanding is that you, Bill Rehnquist and 5 
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt as to whether 
you would join a disposition of the Nixon case on the 
cause of action question {referred to, for brevity, as the 
Bivens question). You view is that we took this case in a 
"collateral issue .. context to decide the immunity 10 
question, and the three of you continue to have serious 
reservations as to whether we properly may dispose of the 
case on a ground neither assigned not submitted to us 
under the specified question, in the petition or in the 
briefs. 15 
Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case. 
Byron and Thurgood would dispose of it narrowly as a case 
in which no private cause of action could be implied, 
limiting the analysis to the context of the special 
relationship of government employment. John and I 20 
preferred to address the cause of action question broadly, 
2. 
holding as my Version II memorandum of last spring was 
written, on the ground that at least in the absence of 
specific congressional authorization no cause of action 
could be implied against the President of the United 25 
States. 
Thus, it is evident that there may be no Court 
opinion if each of us remains with our first preference 
votes. As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a 
Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of 30 
you, Bill Rehqnuist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion 
holding that a President has absolute immunity from damage 
suit liability for the reasons stated at some length in my 
Version I memorandum last spring. John and you both 
joined that memorandum. I have discussed the sitaution 35 
with John, and subject to a possible qualification as to a 
reservation that would not prevent a Court opinion, John 
also is willing to decide the Nixon case on absolute 
immunity. 
I am not entirely at rest as to how to write the 40 
Harlow/Butterfield case. The private cause of action 
issue, though not a question specifically presented in the 
3. 
petition, was stated as a question in their brief and was 
argued. Moreover, if we reach the immunity issue in the 
Harlow/Butterfield case, the decision would be for 45 
qualified immunity only. As there is a Court to dispose 
of this case finally on the absence of an implied cause of 
action, it would be unfortunate to remand it for trial on 
implied immunity. 
but there is certainly greater reason here than in Nixon 50 





"-----· ... - 78-1738 
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My understanding is that you, Bill ~~nq~~ s}_~ 
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt a~~r you 
would join a disposition of the Nixon case o~ -;-i'~~  
~,Lp cJt . ~ rM... 
action question (sometimes referred to, for ~~~:1; ,~;~: ' 
Bivens question). Your view is that we took~~ 
"collateral issue" context to decide the immunity question, 
and the three of you continue to have serious reservations 
as to whether we properly may dispose of the case on a 
ground neither assigned nor submitted to us under the 
specified question, in the petition or in the briefs. 
Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case. 
Byron and Thurgood would dispose of it narrowly as a case in 
which no private cause of action could be implied, limiting 
the analysis to the special relationship of government 
employment. John and I prefer to address the cause of 
action question and would do so broadly along the lines of 
my Version II memorandum of last spring. 
Thus, it is evident that a Court opinion is not 
assured if each of us remains with our first preference 
votes. As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a 
Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of 
you, Bill Rehqnuist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion 
'. ' 
holding that a President has absolute immunity from damage 
suit liability £or the reasons stated in my Version I 
memorandum last spring. John and you both joined that 
memorandum. 
2. 
I have discussed the situation with John, and he 
fully shares the view that a Court opinion in a case 
involving the liability of a President is important 
institutionally. Subject to a possible reservation that 
would not prevent a Court opinion, John therefore is willing 
to decide the Nixon case on absolute immunity. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Chief: 
~U:Jtttntt <g01Ui of tlrt 'Jiitti:i:t~ ~hrlts 
j\tra:~Jringhm. ~. <g. ' 2obln·~ 
December 17, 1981 
78-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
My understanding is that you, Bill Rehnquist and 
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt as to whether you 
would join a disposition of the Nixon case on the cause of 
action question (sometimes referred to, for brevity, as the 
Bivens question). Your view is that we took this case in a 
"collateral issue" context to decide the immunity question, 
and ·the three of you continue to have serious reservations 
as to whether we properly may dispose of the case on a 
ground neither assigned nor submitted to us under the 
specified question, in the petition or in the briefs. 
Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case. 
Byron and Thurgood would dispose of it narrowly as a case in 
which no private cause of action could be implied, limiting 
the analysis to the special relationship of government 
employment. John and I prefer to address the cause of 
action question and would do so broadly along the lines of 
my Version II memorandum of last spring. 
Thus, it is evident that a Court opinion is not 
assured if each of us remains with our first preference 
votes. As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a 
Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of 
you, Bill Rehnquist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion 
holding that a President has absolute immunity from damage 
suit liability for the reasons stated in my Version I 
memorandum last spring. John and you both joined that 
memorandum. 
I have discussed the situation with John, and he 
fully shares the view that a Court opinion in a case 
involving the liability of a President is important 
institutionally. John therefore is willing to decide the 
Nixon case on absolute immunity. John always has had some 
question as to the effect of an Act of Congress that 
,I 
2 0 
expressly provided a damage remedy against a President - as 
unlikely as such action may be. He may "reserve" on this 
question in a way that would not prevent a Court opinion. 
With five votes now for an absolute immunity 
resolution of this case - the question submitted on the 
collateral order - I will draft an opinion this basis. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
December 17, 1981 
78-1738 Mixon v. Fitzgerald 
near Chief: 
My understand! ng is that. you, Bill Rehnquist and 
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt as to whether you 
would ioin a disposition of the Nixon case on the cause of 
action question (sometimes referr.~d to, for hr~vitv, as the 
Bivens question). Your view is that we took this case in a 
"collateral i!=;sue .. context to decide the immuni. ty question, 
and the three of you continue to have serious reservations 
as to whether we Properly may dispose of the caqe on a 
ground neither assigned nor submitted to us under the 
specified question, in the petition or in the briefs. 
Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case. 
Byron and Thurqood would dispose of. it narrowly ~s a case in 
which no private cause of action could be implied, limitinq 
the analysis to the special relationship of government 
employment. .John and t ore fer to ~ddress the cause of 
action question and would do so broadly alonq the Jines of 
my Version II memorandum of last spring. 
Thus, it is evident that a Court opinion is not 
assured if each of us remains with our first preference 
votes. As I view the Nixon case as uniquelv requirinq a 
Court opinion, :t am now prepared to defer. to the w~. shes of 
you, Bill Rehnquist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion 
holding th~t a President has absolute immunity from damage 
suit liability for the rea~ons stated in my Version I 
memorandum last spring. John and you both joined that 
memorandum. 
I have discussed the situation with John, and he 
fully shares the view that a Court oPinion in a case 
involving the liability of a President is impOrtant 
institutionally. John therefore is willing to decide the 
Nixon case on absolute tmmuni tv. ,John always hFls had some 
question as to the effect of an Act of Congress that 
2. 
expressly providP.o a ClamaqP rGmeny ;tqainst a 'Pt'P>sioent - as 
unlikely as such action may be. He may "reserve" on this 
question in a way that would not prevent a Court opinion. 
~Hth five votes now for an absolute i.mmunity 
resolution of this case - the question submitted on the 
coJlateral ordP.r- T 'vill draft an ooinion thts hasif.l. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The r.onfer~nce 
Jan. 29, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Attached Nixon Drafts 
Attached is my first attempt at a draft in Nixon. The first 
two sections (about the first 16 pages) deal with the facts of 
this case and its jurisdictional issues. 
The subsequent sections are entirely new, though of course 
very similar in some respects to last year's Draft VI, Version I. 
It is only fair to say, however, that there are major changes of 
emphasis. In doing the research, I became increasingly persuaded 
of two points. First, the separation of powers is a very 
flexible doctrine. It is therefore difficult to rest an absolute 
constitutional prohibition of presidential liability on this 
doctrine. Second, the Court repeatedly has recognized that the 
law of immunity is appropriately of judicial making. From this 
perspective, I think there are much more powerful arguments that 
the judiciary should not impose liability on the President, at 
least in the absence of an express command from Congress. At 
this level I think the separation of powers argument to be much 
less subject to attacks that it has claimed too much--i.e., 
arguments that an excessively rigid doctrine is inconsistent with 
such cases as United States v. Nixon and even Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co •. v. Sawyer. Thus, at bottom, the draft opinion would 
hold that the President was absolutely immune from suits for 
damages at least in the absence of clear congressional action 
imposing liability: and it reserves--rather than deciding--the 
question what would happen in that unlikely case of a direct 
constitutional conflict between the claims of the Executive and 
Legislative branches. Again, it makes clear that the judiciary 
must recognize the President as absolutely immune both from 
Bivens actions and from suits under statutes of merely general 
applicability. 
Beginning with Section III, however, I should say that I 
think it would be possible simply to readopt the pertinent 
sections from last year's Draft VI, Version I. I therefore have 
attached these sections as a second draft for your consideration. 
The first two sections (dealing with the facts and jurisdiction) 
are omitted from this draft, which begins with Section III. 
I have not yet begun--or really begun to think very 
seriously about--a Harlow draft. It has occurred to me, however, 
that changes in Nixon may seem desirable or even necessary to 
dispose of questions that may arise in Harlow. But I do not 
think that this should be a problem, as I expect to have at least 
a rough draft in Harlow well before Nixon is ready to circulate 
out-of-chambers. 
February 18, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear John: 
Here is a Chambers draft of an opinion. As we 
have collaborated on this issue for more than e year, I 
would, of course, appreciate your reviewing the draft before 
I circulate it. 
Although the basic analysis leading to the holding 
of absolute immunity remains the same, the opinion is 
different i.n several respects from ours last Term. First, 
it is simplified by the absence of the 'T'itle III statutory 
issue that was the centerpiece of T.-\yron's memorandum. 
SAcond, as last year's case involved three defendants in 
addition to the President, I could focus in this case solely 
on presidential immunity. Finally, t have said explicitly -
in view of your reservation - that we were not expressing 
any view ag to presidential immunity if Congress should 
authorize a damage suit remedy against any President. I 
would think it very doubtful whether Congress ha~ any such 
power. 
I am writing a separate opinion in the Fitzgerald 
case, one that I find more troublesome - particularly since 
there may well be no consensus of views among five Justices. 
My bottom li.ne in Fitzgerald will be qualified immunity, the 
view you and I took last 'term with respect to Halderman. At 
Conference, Sandra also ipdicated a ~reference for qualified 
immunity. I would expect the Chief and Bill Rehnquist to go 
for derivative immunity. I do not know whether Byron and 
the Justices who voted with him last Term will elect to 
reach the immunity issue or will hol.d that there is no cause 
of action. 
It is increasingly clear, contrary to my 
expectation, that summary judgment motions have not been 
successful in preventing long drawn out litigation over 
2. 
insubstantial clai~s against officials. For example, in 
addition to the suit pending here, Eo Levi and other Justice 
Department officials are defendants in several other suits -
with the consequent expense and harassment. I therefore 
think Jerry Gesell is right in urginq that when an immunity 
defense in pled, the burden of proof on that issue should be 
allocated to the plaintiff. 
I know that you are pressed at this time, and I 






JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upunu <!J:o-uri: o-f tlrt ~nittb ~tzdts 
~Z!tS.ftinghttt. ~. <!f. 2llgf.l!~ 
February 22, 1982 
Re: 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
For the most part I think your draft op1n1on is 
excellent and I am sure I will join it. I do, however, 
have one concern that perhaps is nothing more than 
style but I think may have sufficient importance to 
discuss with you. At several points in the opinion, at 
pages 14 through 18, you describe the Executive's 
immunity as something that is granted by the Court 
rather than provided by the law. I would be much more 
comfortable if you could make language changes which I 
can illustrate by reference to the last few lines on 
page 14. Instead of stating that federal officials 
"should be accorded" absolute immunity, could we not 
say that they "have a right" to absolute immunity. 
Similarly, instead of a "blanket grant" of absolute 
immunity, could we not refer to a "blanket 
recognition." Again, three lines from the bottom, 
instead of "we extended to federal officials the same 
qualified immunity we had granted to state officials" 
could we perhaps say something like "we held that 
federal officials have the same qualified immunity as 
state officials." 
I am also a little troubled by stating at the top 
of page 16 that we followed the tradition of common law 
courts "by freely weighing considerations of public 
policy." I do not have a specific language change to 
suggest there, but could it not appropriately be 
phrased in terms of the Court having relied on 
considerations of public policy comparable to those 
that had traditionally been recognized by common law 
courts, or something similar? 
-2-
Perhaps this is just a flyspeck, but on page 17, 
in line 4, I wonder why you say "acts in office" 
instead of "official acts." 
Finally, in the second line on page 18, would it 
be sufficient to have "recognized immunity of this 
scope for governors" instead of having "granted" 
immunity. 
In a realistic sense, perhaps your opinion is 
entirely correct in referring to grants of immunity by 
judges, but I feel much more comfortable when I am able 
to say that we are merely applying the law as we 
understand it to exist independently of the composition 
of the Court. I think it is especially important to 
take that approach when the Court is as closely divided 
as it is on the issue in this case. 
Except for these language changes, I really think 
your opinion is excellent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
March 5, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Nixon, Harlow, and Butterfield 
Attached are three drafts, two of which are appended mostly 
for reference. (1) A Nixon draft, marked up to incorporate 
(a) your last requested changes; (b) the changes suggested by 
Justice Stevens; (c) editing changes to make it compatible with 
the tenor of Harlow; and (d) sundry but essentially insubstantial 
changes resulting from research in the record done mostly for 
Harlow. 
(2) A printed Harlow draft, also hand-edited, incorporating 
the changes you requested and a few alterations and additions of 
mine. 
(3) An alternative draft on Harlow Section IV, following the 
line of analysis that you discussed with Justice White. 
There remains for you the major choice which approach to 
take. When you make it, however, nearly everything should be 
ready for the printer. As you will notice, clean printed copies 
would be required before you would want to show anything even 
informally to another Justice. I would think, however, that 
anything and everything could be ready not later than Tuesday. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
PERSONAL 
.inp:rmu <!fourt of tltt ~a .itaftg 
..-ulfinghtn. Jl. c.!f. 2!1.?,.~ 
March 18, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
I will have some "thoughts" on this case. I 
particularly am concerned that - without intent to 
do so - on page 24, you seem to equate Congress and 
"the press." Heaven knows, they regard themselves as 
the Fourth Branch and primus inter pares at that! 
On the merits, qualified immunity for a senior 
Presidential aide, cabinet or sub-cabinet officer, 
does no more than "buy" a lawsuit. Even assuming they 
will be~winnable"suits that will be only after much 
harassment and expense. If Harlow becomes law, as appears 
likely -- and if I were age 40 again -- I would not 
think one second of accepting the job I once held as 
Assistant Attorney General. I will be bound to say 
in dissent that the Court now literally invites 
"shakedown" suits. In 1956 when I left the Executive 
Branch, I could not have been "shaken down" for very much, 
but I'd be subject to harassing lawsuits and in court as a 
defendant-witness, paying other lawyers to defend me--
instead of being paid for being there! 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtutt Qfllurlllf t4t ~tb "taftg 
' jilagftittghttt. ~. <!J. 2llgt~~ 
March 18, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
I am fully sensible of the considerations mentioned in 
your letter of transmittal to me and the Chief, and shall 
make every effort to join your opinion in this case. So 
long as Butz v. Economu is on the books, I don't see how you 
can be faulted for relying on it. I agree with the basic 
thrust of your opinion, and think you have done an excellent 
job in disposing of the case. The few suggestions I am 
about to make do not seem to me, and I hope they do not seem 
to you, to suggest any major (or even minor) alteration in 
the structure of the opinion. 
My concerns are these: 
(1) Page 17, sixth line from the bottom: You describe 
one of the functions of the President as "the administration 
of justice." I don't know that any great damage would be 
done by leaving that as is, but it seems to me that the 
"administration of justice" is more the function of the 
courts under Article III than it is of the President. I 
think the opinion would be improved if you could see your 
way clear to change that phrase to something like "law-
enforcement." 
(2) Page 19, fn. 35: You state in the third paragraph 
of this footnote, on page 20, that the absolute immunity 
accorded the President should extend to "acts within the 
'outer perimeter' of the area of his official 
responsibility." Since in the final paragraph of the 
footnote you conclude that the acts he performed "lay well 
within the outer perimeter of his authority," I would prefer 
to see the Court reserve judgment on the question of how far 
the President's absolute immunity extends. Since you 
conclude, correctly, in my opinion, that he meets the 




discussion could be phrased in terms of an assumption that 
the President's immunity extends at least to the outer 
perimeter, and a conclusion that under this assumption the 
test is satisfied in this case. 
(3) Page 23, carry-over sentence: You state that 
"Presidents may be prosecuted criminally, at least after 
they leave office." While this may well be correct, it 
seems to me there is absolutely no necessity for saying so 
in this case: it is not an issue here, and so far as I know 
the Court has never so held. The language from Story's 
Commentaries, which you quote in fn. 33 on page 19, speaks 
of the person of the President possessing an "official 
inviolability" "in civil cases at least." This would seem 
to indicate that at least in Story's mind, the question was 
an open one. I see no need to salve the wounds of the 
losing view in this case by throwing them a bone which may 
come back to haunt us. -' 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powell 
March 18, 1982 
PERSONA I. 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzqeral~ 
S0-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
near r.hief: 
This is in replv to your personal letter. 
As to the sentence on page 24 of Nixon, certainly 
the press as well as Congress exercises considerable 
restraint on the conduct of a President. As much as I 
rleplor~ his means, Woodward's expose of Watergate preceded 
any action by Congress. I will try, hm-1ever, to clarify the 
language. 
~he second paragraph of your letter puzzles me. 
You say that u: "Harlow becomes the law", the ~ourt will 
then "literally inv1t~ shakedown suits". As J vi~w i.t, 
Harlm" mirrors present lew. As now drafted, its only effect 
on nresent law wil1 be to make it more nifficult for 
plaintiffs to win these suits. 
nutz v. Economou i.s now the law. The defendant in 
that suit was a Cabinet member, and the opini.on aC!opted 
qualified immuni.ty as the standard appJicahle to executive 
officials, except for those performing specially protected 
functions, such as iudges and prosecutors. I joined Butz 
because it '"as foreshaC!owed - if not control Jed bv - your 
opinion for the Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 
You read Gravel more broadly than T. ever have. 
However one reads it, Gravel was decided before both Scheuer 
and Butz. In sum, rather than make new doctrine, I have 
si.mply followed these two well establi.shed precedents of 
this Court. 
~or the reasons stated in my letter of yesterday 
to you and Bill Rehnquist, J' am proposing a modi.fication in 
the Wood v. Strickland standard. 'l'his seems permissible 
because necessary to attain the balance contemplated hv ~ut7. 
itself. 
I have no idea whether. rny ~raft in this case will 
attract a Court. I do have a rather strong feeling that, 
from your viewpoint, as I understand it, my draft is likely 
to be bette~ than any alternative that the Court will adopt. 
~incerely, 




JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u;tutttt <!f11'Utt ~f t4~ ~~ ~hd~s 
..-ult'itt!ltttn. ~. <!}. 20bf'!' 
March 18, 1982 
Re: 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM BERS OF 
THE C HI EF JUSTIC E 
j\u.prtntt <!fMU"t of tlrt ~b j\taftg 
Jras:ftingbtn. ~. <!f. 2llp~.;l 
March 18, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
80-945 - Harlow et al. v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
In due course I will be joining you in 79-1738 and 
dissenting in 80-945. Since I am not prepared, now, to 
overrule Gravel sub silentio -- or otherwise . 
A Presidential aide, for example, may be elbow-to-elbow 
with a President several times a day preparing to implement 
key government policies, while the cabinet officer you 
referred to may not see a President for weeks. If a Senator's 
aide "inherits " the Senator ' s immunity, there is vastly 
greater reason why a senior Presidential aide, who deals 
with matters of far greater moment, is denied the same 
protection. Perhaps we are on the way to generating a 
new industry in the insurance world - " Public Liability 
Insurance " for public officials! 
For me it simply "will not wash " to hold that the 
aides of a Senator with a few hundred thousand constituents 
and a dozen aides derive absolute immunity from the Senat~' 
but that Senior Aides to a President -- who has 22b milllon 
constituents and a large staff of Senior Aides - - do not 
have the same immunity as those of Senator Gravel. Expressed 
or not this overrules Gravel or leaves our cases in 
irreconcilable confusion. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBER S OF 
,jU;Jtrtmt (!ftturt ttf t£rt 'Jfbrittb ,jtatt_s-
~~n.~.<!f. 20~~~ 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 22, 1982 
Re: 79-1728 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
I shall file a dissent in this case. It 
should be done by the time the ferry goes. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
/ 
CHAMBER S OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,juvumt <q01trt ~f tqt ,-uittb ,jtatt.&' 
'~lhudtiugtou. ~. <q. 2.0,?~~ 
March 29, 1982 
No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
- .~-
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Justice O'Connor · 
From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: MAR 3 l 1982 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1738 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER, v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982] 
Memorandum of Concurrence, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER. 
I write separately to emphasize that the presidential im-
munity spelled out today derives from and is mandated by 
the Constitution. Absolute immunity for a President is ei- ~ 
ther implicit in the constitutional doctrine of separation of ~ .. 
powers or it does not exist. 
Although immunity for governmental officials in Bivens 
type actions may have been "of judicial making," ante, at 15, 
the immunity of a President from civil suits is not simply a 
doctrine derived from this Court's interpretation of common 
law or public policy. Of course we are "guided" by the Con-
stitution, ante, at 15, but I could not join an opinion findi g 
absolute immunity for the President based on some vag'!le, 
u~eoryllidependent of the ConstitutiOn . 
.. !'he esserrtlal~ o the doctnne of separation of pow-
ers is to allow for independent functioning of each co-equal 
branch of government within its assigned sphere of respon-
sibility, free from risk of control or intimidation by other 
branches. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707 
(1974); United States v. Gravel, 408 U. S. 606, 617 (1972). 
Even prior to the adoption of our Constitution, judicial 
review of legislative action was recognized in some instances 
as necessary to maintain the proper checks and balances. 
Den on the Dem. of Bayard & Wife v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42 
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(N.C. 1787); Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 4 
Call's 135 (1788). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 
(1803). It has not been used, however, to control or intimi-
date other branches. The proposed opinion correctly ob-
serves that judicial intrusion through private damage actions 
improperly impinges on and hence interferes with the essen-
tial independence of a President. 1 
Exposing a President to civil damage actions for official 
acts within the scope of the Executive authority unduly sub-
jects presidential actions to judicial scrutiny. The judiciary 
always must be hesitant to probe into the elements of presi-
dential decision-making and such judicial intervention is not 
to be tolerated absent imperative constitutional necessity. 
We found such intervention warranted in order to assure the 
proper administration of justice. United States v. Nixon, 
418 U. 8., at 709-716. 2 No such intervention is warranted 
in the present case. 
The enormous range and impact of presidential decisions-
inescapably beyond that of any one Member of Congress-in-
evitably means that large numbers of persons will consider 
themselves aggrieved by such acts. Absent absolute immu-
nity, every person who feels aggrieved may bring a suit for 
damages, and each suit-especially those that proceed on the 
merits-will involve at least a minimum of judicial question-
ing of presidential acts, including the reasons for the action 
and the information on which it was based. This kind of 
scrutiny of day-to-day decisions of the Executive Branch 
would inevitably occur if private civil damage actions are 
' The separation of powers doctrine is implicated to the extent that the 
courts entertain private damage actions for presidential acts taken in the 
"outer perimeter'' of the President's official responsibility. Ante, at 
19-20, n. 35. We do not consider here suits involving acts outside the 
"outer perimeter" of official authority. 
2 This concept emerged in the early years of our national existence as 
well. United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch 469, 507 (1807). 
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brought to advance the private interests of the individual citi-
zen. Although the individual who claims wrongful conduct 
may indeed have sustained some injury, the need to prevent 
inevitable large-scale invasion of the Executive function by 
the judiciary far outweighs the need to vindicate the private 
claims. We have decided that in precisely this same sense, 
the need of a Member of both Houses of Congress and their 
aides to be free from such judicial scrutiny outweighs the 
need for private redress of one claiming injury from acts of a 
Member or aide of a Member. 3 
Judicial intervention would also inevitably inhibit the pro-
cesses of Executive Branch decision-making and impede the 
functioning of the Office of the President. Imposition of li-
ability for damage actions would have a serious effect of di-
verting the attention of a President from his executive duties 
since defending a lawsuit today-even a lawsuit ultimately 
found to be frivolous-often requires significant expenditures 
of time and money. There is a significant likelihood that a 
President, whose unfettered discretion is absolutely essential 
to the functioning of the Executive Branch, would have to 
weigh the possibility of litigation in making or authorizing de-
cisions. Many problems arise in which the choice of the Ex-
ecutive may be a "close call" on a particular decision or course 
of action; fear of a lawsuit could well inhibit appropriate ac-
tion. Ultimate vindication on the merits after trial is plainly 
3 The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 reflects this policy distinction; in 
it Congress waived sovereign immunity for certain damage claims, but 
pointedly excepted any "discretionary function or duty . .. whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused." 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a) (1976). For 
such injuries Congress may in its discretion provide separate non-judicial 
remedies such as private bills. 
In this case Fitzgerald received substantial relief through the route pro-
vided by Congress: the Civil Service Commission ordered him reinstated 
with backpay. Joint App. 87a-88a. In addition, he has to date received 
$142,000 in partial settlement of the suit. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
11. Respondent can hardly argue that he has been denied relief. 
79-1738-MEMORANDUM OF CONCURRENCE 
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a paper shield for a President. 
In short, the constitutional concept of separation of co-
equal powers dictates that a President be immune from civil 
damage actions based on acts within the broad scope of Exec-
utive authority. 4 Even when a President, acting in his offi-
cial capacity, takes actions later held to be unconstitutional, 
an aggrieved citizen's recovery must be by way of Congres-
sional acts designed to limit intrusion of the judiciary into 
presidential affairs. 
'Human fallibility being a reality, Congress in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act took pains to recognize that even when governmental action is in error, 
sovereign immunity is preserved for discretionary acts. See 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2680(a) (1976). 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.fu.prtmt Qf!turl!tf tlft ~tb .i'bttts 
-as!fington. ~. <!f. 2ll&i~~ 
April 5, 1982 
Re: No. 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your proposed opinion. I anticipate 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,juprtmt <!fltltrl of Hrt 'Jni:ttb ,jtzdtg 
'~htgfrhtghtn. ~. <!f. 211?>!~ 
April 5, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
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From: Justice Blackmun 
Circulated: __ _ 
Recirculated: ______ '!___ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1738 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-. 1982) 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
I join JUSTICE WHITE's dissent. For me, the Court leaves I 
unanswered his unanswerable argument that no man, not 
even the President of the United States, is absolutely and 
fully a ove the law. _ See Ullited States v. L~6, 
22 (1882), a arb11ry v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 163 
(1803). 2 Until today, I had thought this principle was the 
foundation of our national jurisprudence. It now appears 
that it is not. 
Nor can I understand the Court's holding that the absolute 
immunity of Lhe President is compelled by separation-of-pow-
ers concerns, when the Court at t l'ie same time expressly 
leaves open, allte, at 16, and n. 27, the possibility that the 
President nevertheless may be fully subject to congressio-
nally-created forms of liability. These two concepts, it 
'"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer 
of the law rna~· set that Ia\\· at defiance with impunity. All the officers of 
the government. from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, 
and are bound to obey it." 
2 "The very essence of civil Iibert~· certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, \\'henever -he receives an in-
jury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. 
In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a peti-
tion, and he never fails to comply \\'ith the judgment of his court." 
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seems to me, cannot coexist. 
I also write separately to express my unalleviated concern 
about the parties' settlement agreement the key details of 
which were not disclosed to the Court by counsel until the 
veritable "last minute," and even then, only because the 
Halperins' motion to intervene had directed the Court's at-
tention to them. See ante, at 11, n. 24. The Court makes 
only passing mention of this agreement in Part liB of its 
opinion. 
For me, the case in effect \\'as settled before argument by 
petitioner's payment of $142,000 to respondent. A much 
smaller sum of $28,000 was left riding on an outcome favor-
able to respondent, with nothing at all to be paid if petitioner 
prevailed, as indeed he now does. The parties publicly 
stated that the amount of any payment would depend upon 
subsequent proceedings in the District Court; in fact, the 
parties essentially had agreed that, regardless of this Court's 
ruling, no further proceedings of substance would occur in 
the District Court. Surely, had the details of this agreement 
been known at the time the petition for certiorari came be-
fore the Court, certiorari would have been denied. I cannot 
escape the feeling that this long-undisclosed agreement 
comes close to being a wager on the outcome of the case, with 
all of the implications that entails. 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,-- U. S. -- (1982), 
most recently-and, it now appears, most conveniently-de-
cided, affords less than comfortable support for retaining the 
case. 'l The pertinent question here is not whether the case 
"The agreement in Hare 11 s was not final until approved by the District 
Court, -- U. S., at -- (slip op. 6). In the present case, the parties 
made their agreement and presented it to the District Court only after the 
fact. Further, there was no preliminary payment in H a t'e 11 s. Each re-
spondent there was to receiYe $400 if the Court denied certiorari or af-
firmed, and nothing if the Court reYersed. Here , $142,000 changed hands 
regardless of the subsequent disposition of the case, with the much smaller 
sum of $28,000 resting on the Court's ultimate ruling. For me, this is not 
79-1738-DISSENT 
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is moot , but whether this is the kind of case or controversy 
over which we should exercise our power of discretionary re-
view. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302 (1943). 
Apprised of all developments, I therefore would have dis-
missed the writ as having been improvidently granted. The 
Court, it seems to me, brushes by this factor in order to re-
solve an issue of profound consequence that otherwise would 
not be here. Lacking support for such a dismissal , however, 
I join the dissent. 
the kind of case or contro\'ers~· contemplated by Article III of the 
Constitution. 
j 
June 1, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Fourth Nixon Draft 
Pending word on changes that you might wish to make, I 
have begun "marking up" a Fourth Nixon draft in light of 
Justice White's and Justice Blackmun's recent circulations. 
Except as indicated here, all changes are entirely 
stylistic, based from my increasing familiarity with the 
Court Style Book. 
Page 18. Justice White's latest draft (page 9) quotes 
someone who had thought of suing the President for damages. 
Accordingly I would just omit the sentence, which adds 
little, that litigation of this kind may have been 
"unthinkable." 
~A .~age 19. Justice White has toughened his claim about 
$ ~1A'he relevant history. See his opinion a~l5. I think we 
eed to respond somewhat in kind. Language is suggested. 
~ 
Pages 23-25. Now that Justice Blackmun has written, we 
~have to identify the particular dissent to which we are 
2. 
responding. Accordingly, I have sprinkled Justice White's 
name throughout the footnotes. 
Response to HAB. I also have attached a draft 
paragraph responding to the claim--asserted most clearly by 
". ~ / HAB--that we cannot "divide" the absolute immunity question 
~~ so as to reserve the case where Congress had expressly 
~r' :::t::::a::dc::e::::n:~:: ::::~l::y~0urt::::ki:ea::r::::::e 
vr ~o do so. (One consideration of course is whether it would 
tDA.~ pass easily by SOC, WHR, and the Chief~ I don't see why it 







gn along 6these(~~n)e:d, it cdould be: (i) added ~- to Footnote page 1 or 11 roppe " as a new 
footnote at the end of the Story quotation on page 17. 
qr 






JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ~' at 1, purports not to 
understand how an express congressional creation of 
Presidential liability could alter the separation-of-powers 
analysis applicable to a President's claim of absolute 
immunity. In Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 
U.S. 425, 433 (1977), we recognized that the separation of 
powers doctrine would require a balancing approach to 
competing claims of constitutional prerogative asserted by 
two Branches of Government. In the event of congressional 
action explicitly creating Presidential liability, we may 
assume that an argument for absolute Presidential immunity 
would be supported by most of the factors on which we rely 
today. On the other hand, an express congressional 
assertion of its legislative power would add an important 
constitutional consideration to the factors weighing against 
absolute Presidential immunity from suit under this 
hypothetical statute. We have no occasion to decide the 
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u.s. 
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powers doctrine would require a balancing approach to 
competing claims of constitutional prerogative asserted by 
two Branches of Government. In the event of congressional 
action explicitly creating Presidential liability, we may 
assume that an argument for absolute Presidential immunity 
would be supported by most of the factors on which we rely 
today. On the other hand, an express congressional 
assertion of its legislative power would add an important 
constitutional consideration to the factors weighing against 
absolute Presidential immunity from suit under this 
hypothetical statute. We have no occasion to decide the 
balance that would be constitutionally required in such a 
case. 
/~ 
#.···oc • .,. .• 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~ttpumt <!fond o-f tfrt ~lt ~tai.t~ 
... Mfriu.gtolt.lB. <!}. 20.?'-1~ 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. June 1, 1982 
RE: No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your dissent in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
.. , 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u:prtmt '4ourt of tqt ~~dt .§taus 
1llaslyington, :@.<g. 20bl'l-;l 
June 2, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Harry: 
/ 
I have already joined BRW's dissent. I now join 




cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 06/02/82 Rider A, p. 19 (Nixon) 
NIXON19 SALLY-POW 
Justice White's dissent intimates that we 
minimize the importance of this historical evidence by its 
location in a footnote, rather than in text. See, post, 
n. 2, at 6, and at 15. We had not supposed that the merit 
of this sort of documentation depends upon its location in 
a court opinion. In light of the fragmentary character of 
the materials - none of which addressed specifically the 
then remote possibility of a damage suit liability of a 






Rider B, p. 19 (Nixon) 
The dissent supports its historical argument by reliance, 
we think, on even more fragmentary materials, including 
primary reliance on ambiguous comments at state ratifying 
conventions. If the weight of evidence is considered, we 
place our reliance on the contemporary understanding of 




On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, 
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law 
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred. 
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an 
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said 
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously 
identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity 
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If 
the law was clearly established, however, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent 
public official should know the law governing his conduct. 
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims 
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither 
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard, 
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
lfp,fss 06/08/82 CN SALLY-POW 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your personal letter, just 
received. I reply promptly as this case should be ready 
to come down on Monday - after two long years. 
Obtaining and holding four votes for an opinion 
on this sensitive question has not been easy. Although 
John has been cooperative throughout, he has insisted from 
the outset that we expressly leave open the constitutional 
question that would arise if Congress ~~i: s~y sought to 
impose a damages liability on a President. I am confident 
that he would not join the opinion unless this issue were 
left open. 
Byron complicated the situation when he relied, 
as he has, on the fact that - in the present posture of 
the case - we must assume that an implied cause of action 
exists against the President both under Bivens and the 
statutes. Thus, I had to address this in my opinion, and 
working it out with the Justices who had joined me was not 
easy. Both John and Sandra were concerned, and it was 
2. 
necessary for me to rewrite the note several times. I 
cannot change it now. 
I fully understand your view that Congress has 
no authority to impose a damages liability on the 
President. Indeed, I am inclined to agree with you. But 
the issue is not here, and the probability is that it 
never will arise. Even if a bill to this effect were 
adopted by both Houses of Congress, the President surely 
would veto it. Thus, the situation that concerns us will 
never arise unless at least two-thirds of both houses wish 
to create this sort of constitutional crisis. 
Chief, in all seriousness 
e wiser now to have a five Justice Court opinion, 
specially one joined by the Chief Justice. We have 
xpressly left open the issue, but in view of the basic 
ationale of the opinion I would have no doubt as to the 
ltimate outcome. 
I am concerned, however, that your absence from 
the majority opinion may dilute its authority. It will be 
characterized, of course, as a plurality and one that did 
not even attract the vote of the Chief Justice. The fact 
without a 
For these reasons I very much hope you will join ~~ 
the opinion expressly, adding whatever you wish to add in 
your concurrence. For example, you could, if you wish, 
nr4 
join the opinion except its reservation with respect to 
-1 
affirmative congressional action. If you should do this, 
I hope you will not refer to Harry's point as to whether 
there is "anything to reserve". I have had trouble enough 
holding my "troops" together because of this and related 
questions. 
After two years, we are on the verge of settling 
- I think for all time - a major constitutional question. 
13 u_f lA><- ~)../.A. ·~ ~ 





June 8, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
I do not believe you have ever expressly ioined 
the Court opinion, although in your letter of March 18 you 
said: 
"In due time T will join you in 79-1738." 
~s there now appears to be a fair chance of 
bringinq ~ixon ann Harlow down on ~onday, I would like to he 
sure of your JOtn. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.i'u.pumt <!}ourl of tqt~h .i'tatts 
~ufri:n:ghtn. !D. <!}. 21lpJl.~ 
PERSONAL 
June 8, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lew is: 
-
I am making a few stylistic changes in my concurring 
opinion, but adding one that is more than stylistic. It is 
really the entire point of my concurrence that the immunity is 
Constitutional. That being so I do not see the basis for any 
suggestion (your Note 27} that there is any reserved question. 
My substantive footnote (N.7} will read as follows, 
probably on the final page: 
"In a footnote the Court suggests that 'we need not 
address directly' whether Congress could create a damages action 
against a President. However, once it is established that the 
Constitution confers absolute immunity, as the Court holds today, 
legislative action cannot alter that result. Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137 (1803}." 
I had thought that was firmly settled law since Marbury v. 
Madison. In short, Harry has a point at his page 1-2. In other 
words, there is no question to "reserve." 
You could solve this, of course, by omitting Note 27. It 
is incongruous that a plurality of four "invites" Congress to 
engage in an obviously futile act of passing a statute 
unconstitutional on its face. 
In short, we ought to "bite the bullet" after all the 
travail you have borne for two Terms. 




Just ice Powell 
June 8, 1982 
PERSONAL 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzaerald 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your personal letter, just received. 
I reply promptly as this case should be ready to come down 
on Monday - after two long years. 
Obtaining and holding four votes for an opinion on 
this sensitive question has not been easy. Although John 
has been cooperative throughout, he has insisted from the 
outset that we expressly leave open the constitutional 
question that would arise if Conqress sought to impose a 
damages liability on a President. I am confident that he 
would not join the opinion unless this issue were left open. 
Byron complicated the situation when he relied, as 
he has, on the fact that - in the present posture of the 
case - we must assume that an implied cause of action exists 
against the President both under Bivens and the statutes. 
Thus, I had to address this in my opinion, and working it 
out with the Justices who had joined me was not easy. Both 
John and Sandra were concerned, and it was necessary for me 
to rewrite the note several times. I cannot change it now. 
I fully understand your view that Congress has no 
authority to impose a damages liability on the President. 
Indeed, I am inclined to agree with you. But the issue is 
not here, and the probability is that it never will arise. 
Even if a bill to this effect were adopted by both Houses of 
Congress, the President surely would veto it. Thus, the 
situation that concerns us wi.ll never arise unless at least 
two-thirds of both houses wish to create this sort of 
constitutional crisis. 
I am concerned, however, that your absence from 
the majority opinion may dilute its authority. It will be 
characterized, of course, as a plurality and one that did 
not even attract the vote of the Chief Justice. The fact 
that you may have gone a bit farther than the plurality 
2. 
still leaves that opinion, with all of its basic analysis, 
without a majority. A plurality on an issue as inflammatory 
as this one (see opinions of dissenting judges here and in 
Harlow), will invite future challenges when the composition 
of the Court changes. 
For these reasons I very much hope you wi. 11 join 
the opinion expressly, adding whatever you wish to add in 
your concurrence. For example, you could, if you wish, join 
the opinion except only its reservation with respect to 
affirmative congressional action. If you should do this, I 
hope you 'A' ill not refer to Harry's point as to whether there 
is "anything to reserve". I have had trouble enough holding 
my "troops" together because of this and related questions. 
After two years, we are on the verge of settling -
I think for all time - a major constitutional question. But 
we need the agreement of the Chief Justice of the United 
States. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
Dear Chief: 
,jnvrtntt <!fcurl 4lf t!rt 'Jnitth ,jtatts 
jfas-4ingbm, !9. <If. 2ll&i'1~ 
June 10, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. 
· ~ 




As I wrote yesterday afternoon, I am entirely willing 
to confer - as you suggest. It may possibly shorten our 
discussion if I respond to what I now understand to be your 
objection to note 27. You say that it "significantly 
undermines the entire holding of the case", and that the 
opinion "gives intimations that Congress - under some 
circumstances -could change it". 
Then you quote Harry's conclusory, off-hand statement 
that my opinion is contradictory, and that the Court "cannot 
have it both ways". 
I respond to these points. Having devoted, in total, 
more time on the Nixon case last Term, and on Nixon and 
Harlow this Term, than on any half a dozen cases since I 
have been on the Court, I have no intention of "undermining" 
the end product of all of this labor. So far as I know, you 
are the only member of the Court who entertains this view. 
Nor do I find in the opinion any "intimations" that it would 
be lawful for Congress to impose specifically a damages 
liability. 
I come now to what we will call Harry's "can't have it 
both ways" dictum. As I have said to you and others with us 
in this case, my own view is that it would be 
unconstitutional for Congress to impose a damage liability 
on the President. 
But I cannot say that it is irrational to think that 
reasonable minds may not differ if Congress were to enact 
specific legislation, identifying certain limited types of 
conduct that would justify a damages remedy if a President 
knowingly violated the statute. Moreover, I followed your 
opinion in the Nixon tapes case in applying what in effect 
is a balancing type of analysis. A statute duly adopted by 
Congress, and signed by an incumbent President, certainly 
would be a new factor - not present in this case - that a 
court would weigh. In the Nixon tapes case you engage in 
precisely the same type of weighing constitutional and 
policy considerations. 
Proceeding on the theory that we do not decide 
constitutional issues not presented, ' I have included the 
reservation - tb which you object in note 27 - in every 
circulation since my first draft of March 17. 
2. 
After Byron argued that we must assume that implied 
private causes of action exist in this case (as is correct), 
I enlarged note 27 as a response to him. Under the 
collateral order doctrine, we are addressing only the 
immunity issue. You will recall your insistence that we 
write the case this way, rather than dispose of it on the 
theory that there was neither a Bivens remedy nor an implied 
cause of action. Therefore, our holding will be that at 
least where there is only an implied cause of action, the 
immunity of a President is absolute. 
I repeat, however, that I will be happy to discuss all 
of this further. 
Sincerely, 




79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
In his dissenting opinion, Harry states he cannot 
"understand the Court's holding that the absolute immunity 
of the President is compelled by separation-of-powers 
concerns, when the Court at the same time expressly leaves 
open ..• the possibility that the President nevertheless may 
be fully subject to congressionally-created forms of 
liability." The two concepts, he contends, "cannot 
coexist." 
In my view Harry is simply wrong. His argument 
misapprehends the balancing approach to separation-of-powers 
questions prescribed by recent decisions of this Court. Our 
unanimous opinion in the Nixon Tapes Case is a highly 
relevant example. In language substantially identical to 
that used to describe the President's absolute immunity in 
this case, the Court stated that the President's evidentiary 
"privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." 418 u.s., at 708. Nonetheless, in the Tapes 
case, and despite finding that the privilege was 
constitutionally mandated, we held that other factors of 
constitutional weight could be more weighty in a particular 
case. See pp. 711-712: 
"In this case we must weigh the importance 
of the general privilege pf confidentiality 
of Pr~sidential communications in performance 
of the President's responsibilities against 
the inroads of such a privilege on the fair 
administration of criminal justice." 
The reservation in this case merely represents an 
application of the balancing analysis applied in United 
States v. Nixon. Like the President's evidentiary 
privilege, absolute Presidential immunity fairly may be 
described as "fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." In this sense the President's absolute 
immunity is "constitutional." At the same time, however, 
the constitutional factors mandating absolute immunity can 
be described, under a balancing approach, as defining the 
weight only on one side of the scale. 
In this case at p. 16, my opinion says: 
"We consider this immunity a functionally 
mandated incident of the President's unique 
office, rooted in the constitutional 
tradition of the separation of powers •... " 
My opinion holds that the constitutional grounds 
supporting absolute Presidential immunity outweigh the 
arguments advanced by BRW for civil damages liability. 
In the unlikely event that Congress acts directly 
to impose liability, another constitutional factor would 
have to be considered: Namely, the fact that Congress had 
enacted legislation approved by the encumbent President, 
that purported to impose a damages liability. The 
2. 
reservation in note 27 of my opinion merely acknowledges 
this. It does no~ suggest that the cbnstitutional arguments 
supporting immunity would be diminished in such a case. Nor 
does the reservation imply how the balance then would be 
struck in such a case. The reservation simply acknowledges 
that direct congressional action would confront this Court 
with a different case and a different constitutional 
question--a question that need not be decided now, even 
though the method of analysis would be the same. 
My opinion's approach thus accords with the Court's 





79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
In Justice White's note 2 he suggests - prior to 
today - Presidents, prosecutors, judges, congressional aides 
and other officials, "could have been held liable for the 
kind of cliam put forward by Fitzgerald - a personnel 
decision made for unlawful reasons." (emphasis added) This 
is simply not so. The law has not heretofore permitted a 
plaintiff to recite "~agicw words and have the incantation 
operate to make the immunity vanish. Moreover, and more 
fundamentally, Justice White errs in treating all of the 
above named officials as if the scope of their authority 
were identical. ~he authority of a President, head of the 
executive branch of our aovernment - a wholly unique office 
- is far broader than that of any other official. As the 
Court states a President has authority in the course of 
personnel changes in an executive department to make 
personnel decisions. This is not to say that, in a given 
case, it would not be appropriate to raise the question 
whether an official - even the President - had acted "within 
the scope of [the official's] constitutional and statutory 
duties". The doctrine of absolute immunity does not extend 
beyond such action. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
T HE CH IEF JUSTI CE 
.i'u.p:rtntt Qfltltri ttl tqt ~tt~ .i'ta:ttg 
Jfasfri:ttghtn. !l. <!}:. 2ll~~~ 
June 10, 1982 
Re: No. 79-J738- Nixon v . Fitzgerald 
Dear Lew is: 
I am amending my concurring opinion in this 
case as follows: 
(a) Insert on page 1, after first full 
paragraph the following: 
However, that does not 
mean a President is "above the 
law." Nixon v. United States, 
418 U • S • 6 8 3 ( 19 7 4) • The 
dissents are very wide of the 
mark to the extent that they 
imply that the Court today 
recognizes a sweeping immunity 
for a President for all acts. 
The Court does no such thing. 
The immunity, as spelled out by 
the Court today, is limited to 
decisions and actions within the 
scope of a President's 
constitutional and statutory 
duties. Ante, at 20-22, n. 34. 
A President, like a Member of 
Congress, a judge , a prosecutor 
or a congressional aide, all with 
absolute immunity, is not immune 
for acts outside official duties 
that inflict injury on others . 
"Straw men" are, of course, more 
easily toppled than real ones. 
{b) Insert on page 5 after line 2 (the final 
sentence of the opinion), the following: 
Far from placing a President 
"above the law" the Court's 
holding places a President on 
essentially the same footing with 
judges and the other officials 
whose absolute immunity we have 
recognized. 
(c) Footnote 6, page 5, now reads: 
In footnote 27 the Court suggests 
that "we need not address 
directly" whether Congress could 
create a damages action against a 
President. However, the Court 
has addressed that issue and 
resolved it: once it is 
established that the Constitution 
confers absolute immunity, as the 
Court holds today, legislative 
action cannot alter that result. 
Nothing in the Court's opinion is 
to be read as suggesting that a 
constitutional holding of this 
Court can be legislatively 
overruled or modified. Marbury 





79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
In his dissenting opinion, Harry states he cannot 
"understand the Court's holding that the absolute immunity 
of the President is compelled by separation-of-powers 
concerns, when the Court at the same time expressly leaves 
open ••• the possibility that the President nevertheless may 
be fully subject to congressionally-created forms of 
liability." The two concepts, he contends, "cannot 
coexist." 
In my view Harry is simply wrong. Hi.s argument 
misapprehends the balanci.nq approach to s~paration-of-powers 
questions prescribe~ by recent decisions of this Court. Our 
unanimous opinton in the Nixon Tapes Case is a highly 
relevant example. In language substantially identical to 
that used to describe the President's absolute immunity in 
this case, the Court stated that the President's evidentiary 
"privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." 418 u.s., at 708. Nonetheless, in the Tapes 
case, and despite finding that the privilege was 
constitutionally mandated, we held that other factors of 
constitutional weight could be more weighty in a particular 
case. See pp. 711-712: 
,, 
"In this case we must weigh the importance 
of the general privilege of confidentiality 
of Presidential communications in performance 
of the President's responsibilities against 
the inroads of such a privilege on the fair 
administration of criminal iustice." 
The reservation in this case merely represents an 
application of the balancing analysis applied in United 
States v. Nixon. Like the President's evidentiary 
privilege, absolute Presidential immunity fairly may be 
described as "fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." In this sense the President's absolute 
immunity is "constitutional." At the same time, however, 
the constitutional factors mandating absolute immunity can 
be described, under a balancing approach, as defining the 
weight only on one side of the scale. 
In this case at p. 16, my opinion says: 
"We consider this immuni.ty a functionally 
mandated incident of the President ' s unique 
office, rooted in the constitutional 
tradition of the separation of powers •••• " 
My opinion holds that the constitutional grounds 
supporting absolute Presidential immunity outweigh the 
arguments advanced by BRW for civil damages liability. 
In the unlikely event that Congress acts directly 
to impose liability, another constitutional factor would 
have to be considered: Namely, the fact that Congress had 
enacted legislation approved by the encumbent President, 
that purported to impose a damages liability. The 
2. 
reservation in n6te 27 of my opinion merely acknowledges 
this. It does not suggest that the constitutional arguments 
supporting immunity would be diminished in such a case. Nor 
does the reservation imply how the balance then would be 
struck in such a case. The reservation simply acknowledges 
that direct congressional action would confront this Court 
with a different case and a different constitutional 
question--a question that need not be decided now, even 
though the method of analysis would be the same. 
My opinion's approach thus accords with the Court's 







lfp/ss 06/11/82 Rider A, p. 25 (Nixon) \ 
NIXON25 SALLY-POW \ 
The dissenters, reaching for authority to 
support their position, cite a current edition of Time 
magazine. Apart from the novelty of citing a popular 
mangazine on a constitutional issue, the article, of 
course, made no reference to damages liability. Rather, 
its statement merely reflected the judgment of this Court 
in the Nixon tapes case and the impeachment resolution of 
the House Judiciary Committee. Contrary to the contention 
of the dissenters, and President's continuing amenability 
to these forms of legal process demonstrates the 
transparent fallacy - rather than the correctness - of the 
dissenting view. This case involves only immunity from 
·.· 
· .. 
private damage suit liability for decision and actions 
within the scope of a President's authority. 
~lune 11, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
As your revised concurring opinion has now b~en 
circulated, I write to say that I am ready for the case to 
come down - provided, of course, the dissenting Justi.ces 
also are ready. 
Is there a possibility that we could do this on 
Tuesday? 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Jfp/ss 
c c ·, ( -c:hA-· • v .-. f 
CHAMBERS OF 
,jn:vrtmt <qouri of tlft ~tb ,jta±t.tl' 
~~~. ~. <q. 2G~~~ 
.J U ST I CE BYRO N R . WH ITE 
June 11, 1982 
Re: 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 




Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§npr mtt <!Jonrl of tltt %rift ?t .;§taftg 
'JlJ ag ftingf.on. ~. <!f. 20~~ ~ 
June 11, 1982 
Re: No . 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I will add to Note 2 page 2 the following: 
"75000 public officers have absolute 
i mmunity from civil damage suits for 
acts within the scope of their 
official function ." 
Regards, 
/ 
June 11, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Harlow 
Dear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra: 
First, we welcome the constructi.ve and supportive 
changes made by the Chief. Justice in his concurring opinion. 
I now ask your advice. In Byron's latest 
circulation, his note 2 on page 4 cites Time maqazine. This 
presents a rather tempting "target". What would you think 
of my adding a note - as encloseo - as a ~~parate paragraph 
in note 42 at the end of our opinion on page 25? 
As we may be able to bring this case down on 
Tuesday, I would a~preci.ate your thoughts this morning if 
convenient. 
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2 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
for acts outside official duties. 2 
The immunity of a President from civil suits is not simply a 
doctrine derived from this Court's interpretation of common 
law or public policy. Of course we are "guided" by the Con-
stitution, ante, at 15, but absolute immunity for a President 
for acts within the official duties of the Chief Executive is to 
be found in the constitutional separation of powers or it does 
not exist. The Court today holds that the Constitution man- ~ 
dates such immunity and I agree. 
The essential purpose of the separation of powers is to al-
low for independent functioning of each co-equal branch of 
government within its assigned sphere of responsibility, free 
from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other 
branches. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707 
(1974); United States v. Gravel, 408 U. S. 606, 617 (1972). 
Even prior to the adoption of our Constitution, as well as 
after, judicial review of legislative action was recognized in 
some instances as necessary to maintain the proper checks 
and balances. Den on the Dem. of Bayard & Wife v. Single-
ton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787); Cases ofthe Judges ofthe Court 
' In their "parade of horribles" and lamentations, the dissents also 
wholly fail to acknowledge why the same perils they fear are not present in 
the absolute immunity the law has long recognized for numerous other offi-
cials. The dissenting opinions manifest an astonishing blind side in point-
ing to that old reliable that "no man is above the law." The Court has had 
no difficulty expanding the absolute immunity of Members of Congress, 
and in granting derivative absolute immunity to numerous aides of Mem-
bers. United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). We have since rec-
ognized absolute immunity for judges, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 
(1978), and for prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), yet 
the Constitution provides no hint that either judges, prosecutors or Con-
gressional aides should be so protected. Absolute immunity for judges 
and prosecutors is seen to derive from the common law and public policy, 
which recognize the need to protect judges and prosecutors from harass-
ment. The potential danger to the citizenry from the malice of thousands 
of prosecutors and judges is at once more pervasive and less open to con-
stant, public scrutiny than the actions of a President. 
\ 
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of Appeals, 4 Call's 135 (1788). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 J 
Cranch 137 (1803). However, the Court's opinion correctly 
observes that judicial intrusion through private damage ac-
tions improperly impinges on and hence interferes with the 
independence that is imperative to the functions of the office 
of a President. 
Exposing a President to civil damage actions for official 
acts within the scope of the Executive authority would inev- \ 
itably subject presidential actions to undue judicial scrutiny. 
The judiciary always must be hesitant to probe into the ele-
ments of presidential decision-making and such judicial inter-
vention is not to be tolerated absent imperative constitutional 
necessity. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 709-716. ;) 
No such intervention is warranted in the present case, as the 
Court holds. 
The enormous range and impact of Presidential decisions-
far beyond that of any one Member of Congress-inescapably 
means that many persons will consider themselves aggrieved 
by such acts. Absent absolute immunity, every person who 
feels aggrieved would be free to bring a suit for damages, and 
each suit-especially those that proceed on the merits-
would involve some judicial questioning of Presidential acts, 
including the reasons for the decision, how it was arrived at, 
the information on which it was based, and who supplied the 
information. Such scrutiny of day-to-day decisions of the \ 
Executive Branch would be bound to occur if civil damage ac-
tions were made available to private individuals. Although 
the individual who claims wrongful conduct may indeed have 
sustained some injury, the need to prevent large scale inva-
sion of the Executive function by the judiciary far outweighs 
the need to vindicate the private claims. We have decided \ 
that in a similar sense Members of both Houses of Con-
gress-and their aides-must be totally free from judicial 
scrutiny for legislative acts; the public interest, in other 
3 See also United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch 469, 507 (1807). 
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words, outweighs the need for private redress of one claim-
ing injury from legislative acts of a Member or aide of a Mem-
ber.~ The Court's concern, and the even more emphatic con-
cerns expressed by JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, over 
"unremedial wrongs" to citizens by a President seem odd 
when one compares the potential for "wrongs" which thou-
sands of CongTessional aides, prosecutors, and judges can 
theoretically inflict-with absolute immunity-on the same 
citizens for whom this concern is expressed. 
Judicial intervention would also inevitably inhibit the pro-
cesses of Executive Branch decision-making and impede the 
functioning of the Office of the President. The need to de-
fend damage suits would have the serious effect of diverting 
the attention of a President from his executive duties since 
defending a lawsuit today-even a lawsuit ultimately found 
to be frivolous-often requires significant expenditures of 
time and money, as many former public officials have learned 
to their sorrow. This very case graphically illustrates the 
point. When litigation processes are not tightly-con-
trolled-and often they are not-they can and are used as 
mechanisms of extortion. Ultimate vindication on the mer-
its does not repair the damage. :; } ....fL_...; 
' United States v. Gravel, 408 U. S. 606 (1972). The Federal Tort 
Claims Act of 1946 reflects this policy distinction; in it Congress waived 
sovereign immunity for certain damage claims, but pointedly excepted any 
"discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion involved 
be abused." 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a) (1976). Under the Act damage result-
ing from discretionary governmental action is not subject to compensation. 
See, e. g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953). For such inju-
ries Congress may in its discretion provide separate nonjudicial remedies 
such as private bills. 
In this case Fitzgerald received substantial relief through the route pro-
vided by Congress: the Civil Service Commission ordered him reinstated 
with backpay. Joint App. 87a-88a. 
• Judge Learned Hand described his feelings: 
"After now some dozen years of experience I must say that as a litigant I 
should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and 
79-1738---MEMORANDUM OF CONCURRENCE 
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I fully agree that the constitutional concept of separation of 
independent co-equal powers dictates that a President be im-
mune from civil damage actions based on acts within the 
scope of Executive authority while in office. 6 Far from plac- l #_) 
ing a President above the law, the Court's holding places a ~ 
President on essentially the same footing with judges and 
other officials whose absolute immunity we have recognized. 
death." 3 Lectures on Legal Topics, Assn of the Bar of the City of New 
York 105 (1926). 
6 In footnote 27, ante, the Court suggests that "we need not address eli- \ 
rectly" whether Congress could create a damages action against a Presi-
dent. However, the Court has addressed that issue and resolved it; once 
it is established that the Constitution confers absolute immunity, as the 
Court holds today, legislative action cannot alter that result. Nothing in 
the Court's opinion is to be read as suggesting that a Constitutional holding 
of this Court can be legislatively oven·uled or modified. Marbury v. Mad-
ison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 




It mi.ght be well to respond to BRW's attempt to 
distinquish types of immunity on the ground of whether "a 
personal decision allegedly was made for unlawful reasons". 
BRW says this is a kind of claim "put forward by 
Fitzgerald". Apparently BRW is saying that neither a judge 
nor prosecutor would have immunity if there were such an 
allegation. I can scarcely believe he is serious. 
Prosecutors, in particular, make personal decisions every 
day as to whom they will prosecute and who knows whether 
their reasons would be viewed as lawful if immunity turned 
on this! The same can be said as to judicial decisions, 
particularly in close cases involving personal iudgments as 
to morality, what will be popular with the public when a 
judge is facing reelection, and the like. 
If Nixon ordered Fitzgerald to be fired as part of 
personnel changes in the Defense Department, this clearly 
was within his Executive authority. 
BRW states that you "fail to grasp (this] difference". 
He deserves a response, and I hope you will give him one. 
Perhaps the library could find for you a case involving 
the prosecutor in New Orleans who was so controversial. His 
name was Garrison. I think we had a cert petition filed 
here by one of his victims who made a strong case that he 
had been prosecuted purely for vindictive and personal 
reasons. 
If you elect to answer BRW, I may add a sentence at the 
end of the final footnote in the Court opinion makinq a 
cross reference to your response to the dissenters argument 
that we are elevating the President "above the law". 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/vde 
Sincerely, 




I must correct my letter delivered to you earlier, as I 
had misread one word in Byron's opinion. He used 
"personnele rather than "personal". The mountain of 
material that we have to read induces mistakes! 
You had a better perception of what Byron was saying. 
He overlooks the central point that the President, vested by 
the Constitution with the authority of the Executive Branch 
of government, certainly has jurisdiction over personnel 
matters. The scope of authority of judges and prosecutors 
is more limited than that of a President. Yet all three 
possess absolute immunity only when they act within their 
authority. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/vde 
·------------·---·~., ··::·-----------...-----~·· 
No. 79-1738, Nixon 
e f ':.Lr J-W. ~ ,, 
v. Fitzgerald ~ ~ I 
For insertion as a footnote on page 23, to be dropped from 
the citation in text to u.s. v. Nixon. 
In his dissenting opinion, post, at 1, Justice BLACKMUN 
states he cannot "understand the Court's holding that the 
absolute immunity of the President is compelled by 
separation-of-powers concerns, when the Court at the same 
time expressly leaves open the possibility that the 
President nevertheless may be fully subject to 
congressionally-created forms of liability." The two 
concepts, he contends, "cannot coexist." Id., at 2. 
Justice BLACKMUN's argument misapprehends the balancing 
approach to separation-of-powers questions prescribed by 
such cases as Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 
U.S. 425, 443 (1977) and United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 
683, 703-713 (1974). In the Nixon Tapes Case, for example, 
the Court stated that the Constitution mandated judicial 
recognition of an evidentiary privilege protecting the 
communications of the President of the United States. In 
language similar to that used today to describe the 
President's absolute immunity, we characterized that 
evidentiary privilege as "fundamental to the operation of 
Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of 
powers under the Constitution." 418 U.S., at 708. 





constitutionally mandated, we held that other factors of 
constitutional weight could be so compelling as to overcome 
the privilege in a particular case. Our reservation in this 
case is consistent with this balancing approach. It 
acknowledges that action by Congress might be considered a 
factor of constitutional weight, which might require the 
Court to reexamine the balance on the constitutional scale. 
Cf. , Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
635-638 (1952} (Jackson, J., concurring}. We do not suggest 
that the constitutional arguments supporting Presidential 
immunity would be diminished in such a case. Nor do we 
imply how the balance then would be struck. We simply 
acknowledge that explicit congressional action would 
confront this Court with a different case. 
~t 1 7 
- ---- ---- -----
/ 
Possible Rider, to Footnote 4/P.. I 
Reaching for authority to support the dissenting 
position, Justice WHITE purports to derive su port from a 
5~ .\! ").t z I t l' 
current edition of Time magazine. ABut the issue that he 
quotes does no more than report the unremarkable 
proposition, with which we are in full agreement, that the 
President is not above the law. This unusual source thus 
would provide legal support for the dissent only if Time 
should share the dissent's persistent error--that of 
confusing immunity from damages liability with being "above 
the law." The Time article of course made no reference to 
~he-­
damages liability. Rather, its statement referred to the 
judgment of this Court in the Nixon tapes case and of the 
House Judiciary Committee in voting an impeachment 
resolution. The President's continuing amenability to these 
forms of legal process demonstrates that the President 
remains as much subject to the law today as ever before. 
~ 
The immunityA recognizef ~ extends only to private suits 
for damages based on decisions and actions within the scope 
of a President's authority. 
19-~ ... ~cJ rv~AA.-/ ~ k~ 
7 
7 ~/(/-, ~ Q; lei~~ ~.:? 
~~"it:1'> 
w4~tt~ 
.~  79-1738 Nixon v. F~tzgerald 
In Justice White's note 2 he suggests -prior to ~~. 
today - Presidents, prosecutors, judges, congressional aides J1 
and other officials, "could have been held liable for the 't.-:f 
kind of cliam put forward by Fitzgerald - a personnel 
decision made for unlawful reasons." [emphasis added] This 
is simply not so. The law has not heretofore permitted a 
plaintiff to recite "magic" words and have the incantation 
operate to make the immunity vanish. Moreover, and more 
fundamentally, Justice White errs in treating all of the 
above named officials as if the scope of their authority 
were identical. The authority of a President, head of the 
executive branch of our government - a wholly unique office 
- is far broader than that of any other official. As the 
Court states a President has authority in the course of 
personnel changes in an executive department to make 
personnel decisions. This is not to say that, in a given 
case, it would not be appropriate to raise the question 
whether an official - even the President - had acted "within 
the scope of [the official's] constitutional and statutory 
duties". The doctrine of absolute immunity does not extend 
beyond such action. 
June 15, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Changes in Nixon 
Your letter seems perfectly appropriate. Attached are 
the clean copies of the two suggested additions, with your 
changes entered. If you want to change the format before 
circulating these to other Justices, either Sally or Ginny 
would know how to "get" the files from my Atex. Or I could 
make changes myself. 
June 15, 1982 
79-1738 ~ixon v. Fitzqerald 
Dear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra, 
In view of Byron's additions on paqes 4-5 and 30 
of his opinion, and the fact that this case now will not 
come down until next week, I no lonqer can resist the 
temptation to respond. 
One of my ~reposed notes addresses specifically 
Byron's reliance on Time magazine in his "eye-catching" note 
2. 
The se-cond suggested aodition i.s a response 
primarily to Harry's statement that our opinion is 
internally contradictory. Again, possible misunderstanding 
here could be clarified, by empha.sizinq the parallel with 
the Court's decision - and its rationale - in United States 
v. Nixon. 
If vou approve, I will add these notes to what I 
hope will be a final circulated draft. 
I am grateful to each of you for "stavinq with me" 
during this long (and now boring!) process. 







JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.:§utrrttttt C!Jonrt of tltt 'Jltnittb ~ta±ts 
.. asfringtMT.. ;!8. <!f. 21lc?J.I.~ 
June 15, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra, 
In view of Byron's additions on pages 4-5 and 30 
of his opinion, and the fact that this case now will not 
come down until next week, I no longer can resist the 
temptation to respond. 
One of my proposed notes addresses specifically 
Byron's reliance on Time magazine in his "eye-catching" note 
2. 
The second suggested addition is a response 
primarily to Harry's statement that our opinion is 
internally contradictory. Again, possible misunderstanding 
here could be clarified, by emphasizing the parallel with 
the Court's decision - and its rationale - in United States 
v. Nixon. 
If you approve, I will add these notes to what I 
hope will be a final circulated draft. 
I am grateful to each of you for "staying with me" 
during this long (and now boring!) process. 







THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~u.pumt Qfltttrl of tlyt ~b .Statts 
Jfas4htghtn. ~. <!f. 2Ll&i,.~ 
PERSONAL 
June 15, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lew is: 
I can't conceivably understand why you insist on rev1v1ng 
the issue that, between us, we have blurred. You now emphasize: 
4 
We do not suggest that the 
constitutional arguments supporting 
Presidential immunity would be diminished in 
such a case. [i.e., if Congress acted]. Nor 
do we imply how that balance would be struck. 
We simply acknowledge that explicit 
congressional action would confront this 
Court with a different case. 
(A different case yes, but precisely the same result.) 
For me this undoes virtually all the reconciling you and I 
have struggled with for days now. And it is wholly unnecessary 
since John found my opinion acceptable. 
I am unwilling to hedge on this issue as the opinion now 
does, and Jackson's sole view in Youngstown carries no weight 
with me. I would not even cite it. 
Let Byron "rant" on this point but don't fall into the 
trap of answering him and rendering the opinion unacceptable to 
me. 
I'm ready to talk if you wish. 
Regards, 
Justice Powell ~ 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
OI~T~ICT OF COLUMBIA 
The parties, through their counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. The United States Air Force ("Air Force") shall assign A. Ernest 
Fitzgerald to the position of Management Systems Deputy to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force·(Financial Management) effective June 21, 1982. The 
job description for this position is attached as. Exhibit 1 and incorporated into 
this Settlement Agreement. 
2. The Air Force shall in good faith assign Fitzgerald tasks and work 
assignments commensurate with the position of Management Systems Deputy to 
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and provide 
him with the appr6priate resources to carry out these assignments. Fitzgerald 
shall in good faith perform the tasks assigned to him in this position. 
3. Pursuant to Rule 4l(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this 
action is dismissed with prejudice subject only to the jurisdiction of the Court to 
enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Should any party to this 
Settlement Agreement believe, that any other party or parties have violated any 
provision of the Agreement, that party ·may file a motion In Civil Action No • 
. 
76-1486 alleging violation of the Settlement Agreement and the Court shall 
entertain such application to determine Its validity and whether relief is 
appropriate. 
4. On February 6, 1984, the Air ~orce shall file a. written report to this 
Court describir1g in detail the assignments given Fitzgerald in the position of 
Management Systems Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
(Financial Management). 
5. Simultaneously herewith the parties have fiJed a joint motion asking 
the Court to vacate the March 31, 1982, Memorandum and Order issued in this 
ease. Whether this Court grants or denies this joint motion sha.ll not affect the 
instant Settlement Agreement. 
6. The Air Force shall pay to Fitzgerald's counsel on the date of the 
Court's approval of this Agreement the sum of $200,000 as attorneys' fees and 
costs for legal services provided plaintiff in this action. This payment shall 
constitute full satisfaction of any and all claims ~or attorneys' fees and costs, 
and plaintiff and his counsel hereby waive any and all claims against defendants 
for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with these proceedings. 
7. This Settlement Agreement does not constitute, and shall not be 
construed, as an admission of liability by the defendants nor as a concession by 
any party as to the correctness of any legal position or factual assertion 
advanced by any other party in this action. 
~/~~ vnrn BDNER,Rt 
HOWREY & SIMON 
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Tel: (202) 383-6899 
R . (~~ 
R. LAWRENCE DESSEM 
Attorney, Department of Justice 
lOth & Pennsylvania Ave., N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Tel: (202) 633-5108 
APPROVED 
_,._ 
. ·-----···- ·- ----- -- -· ----·--· -~- ····--·-·-- ·---· -------- ... ·--~-~--~-- - - --
, . 
. ~ . . 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
FILE'D 
JUN 1 51982 
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
The incumbent of this position acts for and assists the Principal Deputy 
and Assistant Secretary for Financial Management as Management Systems Deputy 
with r.esponsibility and authority necessary for the development of improved 
management controls and broader use of statistical analysis within the Air Force. 
D. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: 
1. The Management Systems Deputy is responsible at the highest Air Force 
level for policies and procedures regarding: 
(a) Integrated performance measurement, cost control and 
reduction 
(b) Economic cost effectiveness analysis 
(c) Management information and control systems 
(d) Productivity enhancement and measurement 
(e) Statistical programs and analysis. 
(f) Cost estimating and cost analysis. 
2. Provides guidance and direction to the Air Staff and the Commands for 
the development and/or implementation of management information and control 
systems, resource management systems and associated data bases. 
3. Formulates, establishes and implements policies and procedures for the 
Air Force productivity program including development of productivity 
enhancement goals and necessary reporting systems . 
.C. Responsible for Air Force integrated performance measurement including 
cost control and reduction activities. This responsibility includes supervision of 
Air Force performance measurement activities including cost/schedules control 
systems criteria (C/SCSC). Responsible for development of new systems and 
improvements of current systems for cost control and cost reduction, for 
application of "should cost" and related analyses and synthesis · techniques to 
Air Force cost estimating, and for Air Force economic cost effectiveness analysis. 
5. Performs or directs analyses and reviews of Air Force operational plans, 
mobilization plans, programs for foreign aid and other data, upon which financial 
requirements for resources are based, in order to develop or direct the development 





- ~-' 6. Develops policies and procedures, and monitors the implementation of 
Air Force statistical programs including methods of analysis and presentation. 
7. Serves as an advisor to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) 
while ~e is ~ppearing before congressional committees. Serves on such committees 
and boards as specified by the Principal Deputy/ Assistant Secretary. 
B. Testifies before Congressional committees when requested. 
9. Assures necessary program coordination between the Department of the 
Air Force, Department of Defense and other government agencies. 
10. Accomplishes management studies and special projects as assigned by 
the Principal Deputy (Financial Management) or the Assistant Secretary (Financial 
Management). 
Supervision Exercised: Incumbent is delegated necessary authority to carry 
out assigned duties and has authority to utilize resources, including manpower, as 
required to satisfactorily discharge the duties of his office. 
lll. CONTROLS OVER WORK: 
Reports to the Principal Deputy/ Assistant Secretary (Financial Management). 
Supervision is limited normally to status reports furnished to the Principal Deputy/ 
Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) for purposes of keeping them informed 
and/or for further guidance and direction. Accomplishes assigned duties and 
responsibilities with a high degree of individual initiative and creativity. Requires 
a high degree of professional stature. 
JV. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACTS: 
This position requires access to TOP SECRET information. Sensitive under 
paragraph 4b(2)(g), AFR 40-3. Incumbent has direct access to information and is 
authorized ~.ravel to visit Air Force field activities ~nd contractors as necessary 
to perform duties described .herein. 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 
79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
For addition at the end of footnote 42, p.25. 
Reaching for authority to suoport the dissenting 
positi.on, ,Justice WHI"''E purports to derive support from a 
recent edition of Time magazine. But the issue that he 
quotes does no more than report the unremarkable 
proposition, with which we are fn full aqreement, that the 
President is not above the law. This unusual source thus 
would provide legal support for the tHssent only if Ti.me 
should share the djssent•s persistent error--that of 
confusinq immunity from damages liab)litv Nitb being "ahove 
the law." "~"he 'T'ime article of course made no reoference to 
damages liability for official acts. Rather, its statement 
referred to the iudgment of this Court in the Nixon tapes 
case and of the House ~lur'Hciary Commit tee in voting an 
impeachment resolution. The President's continuing 
amenability to these forms of legal process demonstrates 
that the President remains as much subject to the l~w today 
as ever before. The immunity tecognized today extends only 
to private suits for damaqe~ based on decisions and actions 
within the scope of a President ' s authority . 
,. 
June 16, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
ME"P-WHANDUM '!'0 'T'RE CONFRR"'.:NCE: 
I prooose to add the attached paragraph at the end 




June 16, 1982 
Dear Byron: 
In takinq a last look at my Nixon draft, it seems to me 
that the O?inion is "heavier" on footnotes than I ordinarilv 
would like an opinion to be. 
Would it inconvenience you if I were to move F.ootnote 
34 to text? t would propose simply to elevate the note--
without any substantive chanqes--to text, probably under a 






20 NIXON r. FITZGERALD 
must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most 
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386·U. 8., at 554. 
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such 
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in provid-
ing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and im-
partially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U. 8. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is . 
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensi-
tive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under 
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence 
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility 
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, 
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits 
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability 
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, 
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but 
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. aJ 
this Court's 1971 BiL·ens deci~ion, fe,rer than a handful of dam:Jgcs D.ction 
ever were fiJed against the President. · None appears to have proceeded to 
judgment on the merits . 
""Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the 
prospe.ct that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in 
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand \\Tote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (C<\2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S. 
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for .. . [den~ing reconry] is that it is impos-
sible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been 
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute .... " 
' 'These dangers are significant even though there is no histmical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a 1ight to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional 'iolations ,,·as not even recognized until 
ivens v. Six Unkuown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
In defining the scope of an official's absolute p1iYilege, this Cow-t has 
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to 
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held 
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in perfor-
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B 
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts 
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S., at 43~31. But the Court 
also has refused to drav.: lines finer than history and reason would support. 
See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all 
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the 
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege 
applicable ... . ");Stump v. Sp01·kman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial 
privilege applies even to acts occun-ing outside "the normal att1ibutes of a 
judicial proceeding''). In view of the special nature of the President's con-
stitutional office, ,,.e think it approp1iate to extend to him absolute immu-
nity from damages actions based on acts within the "outer pe1-imeter" of 
the area of his official responsibility. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad Yaliety of areas, many of which are 
highly ensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a lJarticular action. In this case, for 
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his tes-
timony to Congress- a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the unclerlJing reorga-
nization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the peti-
tioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, 
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the 
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in 
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, 
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for ,,·hich acts 
,,·ere taken. Inqui1ies of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside 
the pe1-imeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitz-
gerald, who was Ja,vfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such 
cause as ·will promote the efficiency of the sen-ice." B1ief for Respondent 
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 75l2(a). Because Congress has granted this legisla-
tive protection, respondent argues, no federal official could. ''ithin his au-
thm-ity, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed \\-ithout satisfying this standard 
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 

























22 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
generally have looked to the common law to determine the 
scope of an_ official's evidentiary privile.ge, 36 we have recog-
nized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separa-
tion of po\vers under the Constitution." United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the 
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, 
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 3' But our cases also · 
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, 
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be 
. served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and 
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action ,,·as taken for a forbid-
den purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
· i~munity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is \\lthin the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
which the Secretary \\ill "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to· pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay ,,·ell within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
a.; This tradition can l;>e traced far back into ow· constitutional history. 
See, e. g., Jfississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are 
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the Presi-
dent in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to 
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 . 610 (1838) 
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are 
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other depart-
ment, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through. the im-
peaching power."). 
36 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss St![iung v. V.E.B. Ca1·/ Zeiss. -Je.na. 40 F .. R.D. 
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F . 2d 979 (CADC), cert tlenied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
:r. Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
--------
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Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judi-
cial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when 
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, 
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supm, or to vindicate the publicjnterest 
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. 
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held war-
ranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages 
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 38 
3!! The Court has recognized befor at there is a lesser public interest in 
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See 
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 311-373 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711- 712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special impor-
tance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as rais-
ing different questions not presented for decision). It never has been de-
nied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals 
\\·hose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of Jus-
TJCE WHJTE's dissent, it is not true that our jurispruclence ordinarily sup-
plies · a remedy iri civil damages for eYery legal wrong. The dissent's ob-
jections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for 
any official. Yet the di ssent makes no attack on the absolute immunity 
recognized for judges and prosecutors. 
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in 
which there is not a damages r~medy for every legal \\Tong. These cases 
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal 
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a dam-
ages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Cw-ran, - - U. S. -- (1982): Middlesex Collnty Sen-erage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); Califor·nia v. Sierra Club, 
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JusTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence 
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion 
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there 
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the 
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknou:n Fedeml Agents, 403 U. S., at 396; 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S.; at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against 
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judi-
cially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"). 
Even the case on which JUSTJCE WHITE places principal reliance, 
---~ ... .,..~ ..... -· -----·- -- ---·- -·- .. ----
.I 
,.. . .._-..... 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. 
~ltp'rtmt <!Jllltrl of tltt 'J!tnittlt .;§tatts 
'Jta.~Jringtcn. 'lfl. <!J. 20g!J1~ 
June 16, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I propose to add the attached paragraph at the end 
of footnote 42 on page 25 of the Court's opinion. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 
79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
For addition at the end of footnote 42, p.25. 
Reaching for authority to support the dissenting 
position, Justice WHITE purports to derive support from a 
recent edition of Time magazine. But the issue that he 
quotes does no more than report the unremarkable 
proposition, with which we are in full agreement, that th~ 
President is not above the law. This unusual source thus 
would provide legal support for the dissent only if Time 
should share the dissent's persistent error--that of 
confusing immunity from damages liability with being "above 
the law." The Time article of course made no reference to 
damages liability for official acts. Rather, its statement 
referred to the judgment of this Court in the Nixon tapes 
case and of the House Judiciary Committee in voting an 
impeachment resolution. The President's continuing 
amenability to these forms of legal process demonstrates 
that the President remains as much subject to the law today 
as ever before. The immunity recognized today extends only 
to private suits for damages based on decisions and actions 
within the scope of a President's authority. 
• .. 
djb 
July 20, 1902 
Re: Nos. 79-1738 and 80 ·- 945 , Ni~<?.!! and I!a:t:~P.~ 
Dear Al , 
Thank you for your letter of July 7, that finally 
reached me here in Richmond. 
Justice White and I both agree with your recommendation 
to apportion the total printing costs two·- thirds to Fi tz-
gerald and one-third to Harlow and Butterfield. 
I have initialed and return the Orders to this effect. 
Enclosures: 
Orders 
r)J- Alexander L. Stevas , Esquire 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. c. 20543 
cc : Mr. Justice White 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N. E. 




.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
.hprtmt <lfouri of tlt'~ ~~b ,jta:Ug 
,ht~lfington. ~. <!f. 2llp~~ 
June 23, 1982 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Cases Held for No. 79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, or 
No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas 
In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner 
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program. 
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered 
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative 
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay 
from the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime, 
however, he had instituted this damages action against 
respondent, his administrative superior. The suit alleged a 
conspiracy to deprive petitioner of First Amendment rights. 
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS 
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an 
alternative remedy under the Civil Service Act. This Court 
then vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the 
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary 
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service 
employees is a special consideration which counsels 
hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of 
affirmative congressional action." The panel also noted 
that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to 
bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in 
favor of judicial relief. 
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government 
employee represented a "special factor" defeating his claim 
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But 
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the 
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black 
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member 
maJority in that case relies on a cumulation of factors not 
all present here. 
2. 
The question raised is an important one. Moreover, the 
CAS deicision in this case is in conflict with the decision 
of CA7 in Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (1981). 
I will vote to GRANT. 
No. 81-872, Turner v. Jordan 
The question here is whether the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency is absolutely immune from 
damages liability for dismissing a CIA employee. The 
employee was dismissed following his public criticism of the 
Agency's personnel practices. His suit in the District 
Court alleged a violation of costitutional rights under the 
First and Fifth Amendments. Ruling on petitioner's claim of 
absolute immunity, the District Court stated that absolute 
immunity might be proper where "defense of a constitutional 
tort action requires the disclosure of classified 
information.• Here, however, the District Court found that 
"the defendants have acknowledged that this case involves no 
such issue of secrecy or security." App. 2la. The District 
Court certified the case for interlocutory appeal under the 
collateral order doctrine. CADC (Tamm, Robb, Edwards) 
affirmed without opinion. 
Harlow, No. 80-945, holds open the possibility that 
federal officials might be entitled to absolute immunity in 
connection with performance of functions "so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability." Slip op., at 12. 
Under Harlow, petitioner thus could establish entitlement to 
absolute immunity in this case if he could "demonstrate that 
he was discharging a protected function when performing the 
act for which liability is asserted." Ibid. Here, as 
noted, the District Court has found that the case involves 
no issue of •secrecy or security.• Nonetheless, the 
Solicitor General argues that the special functions of the 
CIA director require an absolute immunity applicable to all 
personnel actions. Nothing in Harlow suggests that the 
special status of the CIA director might not raise a unique 
and unsettled question. But this question--which does seem 
to me to be unique--of course could be mooted by a decision 
of the question presented in Bush v. Lucas, supra. If 
government employment generally const1tutes a special factor 
precluding inference of a Bivens action for adverse 
personnel actions, that rat1onale would apply a fortiori to 
suits against the Director of the CIA. Assuming that the 
Court will vote to grant in Bush v. Lucas, supra, I will 
vote to Hold this case for No. 81-469. 
3. 
No. 81-1010, Purtill v. Schweiker 
Petitioner is a 53-year-old employee of HHS. When his 
superiors failed to promote him, he filed suit in federal 
court, alleging age discrimination. His complaint based one 
count on a federal statute, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), and one directly on the Constitution. 
The District Court dismissed the Bivens count--which alone 
is here--on grounds that it was preempted by the ADEA. See 
Carlson v. Green, supra. CA3 agreed. 
In this Court there are two possible questions 
presented for decision. The first is the same as that 
presented in No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas. That is whether the 
government's employment relationsh1p with an employee is a 
"special factor counseling hesitation" in the inference of a 
Bivens action. The other is whether the ADEA preempts a 
B1vens action that might otherwise exist. See Carlson v. 
Green, 446 u.s. 14, 18-19 (1980). There appears to be a 
split on the second question. See Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 
F.2d 904 (CA7 1981) (upholding Bivens claim by a former 
federal employee asserting age discrimination by her 
superiors). 
The preemption argument in this case, based on the 
ADEA, appears to be stronger than that made under the 
general civil service laws in Bush v. Lucas, supra. Yet the 
Bush issue--whether federal employment is a special factor 
precluding Bivens actions for employment decisions--is the 
broader and more important issue. Viewing the "special 
factor" question as the one the Court should reach first, I 
would be inclined to Hold this case if Bush is granted. 
Alternatively, I could vote to Grant this case and 
consolidate it for argument with Bush, supra, No. 81-469. 
No. 81-1134, Ashcroft v. National Org. for Women, Inc. 
The petitioner in this case is the Attorney General of 
Missouri. In that capacity he joined other state Attorneys 
General in bringing an antitrust action against respondent 
for its convention boycott of States that had not ratified 
the ERA. Following dismissal of that action, respondent 
sued petitioner under S 1983. Petitioner claimed absolute 
immunity from suit, asserting that prosecutorial immunity 
extended to his initiation of a civil action on behalf of 
the State. Resondent claimed that petitioner's actions in 
arranging for the filing of the civil action all occurred in 
an executive capacity. The District Court denied 
petitioner's immunity claim without opinion, and CAB, in a 
brief per curiam order, concluded that the order appealed 
from was not final within the meaning. of 2B u.s.c~ S 1291 
and thus not appealable. 
4. 
In No. 79-173B, United States v. Nixon, the Court 
reaffirms that orders denying absolute immunity are 
appealable collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949). Respondent 
argues that there can be no conflict with this or other 
cases, because the collateral order doctrine is inherently 
flexible and not mandatory. But CAB did not put its 
decision on this basis. It appears to have held as a matter 
of law that there was no appealable, because not "final," 
order. Because our Nixon decision is incompatible with that 
of CAB in this respect, I am inclined to vote to GV & R in 
light of No. 79-173B. 
No. Bl-15BO, Sanborn v. Wolfel 
The petitioners in this S 19B3 suit are parole 
officers. As a parolee under their supervision, respondent 
was arrested for intoxication. He subsequently forfeited 
bond when he failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. Upon 
receipt of this and other information, petitioners took 
respondent into custody for parole violations. There was no 
on-site hearing to determine whether there was probable 
cause to revoke his parole, as apparently should have been 
held under our decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 40B u.s. 471 
(1972). After he was released from incarceration 27 days 
after his arrest, respondent brought suit against 
petitioners under S 19B3, alleging a violation of due 
process under Morrissey. A jury awarded damages of $1,000. 
On appeal, CA6 rejected petitioners' argument that the trial 
court had erred in imposing on them the burden of proving 
that they had acted in good faith. And, after reviewing the 
record, the CA found that the jury reasonably could have 
found that petitioners did not act in subjective good faith. 
As evidence of bad faith, the CA appears to have relied on 
evidence that petitioners arrested respondent not in 
response to parole violations, but to secure his detention 
while more serious charges were investigaged. Judge Weick 
dissented. He argued that the petitioners indisputably had 
acted in accordance with the policies of the Audit Parole 
Authority of Ohio and approved as lawful by the Attorney 
General of Ohio. That policy was not to hold on-site 
hearings where the parolee had jumped bail for an offense 
committed while on parole. As laymen, petitioners were 
entitled to rely on the policy adopted by their employer. 
The Court opinion in No. B0-945, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
holds that an official is entitled to good faith immunity 
insofar as his conduct does not violate "clearly established 
5. 
constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.• Slip op., at 17. Har!'ow further 
provides that an official may establish entitlement to good 
faith immunity where he can prove that he neither knew nor 
should have known of the relevant legal standard. In light 
of petitioner's claimed reliance on established Ohio 
procedures, the immunity inquiry in this case may be in 
tension with Harlow's reformulated standard. 
Unlike Harlow, however, this case arises under S 1983, 
and thus presents a technically unsettled question: whether 
the Harlow standard should be applied to cases under that 
statute. But see Slip. Op., at 17, and n. 30 (suggesting 
any distinction would be untenable). 
I believe that the Harlow standard should be applicable 
here. I therefore will vote to Grant, Vacate, and Remand in 
light of No. 80-945, Harlow v. Butterfield. A judgment 
order in this case might read as follows: 
"The petition is Granted. The judgment is 
vacated and the case remanded for 
reconsideration in light of No. 80-945, 
Harlow v. Butterfield. See Butz v. Economou, 
438 u.s. 478, 504 (1978) (deeming it 
•untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under the S 1983 and suits 
brought directly under the Constitution 
against federal officials"). 
L.F.P., Jr. 
This is a private suit by respondent Fitzgerald to 
I 
recover damages from former President Nixon/ for .allegedly 
conspiring unla~fully /to cause respondent's dismissal from a 
I 
government position. 
The question presented, / not heretofore decided by 
~ 
I 
this Court, . is the extent of a President's immunity; when 
... .. 
sued for damages. Respondent sought dam~ges under two 
federal statutes, / neither of which expressly creates a 
damages remedy,j~nd under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
Our decisions have recognized two types of 
immunity defenses: "qualified" and "absolute". Prior cases 
establis~ /that qualified immunity is the standardJ'generally 
applicable to executive officials, whether state or federal. 
Absolute immunity is expressly conferred by the 
Constitution;'on members of Congres~their aides, in the 
performance of legislative acts. Our decisions also have 
established absolute immunit~s a defense for judges and 
prosecuting attorneys~or action in the course of their 
official functions. 
The District Court denied petitioner's claim of 
absolute immunity. And the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia~ismissed his appeal. We granted 
certiorari, J'and now reverse. 
we hold that a President is entitled to absolute -
immunity;{rom civil damages liability~n suits based on his 
official act~: We think this immunity is inciden~o a 
Pr'"e: -l :=nt's constitutional office,/ rooted in the separation 
of powers j'and supported by our history. Until recently;l 
civil dama~its against a President were unknown. 
Ill'-
The President occupies a unique position;lin the 
constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution vests 
the entire "executive power" of the United States) n the 
President. His responsibilities include the management of 
I I the Executive Branch, the enforcement of all federal law, 
the conduct of foreign affairs,J'and the defense of our 
country. He is required - sometimes almost daily - to make 
decisions of the utmost discretion and senstivity. 
3. 
We th,ink it would be in toler able, / and , contrary to 
the public interest,J'if ~h such decision were made in the 
shadow of threatened damages sui{;by employees or citizens 
who feel aggrieved. 
A rule of absolute immunity will not leave the 
nation;'ithout adequate protection against serious 
misconduct by the chief executive. In the Nixon tapes case, 
we compelled a Presiden~to make evidence in his possession 
available in a criminal prosecution. 
The constitutional remedy of impeachment, of 
course, remains 
and the media) 
~-
abuse of office. 
~
available. Moreover, oversight by 
A 
Congress 
normally will serve to deter presidential 
In conclusion, I emphasize the narrowness of our 
holding. It applies ~y to private damage suits j and ~y 
to action taken/ within the scope of a President's official 
authority. The President, like judges and prosecutors, is 
not immune for acts outside of his official duties. 
c 
~~:--.~~~'-?· 
!}. /J~) ?u~ JI.-/J~ 
/JL-~,~ ~/~. l+t. ~ 
Jl o~ ~ "h~ 
The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion. 
Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackrnun join. Justice 
Blackrnun also has filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Justices Brennan and Marshall join. 
,June 24, 1982 
Nixon and Harlow 
Dear John, 
~his is merely to say •thank you" 
with warmth and appreciation. 
You were a helpful and steadfast 
supporter through two long Terms of 
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1p1c1a1 to Tille New Yen n-
WASHINGTON, June 24- Follow-
i"l are excerpts from the Supreme 
Court's rulirt~ today givirt~ the Presi-
dent absolute immunity from civil 
auits for damages. Associate Justice 
Lewil F PoweU wrote the majority 
opinion, and Auociate Justice Byron 
R. White filed a dissenti"8 opinion. 
By Justice Powell 
The issue bFfore us is tbe scope of 
the immunity possessed by tbe Presi-
dent of the United States. 
1bia Court has recognized that BOV· 
emment officials are entitled to some 
form of immunity from IUlta for civil 
~ v. ~ou (1978), the 
Court rejected an arJWDent that all 
bigb Federal officiala have a rigbt to 
absolute immunity from constitu-
tiODAl damqe actions. In 10 doinl we 
realflrmed our boldinp that aome of-
tldals, notably Judaes and Pf088CU. 
ton, because of tbe special nature of 
their respcmibilities, require a full 
uemptioo from liability. 
1bia cue now presents tbe claim 
tbat the President of the United States 
· il abielded by absolute immunity from 
civil damaaee liability. Tbi8 inquiry 
involvea policies and principles that 
may be COillidered implicit in the na-
ture of the President's office in a sya-
tem ltrUctured to achieve effective 
pemment Wlder a constitutioaally 
mandated aeparatioo of powers. 
-
Ableoee of Leatslative Action 
Here a former President asserts his 
immunity from civil damages claims 
of two kinds. He stands named as a de-
fendant in a direct action under the 
Constitution and in two statutory ac-
tions under Federal laws of general 
applicability. In neither case has Con-
gress taken express legislative action 
to subject the President to civil liabil-
ity for his official acts . Consequently, 
our holding today need only be that the 
President is absolutely immune from 
civil damages liability for his official 
acts in the absence of explicit affirma-
tive action by Congress. We decide 
only thil constitutional issue, which il 
necessary to disposition of the case be-
fore us. 
We consider this immunity a tunc. 
tionally mandated incident of the 
President's unique office, rooted in 
the constitutional tradition of the 
aeparatioo of powers and lupported 
by our history. 
The President occupies a unique 
position in the constitutional scheme. 
Article II of the Constitution provides 
that "the executive power shall be 
vested in a President of tbe United 
States." 
In arguing that the President is enti-
tled only to qualified immunity, the 
respondent relies on cases in which we 
bave recognized immunity of thil 
scope for pernors and cabinet offi-
cers. We find these cases to be inappc>-
site. 1be President's unique status . 
Wlder the Constitution distinguishes 
liim from other executive officlala. 
'AD Eully ldeatlftable Tarpt' 
Because of the singular importance 
of the President's duties·, diversion of 
his energies by concern with private 
lawsuits would raise unique risks to 
-- --~ 
Immunity __ 
the effective functioning of govern- A rule of absolute immunity for the 
ment. Nor can tbe sheer prominence the i 
of the President's office be ignored. In President will not leave nat on 
view of the vilibllity of his office and without sufficient protection against 
the effect of his actions on countless .misconduct on the part of the chief _ex-
people, the President would be an ecutive. There remains the constitu-
tional remedy of impeachmen_t. In 
easily identifiable target for suits for addition, there are formal and mfor-
civil damages. CoBDizance of thia per- • mal checks on Presidential action that 
IOilal wlnerability frequently could do not apply with equal force to other 
distract a President from his public executive officials. The President is 
duties1 tD the detriment not only of the lllbject to constant scrutiny by the 
• press. Vigilant oversight by Congress 
President and his office but also the also may serve to deter Presidential 
nation that the Presidency was de- abuses of office, as well as to make 
signed to serve. credible the threat of impeachment. 
It is settled law that the separation Other incentives to avoid misconduct 
of powers doctrine does not bar every may include a desire to earn re-elec-
exercile of jurisdiction over the Presi- tion the need to maintain prestige as 
dent of the United States. But our an element of Presidential influence 
cues also bave established. that a and a President's traditional concern 
pourt, before .exercisin8 jurisdiction, for his historical stature. 
Jllust balance the constitutional The existence of alternative reme-
weight of the interest to be served dies and deterrents establishes that 
against the dangers of intrusion on the absolute immunity will not place the 
authority and functions of the execu- President "above the law." For the 
ttve erancb. When judicial action is President, as for judges and pi"Oit!CU-
needed to serve broad public interest tors, absolute immunity merely pre-
- u when the Court acta, not in dero- eludes a particular private remedy 
ption of the separtion of powers but for alleged misconduct in order to ad-
to maintain their proper balance, cf. vance compellin8 public ends. 
!Younptown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw- · 
yer [the 111152 . steel seizure case 1, or to By Justice White, 
vindicate the public interest in an oo-
aotn& crlminal prosecution, see 
Vnited States v. Nixon [the lt74 
Watergate tapes case]- the uercile 
bf jurildictioo has been held warrant-
ed. In the cue of this merely private 
IUit for damages based on a Presi-
dent's official acta, we hold it is not. 
Dissenting 
In view of the special nature of the 
President'• coostitutional office and 
functiuons, we think it appropriate to 
recosntze absolute Presidential im-
munity from damages liability for 
acts within tbe "outer perimeter" of 
~ offici81 reaponsibility. 
J do not agree that if the office of 
President is to operate effectively, the 
bolder of tbat office must be permit-
, ted without fear of liability and re-
, p,:.ness of the function he is perform-
! 
1n3, deliberately to infUct injury on 
others by oonduct that be lmowl vio-
I Protec1oa AplDit MIHGadiiCt 
, • Here respondent argues that peti-
tioner Nixon would have acted outside 
the outer peri.ter of his duties by or-
dering the discharge of an employee 
1 who wu lawfully entitled to retain his 
1 Job. 1bia construction would subject 
the President to trial Oil virtually ' 
f/Yery allegation that an action was 
amlawful or was taken for a forbidden 
purpose. Adoption of this constroction 
Jbus would deprive absolute immunity 
of ita intended effect. We conclude 
~t petitioner's alleged wrongful acts 
lay well within the outer perimeter of 
lUI. authority. 
lates the law. · --
. In Marbury v. Madison (1803), the 
Court .oblerved that while there were 
"important political pawers" com-
mitted to the President for tbe per-
formance of which neither be nor hia 
appointees were accountable in court, 
"the question, whether the lepllty of 
tbe act of the bead of a department be 
ea.._lna~le In a court of jueUce or DOt, 
mUit alwaya depend on tbe aatun of 
tbeact." 
The Court nevertbelea ""'- to 
. follow this COW'M with ..-pect to tbe 
President. It malu!l no effort to diatln-
auilh cateaories of Presidential ~ 
CJuct that lbould be absolutely im-
mune from other cateaortes of ~ 
duct that abould not qualify for that 
level of lmmUDity. Tbe Court ma-d 
CODcludes that wbatever tbe Pl'S-
deot does aDd however caatrary to law . 
be 1mowa bil conduct to be, be may, 
. wttbout fear of .UabWty, injure Fed-
eral .nployees or any other per'IOI1 
witbin or without the GoYemmeot. 
Attadlin& at.olute immUDity to the 
office of the Plaideot, ratber than to 
putk:ular activitlee that the Pl'S-
deot milbt perform, pau. tbe Presi-
deat abOve tbe law. It 18 a revmstou to 
tbe old DOtion that the kial can do 110 
, Wl"CCDD· . 
•A Frtwluw c.--dee' 
The Court cuually, but candidly, I 
ahandone the funct1onal approacb to 
· tm .~ty that bu run tbrouP all of 
our deciaiona. Indeed, the majority 
turDI this nJle on Ita bMd by cleclartDa 
that becaute the fuDctiOal of tbe 
Presldeot'a office are 10 YUied ud 
dlverle aDd IOlDe ol them 10 ~ 
foundly important, the office II Uldque 
ud muat be clothed with oftlc.wide, 
~ute lmmUDity. 'lbllll policy, DOt 
law, and In my view, very poor policy. 
The suuestion that eofon:emeDt of 
the nale of law - i.e., IUbJectin& the 
President to nJles of pneral appUca-
billty - does DOt further the Mpara-
. uon of powers, but rather II in derop-
uon of this pul'IQ8, II blzarn. Re-
~-of wbat the Court mJabt tbiJik 
Of the meritl of Mr. Fttrprald'l 
claim, the Idea that punult of lep1 re-
dreu offends the doctrine of Mpara-
tlon of powers Ia a frivolous conteotion 
puatng u lepl aJ'IUII*lt. It canDOt 
be 1er1auaay arsuect that the President 
mUit be placed beyond the law ud be-
=~udldal enforcement ol CODititu-
re.trainta upon aec::utM offt-
cenln order to impl.neat tbe priDcl-
ple of aeparation of powen. 
Tbe maJOrltY may be Ciirrect bi tca-
CODClUiion that "a rule of abiOluae tm-
mUDity 1rill not I•ve tbe D8tkiD with-
out IUfflcient remedies fur llli8coD-
. duct on the part of tbe c:bief ..ec:. 
'· tlve." 1be remedies ba wblcb the 
' Court ftnds comfort ......... de-
atped to afford reUef fw IDdMdual 
barml. Rather, thaywerecleltpedu 
poUUcal aafety YaM. .. PoUUc:a ud 
blltory, however, are DOt tbe domain 
ol the OOUI'tl; the courtl alit to ... 
lUre eacb Individual that be, u an tn-
dlvtdual, bu eaforceable rtptl that 
be may punue to ac:hHMt a peiCifu1 
~of btl Jealtimate~. 
I find It Ironic, u well u trqlc, that 
tbe Court would 10 ~y dlllc:ard hi 
· own role of uaur1aa '"die rflbt of 
every Individual to ciatm tbe protec. 
tlon of the laWI" (Manury V. M8di-
101l), In the name of P*~ tbe 
prtnciple of aeparatlon ofpowen. 
Court Rules for Nixon, 5·4 
Presidents Given Immunity From Suits 
By Fred Barbash ·-
WW!hln11ton Post St.att Writer 
A bitterly divided Supreme Court 
ruled yesterday that presidents may 
not be sued for monetary damages 
even if they break the law or violate 
citizens' constitutional rights. 
The 5-to-4 de(ision, sought by 
former president Richard M. Nixon 
after being sued by one-time Pen-
tagon cost analyst A. Ernest Fitzger-
ald, created an absolute presidential 
im~nunity from civil damages suits 
and, the majority said, from the in-
hibiting and time-consuming results 
of the thousands of such suits that 
could be brought against a chief ex- • 
ecutive. 
The court refused to similarly 
shield top aides to the president, 
ruling in a complaint brought by 
Fitzgerald against Nixon aides Bryce 
N. Harlow and Alexander P. Butter-
field. 
Justice Byron R. White, writing 
the dissent on the Nixon ·ruling, 
called Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.'s 
majority opinion on presidential im-
munity "tragic." It "is a reversion to 
the old notion that the king can do 
no ·wrong," he said. It "places the 
president above the law." Justices 
William J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood 
Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun 
joined White in dissent. 
In the course of ruling on the two 
complaints yesterday, the court 
made another major change in laws 
designed to deter official miscon-
duct: the justices, apparently in re· 
action to thousands of damages 
claims now swamping state, local 
and federal officials as well as·police 
officers, gave judges new authority tO 
weed out frivolous or insubstantial 
suits without requiring lengthy and 
costly trials. 
Trials will be permitted only 
where a judge agrees that a "clearly 
established" breach of a law or con-
stitutional right is involved, the 
court said in an 8-to-1 vote on Har-
low us. Fitzgerald. 
Fitzgerald was the analyst with 
the Air Force who drew national at-
tention as "the Pentagon whistle 
blower" when he testified before a 
Senate subcommittee in 1968 con-
See COURT, A6, Col. 1 
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cerning $2 billion in cOBt overruns and 
~ .. · tmexpected technical difficulties on the 
C5A transport plane. 
The Nixon administration eliminated 
· Fitzgerald's job in 1970, claiming his re-
moval was only part of an Air Force re-
·1>rganization. At a 1973 news conference, 
Nixon took personal credit for Fitzger-
ald's dismissal: "It was a decision that 
.:· was submitted to me," the president said 
. on Jan. 31, 1973. "I made it and I stick 
by it." 
· · . Nixon later retracted the comment. 
But Fitzgerald sued him for damages in 
1978 for violating his free speech rights, 
adding the former president as a defen-
dant to the suit he had already brought 
against the two Nixon White House aides 
he said participated in the decision, But-
terfield and Harlow. 
Nixon claimed total immunity as pres-
ident from such suits. Harlow and But-
.. terfield claimed that they shared that 
immunity.~. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia rejected all the 
claims, just as it had earlier in a suit 
brought against Nixon, Henry A. Kiss-
inger and others by former National Se-
curity Council staffer Morton Halperin. 
The immunity granted by the court 
yesterday extends to all "official" acts of 
the president. But Powell disputed the 
contention that he was placing the preR-
ident "above the law," saying that there 
are still adequate deterrents to presiden-
tial misconduct, including impeachment. 
He noted that, as in the- Watergate tapes 
case, the president could be subjected to 
subpoenas, to "constant scrutiny by the 
press" and to "vigilant oversight" by Con-
gress. 
· At the same time, he said the Consti-
tution, in its separation of powers provi-
sions, requires that the chief executive be 
allowed to exercise his powers. "The pres-
ident's unique status under the Consti-
tution distinguishes him from other ex-
ecutive officials," Powell said. "Because of 
the singular importance of the president's 
duties, diversion of his energies by con-
cern with private lawsuits would raise 
unique risks to the effective functioning 
of government." 
The chief executive now joins a select 
group of officials immunized by the Su-
preme Court, including Supreme Court 
justices, other judges and prosecutors. 
The Constitution explicitly protects 
members of Congress from having to an-
swer in the courts for official decisions. 
Presidential immunity, under Powell's 
ruling, appeared to be even broader than 
theirs, reachipg, as . he put it, to "the 
outer perimeter" of the presidency. 
The court has extended much less pro-
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
. .. calls immunity decision frightening 
tection to all other public officials rang-
ing from Cabinet officers to police offi-
cers to dog catchers. They may not be 
sued for actions taken in "good faith." 
In ruling on the Harlow and Butter-
field case, the court said they and other 
top presidential aides ordinarily enjoy 
only that same "good faith" immunity 
that protects the other officials. 
Except in special circumstances, per-
haps involving foreign policy or national 
security decisions and where they func-
tion as "alter egos" of the president, these 
top-level White House assistants should 
be treated like Cabinet members, Powell 
. said. 
But in an important victory for these 
aides and holders of public office every-
where, the court radically altered the de-
finition of "good faith." In the past, they 
lost their protection if they acted "with 
malicious intention" to break a law or 
violate a citizen's rights. Powell said that 
was too subjective and often resulted in 
trials or lengthy and expensive fact-gath-
. ering expeditions just to resolve the im-
munity issue. 
Yesterday, the court said they could be 
sued only when the law or constitutional 
safeguard breached "was clearly estab-
lished at the time an action occurred." 
If not, Powell said the judge should 
dismiss the case without a trial. He said 
this frees ofticials from harassment 
through frivolous or insubstantial suits: 
"The social costs include expenses of lit-
igation, the diversion of official energy 
from pressing public issues, and the de-
terrence of able citizens from acceptance 
of public office." 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dis-
sented in Harlow us. Fitzgerald, saying 
that presidential aides should share pres- ' 
idential immunity, as Capitol Hill aides 
are sometimes allowed under court rul-
ings to share legislative immunity. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall , Black-
mun, White and William H. Rehnquist 
joined in separate statements, but with 
John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day 
O'Connor, also agreed with Powell 's ma-
jority opinion. 
In Nixon us. Fitzgerald, the absolute-
immunity decision, Blackmun, joined by 
Brennan and Marshall, wrote a dissent in 
addition to White's. 
The court attempted unsuccessfully to 
resolve these same questions last year in 
Halperin's case. It resulted in a 4-to-4 
split, when Rehnquist disqualified him-
self because he had been a member of 
the Nixon Justice Department. That case 
is still in the U.S. District Court in 
Washington, awaiting yesterday's ruling 
for further action. 
Some justices thought the issue should 
have been left unresolved again this 
term, because of an out-of-court settle-
ment between Nixon and Fitzgerald. 
Under that agreement Nixon agreed to . 
pay $142,000 to Fitzgerald in exchange 
for the dropping of the suit. Nixon 
agreed to pay Fitzgerald another $28,000 
should Fitzgerald win the immunity issue 
at the Supreme Court. Thus, no matter 
how the court ruled yesterday, there 
would be no trial ' of Nixon under the 
agreement. 
Blackmun, with Brennan and Mar -
. shall, called this a "wager" yesterday, 
which, they said, made the case inappro-
p'riate for review . 
Fitzgerald, who won a :;eparate legal 
battle for reinstatement on Jut:te 15, said 
yesterday that the immunity decision 
"ought to frighten anyone who loves lib-
erty. If the king can do no wrong, we're 
in a lot of trouble." His suit against Har-
low and Butterfield goes back to the Dis-
trict Court for further consideration. 
Arthur Spitzer, an American Civil Lib-
erties Union official here, said the deci-
sion "puts the president. above the law." 
A Nixon lawyer, R. Stan Mortenson, 
praised the ruling, saying that t.he pres-
idency should have the same immunity 
enjoyed by the top officials in the other 
branch~s of government. 
Elliot L. Richardson, representing 
Harlow and Butterfield, applauded the 
ruling in his clients' case and said "public 
officials from local school board members 
to White House advisers and the public 
itself" should also applaud it. 
Washington Post researcher Carin 
Pratt contributed to this artic:le. 
Court Rules for Nixon., 5·4 
Presidents Given Immunity From Suits 
By Fred Barbash · ~ 
Wll.'!hlngton Post Staff Writer 
A bitterly divided Supreme Court 
ruled yesterday that presidents may 
not be sued for monetary damages 
even if they l)reak the law or violate 
citizens' constitutional rights. 
The 5-to-4 de(ision, sought by 
former president Richard M. Nixon 
after being sued by one-time Pen-
tagon cost analyst A. Ernest Fitzger-
ald, created an absolute presidential 
immunity from civil damages suits 
and, the majority said, from the in-
hibiting and time-consuming results 
of the thousands of such suits that 
rould be brought against a chief ex- • 
ecutive. 
The court refused to similarly 
shield top aides to the president, 
ruling in a complaint brought by 
Fitzgerald against Nixon aides Bryce 
N. Harlow and Alexander P. Butter-
field. 
Justice Byron R. White, writing 
the dissent on the Nixon ruling, 
called Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.'s 
majority opinion on presidential im-
munity "tragic." It "is a reversion to 
the old notion that the king can do 
no · wrong," he said. It "places the 
president above the law." Justices 
William J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood 
Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun 
joined White in dissent. 
In the course of ruling on the two 
complaints yesterday, the court 
made another major change in laws 
designed to deter official miscon-
duct: the justices, apparently in re-
action to thousands of damages 
claims now swamping state, local 
and federal officials as well as·police 
officers, gave judges new authority tO 
weed out frivolous or insubstantial 
suits without requiring lengthy and 
costly trials. 
Trials will be permitted only 
where a judge agrees that a "clearly 
established" breach of a law or con-
stitutional right is involved, the 
court said in an 8-to-1 vote on Har-
low us. Fitzgerald. 
Fitzgerald was the analyst with 
the Air Force who drew national at-
tention as "the Pentagon whistle 
blower" when he testified before a 
Senate subcommittee in 1968 con-
See COURT, A6, Col. 1 
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cerning $2 billion in coet overruns and 
··· · · Wlexpected technical difficulties on the 
C5A transport plane. 
The Nixon administration eliminated 
Fitzgerald's job in 1970, claiming his re-
moval was only part of an Air Force re-
'Organization. At a 1973 news conference, 
Nixon took personal credit for Fitzger-
ald's dismissal: "It was a decision that 
'·· was submitted to me," the president said 
on Jan. 31, 1973. "I made it and I stick 
by it." 
·.: · . Nixon later retracted the comment. 
But Fitzgerald sued him for damages in 
1978 for violating his free speech rights, 
adding the former president as a defen-
dant to the suit he had already brought 
against the two Nixon White House aides 
he said participated in the decision, But-
terfield and Harlow. 
Nixon claimed total immunity as pres-
ident from such suits. Harlow and But-
terfield claimed that they shared that 
immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia rejected all the 
claims, just as it had earlier in a suit 
brought against Nixon, Henry A. Kiss-
inger and others by former National Se-
curity Council staffer Morton Halperin. 
The . immunity granted by the court 
yesterday extends to all "official" acts of 
the president. But Powell disputed the 
contention that he was placing the pres-
ident "above the law," saying that there 
are still adequate deterrents to presiden-
tial misconduct, including impeachment. 
He noted that, as in the Watergate tapes 
case, the president could be subjected to 
subpoenas, to "constant scrutiny by the 
press" and to "vigilant oversight" by Con-
gress. 
At the same time, he said the Consti-
tution, in its separation of powers provi-
sions, requires that the chief executive be 
allowed to exercise his powers. "The pres-
ident's unique status under the Consti-
tution distinguishes him from other ex-
ecutive officials," Powell said. "Because of 
the singular importance of the president's 
duties, diversion of his energies by con-
cern with private lawsuits would raise 
unique risks to the effective functioning 
of government." 
The chief executive now joins a select 
group of officials immunized by the Su-
preme Court, including Supreme Court 
justices, other judges and prosecutors. 
The Constitution explicitly protects 
members of Congress from having to an-
swer in the courts for official decisions. 
Presidential immunity, under Powell's 
ruling, appeared to be even broader than 
theirs, reachipg, as . he put it, to "the 
outer perimeter" of the presidency. 
The court has extended much less pro-
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
... calls immunity decision frightening 
tection to all other public officials rang-
ing from Cabinet officers to police offi-
cers to dog catchers. They may not be 
sued for actions taken in "good faith ." 
In ruling on the Harlow and Butter-
field case, the court said they and other 
top presidential aides ordinarily enjoy 
only that same "good faith" immunity 
that protects the other officials. 
Except in special circumstances, per-
haps involving foreign policy or national 
security decisions and where they func-
tion as "alter egos" of the president, these 
top-level White House assistants should 
be treated like Cabinet members, Powell 
. said. 
But in an important victory for these 
aides and holders of public office every-
where, the court radically altered the de-
finition of "good faith." In the past, they 
lost their protection if they acted "with 
malicious intention" to break a law or 
violate a citizen's rights. Powell said that 
was too subjective and often resulted in 
trials or lengthy and expensive fact-gath-
. ering expeditions just to resolve the im-
munity issue. 
Yesterday, the court said they could be 
sue only when the law or constitutional 
safeguard breached "was clearly estab-
lished at the time an action occurred." 
If not, Powell said the judge should 
dismiss the case without a trial. He said 
this frees ofticials from harassment 
through frivolous or insubstantial suits: 
"The social costs include expenses of lit-
igation, the diversion of official energy 
from pressing public issues, and the de-
terrence of able citizens from acceptance 
of public office." 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dis-
sented in Harlow us. Fitzgerald, saying 
that presidential aides should share pres- ' 
iden~ia1 immunity, as Capitol Hill aides 
are sometimes allowed under court rul-
ings to share legislative immunity. 
Justice!! Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, White and William H. Rehnquist 
joined in separate statements, but with 
John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day 
O'Connor, also agreed with Powell's ma-
, jority opinion. 
[n Nixon us. Fitzgerald, the absolute-
immunity decision, Blackmun, joined by 
Brennan and Marshall, wrote a dissent in 
addition to White's. 
The court attempted unsuccessfully to 
resolve these same questions last year in 
Halperin's case. It resulted in a 4-to-4 
split, when Rehnquist disqualified him-
self because he had been a member of 
the Nixon Justice Department. That case 
is still in the U.S. District Court in 
Washin{,tt.on, awaiting yesterday's ruling 
for further action. 
Some justices thought the issue should 
have been left unresolved again this 
term, because of an out-of-court settle-
ment between Nixon and Fitzgerald. 
Under that agreement Nixon agreed to . 
pay $142,000 to Fitzgerald in exchange 
for the dropping of the suit. Nixon 
agreed to pay Fitzgerald another $28,000 
should Fitzgerald win the immunity issue 
at the Supreme Court. Thus, no matter 
how the court ruled yesterday, there 
would be no trial ' of Nixon under the 
agreement. 
Blackmun, with Brennan and Mar-
. shall, called this a "wager" yesterday, 
which, they said, made the case inappro-
p'riate for review . 
Fitzgerald, who won a separate legal 
battle for reinstatement on Jul)e 15, said 
yesterday that the immunity decision 
"ought to frighten anyone who loves lib-
erty. If the king can do no wrong, we're 
in a lot of trouble." His suit against Har-
low and Butterfield goes back to the Dis-
trict Court for further consideration. 
Arthur Spitzer, an American Civil Lib-
erties Union official here, sajd the deci-
sion "puts the president above the law." 
A Nixon lawyer, R. Stan Mortenson, 
praised the ruling, saying that the pres-
idency should have the same immunity 
enjoyed by the top officials in the other 
br.anchl!s of government. 
Elliot L. Richardson, representing 
Harlow and Butterfield, applauded the 
ruling in his clients' case and said "public 
officials from local school board members 
to White House advisers and the public 
itself" should also applaud it. 
Washington Post researcher Carin 
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HIGH COURT HOLDS. I • 
PRESIDENT IMMUNE 
F.ROM DAMAGE SUITS 
5-4 RULING ON NIXON ·CASE 
C~mpanion. Decision Upholds 
'Qualifjed' Protection for 
Chief Executive's Aides 
8J LINDA GREENHOUSE 
., ....... n.,.._Yift,_. 
WASHINGTON, JUDe 24- Tbe Su-
preme Court nded 5 to 4 today tbat DO 
P!Sdent may-be IU8d for cSamape for 
any otftcial actiGil be takes wbile in of-
flee. 
OYertumin& a lower court ruUn& in a 
IUft lpinlt former Prelident Richard 
M. Nixao, the Court declared tbat "ab-
.Excerpta from the rult,.,s, page Al2. 
IOlute PrSdeotial immunity" Ia a 
"functiooally mudated inddent of the 
Premdent'aiiDique office, rooted In the 
9QIWtitutioaal traditiOil of tbe eepara-
. tAm of powers al)d supported by our JU. 
lOry." 
ID a compaid011 l'llliD&. tbe Court r&-
fuled, 8 to 1, to accord tbe same abeo-
lute immunity to top Presidential advts-
.... But the Justices effectively rewrote 
tbe law of "quallfied immunity" tbat 
appU• to most Federal aDd ltate otri-
clall, JDaldDa it IIUbstantially more 
llbly tbat courts wtl.l dlamiu IUita 
apinlt IIUCb officials before trial. 
CGart Bitterly DIYidecl . I 
· Becauae officials covered by "quali-
fied immunity" are sued much more 
often tban tbe President, tbe companiOD 
ruUna bu more practical llplficance 
tban the ru.Ung Oil Presidential immuni-
ty. 
But It was the decision 011 P!Sden-
tlal immunity tbat left the Court bit-
terly divided after almost teveo IDOiltbs 
of arappJJD& with the Cue. Tbe rulin& 
wu 011 a damqe IU!t by a former Air 
Force budpt analyst, A. Er1*t Fltz.. 
...-ud. wboc:blqec( tlllltlle ..... bil 
job a a nnlt of a White Bo.e CC1118ptr-
acy to deprive b1m of bil dvll rtpta. Be 
wu dlamlued after apo~inl a.t over-
niDI m tbe CS-A tnmport pl&De. 
Tbe ruHnp CDDCemed Ollly immunity 
from dvlllllita for damlpa, DOt from 
crtminal proMICUti0111 or from other 
types of judicial actt011. Tbe majority 
made c:1eu tbat it ... DOt cuttna any 
doubt Oil tbe Court'• 1874 rulin& tbat 1'&-
- quired Pr'811deut Nlml to tum over the 
Waterpte tapel. Today'1 ruUq wu 
bued larply 011 what Aaoclate JUitlce 
Lewla F. PonD h . called tbe- '"pablic 
Ceatlaaed• .... AU, Cel-· 
High Court Rules President.ls Immune From Civil 
CGntfnued From Pqe Al 
interest" in permitting a President to 
· act as he aees fit without fear of being 
sued, 1 
Justice Powell wrote the majority 
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren 
E. Burger and Associate Justices Wil-
liam H. Rebnquiat, Jolm Paul Stevens 
and Sandra Day O'Connor. 
Aasoclate Justice Byron R. White's 
diaaenting opinioa, which labeled the 
majority Nling "tragic" and "bi-
zarre," was joined by Associate Jus-
tices William J. Brennan Jr., ThW"Jood 
Marsball and Harry A. Blackmun. 
The Supreme Court has accorded ab-
eolute immunity from civil suits to 
j~es and prosecutors, and Justice 
Powell said tbat, like tboee officiala, "a 
President must coocem himself with 
matters likely to arouse the moat in-
tense feelings." 
"Yet, as obr decisions have recog-
nized," he continued, "it is In precisely 
such cases that there exists the greatest 
Aaodate Justlee Lewis F. Powell 
Jr. wrote tbe majority opbdoa. 
public interest in providing an official • ----,= =====-----
the maximum ability to deal fearlessly 
and ims-rtially with the duties of his of-
fice. This concern is compelling where 
the offtcebolder must make the most 
sensitive and far-r.cbin& deciaioos eo-
said he was "obviously not" pleased 
with the ruling, which he said "ought 
to frighten anyone wbo loves lib-
erty."] i 
Justice Powell said that the decision 
"will not leave the nation without suffi. · 
cient protection against ~uct on 
the part of the chief executive." The 1m-
trusted to any official wxler our coosti- peachment process, as well as "coo-
tutioaal system." stant scrutiny by the press" and "vtgi-
Tbe majority rejected the argument lant oversight by Congress," be said, 
that the scope of a President's im- will insure that "abeolute immunity 
munity sbould be limited to particular wtll not place the Prelident 'above the 
functions, concluding that absolute im- law.' " 
munity extends to all "acts within the In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
'outer perj.meter' of his official respon- White disagreed with that analysis. The 
sibillty." Mr. Fitzgerald' bad argued majority, he said, "CODCludel that 
that whatever immunity a President whatever the President does and bow-
might enjoy should not extend to dis- ever contrary to law ·he knows his coo-
c:barJinlcivilservants. duct to be, he may, Without fear of u. 
Mr. FitzBerald recently settled a ability, injure Federal employees or 
separate suit against the Federal Gov- any other per&Qil wi~ or without the 
emment, winning back ~ job and Government." 
S3QO,OOOinlegal fees. "Attaching abeolute immunity to the 
Earlier, be and Mr. Nixon bad en- office of the President, rather than to 
tered into an agreement to avoid a trial particular activities that the President 
of his damage suit no matter bow the might perform, places the Prelident 
Supreme Court ruled on the Immunity above the law," Justice White 'oontin-
issue. Mr. Nixon paid him $142,000 and ued. "It is a revenion to the old notion 
would have paid him $28,000 more bad l that the king can do no WI'OIII·" 
the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of I Aldie Al8o Named Ill Suit 
the United States Court of Appeals for . 
the District of Columbia that the Prell- ' In his $3.5 million lawsuit, Mr. Fltz.. 
dent did not have absolute Immunity. \ geral~ also named two of President 
[1be Associated Press quoted a Nixoo s senior &Idee, Bryce N. Barlow 
IQ)Okesman for Mr. Nixon in New 1 and Aluander · P. Butterfteld. They 
York. Nicholas Ruwe as saying, argued that they, too, were entitled to 
"Foriner President NtxOO's custom is abeolute immunity "derivative" of the 
1 not to comment on court decisions." President's. · 
Mr. fitzprald at a news conference, The Court rejected that &rJWDent in a 
' separate opinion by Justice Powell, 
with oaly Chief Justice Burpr &l'IUing 
in dissent that abeolute Immunity was 
necessary to protect the President's 
"alter egos" from the same Pl'eiiiW'el 
from which immunity protected the 
President. 
· "8Ui_t.D_niuna that Mr. Harlow and Mr. 
Butterfield were entitled oaly to the 
"qualified immunity" the Court bas 
previously accorded to Cabinet officers, 
pemors and other officiala, .the Jus-
tices aave "qualltied Immunity" a new 
definition. . · 
In the past, Justice Powell noted, an 
official claiming "qualified immunity" 
bad to meet both an objective &Dd a~ 
jectlve teat. 
Objectively, the official bad to prove 
tbat be did not know, or CfJU)d not rea-
sooably have been upected to know, 
that be bad violated the plaintiff's lepl 
~ ,constitutional rtahts. Subjectively, 
be also had to prove that be bad DOt 
acted "With malicious intent." 
While the objective test can often be 
met by demonstrating that the law wu 
unclear or the constitutional right UDd~ 
fined at the time of the events, It bas 
been much harder for offldals to prove 
their lack of malice. 
Subjeetlve Alpeet Eadld 
The Court today abollsbed the subjec-
tive aspect of qualified immunity. , 
Justice Powell said: "Government 
officials performing discretioaary func.. 
tioos &enerally are shielded from liabil-
Ity for civil damages insofar u their 
conduct does not violate cl~ estab-
lilbed statutory or conatltuti rilbts 
of which a reasonable pei'BOil would 
bave lmown." 
In practical terms, the new definition 
means that officials wbo are sued will 
be much more likely to succeed in bav-
in&lluits dismiued on "summary judg-
ment" before trial. Judi• oow relate 
to grant ~ judgment because 
the official's state of mind is an issue 
that typically has to be decided by a 
jury after conflictln& evldeoce is beard. 
State of m1Dd will no DO loDpr be an 
~- . 
As a result of the ruling 011 PI_.. 
tiallmmunlty, ln the cue of NIJon v. 
Fitzgerald (No. '19-1738), Mr. Pttz&er-
ald's lawsuit will be clismiued by tbe 
appeala court. 1n the second rullna, ln 
the cue of Harlow and Butterfleld v. 
Fitzgerald (No. 80-MS), the Supreme 
Court vacated the appeals CllJU!t's Nl-
inl Oil qualified immunl~ordered 
lt to take "twtber actioD COIIIIIttDt 
with this oplnlon." -/ 
Elliot L. Rlchardlon, wbo repr. 
sented the two officiala in the Supreme 
Court, said today that be was "CODS-
dent" that the suit qaiJult tbem would 
oow be dlamtsaed. 
Suits 
June 30, 1982 
JUL 1 .. 1982 
The Honorable Harry A. Blackmun 
Supreme Court of the United States 
c/o the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
of the United States 
One First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Blackmun: 
It has come to my attention that there is a 
factual error in the letter I sent to you on June 29, 1982. 
I stated in the first paragraph of that letter that I no 
longer represented Mr. Fitzgerald when the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was filed on Mr. Nixon's behalf in 
the Supreme Court. In fact, the Petition was filed on 
May 2, 1~80, and I ceased representing Mr. Fitzgerald on 
July 20, 1981. I apologize for the error. 
While this change makes no difference at all in 
terms of the points I was making in my letter, I did want 
to make certain that the letter was in all respects accurate. 
EBP;pmd 
cc: All Members of the Court 




815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20006 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UN'ITED STATES · 
WASHINGTON , D . C ., 20543 
July 7, 1982 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No. 79-1738; and 
Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, 
No. 80-945 
In the above cases I have prepared judgments pursuant 
to Rule 50.2 dealing with costs. There was only one joint 
appendix prepared by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield for 
use in both of the cases for a total cost of $26,649.57. I am 
concerned with the award of total costs against Mr. Fiizgerald. 
Certainly, in the Nixon case, which is a true reversal, Mr. 
Fitzgerald should bear the costs. In the Harlow, et al., case, 
while the opinion provides that the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated (The Court of Appeals apparently dismissed 
petitioners' appeal from the denial of their immunity defense), 
the Supreme Court has remanded the case so the District Court 
may reconsider respondent's pretrial showing, in connection 
with petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Hence, it does 
not truly appear that petitioners prevailed in this Court. 
It might be more equitable to apportion the total 
printing cost so that Fitzgerald would pay costs in the Nixon 
case and split the cost with respect to the Harlow, et al., 
case for a total of two-thirds of the costs of printing the 
joint appendix. Petitioners Harlow and Butterfield would bear 
the additional one-third printing cost. I have prepared a pro-
posed judgment that provides Harlow and Butterfield to recover 
$17,766.38 from Fitzgerald which would represent the printing 
cost of petitioner Nixon and one-half of the cost of printing in 
the Harlow, et al., case. I am also attaching a proposed judg-
ment that awards total costs against Fitzgerald. 
Attachments 
Respectfully submitted, 
Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk 
dfl 07/08/82 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Costs in Harlow and Nixon--## 80-945 and 79-1738 
The cost of printing the joint appendix in these 
cases came to $26,949.57. There was only one joint appendix 
in the two cases. 
Clerk Stevas proposes that Fitzgerald pick up 2/3 of 
the tab. He reasons that there were three defendants and that 
the cost of printing may be thought of as divided among the 
three. Fitzgerald clearly lost in Nixon and so he must pay 
Nixon's third. But Fitzgerald did not clearly lose in Harlow. 
The judgment below was vacated, and normally if the judgment 
below is vacated the winner below--Fitzgerald, here--pays the 
costs. Yet in this case Harlow and Butterfield were also 
losers: their claim of absolute immunity was rejected. 
Because of the uncertainty Clerk Stevas suggests that you 
split the difference between Harlow/Butterfield and 
Fitzgerald. Thus of the remaining two thirds of expense 
Fitzgerald would pay 1/3 and Harlow and Butterfield would make 
up the remaining third. 
Clerks Stevas' recommendation is reasonable. I'm 
inclined to think, however, that even though the decision 
2. 
below--an order of dismissal without opinion--was vacated, 
Harlow and Butterfield really did lose. They brought the 
matter here on an interlocutory appeal to establish absolute 
immunity for presidential advisers. I think that a fairer way 
to apportion costs would be to think of costs as divided in 
two between the two cases. Fitzgerald won one case and lost 
one. He should pay Nixon's half or $13,474.79. 
July 12, 1982 
Nos. 79-1738 and 80-945, Nixo~ and ~~rlow cases 
Dear Byron, 
In enclose copies of Al Stevas' letter of July 7 
and of two drafts of proposed judgments: one that would 
impose the total $26,900.57 costs on Fitzgerald, and the 
other that would split the costs two-thirds to Fitzgerald 
and one third to Harlow and Butterfield. 
Al recommends the latter (i.e. the division of the 
costs). I am inclined to agree with his recommendation. 
I doubt the fairness of imposing the total costs on 
Fitzgerald. He did not clearly lose in Harlow. The 
judgment below was vacated, and normally this would 
result in Fitzgerald paying the costs. Yet, Harlow and 
Butterfield failed in their claim of absolute immunity. 
They are better postured to preva 1 on the remand in view 
of the ~ed standard. 
What do you think? 
Mr. Justice White 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Sincerely, 
' . 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
.invrttttt <!Jo-urto-f tlrt ~tb .itatts-
~Iringtttn, ~. (!f. 20biJl.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WH ITE 
July 16, 1982 
Re: 79-1738 and 80-945: 
Nixon and Harlow cases 
Dear Lewis, 
Your recommendation on the division of 
costs in these cases is fine with me. 
No big deal in Utah, but I've always 
disliked being blind-sided. Fred Graham was 
on the spot and helped subdue the aggressor. 
Fred apparently was protecting my First 
Amendment right to speak. 




July 20, 1982 
Dear Al T 
Thank you for your letter of July 7, that finally 
reached me here in Richmond. 
Justice White and I both agree with your recommendation 
to apportion the total printing costs two- thirds to Fitz-
gerald and one-third to Harlow and Butterfield. 




(j}J. Alexander L. Stevas, Esquire 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. c. 20543 
cc : Mr. Justice White 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. c. 20543 
Sincerely , 
CHA M B E RS OF 
T H E C HIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.pumt <!J:llltti of t4t ~b, .itatts: 
~as:fringhtn. !1. <If. 2ll~~~ 
f~ 
June 9, 1982 ~
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lew is: 
The "closing crunch" is always bad and worse this year. 
But the pressures must not lead us into grave errors of 
constitutional dimensions. I cannot believe that Bill and Sandra 
like Note 27 1 for it significantly undermines the entire holding 
of this case. For the Court to make a ConscDEutional holding and 
then give intimations that Congress -- under some circumstances 
-- could change it, does even more than undermine the immediate 
holding. It would inevitably add a new dimension to the now 
dormant drive in Congress to curtail the Court's jurisdiction. 
So far as I am concerned Congress can no more alter or modify the 
basic holding of this case than it can modify or overrule Marbury 
v. Madison, Brown v. Board of Education, or Nixon v. u.s .. Had 
the matter remained dormant I could have joined the opinion with 
a reservation that I did not agree with Footnote 27. But Har~'s 
opinion flushed the point directly . we simply cannot have it 
both ways. Perhap~next sfep is to have a session with the 
five who are in the majority and see if this can ' t be hammered 
out . I will make myself available at any time . 
Regards, 
Just ice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
,juvutttt <!fouriltf tlrt 'Jiittittb ,jtatts 
'J»a~fringtut4 !9. <!f. 21l~.l1,;l 
June 9, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
If we are to continue the two year debate (happily 
outside of our opinions!), the Time magazine article 
confirms that, indeed, a President is not above the law. 
The Nixon Tapes Case and the imminent impeachment 
resolution, made this clear. I could find nothing in the 
Time review about private damage suit actions. 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
ss 
June 9, 1982 
PERSONAL 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief: 
You will not bP. surprised that vour letter of this 
afternoon, requiri.ng that we carry this case over, comes as 
more than a little disappointing - especially as it comeR in 
the "closing crunch" of the Term. 
But, of course, any member of this Court has this 
privilege, and I appreciate that you have reservations about 
the opinion - although it has been substantially in this 
form for some time. 
In any event, I am agreeable to getting the five 
of us together to discuss your concern. I hope this can he 
done on Fridav or Mondav at the latest. 
I assume that at Conference tomorrow you will say 
simply that you are not ready for Nixon and Harlow to come 
down. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
Circulated: ________ _ 
9 JUN 1982 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1738 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The four dissenting members of the Court in Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), argued that all federal offi-
cials are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for any ac-
tion they take in connection with their official duties. That 
immunity would extend, even to actions taken with express 
knowledge that the conduct was clearly contrary to the con-
trolling statute or clearly violative of the Constitution. For-
tunately, the majority of the Court rejected that approach: 
We held that although public officials perform certain func-
tions that entitle them to absolute immunity, the immunity 
attaches to particular functions-not to particular offices. 
Officials performing functions for which immunity is not abso-
lute enjoy qualified immunity; they are liable in damages only 
if their conduct violated well-established law and if they 
should have realized that their conduct was illegal. 
The Court now applies the dissenting view in Butz to the 
office of the President: A President acting within the outer 
boundaries of what Presidents normally do may, without li-
ability, deliberately cause serious injury to any number of cit-
izens even though he knows his conduct violates a statute or 
tramples on the constitutional rights of those who are in-
jured. Even if the President in this case ordered Fitzgerald 
fired by means of a trumped-up reduction in force, knowing 
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that such a discharge was contrary to the civil service laws, 
he would be absolutely immune from suit. By the same to-
ken, if a President, without following the statutory proce-
dures which he knows apply to himself as well as to other fed-
eral officials, orders his subordinates to wiretap or break into 
a home for the purpose of installing a listening device, and 
the officers comply with his request, the President would be 
absolutely immune from suit. He would be immune regard-
less of the damage he inflicts, regardless of how violative of 
the statute and of the Constitution he knew his conduct to be, 
and regardless of his purpose. 1 
The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the 
Constitution. If that is the case, Congress can not provide a 
remedy against presidential misconduct and that the criminal 
laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the Pres-
ident. I find this approach completely unacceptable. I do 
not agree. that if the office of President is to operate effec-
tively, the holder of that office must be permitted, without 
fear of liability and regardless of the function he is perform-
ing, deliberately to inflict injury on others by conduct that he 
knows violates the law. 
We have not taken such a scatter-gun approach in other 
cases. Butz held that absolute immunity did not attach to 
the office held by a member of the President's Cabinet but 
only to the specific functions performed by that officer for 
which absolute immunity is clearly essential. Members of 
Congress are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution, but the immunity extends only to 
their legislative acts. We have never held that in order for 
legislative work to be done, it is necessary to immunize all of 
the tasks that legislators must perform. Constitutional im-
munity does not extend to those many things that Senators 
and Representatives regularly and necessarily do that are 
not legislative acts. Members of Congress, for example, re-
' This, of course, is not simply a hypothetical example. See Kissinger v. 
Halperin , aff'd by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981). 
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peatedly importune the executive branch and administrative 
agencies outside hearing rooms and legislative halls, but they 
are not immune if in connection with such activity they delib-
erately violate the law. United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501 (1972), for example, makes this clear. Neither is a 
Member of Congress or his aide immune from damage suits if 
in order to secure information deemed relevant to a legisla-
tive investigation, he breaks into a house and carries away 
records. Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972). 
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but 
only when performing a judicial function, and even then they 
are subject to criminalliablity. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 
U. S. 24, 31 (1980), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503 
(1974). The absolute immunity of prosecutors is likewise 
limited to the prosecutorial function. A prosecutor who di-
rects that an investigation be carried out in a way that is pa-
tently illegal is not immune. 
In Marbury v. Madison, the Court, speaking through the 
Chief Justice, observed that while there were "important po-
litical powers" committed to the President for the perfor-
mance of which neither he nor his appointees were account-
able in court, "the question, whether the legality of the act of 
the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice 
or not, must always depend on the nature of that act." 1 
Cranch, 137, 165 (1803). The Court nevertheless refuses to 
follow this course with respect to the President. It makes 
no effort to distinguish categories of presidential conduct that 
should be absolutely immune from other categories of con-
duct that should not qualify for that level of immunity. The 
Court instead concludes that whatever the President does 
and however contrary to law he knows his conduct to be, he 
may, without fear of liability, injure federal employees or any 
other person within or without the government. 
Attaching absolute immunity to the office of the President, 
rather than to particular activities that the President might 
perform, places the President above the law. It is a rever-
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sion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong. Until 
now, this concept had survived in this country only in the 
form of sovereign immunity. That doctrine forecloses suit 
against the government itself and against government offi-
cials, but only when the suit against the latter actually seeks 
relief against the sovereign. Larsen v. Domestic and For-
eign Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). Suit against an offi-
cer, however, may be maintained where it seeks specific re-
lief against him for conduct contrary to his statutory 
authority or to the Constitution. ld., at 698. Now, how-
ever, the Court clothes the office of the President with sover-
eign immunity, placing it beyond the law. 
In Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 163, the Chief Justice, 
speaking for the Court, observed that the "Government of 
the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to ob-
serve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for 
the violation of a vested legal right." Until now, the Court 
has consistently adhered to this proposition. In Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), a unanimous Court held that 
the governor of a state was entitled only to a qualified immu-
nity. We reached this position, even though we recognized 
that 
"[i]n the case of higher officers of the executive branch-
the inquiry is far more complex since the range of deci-
sions and choices-whether the formulation of policy, of 
legislation, of budgets, or of day-to-day decisions-is vir-
tually infinite-in short, since the options which the chief 
executive and his principal subordinates must consider 
are far broader and far more subtle than those made by 
officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion 
must be comparably broad." Id., at 246, 247. 
As JUSTICE BRENNAN observed in McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U. S. 183, 252 (dissenting opinion), "The principle 
that our government shall be of laws and not of men is so 
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strongly woven into our constitutional fabric that it has found 
recognition in not just one but several provisions of the Con-
stitution" (footnote omitted). And as THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
said in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S. 401, 
429 (1981) (dissenting opinion): 
"Accountability of each individual for individual conduct 
lies at the core of all law-indeed, of all organized soci-
eties. The trend to eliminate or modify sovereign im-
munity is not an unrelated development; we have moved 
away from 'the king can do no wrong.' The principle of 
individual accountability is fundamental if the structure 
of an organized society is not to be eroded to anarchy and 
impotence, and it remains essential in civil as well as 
criminal justice." 
Unfortunately, the Court now abandons basic principles 
that have been powerful guides to decision. It is particu-
larly unfortunate since the judgment in this case has few, if 
any, indicia of a judicial decision; it is almost wholly a policy 
choice, a choice that is without substantial support and that 
in all events is ambiguous in its reach and import. 
We have previously stated that "the law of privilege as a 
defense to damage actions against officers of government has 
'in large part been of judicial making."' Butz v. Economou, 
438 U. S. at 501-502 (1978), quoting Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 
564, 569 (1959). But this does not mean that the Court has 
simply "enacted" its own view of the best public policy. No 
doubt judicial convictions about public policy-whether and 
what kind of immunity is necessary or wise-have played a 
part, but the courts have been guided and constrained by 
common-law tradition, the relevant statutory background 
and our constitutional structure and history. Our cases deal- . 
ing with the immunity of members of Congress are construc-
tions of the Speech or Debate Clause and are guided by the 
history of such privileges at common law. The decisions 
dealing with the immunity of state officers involve the ques-
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tion of whether and to what extent Congress intended to 
abolish the common law privileges by providing a remedy in 
the predecessor of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional viola-
tions by state officials. Our decisions respecting immunity 
for federal officials, including absolute immunity for judges, 
prosecutors and those officials doing similar work, also in 
large part reflect common law views, as well as judicial con-
clusions as to what privileges are necessary if particular func-
tions are to be performed in the public interest. 
Unfortunately, there is little of this approach in the Court's 
decision today. A footnote casually, but candidly, abandons 
the functional approach to immunity that has run through all 
of our decisions. Ante, at n. 34. Indeed, the majority turns 
this rule on its head by declaring that because the functions of 
the President's office are so varied and diverse and some of 
them so profoundly important, the office is unique and must 
be clothed with office-wide, absolute immunity. This is pol-
icy, not law, and in my view, very poor policy. 
I 
In declaring the President to be absolutely immune from 
suit for any deliberate and knowing violation of the Constitu-
tion or of a federal statute, the Court asserts that the immu-
nity is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation 
of powers and supported by our history" 2 Ante, at 17. The 
decision thus has all the earmarks of a constitutional pro-
nouncement-absolute immunity for the President's office is 
mandated by the Constitution. Although the Court appears 
to disclaim this, ante at n. 27, it is difficult to read the opinion 
coherently as standing for any narrower proposition: At-
tempts to subject the President to liability either by Con-
gress through a statutory action or by the courts through a 
Bivens proceeding would violate the separation of powers. 3 
2 Although the majority opinion initially claims that its conclusion is 
based substantially on "our history," historical analysis in fact plays virtu-
ally no part in the analysis that follows. 
3 On this point, I am in agreement with the concurring memorandum of 
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Such a generalized absolute immunity cannot be sustained 
when examined in the traditional manner and in light of the 
traditional judicial sources. 
The petitioner and the Solicitor General, as amicus, 4 rely 
principally on two arguments to support the claim of absolute 
immunity for the President from civil liability: absolute im-
munity is an "incidental power'' of the Presidency, histori-
cally recognized as implicit in the Constitution, and absolute 
immunity is required by the separation of powers doctrine. 
I will address each of these contentions. 
A 
The Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, guarantees abso-
lute immunity to members of Congress; nowhere, however, 
does the Constitution directly address the issue of presiden-
tial immunity. 5 Petitioner nevertheless argues that the de-
bates at the Constitutional Convention and the early history 
of constitutional interpretation demonstrate an implicit as-
sumption of absolute presidential immunity. In support of 
this position, petitioner relies primarily on three separate 
items: First, preratification remarks made during the discus-
sion of presidential impeachment at the Convention and in 
The Federalist; second, remarks made during the meeting of 
the first Senate; and third, the views of Justice Story. 
The debate at the Convention on whether or not the Presi-
dent should be impeachable did touch on the potential dan-
gers of subjecting the President to the control of another 
branch, the Legislature. 6 Governor Morris, for example, 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. 
4 The Solicitor General relies entirely upon the brief filed by his office in 
Kissinger v. Halperin, supra. 
5 In fact, 'insofar as the Constitution addresses the issue of Presidential 
liability, its approach is very different from that taken in the Speech or De-
bate Clause. The possibility of impeachment assures that the President 
can be held accountable to the other branches of Government for his ac-
tions; the Constitution further states that impeachment does not bar crimi-
nal prosecution. 
6 The debate is recorded in 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Con-
- -----
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complained of the potential for dependency and argued that 
"(the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutors 
who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that 
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 7 Col. Mason re-
sponded to this by asking if "any man [shall] be above Jus-
tice" and argued that this was least appropriate for the man 
"who can commit the most extensive injustice." 8 Madison 
agreed that "it [is] indispensable that some provision should 
be made for defending the Community against the incapacity, 
negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate." 9 Pinkney re-
sponded on the other side, believing that if granted the 
power, the Legislature would hold impeachment "as a rod 
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his 
independence." 10 
Petitioner concludes from this that the delegates meant im-
peachment to be the exclusive means of holding the President 
personally responsible for his misdeeds, outside of electoral 
politics. This conclusion, however, is hardly supported by 
the debate. Although some of the delegates expressed con-
cern over limiting presidential independence, the delegates 
voted eight to two in favor of impeachment. Whatever the 
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another 
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently 
shared, to insulate the President from political liability in the 
impeachment process. 
Moreover, the Convention debate did not focus on wrongs 
the President might commit against individuals, but rather 
on whether there should be a method of holding him account-
able for what might be termed wrongs against the state. 11 
vention of 1787, 64-69 (1934). 
' I d., at 64. 
8 I d., at 65. 
9 Ibid. 
10 I d., at 66. 
11 In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton described impeachable offenses as fol-
lows: "They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denomi-
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Thus, examples of the abuses that concerned delegates were 
betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that 
the alternative to an impeachment mechanism would be "tu-
mults and insurrections" by the people in response to such 
abuses. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this 
debate are that the independence of the Executive was not 
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the 
other branches and that there was no general desire to insu-
late the President from the consequences of his improper 
acts. 12 
Much the same can be said in response to petitioner's reli-
ance on The Federalist No. 77. In that essay, Hamilton 
asked whether the presidency combines "the requisites to 
safety in the republican sense-a due dependence on the peo-
ple-a due responsibility." He answered that the constitu-
tional plan met this test because it subjected the President to 
both the electoral process and the possibility of impeachment, 
including subsequent criminal prosecution. Petitioner con-
cludes from this that these were intended to be the exclusive 
means of restraining presidential abuses. This, by no means 
follows. Hamilton was concerned in Federalist No. 77, as 
were the delegates at the Convention, with the larger politi-
cal abuses,-"wrongs against the state"-that a President 
nated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the 
society itself." 
12 The majority's use of the historical record is in line with its other argu-
ments: It puts the burden on respondent to demonstrate no presidential 
immunity, rather than on petititoner to prove the appropriateness of this 
defense. Thus, while noting that the doubts of some of the Framers were 
not sufficient to prevent the adoption of the Impeachment Clause, the ma-
jority nevertheless states that "nothing in [the] debates suggests an expec-
tation that the President would be subjected to [civil damages actions]." 
Ante, at n. 31. Of course, nothing in the debates suggests an expectation ) 
that the President would not be liable in civil suits for damages either. 
Nevertheless, the debates are one element that the majority cites to sup-
port its conclusion that "[t]he best historical evidence clearly supports the 
Presidential immunity we have upheld." Ante, at n. 31. 
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might commit. He did not consider what legal means might 
be available for redress of individualized grievances. 13 
That omission should not be taken to imply exclusion in 
these circumstances is well illustrated by comparing some of 
the remarks made in the state ratifying conventions with 
Hamilton's discussion in No. 77. In the North Carolina rati-
fying convention, for example, there was a discussion of the 
adequacy of the impeachment mechanism for holding execu-
tive officers accountable for their misdeeds. Governor John-
son defended the constitutional plan by distinguishing three 
legal mechanisms of accountability: 
"If an officer commits an offence against an individual, 
he is amenable to the courts of law. If he commits 
crimes against the state, he may be indicted and pun-
ished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and 
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial 
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public." 14 
Governor Johnson surely did not contemplate that the avail-
ability of an impeachment mechanism necessarily implied the 
exclusion of other forms of legal accountability; rather, the 
method of accountability was to be a function of the character 
of the wrong. Mr. Maclaine, another delegate to the North 
Carolina Convention, clearly believed that the courts would 
13 Other commentary on the proposed Constitution did, however, co -
sider the subject of presidential immunity. In fact, the subject was dis-
cussed in the first major defense of the Constitution published in the 
United States. In his essays on the Constitution, published in the Inde-
pendent Gazetteer in September 1787, Tench Coxe included the following 
statement in his description of the limited power of the proposed office of 
the President: "His person is not so much protected as that of a member of 
the House of Representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any 
other man in the ordinary course of law." Quoted in II The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 141 (1976) (emphasis in 
original). 
14 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, at 43. 
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remain open to individual citizens seeking redress from inju-
ries caused by presidential acts: 
"The President is the superior officer, who is to see the 
laws put in execution. He is amenable for any malad-
ministration in his office. Were it possible to suppose 
that the President should give wrong instructions to his 
deputies, whereby the citizens would be distressed, they 
would have redress in the ordinary courts of common 
law." 15 
A similar distinction between different possible forms of 
presidential accountability was drawn by Mr. Wilson at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
"[The President] is placed high, and is possessed of 
power far from being contemptible; yet not a single priv-
ilege is annexed to his character; far from being above 
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character 
as a citizen, and in his public character by 
impeachment." 16 
There is no more reason to respect the views of Hamilton 
than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitu-
tional convention; both were instrumental in securing the 
ratification of the Constitution. But more importantly, 
there is simply no express contradiction in their statements. 
Petitioner relies on an inference drawn from silence to create 
this contradiction. The surrounding history simply does not 
support this inference. 
The second piece of historical evidence cited by petitioner 
is an exchange at the first meeting of the Senate, involving 
Vice-President Adams and Senators Ellsworth and MacClay. 
The debate started over whether or not the words "the Presi-
16 I d., at 47. 
16 2 Elliot 480. 
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dent" should be included at the beginning of Federal writs, 
similar to the manner in which English writs ran in the King's 
name. Senator MacClay thought that this would improperly 
combine the executive and judicial branches. This, in turn, 
led to a discussion of the proper relation between the two. 
Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President Adams defended the 
proposition that 
"the President, personally, was not subject to any proc-
ess whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought 
against him; was above the power of judges, justices, 
&c. For [that] would put it in the power of a common 
justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the 
whole machine of government." 17 
In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive 
form of process available against the President. Senator 
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a 
President · committing "murder in the street." In his view, 
in such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the 
exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather, 
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded 
the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none 
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amaz-
ingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 18 In his view, 
Senator Ellsworth and his supporters had not fully compre-
hended the difference in the political position of the American 
President and that of the British monarch. Again, nothing 
more can be concluded from this than that the proper scope of 
presidential accountability, including the question whether 
the President should be subject to judicial process, was no 
clearer then than it is now. 
The final item cited by petitioner clearly supports his posi-
tion, but is of such late date that it contributes little to under-
" W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United 
States in 1789-1791, 152 (1969). 
'
8 Ibid. 
----- - --- . -· --------
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standing the original intent. In his Commentaries on the 
Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described the 
"incidental powers" of the President: 
"Among these must necessarily be included the power to 
perform [his functions] without any obstruction or 
impediment whatsoever. The President cannot, there-
fore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, 
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and 
for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases 
at least, to possess an official inviolability. In the exer-
cise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion, 
and he is accountable only to his country and to his own 
conscience. His decision in relation to these powers is 
subject to no control, and his discretion, when exercised, 
is conclusive." 19 
While Justice Story may have been firmly committed to 
this view in 1833, Senator Pinckney, a delegate to the Con-
vention, was as firmly committed to the opposite view in 
1800.20 
Senator Pinckney, arguing on the floor of the Senate, con-
trasted the privileges extended to members of Congress by 
the Constitution with the lack of any such privileges ex-
tended to the President. 21 He argued that this was a delib-
19 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 372 (1873). 
20 It is not possible to determine whether this is the same Pinckney that 
Madison recorded as Pinkney, who objected at the Convention to granting 
a power of impeachment to the Legislature. Two Charles Pinckneys at-
tended the Convention. Both were from South Carolina. See 3 M. 
Farrand, supra, at 559. 
21 Senator Pinckney's comments are recorded at 10 Annals of Congress 
69-83. Petitioner contends that these remarks are not relevant because 
they concerned only the authority of Congress to inquire into the origin of 
an allegedly libelous newspaper article. Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 7. 
Although this was the occasion for the remarks, Pinckney did discuss the 
immunity of members of Congress as a privilege embodied in the Speech or 
Debate Clause: "our Constitution supposes no man ... to be infallible, but 
considers them all as mere men, to be subject to all the passions and frail-
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erate choice of the delegates to the Convention, who "well 
knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had 
been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no 
such authority should ever be exercised here." Therefore, 
"[n]o privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive, 
nor any except that ... for your Legislature." 22 
In previous immunity cases the Court has emphasized the 
ties, and crimes, that men generally are, and accordingly provides for the 
trial of such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legisla-
ture, for their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to 
public opinion .... " This, then, was one of the privileges of Congress that 
he was contrasting with those extended (or not extended) to the President. 
22 The majority cites one additional piece of historical evidence, a letter 
by President Jefferson, which it contends demonstrates "that Jefferson be-
lieved the President not to be subject to judicial process." Ante, at n. 31. 
Thomas Jefferson's views on the relation of the President to the judicial 
process are, however, not quite so clear as the majority suggests. Jeffer-
son took a variety of positions on the proper relation of executive and judi-
cial authority, at different points in his career. It would be suprising if 
President Jefferson had not argued strongly for such immunity from judi-
cial process, particularly in a confrontation with Chief Justice Marshall. 
Jefferson's views on this issue before he became President would be of a 
good deal more significance. In this regard, it is significant that in Jeffer-
son's second and third drafts of the Virginia Constitution, which also pro-
posed a separation of the powers of government into three separate 
branches, he specifically proposed that the Executive be subject to judicial 
process: "he shall be liable to action, tho' not to personal restraint for pri-
vate duties or wrongs." 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 350, 360. Also sig-
nificant is the fact that when Jefferson's followers tried to impeach Justice 
Chase in 1804-1805, one of the grounds of their attack on him was that he 
had refused to subpoena President Adams during the trial of Dr. Cooper 
for sedition. See Corwin, "The President: Office and Powers" 113. Fi-
nally, it is worth noting that even in the middle of the debate over Chief 
Justice Marshall's power to subpoena the President during the Burr trial, 
Jefferson looked to a legislative solution of the confrontation: "I hope how-
ever that ... at the ensuing session of the legislature [the Chief Justice] 
may have means provided for giving to individuals the benefit of the testi-
mony of the [Executive] functionaries in proper cases." X Works of 
Thomas Jefferson, 407 n. (P. Ford Ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from Presi-
dent Jefferson to George Hay, United States District Attorney for 
Virginia). I~ 
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importance of the immunity afforded the particular govern-
ment official at common law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U. S. 409, 421 (1976). Clearly this sort of analysis is not pos-
sible when dealing with an office, the presidency, that did not 
exist at common law. To the extent that historical inquiry is 
appropriate in this context, it is constitutional history, not 
coinmon law, that is relevant. From the history discussed 
above, however, all that can be concluded is that absolute im-
munity from civil liability for the President finds no support 
in constitutional text or history, or in the explanations of the 
earliest commentators. This is too weak a ground to support 
a declaration by this Court that the President is absolutely 
immune from civil liability, regardless of the source of liabil-
ity or the injury for which redress is sought. This much the 
majority implicitly concedes since history and text, tradi-
tional sources of judicial argument, merit only a footnote in 
the Court's opinion. Ante, at n. 31. 
B 
No bright line can be drawn between arguments for abso-
lute immunity based on the constitutional principle of separa-
tion of powers and arguments based on what the Court refers 
to as "public policy." This necessarily follows from the 
Court's functional interpretation of the separation of powers 
doctrine: 
"[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper 
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper in-
quiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Ex-
ecutive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977). 
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707 
(1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 579, 635 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Petitioner argues that pub-
lic policy favors absolute immunity because absent such im-
munity the President's ability to execute his constitutionally 
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mandated obligations will be impaired. The convergence of 
these two lines of argument is superficially apparent from the 
very fact that in both instances the approach of the Court has 
been characterized as a "functional" analysis. 
The difference is only one of degree. While absolute im-
munity might maximize executive efficiency and therefore be 
a worthwhile policy, lack of such immunity may not so dis-
rupt the functioning of the presidency as to violate the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Insofar as liability in this case is 
of congressional origin, petitioner must demonstrate that 
subjecting the President to a private damages action will pre-
vent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned 
functions." Insofar as liability is based on a Bivens action, 
perhaps a lower standard of functional disruption is appropri-
ate. Petitioner has surely not met the former burden; I do 
not believe that he has met the latter standard either. 
Taken at face value, the Court's position that as a matter of 
constitutional law the President is absolutely immune should 
mean that he is immune not only from damages actions but 
also from suits for injunctive relief, criminal prosecutions 
and, indeed, from any kind of judicial process. But there is 
no contention that the President is immune from criminal 
prosecution in the courts under the criminal laws enacted by 
Congress or by the states for that matter. Nor would such a 
claim be credible. The Constitution itself provides that im-
peachment shall not bar "Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and 
Punishment, according to Law." Article I, Section II, 
Clause VII. Similarly, our cases indicate that immunity 
from damages actions carries no protection from criminal 
prosecution. Supra, at 3. 
Neither can there be a serious claim that the separation of 
powers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial re-
view or insulates the President from judicial process. No ar-
gument is made here that the President, whatever his liabil-
ity for money damages, is not subject to the courts' injunctive 
powers. See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., supra; 
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioner's at-
tempt to draw an analogy to the Speech or Debate Clause, 
Brief, at 45, one purpose of which is "to prevent accountabil-
ity before a possibly hostile judiciary," Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U. S., 606, 617 (1972), breaks down at just this 
point. While the Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that 
"for any Speech or Debate" congressmen "shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place," and, thus, assures that congress-
men, in their official capacity, shall not be the subject of the 
courts' injunctive powers, no such protection is afforded the 
Executive. Indeed, as the cases cited above indicate, it is 
the rule, not the exception, that executive actions-including 
those taken at the immediate direction of the President-are 
subject to judicial review. 23 Regardless of the possibility of 
money damages against the President, then, the constitution-
ality of the President's actions or their legality under the ap-
plicable statutes can and will be subject to review. Indeed, 
in this very case, respondent Fitzgerald's dismissal was set 
aside by the Civil Service Commission as contrary to the ap-
plicable regulations issued pursuant to authority granted by 
Congress. 
Nor can private damages actions be distinguished on the 
ground that such claims would involve the President person-
ally in the litigation in a way not necessitated by suits seeking 
declaratory or injunctive relief against certain presidential 
actions. The President has been held to be subject to judi-
cial process at least since 1807. Aaron Burr case, 25 Fed. 
Cas. 30 (1807) (Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit jus-
tice). Burr "squarely ruled that a subpoena may be directed 
'"' The Solicitor General, in fact, argues that the possibility of judicial re-
view of presidential actions supports the claim of absolute immunity: Judi-
cial review "serves to contain and correct the unauthorized exercise of the 
President's power," making private damages actions unnecessary in order 
to achieve the same end. Brief, at 31 (see n. 3). 
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to the President." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, 709 (DC 
Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected any sug-
gestion that all judicial process, in and of itself, constitutes an 
unwarranted interference in the Presidency: 
"The guard, furnished to this high officer, to protect him 
from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary sub-
poenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after 
those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance 
which is to precede their being issued." 25 Fed. Cas., 
at 34. 
This position was recently rearticulated by the Court in 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706 (1974): 
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the 
need for confidentiality ... without more, can sustain an 
absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity 
from judicial process under all circumstances." 
These two lines of cases establish then that neither sub-
jecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of their 
constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial 
process violates the separation of powers doctrine. Simi-
larly, neither has been held to be sufficiently intrusive to jus-
tify a judicially declared rule of immunity. With respect to 
intrusion by the judicial process itself on Executive fpnctions, 
subjecting the President to private claims for mon.!y dam-
ages involves no more than this. If there is a separation of 
powers problem here, it must be found in the nature of the 
remedy and not in the process involved. 
We said in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), that 
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should 
know he is acting outside the law, and . . . insisting on an 
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not 
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment." I d. 
at 506-507. Today's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No. 
80-945, makes clear that the President, were he subject to 
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civil liability, could be held liable only for an action that he 
knew, or as an objective matter should have known, was ille-
gal and a clear abuse of his authority and power. In such 
circumstances, the question that must be answered is who 
should bear the cost of the resulting injury-the wrongdoer 
or the victim. 
The principle that should guide the Court in deciding this 
question was stated long ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "The 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 
137, 163 (1803). Much more recently, the Court considered 
the role of a damages remedy in the performance of the 
courts' traditional function of enforcing federally guaranteed 
rights: "Historically, damages have been regarded as the or-
dinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. S. 388, 395 (1971). 24 To the extent that the Court de-
nies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim 
the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him "the 
protection of the laws." 25 
That the President should have the same remedial obliga-
tions toward those whom he injures as any other federal offi-
cer is not a surprising propc )ition. The fairness of the reme-
24 See also Justice Harlan's discussion of the appropriateness of the dam-
ages remedy in order to redress the violation of certain constitutional 
rights. Bivens v. Six Unknov.m Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 
407-410 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
25 Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, ante, at n. 38, I do not 
suggest that there must always be a remedy in civil damages for every 
legal wrong or that Marbury v. Madison stands for this proposition. 
Marbury does, however, suggest the importance of the private interests at 
stake within the broader perspective of a political system based on the rule 
of law. The functional approach to immunity questions, which we have 
previously followed but which the majority today discards, represented an 
appropriate reconciliation of the conflicting interests at stake. 
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dial principle the Court has so far followed-that the 
wrongdoer, not the victim, should ordinarily bear the costs of 
the injury-has been found to be outweighed only in in-
stances where potential liability is "thought to injure the gov-
ernmental decisionmaking process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U. S. 409, 437 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). The ar-
gument for immunity is that the possibility of a damages ac-
tion will, or at least should, have an effect on the performance 
of official responsibilities. That effect should be to deter un-
constitutional, or otherwise illegal, behavior. This may, 
however, lead officers to be more careful and "less vigorous" 
in the performance of their duties. Caution, of course, is not 
always a virtue and undue caution is to be avoided. 
The possibility of liability may, in some circumstances, dis-
tract officials from the performance of their duties and influ-
ence the performance of those duties in ways adverse to the 
public interest. But when this "public policy" argument in 
favor of absolute immunity is cast in these broad terms, it ap-
plies to all officers, both state and federal: All officers should 
perform their responsibilities without regard to those per-
sonal interests threatened by the possibility of a lawsuit. 
See Imbler, supra, at 436 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). 26 
Inevitably, this reduces the public policy argument to noth-
ing more than an expression of judicial inclination as to which 
c ... ficers should be encouraged to perform their functions with 
"vigor," although with less care. 27 
The Court's response, until today, to this problem has been 
to apply the argument to individual functions, not offices, and 
26 The Court has never held that the "public policy" conclusions it 
reaches as to the appropriateness of absolute immunity in particular in-
stances are not subject to reversal through congressional action. Implic-
ity, therefore, the Court has already rejected a constitutionally-based, 
separation of powers argument for immunity for federal officials. 
27 Surely the fact that officers of the court have been the primary benefi-
ciaries of this Court's pronouncements of absolute immunity gives support 
to this appearance of favoritism. 
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to evaluate the effect of liability on governmental decision-
making within that function, in light of the substantive ends 
that are to be encouraged or discouraged. In this case, 
therefore, the Court should examine the functions implicated 
by the causes of action at issue here and the effect of poten-
tial liability on the performance of those functions. 
II 
The functional approach to the separation of powers doc-
trine and the Court's more recent immunity decisions 28 con-
verge on the following principle: The scope of immunity is de-
termined by function, not office. The wholesale claim that 
the President is entitled to absolute immunity in all of his ac-
tions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all 
presidential communications are entitled to an absolute privi-
lege, which was rejected in favor of a functional analysis, by a 
unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, supra. There-
fore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a broad 
immunity in certain areas of executive responsibility, 29 the 
only question that must be answered here is whether the dis-
missal of employees falls within a constitutionally assigned 
executive function, the performance of which would be sub-
stantially impaired by the possibility of a private action for 
damages. I believe it does not. 
Respondent has so far proceeded in this action on the basis 
of three separate causes of action: two federal statutes----5 
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 .u. S. C. § 1505--and the First 
Amendment. At this point in the litigation, the availability 
of these causes of action is not before us. Assuming the cor-
rectness of the the lower court's determination that the two 
28 See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United 
States, 446 U. S. 719 (1980); Butz, supra. at 511. 
29 I will not speculate on the presidential functions which may require 
absolute immunity, but a clear example would be instances in which the 
President participates in prosecutorial decisions. 
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federal statutes create a private right of action, I find the 
suggestion that the President is immune from those causes of 
action to be unconvincing. The attempt to found such immu-
nity upon a separation of powers argument is particularly 
unconvincing. 
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211, states that 
"[t]he right of employees ... to ... furnish information to 
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member 
thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 
18 U. S. C. § 1505, makes it a crime to obstruct congressional 
testimony. It does not take much insight to see that at least 
one purpose of these statutes is to assure congressional ac-
cess to information in the possession of the Executive 
Branch, which Congress believes it requires in order to carry 
out its responsibilities. 30 Insofar as these statutes implicate 
a separation of powers argument, I would think it to be just 
the opposite of that suggested by petitioner and accepted by 
the majority. In enacting these statutes, Congress sought 
to preserve its own constitutionally mandated functions in 
the face of a recalcitrant Executive. 31 Thus, the separation 
30 See, e. g. , 48 Cong. Rec. 4653 (1912) ("During my first session of Con-
gress I was desirous of learning the needs of the postal service and inquir-
ing into the conditions of the employees. To my surprise I found that 
under an Executive order these civil service employees could not give me 
any information.") (remarks of Rep. Calder); id. , at 4656 ("I believe it is 
high time that Congress should listen to the appeals of these men and pro-
vide a way whereby they can properly present a petition to the Members of 
Congress for a redress of grievances without the fear of losing their official 
positions") (remarks of Rep. Reilly); id. , at 5157 ("I have always requested 
employees to consult with me on matters affecting their interest and be-
lieve that it is my duty to listen to all respectful appeals and complaints.") 
(remarks of Rep. Evans). Indeed, it is for just this reason that petitioners 
in No. 8~945 argue that the statutes do not create a private right of action: 
"5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 were designed to protect the leg-
islative process, not to give one such as Fitzgerald a right to seek dam-
ages." Brief for petitioners, at 26, n. 11. 
31 Indeed, the impetus for passage of what is now 5 U. S. C. § 7211 was 
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of powers problem addressed by these statutes was first of all 
presidential behavior that intruded upon, or burdened, Con-
gress' performance of its own constitutional responsibilities. 
It is no response to this to say that such a cause of action 
would disrupt the President in the furtherance of his respon-
sibilities. That approach ignores the separation of powers 
problem that lies behind the congressional action; it assumes 
that presidential functions are to be valued over congres-
sional functions. 
The argument that by providing a damages action under 
these statutes (as is assumed in this case) Congress has 
adopted an unconstitutional means of furthering its ends, 
must rest on the premise that presidential control of execu-
tive employment decisions is a constitutionally assigned 
presidential function with which Congress may not signifi-
cantly interfere. This is a frivolous contention. In United 
States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886), this Court held 
that "when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of infe-
rior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and re-
strict the power of removal as it deems best for the public in-
terest." Whatever the rule may be with respect to high 
officers, see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 
U. S. 602 (1935), with respect to those who fill traditional bu-
reaucratic positions, restrictions on executive authority are 
the rule and not the exception. 32 This case itself demon-
strates, the severe statutory restraints under which the 
President operates in this area. 
Fitzgerald was a civil service employee working in the Of-
fice of the Secretary of the Air Force. Although his position 
the imposition of "gag rules" upon testimony of civil servants before con-
gressional committees. See Exec. Order No. 402 (Jan. 25, 1906); Exec. 
Order No. 1142 (Nov. 26, 1909). 
32 Thus, adverse action may generally be taken against civil servants 
only "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 
U. S. C. §§ 7503, 7513 and 7543. 
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was such as to fall within the "excepted" service, which 
would ordinarily mean that Civil Service rules and regula-
tions applicable to removals would not protect him, 5 CFR 
Part 6, § 6.4, his status as a veteran entitled him to special 
protections. Veterans are entitled to certain Civil Service 
benefits afforded to "preference eligibles." 5 U. S. C. 
§ 2108. These benefits include that set forth in 5 U. S. C. 
§7513(a): "An agency may take [adverse action] against an 
employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of 
the service." Similarly, his veteran status entitled Fitzger-
ald to the protection of the reduction in force procedures es-
tablished by civil service regulation. 5 U. S. C. 
§§ 3501-3502. It was precisely those procedures that the 
Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission found had 
been violated, in his 1973 recommendation that respondent 
be reappointed to his old position or to a job of comparable 
authority. 
This brief review is enough to illustrate my point: Person-
nel decisions of the sort involved in this case are emphatically 
not a constitutionally assigned presidential function that will 
tolerate no interference by either of the other two branches 
of government. More important than this "quantitative" 
analysis of the degree of intrusion in presidential decision-
making permitted in this area, however, is the "qualitative" 
anaylsis suggested in § I(B) above. 
Absolute immunity is appropriate when the threat of liabil-
ity may bias the decisionmaker in ways that are adverse to 
the public interest. But as the various regulations and stat-
utes protecting civil servants from arbitrary executive action 
illustrate, this is an area in which the public interest is de-
monstrably on the side of encouraging less "vigor'' and more 
"caution" on the part of decisionmakers. That is, the very 
steps that Congress has taken to assure that executive em-
ployees will be able freely to testify in Congress and to assure 
that they will not be subject to arbitrary adverse actions indi-
cate that those policy arguments that have elsewhere justi-
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fled absolute immunity are not applicable here. Absolute 
immunity would be nothing more than a judicial declaration 
of policy that directly contradicts the policy of protecting civil 
servants reflected in the statutes and regulations. 
If respondent could, in fact, have proceeded on his two 
statutory claims, the Bivens action would be superfluous. 
Respondent may not collect damages twice, and the same in-
juries are put forward by respondent as the basis for both the 
statutory and constitutional claims. As we have said before, 
"were Congress to create equally effective alternative reme-
dies, the need for damages relief [directly under the Con-
stitution] might be obviated." Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 
228, 248 (1979). Nevertheless, because the majority decides 
that the President is absolutely immune from a Bivens action 
as well, I shall express by disagreement with that conclusion. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 
U. S. 388 (1971), we held that individuals who have suffered 
a compensable injury through a violation of the rights guar-
anteed them by the Fourth Amendment may invoke the gen-
eral federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts in a 
suit for damages. That conclusion rested on two principles: 
First, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws," 403 U. S., at 397, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 163 (1803); second, "[h]istorically, damages have 
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of per-
sonal interests in liberty." 403 U. S., at 395. In Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1977), we rejected the argument 
of the federal government that federal officers, including cab-
inet officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for 
such constitutional violations-a position that we recognized 
would substantially undercut our conclusion in Bivens. We 
held there that although the performance of certain limited 
functions will be protected by the shield of absolute immu-
nity, the general rule is that federal officers, like state offi-
cers, have only a qualified immunity. Finally, in Davis v. 
----·~-----
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Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we held that a Congressman 
could be held liable for damages in a Bivens-type suit brought 
in federal court alleging a violation of individual rights guar-
anteed the plaintiff by the Due Process Clause. In my view, 
these cases have largely settled the issues raised by the 
Bivens apsect of this case. 
These cases established the following principles. First, it 
is not the exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch to 
create a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation. 
In the absence of adequate legislatively prescribed remedies, 
the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts 
permits the courts to create remedies, both legal and equita-
ble, appropriate to the character of the injury. Second, ex-
ercise of this "judicial" function does not create a separation 
of powers problem: We have held both executive and legisla-
tive officers subject to this judicially created cause of action 
and in each instance we have rejected separation of powers 
arguments. Holding federal officers liable for damages for 
constitutional injuries no more violates separation of powers 
principles than do the equitable remedies that result from the 
traditional function of judicial review. Third, federal offi-
cials will generally have a "qualified immunity" from such 
suits; absolute immunity will be extended to certain functions 
only on the basis of a showing that exposure to liability is in-
consistent with the proper performance of the official's duties 
and responsibilities. Finally, Congress retains the power to 
restrict exposure to liability, and the policy judgments im-
plicit in this decision should properly be made by Congress. 
The majority fails to recognize the force of what the Court 
has already done in this area. Under the above principles, 
the President could not claim that there are no circumstances 
under which he would be subject to a Bivens-type action for 
violating respondent's constitutional rights. Rather, he 
must assert that the absence of absolute immunity will sub-
stantially impair his ability to carry out particular functions 
that are his constitutional responsibility. For the reasons I 
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have presented above, I do not believe that this argument 
can be successfully made under the circumstances of this 
case. 
It is, of course, theoretically possible, that the President 
should be held to be absolutely immune because each of the 
functions for which he has constitutional responsibility would 
be substantially impaired by the possibility of civil liability. 
I do not think this argument is valid for the simple reason 
that the function involved here does not have this character. 
Which side of the line other presidential functions would fall 
on need not be decided in this case. 
The majority opinion suggests a variant of this argument. 
It argues, not that every presidential function has this char-
acter, but that distinguishing the particular functions in-
volved in any given case would be "difficult." Ante, at n. 
34. 33 Even if this were true, it would not necessarily follow 
that the President is entitled to absolute immunity: That 
would still depend on whether, in those unclear instances, it 
is likely to be the case that one of the functions implicated de-
serves the protection of absolute immunity. In this particu-
lar case, I see no such function. 34 
33 The majority also seems to believe that by "function" the Court has in 
the past referred to "subjective purpose." See ante, at n. 34 ("judges fre-
quently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were 
taken."). I do not read our cases that way. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 
U. S. 349, 362 (1978), we held that the factors determining whether a 
judge's act was a "judicial action" entitled to absolute immunity "relate to 
the nature of the act itself, i.e, whether it is a function normally performed 
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties." Neither of these fac-
tors required any analysis of the purpose the judge may have had in carry-
ing out the particular action. Similarly in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 
478, 512-516 (1977), when we determined that certain executive functions 
were entitled to absolute immunity because they shared "enough of the 
characteristics of the judicial process," we looked to objective qualities and 
not subjective purpose. 
34 The majority seems to suggest that responsibility for governmental re-
organizations is one such function. Ante, at n. 34. I fail to see why this 
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I do not believe that subjecting the President to a Bivens 
action would create separation of powers problems or "public 
policy" problems different from those involved in subjecting 
the President to a statutory cause of action. 35 Relying upon 
the history and text of the Constitution, as well as the ana-
lytic method of our prior cases, I conclude that these prob-
lems are not sufficient to justify absolute immunity for the 
President in general, nor under the circumstances of this case 
in particular. 
III 
Because of the importance of this case, it is appropriate to 
examine the reasoning of the majority opinion. 
The opinion suffers from serious ambiguity even with re-
spect to the most fundamental point: How broad is the immu-
nity granted the President? The opinion suggests that its 
scope is limited by the fact that under none of the asserted 
causes of action "has Congress taken express legislative ac-
tion to subject the President to civil liability for his official 
acts." Ante, at 16. We are never told, however, how or 
why Congressional action could make a difference. It is not 
apparent that any of the propositions relied upon by the ma-
jority to immunize the President would not apply equally to 
such a statutory cause of action; nor does the majority indi-
cate what new principles would operate to undercut those 
propositions. 
In the end, the majority seems to overcome its initial hesi-
tation, for it announces that, "[ w ]e consider [absolute] immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and supported by our history," ante, at 
should be so. 
85 Although our conclusions differ, the majority opinion reflects a similar 
view as to the relationship between the two sources of the causes of action 
in this case: It does not believe it necessary to differentiate in its own anal-
ysis between the statutory and constitutional causes of action. 
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16-17. See also ante, at 24 ("A rule of absolute immunity for 
the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient 
remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief execu-
tive."). 36 While the majority opinion recognizes that "[i]t is 
settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does not 
bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the 
United States," it bases its conclusion, at least in part, on a 
suggestion that there is a special jurisprudence of the presi-
dency. Ante, at 22. 37 
But in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), we up-
held the power of a federal district court to issue a subpoena 
duces tecum against the President. In other cases we have 
enjoined executive officials from carrying out presidential 
,. THE CHIEF JusTICE leaves no doubt that he, at least, reads the major-
ity opinion as standing for the broad proposition that the President is abso-
lutely immune under the Constitution: 
"I write separately to underscore that the presidential immunity spelled 
out today derives from and is mandated by the constitutional doctrine of I 
separation of powers." Concurring opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ante, 
at 1. 
37 Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 
U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of whether a court may 
compel the President himself to perform ministerial executive functions: 
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection, 
without expressing any opinion on the broader isseus ... whether, in any 
case, the President, ... may be required, by the process of this court, to 
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held ame-
nable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime." 
Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by the 
majority, did not indicate that the President could never be subject to judi-
cial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument 
that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional judicial infringe-
ment upon the Executive Branch: 
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general 
in the discharage of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an execu-
tive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act, 
which neither he nor the president had any authority to deny or control." 
Id., 'at 610. 
--- ------
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directives. See e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Not until this case has there ever 
been a suggestion that the mere formalism of the name ap-
pearing on the complaint was more important in resolving 
separation of powers problems than the substantive charac-
ter of the judicial intrusion upon executive functions. 
The majority suggests that the separation of powers doc-
trine permits exercising jurisdiction over the President only 
in those instances where "judicial action is needed to serve 
broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in dero-
gation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their 
proper balance." Ante, at 23. Without explanation, the 
majority contends that a "merely private suit for damages" 
does not serve this function. 
The suggestion that enforcement of the rule of law-i. e., 
subjecting the President to rules of general applicability-
does not further the separation of powers, but rather is in 
derogation of this purpose, is bizarre. At stake in a suit of 
this sort, to the extent that it is based upon a statutorily cre-
ated cause of action, is the ability of Congress to assert legal 
restraints upon the Executive and of the courts to perform 
their function of providing redress for legal harm. Regard-
less of what the Court might think of the merits of Mr. Fitz-
gerald's claim, the idea that pursuit of legal redress offends 
the doctrine of separation of powers is a frivolous contention 
passing as legal argument. 
Similarly, the majority implies that the assertion of a con-
stitutional cause of action-the whole point of which is to as-
sure that an officer does not transgress the constutitionallim-
its on his authority-may offend separation of powers 
concerns. This is surely a perverse approach to the Con-
stitution: Whatever the arguments in favor of absolute immu-
nity may be, it is untenable to argue that subjecting the Pres-
ident to constitutional restrictions will undercut his "unique" 
role in our system of government. It cannot be seriously ar-
gued that the President must be placed beyond the law and 
---- - ---------
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beyond judicial enforcement of constitutional restraints upon 
executive officers in order to implement the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. 
Focusing on the actual arguments the majority offers for 
its holding of absolute immunity for the President, one finds 
suprisingly little. As I read the relevant section of the 
Court's opinion, I find just three contentions from which the 
majority draws this conclusion. Each of them is little more 
than a makeweight; together they hardly suffice to justify the 
wholesale disregard of our traditional approach to immunity 
questions. 
First, the majority informs us that the President occupies· 
a "unique position in the constitutional scheme," including 
responsibilities for the administration of justice, foreign af-
fairs, and management of the Executive Branch. Ante, at 
17-18. True as this may be, it says nothing about why a 
"unique" rule of immunity should apply to the President. 
The President's unique role may indeed encompass functions 
for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It 
does not follow from that, however, that he is entitled to ab-
solute immunity either in general or in this case in particular. 
For some reason, the majority believes that this unique-
ness of the President shifts the burden to respondent to 
prove that a rule of absolute immunity does not apply. The 
respondent has failed in this effort, the Court suggests, be-
cause the President's uniqueness makes "inapposite" any 
analogy to our cases dealing with other executive officers. 
Ante, at 18. Even if this were true, it would not follow that 
the President is entitled to absolute immunity; it would only 
mean that a particular argument is out of place. But the fact 
is that it is not true. There is nothing in the President's 
unique role that makes the arguments used in those other 
cases inappropriate. 
Second, the majority contends that because the President's 
"visibility" makes him particularly vulnerable to suits for civil 
damages, ante, at 20, a rule of absolute immunity is required. 
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The force of this argument is surely undercut by the major-
ity's admission that "there is no historical record of numerous 
suits against the President." Id, at n. 33. Even granting 
that a Bivens cause of action did not becomes available until 
1971, in the eleven years since then there have been only a 
handful of suits. Many of these are frivolous and dealt with 
in a routine manner by the courts and the Justice Depart-
ment. There is no reason to think that, in the future, the 
protection afforded by summary judgment procedures would 
not be adequate to protect the President, as they currently 
protect other executive officers from unfounded litigation. 
Indeed, given the decision today in Harlow & Butterfield v. 
Fitzgerald, No. 80-945, there is even more reason to believe 
that frivolous claims will not intrude upon the President's 
time. Even if judicial procedures were found not to be suffi-
cient, Congress remains free to address this problem if and 
when it develops. 
Finally, the Court suggests that potential liability "fre-
quently could distract a President from his public duties." 
Ante, at 20. Unless one assumes that the President himself 
makes the countless high level executive decisions required 
in the administration of government, this rule will not do 
much to insulate such decisions from the threat of liability. 
The logic of the proposition cannot be limited to the Presi-
dent; its extension, however, has been uniformly rejected by 
this Court. See Butz, supra; Harlow & Butterfield, supra. 
Furthermore, in no instance have we previously held legal 
accountability in itself to be an unjustifiable cost. The avail-
ability of the courts to vindicate constitutional and statutory 
wrongs has been perceived and protected as one of the vir-
tues of our system of delegated and limited powers. As I ar-
gued in§ I, our concern in fashioning absolute immunity rules 
has been that liability may pervert the decisionmaking proc-
ess in a particular function by undercutting the values we ex-
pect to guide those decisions. Except for the empty general-
ity that the President should have "'the maximum ability to 
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deal fearlessly and impartially with' the duties of his office," 
ante at 20, the majority nowhere suggests a particular, dis-
. advantageous effect on a specific presidential function. The 
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas 
that may intrude on individuals' legally protected rights has 
never before been counted as a cost. 
IV 
The majority may be correct in its conclusion that "a rule of 
absolute immunity will not leave the Nation without suffi-
cient remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief execu-
tive." Ante, at 24. Such a rule will, however, leave Mr. 
Fitzgerald without an adequate remedy for the harms that he 
may have suffered. More importantly, it will leave future 
plaintiffs without a remedy, regardless of the substantiality 
of their claims. The remedies in which the Court finds com-
fort were never designed to afford relief for individual harms. 
Rather, they were designed as political safety-valves. Poli-
tics and history, however, are not the domain of the courts; 
the courts exist to assure each individual that he, as an indi-
vidual, has enforcable rights that he may pursue to achieve a 
peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances. 
I find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the Court would so 
casually discard its own role of assuring "the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws," Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), in the name of protecting 
the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
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that such a discharge was contrary to the civil service laws, 
he would be absolutely immune from suit. (By the same to-
ken, if a President, without following the "S'tatutory proce-
dures which he knows apply to himself as well as to other fed-
eral officials, orders his subordinates to ~retap or ~into 
a home for the purpose of installing a listening device, and 
the officers comply with his request, the President would be 
absolutely immune from suit] He would be immune regard-
less of the damage he inflicts, regardless of how violative of 
the statute and of the Constitution he knew his conduct to be, 
and regardless of his purpose. 1 
The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the 
Constitution. If that is the case, Congress can not provide a 
remedy against presidential misconduct and that the criminal 
laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the Pres-
ident. I find this approach completely unacceptable. I do 
not agree that if the office of President is to operate effec-
tively, the holder of that office must be permitted, without 
fear of liability and regardless of the function he is perform-
ing, d~ury on others by conduct that he 
knows violates the law. 
We have not taken such a scatter-gun approach in other 
cases. Butz held that absolute immunity did not attach to 
the office held by a member of the President's Cabinet but 
only to the specific functions performed by that officer for 
which absolute immunity is clearly essential. Members of 
Congress are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution, but the immunity extends only to 
their legislative acts. We have never held that in order for 
legislative work to be done, it is necessary to immunize all of 
the tasks that legislators must perform. Constitutional im-
munity does not extend to those many things that Senators 
and Representatives regularly and necessarily do that are 
not legislative acts. Members of Congress, for example, re-
' This , of course, is not simply a hypothetical example. See Kissinger v. 
Halperin, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981). 
79-1738---DISSENT 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 3 
peatedly importune the executive branch and administrative 
agencies outside hearing rooms and legislative halls, but they 
are not immune if in connection with such activity they delib-
erately violate the law. United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501 (1972), for example, makes this clear. Neither is a 
Member of Congress or his aide immune from damage suits if 
in order to secure information deemed relevant to a legisla-
tive investigation, he breaks into a house and carries away 
records. Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972). 
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but 
only when performing a judicial function, and even then they 
are subject to criminal liablicy. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 
U. S. 24, 31 (19'SO), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503 
(1974). The absolute immunity of prosecutors is likewise 
limited to the prosecutorial function. A prosecutor who di-
rects that an investigation be carried out in a way that is pa-
tently illegal is not immune. 
In Marbury v. Mad is on, the Court, speaking through the 
Chief Justice, observed that while there were "important po-
litical powers" committed to the President for the perfor-
mance of which neither he nor his appointees were account-
able in court, "the question, whether the legality of the act of 
the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice 
or not, must always depend on the nature of that act." 1 
Cranch, 137, 165 (1803). The Court nevertheless refuses to 
follow this course with respect to the President. It makes 
no effort to distinguish categories of presidential conduct that 
should be absolutely immune from other categories of con-
duct that should not qualify for that level of immunity. The 
Court instead concludes that whatever the President goes 
and however contrail: to law he knows hls conduct to be, he 
may, WittfoUt fear of liability, injure federal employees or any 
other person within or without the government. 
Attaching absolute immunity to the office of the President, 
rather than to particular activities that the President might 
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sion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong. Until 
now, this concept had survived in this country only in the 
form of sovereign immunity. That doctrine forecloses suit 
against the government itself and against government offi-
cials, but only when the suit against the latter actually seeks 
relief against the sovereign. Larsen v. Domestic and For-
eign Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). Suit against an offi-
cer, however, may be maintained where it seeks specific re-
lief against him for conduct contrary to his statutory 
authority or to the Constitution. ld., at 698. Now, how-
ever, the Court clothes the office of the President with sover-
eign immunity, placing it beyond the law. 
In Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 163, the Chief Justice, 
speaking for the Court, observed that the "Government of 
the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to ob-
serve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for 
the violation of a vested legal right." Until now, the Court 
has consistently adhered to this proposition. In Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), a unanimous Court held that 
the governor of a state was entitled only to a qualified immu-
nity. We reached this position, even though we recognized 
that 
"[i]n the case of higher officers of the executive branch-
the inquiry is far more complex since the range of deci-
sions and choices-whether the formulation of policy, of 
legislation, of budgets, or of day-to-day decisions-is vir-
tually infinite-in short, since the options which the chief 
executive and his principal subordinates must consider 
are far broader and far more subtle than those made by 
officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion 
must be comparably broad." Id., at 246, 247. 
As JUSTICE BRENNAN observed in McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U. S. 183, 252 (dissenting opinion), "The principle 
that our government shall be of laws and not of men is so 
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strongly woven into our constitutional fabric that it has found 
recognition in not just one but several provisions of the Con-
stitution" (footnote omitted). And as THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
said in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S. 401, 
429 (1981) (dissenting opinion): 
"Accountability of each individual for individual conduct 
lies at the core of all law-indeed, of all organized soci-
eties. The trend to eliminate or modify sovereign im-
munity is not an unrelated development; we have moved 
away from 'the king can do no wrong.' The principle of 
individual accountability is fundamental if the structure 
of an organized society is not to be eroded to anarchy and 
impotence, and it remains essential in civil as well as 
criminal justice." 
Unfortunately, the Court now abandons basic principles 
that have been powerful guides to decision. It is particu-
larly unfortunate since the judSlEent in this case has few, if 
any, indicia of a_judicial decision; it is almost whol'JYiPolicy 
choice, a choicetliat is without substantial support and that 
in a11 events is ambiguous in its reach and import. 
I agree with the Court's observation that "the law of privi-
lege as a defense to damage actions against officers of gov-
ernment has 'in large part been of judicial making."' Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. at 501-502 (1978), quoting Barr v. Ma-
teo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959). But this does not mean that 
the Court has simply "enacted" its own view of the best pub-
lic policy. No doubt judicial convictions about public pol-
icy-whether and what kind of immunity is necessary or 
wise-have played a part, but the courts have been guided 
and constrained by common-law tradition, the relevant statu-
tory background and our constitutional structure and history. 
Our cases dealing with the immunity of members of Congress 
are constructions of the Speech or Debate Clause and are 
guided by the history of such privileges at common law. The 
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the question of whether and to what extent Congress in-
tended to abolish the common law privileges by providing a 
remedy in the predecessor of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitu-
tional violations by state officials. Our decisions respecting 
immunity for federal officials, including absolute immunity 
for judges, prosecutors and those officials doing similar work, 
also in large part reflect common law views, as well as judi-...----. 
cial conclusions as to what privileges are necessary if particu-
lar functions are to be performed in the public interest. 
Unfortunately, there is little of this appro~ch in the Court's 
decision today. A footnote casually, but candidly, abandons 
the functional approach to immunity that has run through all 
of our decisions. Ante, at n. 35. Indeed, the majority turns 
this rule on its head by declaring that because the functions of 
the President's office are so varied and diverse and some of 
them so profoundly important, the office is unique and must 
be clothed with office-wide, absolute immunity. This is pol-
~ not law, and in my view, very poor policy. ;...---
I 
In declaring the President to be absolutely immune from 
suit for any deliberate and knowing violation of the Constitu-
tion or of a federal statute, the Court asserts that the immu-
nity is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation 
of powers and justified by considerations of public policy." 
Ante, at 17. The decision thus has all the earmarks of a con-
stitutional pronouncement-absolute immunity for the Presi-
dent's office is mandated by the Constitution. Although the 
Court appears to disclaim this, ante at n. 27, it is difficult to 
read the opinion coherently as standing for any narrower 
proposition: Attempts to subject the President to liability ei-
ther by Congress through a statutory action or by the courts 
through a Bivens proceeding would violate the separation of 
powers. 2 Such a generalized absolute immunity cannot be 
2 On this point, I am in agreement with the concurring memorandum of 
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sustained when examined in the traditional manner and in 
light of the traditional judicial sources. 
The petitioner and the Solicitor General, as amicus, 3 rely 
principally on two arguments to support the claim of absolute 
immunity for the President from civil liability: absolute im-
munity is an "incidental power" of the Presidency, histori-
cally recognized as implicit in the Constitution, and absolute 
immunity is required by the separation of powers doctrine. 
I will address each of these conten!!t!digon[!]S:;i,. _________ _ 
The Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, guarantees abso-
lute immunity to members of Congress; nowhere, however, 
does the Constitution directly address the issue of presiden-
tial immunity. 4 Petitioner nevertheless argues that the de-
bates at the Constitutional Convention and the early history 
of constitutional interpretation demonstrate an implicit as-
sumption of absolute presidential immunity. In support of 
this position, petitioner relies primarily on three separate 
items: First, preratification remarks made during the discus-
sion of presidential impeachment at the Convention and in 
The Federalist; second, remarks made during the meeting of 
the first Senate; and third, the views of Justice Story. 
The debate at the Convention on whether or not the Presi-
dent should be impeachable did touch on the potential dan-
gers of subjecting the President to the control of another 
branch, the Legislature. 5 Governor Morris, for example, 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. 
3 The Solicitor General relies entirely upon the brief filed by his office in 
Kissinger v. Halperin, supra. 
' In fact, insofar as the Constitution addresses the issue of Presidential 
liability its approach is very different from that taken in the Speech or De-
bate Cfause. The possibility of impeachment assures that the President 
can be held accountable to the other branches of Government for his ac-
tions; the Constitution further states that impeachment does not bar crimi-
nal prosecution. 
'""The debate is recorded in 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, 64-69 (1934). 
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complained of the potential for dependency and argued that 
"[the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutors 
who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that 
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 6 Col. Mason re-
sponded to this by asking if "any man [shall] be above Jus-
tice" and argued that this was least appropriate for the man 
"who can commit the most extensive injustice." 7 Madison 
agreed that "it [is] indispensable that some provision should 
be made for defending the Community against the incapacity, 
negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate." 8 Pinkney re-
sponded on the other side, believing that if granted the 
power, the Legislature would hold impeachment "as a rod 
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his 
independence." 9 
Petitioner concludes from this that the delegates meant im-
peachment to be the exclusive means of holding the President 
personally responsible for his misdeeds, outside of electoral 
politics. This conclusion, however, is hardly supported by 
the debate. Although some of the delegates expressed con-
cern over limiting presidential independence, the delegates 
voted eight to two in favor of impeachment. Whatever the 
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another 
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently 
shared, to insulate the President from political liability in the 
impeachment process. 
Moreover, the Convention debate did not focus on wrongs 
the President might commit against individuals, but rather 
on whether there should be a method of holding him account-
able for what might be termed wrongs against the state. 10 
6 I d., at 64. 
7 !d., at 65. 
8 Ibid. 
9 I d., at 66. 
10 In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton described impeachable offenses as fol-
lows: "They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denomi-
nated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the 
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Thus, examples of the abuses that concerned delegates were 
betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that 
the alternative to an impeachment mechanism would be "tu-
mults and insurrections" by the people in response to such 
abuses. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this 
debate are that the independence of the Executive was not 
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the 
other branches and that there was no general desire to insu-
late the President from the consequences of his improper 
acts. 
Much the same can be said in response to petitioner's reli-
ance on The Federalist No. 77. In that essay, Hamilton 
asked whether the presidency combines "the requisites to 
safety in the republican sense-a due dependence on the peo-
ple-a due responsibility." He answered that the constitu-
tional plan met this test because it subjected the President to 
both the electoral process and the possibility of impeachment, 
including subsequent criminal prosecution. Petitioner con-
cludes from this that these were intended to be the exclusive 
means of restraining presidential abuses. This, by no means 
follows. Hamilton was concerned in Federalist No. 77, as 
were the delegates at the Convention, with the larger politi-
cal abuses,-"wrongs against the state"-that a President 
might commit. He did not consider what legal means might 
be available for redress of individualized grievances. 
That omission should not be taken to imply exclusion in 
these circumstances is well illustrated by comparing some of 
the remarks made in the state ratifying conventions with 
Hamilton's discussion in No. 77. In the North Carolina rati-
fying convention, for example, there was a discussion "Or-the 
adequacy of the impeachment mechanism for holding execu-
tive officers accountable for their misdeeds. GovernorJolm-
son defended the constitutional plan by distinguishing three 
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"If an officer commits an offence against an indivi~l,  
he isamellable to the courts of law. If he commits 
crimes against the state, he may be indicted and pun-
ished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and 
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial 
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public." 11 
Governor Johnson surely did not contemplate that the avail- ; 
ability of an impeachment mechanism necessarily implied the 
exclusion of other forms of legal accountability; rather, the 
method of accountability was to be a function of the character 
of the wrong. Mr. Maclaine, another delegate to the North 
Carolina Convention, clearly believed that the courts would 
remain open to individual citizens seeking redress from inju-
ries caused by presidential acts: 
"The President is the superior officer, who is to see the 
laws put in execution. He is amenable for any malad-
ministration in his office. Were it possible to suppose 
that the President should give wrong instructions to his 
deputies, whereby the citizens would be distressed, they 
would have redress in the ordinary courts of common 
law." 12 
A similar distinction between different possible forms of 
presidential accountability was drawn by Mr. Wilson at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention: ~ 
"[The President] is placed high, and is possessed of 
power far from being contemptible; yet not a single priv-
ilege is annexed to his character; far from being above 
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character 
as a citiz;e11, and in his public character by impeach-
ment."13 
11 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, at 43. 
12 !d., iir4T. 
13 2 Elliot 480. 
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There is no more reason to respect the views of Hamilton 
than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitu-
tional convention; both were instrumental in securing the 
ratification of the Constitution. But more importantly, 
there is simply no express contradiction in their statements. 
Petitioner relies on an inference drawn from silence to create 
this contradiction. The surrounding history simply does not 
support this inference. 
The s~cond 2_iece of historical e':_idence cited by petitioner 
is an exchangeat the first meetmg ofthe Senate, involving 
Vice-President Adams and Senators Ellsworth and MacClay. 
The debate started over whether or not the words "the Presi-
dent" should be included at the beginning of Federal writs, 
similar to the manner in which English writs ran in the King's 
name. Senator MacClay thought that this would improperly 
combine the executive and judicial branches. This, in turn, 
led to a discussion of the proper relation between the two. 
Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President Adams defended the 
proposition that 
"the President, personally, was not subject to any proc-
ess whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought 
against him; was above the power of judges, justices, 
&c. For [that] would put it in the power of a common 
justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the 
whole machine of government." 14 
In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive 
form of process available against the President. Senator 
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a 
President committing "murder in the street." In his view, 
in such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the 
exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather, 
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded 
"W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United 
States in 1789-1791, 152 (1969). 
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the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none 
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amaz-
ingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 15 In his view, 
Senator .Ellsworth.and his supporters had not fully compre-
hended the difference in the political position of the American 
President and that of the British monarch. Again, nothing 
more can be concluded from this than that the proper scope of 
presidential accountability, including the question whether 
the President should be subject to judicial process, was no 
clearer then than it is now. 
The final item cited by petitioner clearly supports his posi-
tion, but is of such late date that it contributes little to under-
standing the original intent. In his Commentaries on the 
Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described the 
"incidental powers" of the President: 
"Among these must necessarily be included the power to 
perform [his functions] without any obstruction or 
impediment whatsoever. The President cannot, there-
fore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, 
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and 
for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases 
at least, to possess an official inviolability. In the exer-
cise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion, 
and he is accountable only to his country and to his own 
conscience. His decision in relation to these powers is 
subject to no control, and his discretion, when exercised, 
is conclusive." 16 
15 Ibid. 
ly committed to 
egate to the Con-
e opposite v!ew in 
16 2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 372 (1873). 
17 It is not possible to determine whether this is the same Pinckney that 
Madison recorded as Pinkney, who objected at the Convention to granting 
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Senator Pinckney, arguing on the floor of the Senate, con-
trasted the pri~eges extended to members of Congress by 
the Constitution with the lack of any such privileges ex-
tended to the President. 18 He argued that this was a delib-
erate choice of the delegates to the Convention, who "well 
knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had 
been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no 
such authority should ever be exercised here." Therefore, 
"[n]o privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive, 
nor any except that . . . for your Legislature." 
In previous immunity cases the Court has emphasized the 
importance of the immunity afforded the particular govern-
ment official at common law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U. S. 409, 421 (1976). Clearly this sort of analysis is not pos-
sible when dealing with an office, the presiUency, thatdrd not 
extsfat cbmmon raw.~o the" extent that historica~is 
appropriate in this context, it is constitutional history, not 
common law, that is relevant. From the history discussed 
above, however, all that can be concluded is that absolute im-
munity from civil liability for the President finds no firm sup-
port in constitutional text or history, or in the explanations of 
a power of impeachment to the Legislature. Two Charles Pinckneys at-
tended the Convention. Both were from South Carolina. See 3 M. 
Farrand, supra, at 559. 
' ~ Senator Pinckney's comments are recorded at 10 Annals of Congress 
69-83. PetitiOner contends that these remarks are not relevant because 
they concerned only the authority of Congress to inquire into the origin of 
an allegedly libelous newspaper article. Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 7. 
Although this was the occasion for the remarks, Pinckney did discuss the 
immunity of members of Congress as a privilege embodied in the Speech or 
Debate Clause: "our Constitution supposes no man ... to be infallible, but 
considers them all as mere men, to be subject to all the passions and frail-
ties, and crimes, that men generally are , and accordingly provides for the 
trial of such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legisla-
ture , for their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to 
public opinion .... " This , then, was one of the privileges of Congress that 
he was contrasting with those extended (or not extended) to the President. 
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the early commentators. This is too weak a ground to sup-
port a declaration by this Court that the President is abso-
lutely immune from civil liability, regardless of the source of 
liability or the injury for which redress is sought. This much 
the majority implicitly concedes since history and text, tradi-
tional sources of judicial argument, rrr;;rr-only a brief foot-
~ in the Court's opinion. Ante, at n-:-s2._ --
B 
No bright line can be drawn between arguments for abso-
lute immunity based on the constitutional principle of separa-
tion of powers and arguments based on what the Court refers 
to as "public policy." This necessarily follows from the 
Court's functional interpretation of the separation of powers 
doctrine: 
"[l]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper 
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper in-
quiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Ex-
ecutive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977). 
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707 
(1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 579, 635 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Petitioner argues that pub-
lic policy favors absolute immunity because absent such im-
munity the President's ability to execute his constitutionally 
mandated obligations will be impaired. The convergence of 
these two lines of argument is superficially apparent from the 
very fact that in both instances the approach of the Court has 
been characterized as a "functional" analysis. 
The difference is only one of degree. While absolute im-
munity might maximize executive efficiency and therefore be 
a worthwhile policy, lack of such immunity may not so dis-
rupt the functioning of the presidency as to violate the sepa-




of congr:essi~nal origin, petitioner must demonstrate that 
srtbjecting the President to a private damages action will pre-
vent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned 
functions." Insofar as liability is based on a Bivens action, 
perhaps a lower standard of functional disruption is appropri-
ate. Petitioner has surely not met the former burden; I do 
not believe that he has met the latter standard either. 
Taken at face value, the Court's position that as a matter of 
constitutional law the President is absolutely immune should 
mean that he is immune not only from damages actions but 
also from suits for injunctive relief, criminal prosecutions 
and, indeed, from any kind of judicial process. "Thrt there is 
no contention that the President is immune from criminal 
prosecution in the courts under the criminal laws enacted by 
Congress or by the states for that matter. Nor would such a 
claim be credible. The Constitution itself provides that im-
peachment shall not bar "Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and 
Punishment, according to Law." Article I, Section II, 
Clause VII. Similarly, our cases indicate that immunity 
from damages actions carries no protection from criminal 
prosecution. Supra, at 3. 
Neither can there be a serious claim that the separation of 
powers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial re-
view or insulates the President from judicial process. No ar-
gument is made here that the President, whatever his liabil-
ity for money damages, is not subject to the courts' injunctive 
powers. See, e. g. , Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., supra; 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Panama 
R efining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioner's at-
tempt to draw an analogy to the Speech or Debate Clause, 
Brief, at 45, one purpose of which is "to prevent accountabil-
ity before a possibly hostile judiciary," Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U. S., 606, 617 (1972), breaks down at just this 
point. While the Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that 
"for any Speech or Debate" congressmen "shall not be ques-
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men, in their official capacity, shall not be the subject of the 
courts' injunctive powers, no such protection is afforded the 
Executive. Indeed, as the cases cited above indicate, it is 
the rule, not the exception, that executive actions-including 
those taken at the immediate direction of the President-are 
subject to judicial review. 19 Regardless of the possibility of 
money damages against the President, then, the constitution-
ality of the President's actions or their legality under the ap-
plicable statutes can and will be subject to review. Indeed, 
in this very case, respondent Fitzgerald's dismissal was set 
aside by the Civil Service Commission as contrary to the ap-
plicable regulations issued pursuant to authority granted by 
Congress. 
Nor can private damages actions be distinguished on the 
ground that such claims would involve the President person-
ally in the litigation in a way not necessitated by suits seeking 
declaratory or injunctive relief against certain presidential 
actions. The President has been held to be subject to iudi-
cial process at least since 1807. Aaron Burr case, 25 Fed. 
Cas. 30 (iBo7) (clilef'"Justi;;"Marshall, sitting as circuit jus-
tice). Burr "squarely ruled that a subpoena may be directed 
to the President." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, 709 (DC 
Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected any sug-
gestion that all judicial process, in and of itself, constitutes an 
unwarranted interference in the Presidency: 
"T~rd, furnished to this high officer, to protect him 
from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessaary sub-
poenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after 
those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance 
which is toprecede the1r'being issued." 25 Fed. Cas., 
at 34. 
'
9 The Solicitor General, in fact, argues that the possibility of judicial re-
view of presidential actions supports the claim of absolute immunity: Judi-
cial review "serves to contain and correct the unauthorized exercise of the 
President's power," making private damages actions unnecessary in order 
to achieve the same end. Brief, at 31 (see n. 3). 
~~ 
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This position was recently rearticulated by the Court in 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706 (1974): 
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the 
need for confidentiality ... without more, can sustain an 
absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity 
from judicial process under all circumstances." 
These two lines of cases establish then that neither sub-
jecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of their 
constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial 
process violates the separation of powers doctrine. Simi-
larly, neither has been held to be sufficiently intrusive to jus-
tify a judicially declared rule of immunity. With respect to 
intrusion by the judicial process itself on Executive functions, 
sub"ectin the President to private claims for mone dam-
ages invo~m~e t ant 1s. ere IS a separation of 
powers problernnere, it must be found in the nature of the 
remedy and not in the process involved. 
We said in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), that 
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should 
know he is acting outside the law, and ... insisting on an 
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not 
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment." I d. 
at 506-507. Today's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No. 
8~945, makes clear that the President, were he subject to 
civil liability, could be held liable only for an action that he 
knew, or as an objective matter should have known, was ille-
gal and a clear abuse of his authority and power. In such 
circumstances, the question that must be answered is who 
should bear the cost of the resulting injury-the wrongdoer 
or the victim. 
The principle that should guide the Court in deciding this 
question was stated long ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "The 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in tfie right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 
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the role of a damages remedy in the performance of the 
courts' traditional function of enforcing federally guaranteed 
rights: "Historically, damages have been regarded as the or-
dinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. ~ 395 (1971). 20 To the extent that the Court de-
nies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim 
the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him "the 
protection of the laws." 
That the President should have the same remedial obliga-
tions toward those whom he injures as any other federal offi-
cer is not a surprising proposition. The fairness of the reme-
dial principle the Court has so far followed-that the 
wrongdoer, not the victim, should ordinarily bear the costs of 
the injury-has been found to be outweighed only in in-
stances where potential liability is "thought to injure the gov-
ernmental decisionmaking process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U. S. 409, 437 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). The ar-
gument for immunity is that the possibility of a damages ac-
tion will, or at least should, have an effect on the performance 
of official responsibilities. That effect should be to deter un-
constitutional, or otherwise illegal, behavior. This may, 
however, lead officers to be more careful and "less vigorous" 
in the performance of their duties. Caution, of course, is not 
always a virtue and undue caution is to be avoided. 
The possibility of liability may, in some circumstances, dis-
tract officials from the performance of their duties and influ-
ence the performance of those duties in ways adverse to the 
public interest. But when this "public policy" argument in 
favor of absolute immunity is cast in these broad terms, it ap-
plies to all officers, both state and federal: All officers should 
20 See also Justice Harlan's discussion of the appropriateness of the dam-
ages remedy in order to redress the violation of certain constitutional 
rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 
407-410 (1971) (Harlan, J . concurring). 
79-1738---DISSENT 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 19 
perform their responsibilities without regard to those per-
sonal interests threatened by the possibility of a lawsuit. 
See Imbler, supra, at 436 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). 21 
Inevitably, this reduces the public policy argument to noth-
ing more than an expression of judicial inclination as to which 
officers should be encouraged to perform their functions with 
"vigor," although with less care. 22 
The Court's response, until today, to this problem has been 
to apply the ~rgument to individual functiol}§, not offices, and 
to evaluate the ert'ect orliabiiity on governmental decision-
making within that function, in light of the substantive ends 
that are to be encouraged or discouraged. In this case, 
therefore, the Court should examine the functions implicated 
by the causes of action at issue here and the effect of poten-
tial liability on the performance of those functions. 
II 
The functional approach to the separation of powers doc-
trine and the e-ourt's more recent immunity decisions 23 con-
verge on the following principle: The scope of immunitti_s de-
te:r.:._mined by functign, not office. Tfie wholesale claim that 
the President is entitled1o absolute immunity in all of his ac-
tions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all 
presidential communications are entitled to an absolute privi-
lege, which was rejected in favor of a functional analysis, by a 
unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, supra. There-
21 The Court has never held that the "public policy" conclusions it 
reaches as to the appropriateness of absolute immunity in particular in-
stances are not subject to reversal through congressional action. Implic-
ity, therefore, the Court has already rejected a constitutionally-based, 
separation of powers argument for immunity for federal officials. 
22 Surely the fact that officers of the court have been the primary benefi-
ciaries of this Court's pronouncements of absolute immunity gives support 
to this appearance of favoritism. 
23 See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United 
States, 446 U. S. 719 (1980); Butz, supra. at 511. 
I 
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fore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a broad 
immunity in certain areas of executive responsibility,24 the 
only uestion that must be answe ed here is whether the dis-
missal of emp o~es f~ s wit ~const~ a y asswed 
executive function, the performance of which would be sub-
stantially Tmpafred by the possibility of a private action for 
damages. I believe it does not. 
Respondent has so far proceeded in this action on the basis 
of three separate causes of action: two federal statutes-5 
U. S. C. §7211 and 18 U.S. C. § 1505--and the First 
Amendment. At this point in the litigation, the availability 
of these causes of action is not before us. Assuming the cor-
rectness of the the lower court's determination that the two 
federal statutes create a private right of action, I find the 
suggestion that the President is immune from those causes of 
action to be unconvincing. The attempt to found such immu-
nity upon a separation of powers argument is particularly 
unconvincing. 
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211, states that 
"[t]he right of employees ... to ... furnish information to 
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member 
thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 
18 U. S. C. § 1505, makes it a crime to obstruct congressional 
testimony. It does not take much insight to see that at least 
one purpose of these statutes is to assure congressional ac-
cess to information in the possession of the Executive 
Branch, which Congress believes it requires in order to carry 
out its responsibilities. 25 Insofar as these statutes implicate 
@m not speculate on the presidential functions which may require 
absolute immunity, but a clear example would be instances in which the 
President participates iripFOsecutorial decisions. 
25 See, e. g. , 48 Cong. Re~'During my first session of Con-
gress I was desirous of learning the needs of the postal service and inquir-
ing into the conditions of the employees. To my surprise I found that 
under an Executive order these civil service employees could not give me 
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a separation of powers argument, I would think it to be just 
the opposite of that suggested by petitioner and accepted by 
the majority. In enacting these statutes, Congress sought 
to preserve its own constitutionally mandated functions in 
the face of a recalcitrant Executive. 26 Thus, the separation 
of powers problem addressed by these statutes was first of all 
presidential behavior that intruded upon, or burdened, Con-
gress' performance of its own constitutional responsibilities. 
It is no response to this to say that such a cause of action 
would disrupt the President in the furtherance of his respon-
sibilities. That approach ignores the separation of powers 
problem that lies behind the congressional action; it assumes 
that presidential functions are to be valued over congres-
sional functions. 
The argument that by providing a damages action under 
these statutes (as is assumed in this case) Congress has 
adopted an unconstitutiOiial m eans of furthering its ends, 
must rest on the premise that presidential control of execu-
tive employment decisions is a constitutionally assigned 
presidential function with which Congress may not signifi-
cantly interfere. This is a frivolous contention. In United 
States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886), this Court held 
high time that Congress should listen to the appeals of these men and pro-
vide a way whereby they can properly present a petition to the Members of 
Congress for a redress of grievances without the fear of losing their official 
positions") (remarks of Rep. Reilly); id., at 5157 ("I have always requested 
employees to consult with me on matters affecting their interest and be-
lieve that it is my duty to listen to all respectful appeals and complaints.") 
(remarks of Rep. Evans). Indeed, it is for just this reason that petitioners 
in No. 80-945 argue that the statutes do not create a private right of action: 
"5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 were designed to protect the leg-
islative process, not to give one such as Fitzgerald a right to seek dam-
ages." Brief for petitioners, at 26, n. 11. 
26 Indeed, the impetus for passage of what is now 5 U. S. C. § 7211 was 
the imposition of "gag rules" upon testimony of civil servants before con-
gressional committees. See Exec. Order No. 402 (Jan. 25, 1906); Exec. 
Order No. 1142 (Nov. 26, 1909). 
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that "when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of infe-
rior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and re-
strict the power of removal as it deems best for the public in-
terest." Whatever the rule may be with respect to high 
officers, see Humphrey's E xecutor v. United States, 295 
U. S. 602 (1935), with respect to those who fill traditional bu-
reaucratic positions, restrictions on executive authority are 
the rule and not the exception. 27 This case itself demon-
strates, the \ eve:r_:e _statutory r~str~in!§'' ~nder which the 
President operates i~a.-
Fitzgerald was a civil service employee working in the Of-
fice of the Secretary of the Air Force. Although his position 
was such as to fall within the "excepted" service, which 
would ordinarily mean that Civil Service rules and regula-
tions applicable to removals would not protect him, 5 CFR 
Part 6, § 6.4, his status as a veteran entitled him to special 
protections. Veterans are entitled to certain Civil Service 
benefits afforded to "preference eligibles." 5 U. S. C. 
§ 2108. These benefits include that set forth in 5 U. S. C. 
§7513(a): "An agency may take [adverse action] against an 
employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of 
the service." Similarly, his veteran status entitled Fitzger-
ald to the protection of the reduction in force procedures es-
tablished by civil service regulation. 5 U. S. C. 
§§ 3501-3502. It was precisely those procedures that the 
Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission found had 
been violated, in his 1973 recommendation that respondent 
be reappointed to his old position or to a job of comparable 
authority. 
This brief review is enough to illustrate my point: Person--nel decisions of the sort involved in this case are em hatically 
not a constitutionally ass1gne presidentm function that will 
27 Thus, adverse action may generally be taken against civil servants 
only "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 
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tolerate no interference by either of the other two branches 
of government. More important than this "quantitative" 
analysis of the degree of intrusion in presidential decision-
making permitted in this area, however, is the "qualitative" 
anaylsis suggested in § I(B) above. 
Absolute immyni.U: is appropriate when the threat of ~abil­
ity may bias the decisionmakg,r W wax_s tfiat are adverse to 
the public interest. But as the various regulations and stat-
utes protecting civil servants from arbitrary executive action 
illustrate, this is an area in which the public interest is de-
monstrably on the side of encouraging less "vigor" and more 
"caution" on the part of decisionmakers. That is, the very 
steps that Congress has taken to assure that executive em-
ployees will be able freely to testify in Congress and to assure 
that they will not be subject to arbitrary adverse actions indi-
cate that those policy arguments that have elsewhere justi-
fied absolute immunity are not applicable here. Absolute 
immunity would be nothing more than a judicial declaration 
of policy that directly contradicts the policy of protecting civil 
servants reflected in the statutes and regulations. 
If respondent could, in fact, have proceeded on his two 
statutory claims, the Bivens action would be superfluous. 
Respondent may not collect damages twice, and the same in-
juries are put forward by respondent as the basis for both the 
statutory and constitutional claims. As we have said before, 
"were Congress to create equally effective alternative reme-
dies, the need for damages relief [directly under the Con-
stitution] might be obviated." Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 
228, 248 (1979). Nevertheless, because the majority decides 
that the President is absolutely immune from a Bivens action 
as well, I shall express by disagreement with that conclusion. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 
U. S. 388 (1971), we held that individuals who have suffered 
a compensable injury through a violation of the rights guar-
anteed them by the Fourth Amendment may invoke the gen-
eral federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts in a 
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suit for damages. That conclusion rested on two principles: 
First, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws," 403 U. 8., at 397, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 163 (1803); second, "[h]istorically, damages have 
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of per-
sonal interests in liberty." 403 U. S., at 395. In Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1977), we rejected the argument 
of the federal government that federal officers, including cab-
inet officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for 
such constitutional violations-a position that we recognized 
would substantially undercut our conclusion in Bivens. We 
held there that although the performance of certain limited 
functions will be protected by the shield of absolute immu-
nity, the general rule is that federal officers, like state offi-
cers, have only a qualified immunity. Finally, in Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we held that a Congressman 
could be held liable for damages in a Bivens-type suit brought 
in federal court alleging a violation of individual rights guar-
anteed the plaintiff by the Due Process Clause. In my view, 
these cases have largely settled the issues raised by the 
Bivens apsect of this case. 
These cases established the following principles. First, it 
is not the exclusiVe"prerogative or the legislative branch to 
create a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation. 
In the absence of adequate legislatively prescribed remedies, 
the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts 
permits the courts to create remedies, both legal and equita-
ble, appropriate to the character of the injury. Second, ex-
ercise of this "judicial" function does not create a separation 
of powers problem: We have held both executive and legisla-
tive officers subject to this judicially created cause of action 
and in each instance we have rejected separation of powers 
arguments. Holding federal officers liable for damages for 
constitutional injuries no more violates separation of powers 
principles than do the equitable remedies that result from the 
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traditional function of judicial review. Third, federal offi-
cials will generally have a "qualified immunity" from such 
suits; absolute immunity will be extended to certain functions 
only on the basis of a showing that exposure to liability is in-
consistent with the proper performance of the official's duties 
and responsibilities. Finally, Congress retains the power to ( 
restrict exposure to liability, and the policy judgments im-
plicit in this decision should properly be made by Congress. 
The majority fails to recognize the force of what the Court 
has already done in this area. Under the above principles, 
the President could not claim that there are no circumstances 
under which he would be subject to a Bivens-type action for 
violating respondent's constitutional rights. Rather, he 
must assert that the absence of absolute immunity will sub-
stantially impair his ability to carry out particular functions 
that are his constitutional responsibility. For the reasons I 
have presented above, I do not believe that this argument 
can be successfully made under the circumstances of this 
case. 
It is, of course, theoretically possible, that the President 
should be held to be absolutely immune because each of the 
functions for which he has constitutional responsibility would 
be substantially impaired by the possibility of civil liability. 
I do not think this argument is valid for the simple reason 
that the function involved here does not have this character. 
Which side of the line other presidential functions would fall 
on need not be decided in this case. 
The majority opinion suggests a variant of this argument. 
It argues, not that every presidential function has this char-
acter, but that distinguishing the particular functions in-
volved in any given case would be "difficult." Ante, at n. 
35. 28 Even if this were true, it would not necessarily follow 
28 The majority also seems to believe that by "function" the Court has in 
the past referred to "s~ose." See ante, at n. 35 ("judges fre-
quently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were 
? 
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that the President is entitled to absolute immunity: That 
would still depend on whether, in those unclear instances, it 
is likely to be the case that one of the functions implicated de-
serves the protection of absolute immunity. In this particu-
lar case, I see no such function. 29 
I do not believe that subjecting the President to a Bivens 
action would create separation of powers problems or "public 
policy" problems different from those involved in subjecting 
the President to a statutory cause of action. 3{) Relying upon 
the history and text of the Constitution, as well as the ana-
lytic method of our prior cases, I conclude that these prob-
lems are not sufficient to justify absolute immunity for the 
President in general, nor under the circumstances of this case 
in particular. 
III 
Because of the importance of this case, it is appropriate to 
examine the reasoning of the majority opinion. 
The opinion suffers from ~erious ambizyit;y even with re-
spect to the most fundamental point1io""w broad is the immu-
taken."). I do not read our cases that way. In ~2!P v. Sparkman, 435 
U. S. 349, 362 (1978), we held that the factors etermining whether a 
judge's act was a "judicial action" entitled to absolute immunity "relate to 
the nature of the act itself, i . e, whether it is a function normally performed 
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties." Neither of these fac-
tors required any analysis of the purpose the judge may have had in carry-
ing out the particular action. Similarly in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 
478, 512-516 (1977) , when we determined that certain executive functions 
were entitled to absolute immunity because they shared "enough of the 
characteristics of the judicial process," we looked to objective qualities and 
not subjective purpose. 
29 The majority seems to suggest that responsibility for governmental re-
organizations is one such function. Ante, at n. 35. I fail to see why this 
should be so. 
30 Although our conclusions differ, the majority opinion reflects a similar 
view as to the relationship between the two sources of the causes of action 
in this case: It does not believe it necessary to differentiate in its own anal-
ysis between the statutory and constitutional causes of action. 
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nity granted the President? The opinion suggests that its 
scope is limited by the fact that under none of the asserted 
causes of action "has Congress taken express legislative ac-
tion to subject the President to civil liability for his official 
acts." Ante, at 17. We are never told, however, how or 
why Congressional action could make a difference. It is not 
apparent that any of the propositions relied upon by the ma-
jority to immunize the President would not apply equally to 
such a statutory cause of action; nor does the majority indi-
cate what new principles would operate to undercut those 
propositions. 
In the end, the majority seems to overcome its initial hesi-
tation, for it announces that, "[ w ]e consider [absolute] immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public 
policy," ibid. See also id., at 23 ("A rule of absolute immu-
nity for the President will not leave the Nation without suffi-
cient remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief execu-
tive.").31 There is even a disturbing suggestion that the 
President may be immune from judicial process in general: 
"Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the 
Court, there have been strong statements in previous opin-
ions asserting the immunity of the President from judicial or-
ders." Ante, at 21 n. 36. 32 Yet, on the very next page the 
31 THE CHIEF JUSTICE leaves no doubt that he, at least, reads the major-
ity opinion as standing for the broad proposition that the President is abso-
lutely immune under the Constitution: 
"I write separately to emphasize that the presidential immunity spelled out 
today derives from and is mandated by the Constitution. Absolute immu-
nity for a President is either implicit in the constitutional doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers or it does not exist." Memorandum of Concurrence, at 1. 
32 Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 
U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of whether a court may 
compel the President himself to perform ministerial executive functions: 
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection, 
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majority recognizes that this issue has long been resolved: "It 
is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does not 
bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the 
United States." Ante, at 22. 
without expressing any opinion on the broader isseus ... whether, in any 
case, the President, ... may be required, by the process of this court, to 
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held ame-
nable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime." 
Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by the 
majority, did not indicate that the President could never be subject to judi-
cial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument 
that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional judicial infringe-
ment upon the Executive Branch: 
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general 
in the discharage of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an execu-
tive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act, 
which neither he nor the president had any authority to deny or control." 
!d., at 610. 
The majority also contends that "strong historical considerations" sup-
port this view. The history cited is for the most part that reviewed in 
§I of this opinion. In addition, it cites a letter by President Jefferson, 
which it contends demonstrates that "Jefferson believed the Presiaent not 
to be subject to judicial process." 
Thomas Jefferson's views on the relation of the President to the judicial 
process are, however, not quite so clear as the majority suggests. Jeffer-
son took a variety of positions on the proper relation of executive and judi-
cial authority, at different points in his career. It would be suprising if 
President Jefferson had not argued strongly for such immunity from judi-
cial process, particularly in a confrontation with Chief Justice Marshall. 
Jefferson's views on this issue before he became President would be of a 
good deal more significance. In this regard, it is significant that in Jeffer-
son's second and third drafts of the Virginia Constitution, which also pro-
posed a separation of the powers of government into three separate 
branches, he specifically proposed that the Executive be subject to judicial 
process: "he shall be liable to action, tho' not to personal restraint for pri-
vate duties or wrongs." 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 350, 360. Also sig-
nificant is the fact that when Jefferson's followers tried to impeach Justice 
Chase in 1804-1805, one of the grounds of their attack on him was that he 
had refused to subpoena President Adams during the trial of Dr. Cooper 
for sedition. See Corwin, "The President: Office and Powers" 113. Fi-
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In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), we upheld 
the power of a federal district court to issue a subpoena duces 
tecum against the President. In other cases we have en-
joined executive officials from carrying out presidential 
directives. See e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Not until this case has there ever 
been a suggestion that the mere formalism of the name ap-
pearing on the complaint was more important in resolving 
separation of powers problems than the substantive charac-
ter of the judicial intrusion upon executive functions. 
The majority suggests that the separation of powers doc-
trine permits exercising jurisdiction over the President only 
in those instances where "judicial action is needed to serve 
broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in dero-
gation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their 
proper balance." Ante, at 22. Without explanation, the 
majority contends that a "merely private suit for damages" 
does not serve this function. 
The suggestion that enforcement of the rule of law-i. e., 
subjecting the President to rules of general applicability-
does not further the separation of powers, but rather is in 
derogation of this purpose, is bizarre. At stake in a suit of 
this sort, to the extent that it is based u on a statutoril cr -
ated cause of ac wn, is the ao1 1ty of Congress to assert legal ...... 
nally, it is worth noting that even in the middle of the debate over Chief 
Justice Marshall's power to subpoena the President during the Burr trial, 
Jefferson looked to a legislative solution of the confrontation: "I hope how-
ever that ... at the ensuing session of the legislature [the Chief Justice] 
may have means provided for giving to individuals the benefit of the testi-
mony of the [Executive] functionaries in proper cases." X Works of 
Thomas Jefferson, 407 n. (P. Ford Ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from Presi-
dent Jefferson to George Hay, United States District Attorney for 
Virginia). r? 
Only by virtue of brevity of its analysis can the majority plausably put I \ 
forth the claim that this history provides "strong" support for a proposition 
that it admits to being demonstrably untrue one page later. 
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restraints upon the Executive and of the courts to perform 
their function of providing redress for legal harm. Regard-
less of what the Court might think of the merits of Mr. Fitz-
gerald's claim, the idea that pursuit of legal redress offends 
the doctrine of separation of powers is a frivolous contention 
passing as legal argument. 
Similarly, the majority implies that the assertion of a con-
stitutional cause of action-the whole point of which is to as-
sure that an officer does not transgress the constutitionallim-
its on his authority-may offend separation of powers 
concerns. This is surely a perverse approach to the Con-
stitution: Whatever the arguments in favor of absolute immu-
nity may be, it is untenable to argue that subjecting the Pres-
ident to constitutional restrictions will undercut his "unique" 
role in our system of government. It cannot be seriously ar- I 
gued that the President must be p~cEld beyond the law and 
beyond judicial enforcement oT constitutional restraints upon 
executive Officers in order to implement the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. 
Focusing on the actual arguments the majority offers for 
its holding of absolute immunity for the President, one finds -suprisingly little. As I read the relevant section of the 
Court's opinion, I find just three contentions from which the 
majority draws this conclusion. Each of them is little more 
than a makeweight; together they hardly suffice to justify the 
wholesale disregard of our traditional approach to immunity 
questions:-~- '---" 
First,the majority informs us that the President occupies 
a "unique position in the constitutional scheme," including 
responsibilities for the administration of justice, foreign af-
fairs, and management of the Executive Branch. Ante, at 
17-18. True as this may be, it says nothing about why a 
"unique" rule of immunity should apply to the President. 
The President's unique role may indeed encompass functions 
for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It 
does not follow from that, however, that he is entitled to ab-
solute immunity either in general or in this case in particular. 
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For some reason, the majority believes that this unique-
ness of the President shifts the burden to respondent to 
prove that a rule of absolute immunity does not apply:- The 
respondent has failed in this effort, the Court suggests, be-
cause the President's uniqueness makes "inapposite" any 
analogy to our cases dealing with other executive officers. 
Even if this were true, it would not follow that the President 
is entitled to absolute immunity; it would only mean that a 
particular argument is out of place. But the fact is that it is 
not true. There is nothing in the President's unique role 
that makes the arguments used in those other cases 
inappropriate. 
Second, the majority contends that because the President 
is "particularly vulnerable to suits for civil damages," ante, at 
19, a rule of absolute immunity is required. The force of this 
argument is surely undercut by the majority's admission that 
"there is no historical record of numerous suits against the 
President." ld, at n. 34. Even granting that a Bivens 
cause of action did not becomes available until 1971, in the 
eleven years since then there have been only a handful of 
suits. Many of these are frivolous and dealt with in a routine 
manner by the courts and the Justice Department. There is 
no reason to think that, in the future, the protection afforded 
by summary judgment procedures would not be adequate to 
protect the President, as they currently protect other execu-
tive officers from unfounded litigation. Indeed, given the 
decision today in Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, No. 
80--945, there is even more reason to believe that frivolous 
claims will not intrude upon the President's time. Even if 
judicial procedures were found not to be sufficient, Congress 
remains free to address this problem if and when it develops. 
Finally, the Court suggests that potential liability could 
"distort the process of decisionmaking" because executive be-
havior would necessarily be somewhat defensive in character 
to guard against this possibility. Unless one assumes that 
the President himself makes the countless high level execu-
tive decisions required in the administration of government, 
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this rule will not do much to insulate such decisions from the 
threat of liability. The logic of the proposition cannot be lim-
ited to the President; its extension, however, has been uni-
formly rejected by this Court. See Butz, supra; Harlow & 
Butterfield, supra. Furthermore, in no instance have we 
previously held legal accountability in itself to be an unjustifi-
able cost. The availability of the courts to vindicate con-
stitutional and statutory wrongs has been perceived and pro-
tected as one of the virtues of our system of delegated and 
limited powers. As I argued in§ I, our concern in fashioning 
absolute immunity rules has been that liability may pervert 
the decisionmaking process in a particular function by under-
cutting the values we expect to guide those decisions. The 
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas 
that may intrude on individuals' legally protected rights has 
never before been counted as a cost. 
IV 
The majority may be correct in its conclusion that "a rule of 
absolute immunity will not leave the Nation without suffi-
cient remedies for misconduct on the part of t~e chief execu-
tive." Ante, at 23. Such a rule will, however, leave Mr. 
Fitzgerald without an adequate remedy for the harms that he 
may have suffered. More importantly, it will leave future 
plaintiffs without a remedy, regardless of the substantiality 
of their claims. The remedies in which the Court finds com-
fort were never designed to afford relief for individual harms. 
Rather, they were designed as political safety-valves. Poli-
tics and history, however, are not the domain of the courts; 
the courts exist to assure each individual that he, as an indi-
vidual, has enforcable rights that he may pursue to achieve a 
peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances. 
I find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the Court would so 
casually discard its own role of assuring "the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws," Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), in the name of protecting 
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May 12, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
BRW's draft dissent contains few surprises. Under the 
circumstances I think we should not attempt to provoke a long 
series of exchanges before the opinion issues. Some changes are 
needed, however. I haye marked suggestions on the attached 
draft, beginning at page 15 of our opinion. In this cover memo I 
explain--page by page--what I think the suggested changes would 
accomplish. 
J3 J }1.A Page 15. I think BRW' s strongest charge--anticipated 
~~ier by JPS--is that the opinion has included too much 
£~policy" language, too few of the indicia of a judicial opinioh .• ; 
~_!3-ere is no loss from dropping this "policy" sentence." ~ 
Page 16. "Insert A" is a suggested re-write of the deleted 
paragraphs. It has three aims: (1) to omit certain excess 
"policy" language; (2) to pin the origin of the "policy" language 
on BRW's own Butz opinion; and (3) to explain the "policy" 
.-
inquiry in terms of structural and functional presuppositions of 
our institutions of government. 
Page 17. The change in text lets us cite Story "upfront" as 
an exposition of the kind of functional/policy concern on which a 
court, consistently with the "judicial" role, can rely. The 
language added to note 27 responds to BRW's claim that Congress 
must be able to restrain the President in order to protect its 
own role in the separation of powers. The point essentially is 
that, whatever its general intentions, it has not shown that it 
meant to subject the President to damages liability. 
Page 19. BRW claims that we present no "arguments" in 
support of absolute immunity--merely shift the burden of proof. 
"Insert B" does little more than move the sentences in the 
paragraph as originally written. It does, however, put the case 
a bit more affirmativelys--the reason I would recommend its 
adoption. 
Page 20. The change in text is very close to being 
stylistic. The footnote change responds to the dissent's claim 
that there would be no need to inquire into the President's 
motives to perform a division of his functions. 
Page 21. BRW alleges that the historical recitation of the 
footnote engages in overstatement. This seems to me precisely 
the kind of debate we should avoid--whether a footnote, of only 
marginal importance, is shaded a bit too harshly. I think the 
best way to deal with this criticism is to defuse it. 
Page 23. Insert C, to be added to the footnote, responds to 
BRW's major premise that our jurisprudence assumes a damages 
remedy for every wrong. In many ways I think this is the ground 
on which we must meet BRW in order to be persuasive. 
Page 24. The suggested footnote--"Insert D"--deals with 
BRW's rhetorical charge that the Court puts the President "above 
the law." 
~uprtmt <!fou.rt of tltt ~b ~tafte 
Waalyington. ~. <!f. 20,?'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHAL\-
May 12, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Byron: 





cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 05/15/82 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dick DATE: May 14, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
79-1738 Nixon 
My tentative comments - subject to discussion - on 
suggested changes in our opinion, are as follows: 
Pages 15 and 16 - I do not view the fulminating 
of the dissent about "public policy" necssarily suggests a 
deemphasis by us on what the Court has said before about 
reliance on policy in immunity cases. No one has relied 
more heavily on it than BRW himself. In effect, we are 
relying on stare decisis. 
Having said this, and on a second reading of your 
changes on 15 and 16, I believe they are an improvement. I 





,, II .,,.v"'t; V\ 1), f.e ol ~1 
"Our decisions concerning the immunity of 
government officials from civil damages 
liability have been guided primarily by the 
Constitution, federal statutes/ and history. 
QAdditionally, at least in the absence of 
explicit~ constitutional or congressional 
guidance, / immunity decisions have been 
informed by the common law o(for example, in 
cases arising under the inexplicit language 
of §1983). Tht s Court also neG-e,ssaril-y has 
weighed concerns of public policy1 in light- of 
our history and the structure of our . 
government. (Dick, here cite "public policy" 
statements from Butts, etc.). 
~ 
e ft"c. • tly 
At this point we 'can pick up - if you agree - the second 
full paragraph in your insert A. 
Page 17. Apart from minor editing, the only 
change is in note 27. I will address this below. 
Page 19. Your insert B is a fine substitute for 
the present language. I have done minor editing. 
Note 35. Although you have made no change in note 
35 (not at bottom of your rider B-2), I am not at all sure 
now thatwe should say that where an official possesses 
absolute immunity (e.g., a judge), it extends only "to acts 
in performance of particular function". We hold in this 
case that presidential immunity extends only to action taken 
within the scope of his authority- i.e., official duties. 
If he committed a personal fraud (conspired with a friend to 
defraud a widow for personal gain), or a personal tort 
(assault and battery of the President of Americans for 
Democratic Action), the President would no more have 
immunity than would the Texas judge who conspired to commit 
a fraud. See the draft of a footnote that I have dictated. 
Page 20. I like the new sentence beginning page 
20. I also like the insert proposed for the footnote. If 
we decide to take the position that I mention above with 
respect to "functional" analysis, other changes would have 
2. 
' 
to be made in this note. The central point, however, would 
remain the same: namely, that because of the scope of the 
executive power of the United States under our Constitution, 
the official acts of a President embrace the spectrum of 
government. Nevertheless, in so acting within the scope of 
his authority, his motives would be as irrelevant as those 
of a judge or prosecutor acting judicially or 
prosecutorially. Drawing distinctions near the "outer 
perimeter" would be difficult but not impossible. 
Page 21. The editing changes are good. I would 
like to take a look at what we wrote last Term about history 
before deciding whether to say anything further about it. 
Page 23, n. 41. I think your insert is quite good 
- and an effective answer to BRW. 
Page 24, n. 45. This also is helpful. 
* * * * * 
Now, Dick, I come to your memo of May 14, with the 
suggested long revision of note 27. we need to talk about 
this, but my initial reactions are as follows: 
I agree that we need to respond to the dissent's 
implied cause of action theory. In general terms, we could 
start by saying that the dissent injects into this case the 
argument that a damages cause of action against the 
President may be implied from the statutes on which 
3. 
' respondent relies. The issue is not before us (stating 
why). We address it briefly only because the dissent relies 
on it. Then, Dick, I would make in summary form the 
"intent" argument that you made so persuasively in Merrill 
Lynch. Cite the Court's opinion in Merrill Lynch that 
turned entirely on intent, Sea Clammers and other relevant 
cases. 
After making clear that intent must be 
established, I would repeat what we have in present note 27, 
and follow this with strong statements that there is not a 
word in the statutes or legislative history that supports an 
intention to impose a damages liability on the President of 
the United States. Nor were thre any prior court decisions, 
such as those relied upon in Merrill Lynch. We might add 
that in view of other remedies provided expressly in these 
statutes, our cases also militate against even implying 
causes of action against~ officials. See, e.g. Bush (?). 
I would reserve for a final paragraph the answer 




May 14, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Nixon 
Attached is some language drafted as a substitute for the 
current Footnote 27 of the Nixon opinion. For what it is worth, 
I believe that it should be included. David has seen it, and he 
agrees. On the other hand, you of course must worry whether it 
would offend the Chief. 
Note 27. 
The Court previously has suggested that separation-of-powers 
concerns might make it inappropriate for a court to "infer" a 
Bivens cause of action against an official of the President's 
constitutional stature. See Carlson v. Green, supra, at 19 (in 
direct constitutional actions against officials with independent 
status in our constitutional scheme .•• judicially created 
remedies ••. might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, supra, at 396 (inference of a 
constitutional damages remedy would be inappropriate in~ case 
involving "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence 
of affirmative action by Congress"). 
Similar concerns, discussed in test infra, counsel 
hesitation in concluding that Congress intended a statute of 
general reference to subject the President to damages liability 
for his official acts. We know of no instance in which Congress 
explicitly has undertaken to expose the President to damages 
liability, and we have no occasion to consider the serious 
constitutional issues that would arise if Congress should do so. 
•st~~U, ... ~
JUSTICE WHITEA s~gge~ts that the statutes on which respondent 
relies should be construed as intended to create a damages action 
lk~ .... H.At 
against the President. Ia a~ the purpose of these statutes 
was to control Executive behavior. Post, at 21. And from this 
purpose he would infer that Congress must have intended to 
subject the President, as the principal Executive officer, to 
private suits for damages. 
In the present posture of the case we must assume that 
~4..4 ...... ~-~~("4~-1.4 .. 
causes of action may be inferretl under 5 u.s.c. 7211 and 18 
" u.s.c. § 1505. See note 20 supra. Even assuming that damages 
actions may be inferred against some wrongdoers, ..QgueveP"-J we eo 
~114J,..,. ~ ...... ~..,_. 
oA&t ehtl'\ok it followsf that an intent to impose liabiity on the 
1 ~ ~ . 
President d. The legislative history cited by 
~4-f_./,.,..... ~ ;-/ ~ •·111/.t I l4c.. /Z...:t-', 
JUSTICE WHITE, post, at 20-2l,J\~~y. ~!Te.e~~Fa:liy. ' 
That history principally involves the enactment of Section 6 of 
the Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 
539. The predecessor of 5 u.s.c. § 7211, this legislation was 
passed by Congress partly to override "gag rules" imposed by 
executive orders prior to that time. In terms the statute 
provided that civil service employees had a right to report to 
Congress and that they should not be punished for doing so. Yet 
there is no indication on the face of the statute that Congress 
intended to impose damages liability on the President. And, in 
the historical context, it is implausible that Congress in 1912 
could have intended to create a damages remedy against the 
President by mere implication. Only a few years earlier, in 
1896, this Court had held that the Postmaster General was 
absolutely immune from civil suits arising from "action having 
more or less connection with the general matters committed by law 
to his control or supervision." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 
498 (1896). The rationale of Spalding, see id., at 498-499, 
would have applied to the President a fortiori. Accordingly, we 
cannot accept that "Congress •.• would [have meant to] impinge on 
a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert 
inclusion in the general language before us." Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 u.s. 367, 376 (1 1). Nor is any indication of 
intent supplied by the floor debates. On the contrary, these 
suggest that congressional oversight--not a remedy in damages 
from the President--would be the principal enforcement mechanism. 
See 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (19121 ("Supervisory officials will 
hesitate to trump up charges •.. as all cases of removals will be 
submitted to Congress each year, and if an employee can produce 
satisfactory evidence that he has not received the protection 
afforded in this bill his case can be made the subject of a 
special inquiry if Congress so decides) (remarks of Rep. Calder); 
id., at 4656 ("Men in official position will hesitate to trump up 
charges against some employee ... , as ail the cames of removals 
and reductions will be submitted to Congress each year II ) . . . . . 
The other section from which respondent would infer a cause 
of action against the President is a criminal statute, 18 u.s.c. 
§ 1505, originally enacted in 1940. It of course does not refer 
expressly to the President. And even the respondent fails to 
argue that the legislative history suggests any intent to create 
a damages remedy enforceable against the President on the basis 
of his official acts. 
lfp/ss 05/15/82 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dick DATE: May 14, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
79-1738 Ni.xon 
My tentative comments - subject to discussion - on 
suggested changes in our opinion, are as follows: 
Pages 15 and 16 - I do not view the Fulrninatina 
of the dissent about "public policv" necssarily sugqests ~ 
deemphasis by us on what the ~ourt has said before about 
reliance on policy in immunity cases. No one has relied 
more h~avilv on it than Bml himself. In effect, we are 
relying on stare decisis. 
Having said this, and on a second reading ot your 
changes on 15 and 16, I believe they are an improvement. I 
suggest we revise the beqinning of subpart B alonq 
thefollowing lines: 
"Our dec:i.sions concerning the bnrnuni ty of 
government officials from civil damages 
liability have been guided primarily by the 
Constitution, federal statutes and history. 
Additionally, at least in the absence of 
explicity constitutional or congressional 
guidance, immunity decisions have been 
informed by the common law (for example, in 
cases arising under the inexplicit language 
of §1983). This Court also necessarily has 
weighed concerns of public policy in liqht of 
our history and the structure of our 
government. (Dick, here cite "public pol icy" 
statements from Butts, etc.). 
At this point we can pick up - if you agree - the second 
full paragraph in your insert A. 
Page 17. Apart from minor editing, the only 
change is in note 27. l will address this below. 
Page 19. Your insert B is a fine substitute for 
the present language. I have done minor editing. 
Note 35. Although you have made no change in note 
35 (not at bottom of your rider B-2), I am not at all sure 
now thatwe should ~ay that where an official possesses 
absolute immunitv (e.g., a judge} 1 it extends onlv "to acts 
in performance of particular function". We hol~ in this 
case that presidential immunity extends only to action taken 
with in the scope of hi.s authority - i.e. 1 official duties. 
If he committed a personal fraud (conspired with a friend to 
defraud a widO\tl for personal gain), or a personal tort 
(assault and battery of the President of ~mericans for 
Democratic Action), the President would no more have 
immunity than would the rrexas judge who conspired to commit 
a fraud. See the draft of a footnote that I have dictated. 
Page 20. I like the new sentence beginning page 
20. I also like the insert proposed for the footnote. If 
we decide to take the po~ition that I mention above with 
respect to "functional" analysis, other changes would have 
2. 
to be made in this note. The central point, however, would 
remain the same: namely, that because of the scope of the 
executive power of the United States under our Constitution, 
the official acts of a President embrace the spectrum of. 
government. Nevertheless, in so acting within the scope of 
his authority, his motives would be as irrelevant as those 
of a judge or prosecutor acting judicially or 
prosecutorially. Drawing distinctions near the "outer 
perimeter" would be difficult but not impossible. 
Page 21. The editing changes are good. T. would 
like to take a look at what we wrote last Term about history 
before decirHnq whether to say anvthing further about it. 
Page 23, n. 41. I think your inse~t is quite good 
- and an effective answer to BRW. 
Page 24, n. 45. Thls also is helpful. 
* * * * * 
Now, Dick, I come to your memo of Mav 14, with the 
suggested long r.evi.sion of note 27. We need to talk about 
this, but my initial reactions are as follows: 
I agree that we need to respond to the dissent's 
implied cause of action theory. In qeneral terms, we could 
start by saying that the dissent injects into this case the 
argument that a damages cause of action against the 
President may be implied from the statutes on which 
3. 
respondent relies. The issue is not before us (stating 
why). We address it briefly only because the dissent relies 
on it. Then, Dick, I would make in summary form the 
"intent" argument that you made so persuasively in Merrill 
Lynch. Cite the Court's opinion in Mer.r :U.l Lynch that 
turned entirely on intent, Sea Clammers and other. relevant 
cases. 
After making clear that intent must be 
established, I would repeat what we have in present note 27, 
and follow this with strong statements that there is not a 
word in the statutes or legislati.ve history that supports an 
intention to impo~e a damages liability on the President of 
the United States. Nor were thre any prior court decisions, 
such as those relied upon in Merr i 11 Lynch. _we might add 
that in view of. other remedies provided expressly in these 
statutes, our cases also militate against even implying 
causes of action against .!!!!Y_ officials. See, e.g. Bush (?). 
I would reserve for a final paragraph the answer 





May 18, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Oear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra: 
I send to each of you herewith, a third draft of 
my opinion for the Court, which you have joi.ned. 
Byron's dissent, persuasive from his viewpoint, 
tempted me to respond to a number of points. On reflection, 
however, I concluded that he had made only two suhRtantial 
arguments: (i) that in resolving this ca~e, we had to 
"assume" that there is an implied cause of action against a 
President under both Bivens and the Civil Service statutes1 
and (ii) that we relied too heavily on "public oolicy". 
I therefore have confined responses to his opini.on 
almost exclusively to these two points. I think Byron 
perhaps is correct that I had overeompha.s i z~d "pol icv", when 
the fundamental support for absolute t.mmuni ty comes from the 
Constitution, and the structure and history of our 
government. Changes in the text, marked in the marqin of my 
third drCift, have attempted to make this clear. 
The "imPlied cause of action" point is peculiar in 
the present posture of the case. You may recall tha.t there 
was a majority (including Byron) to decide this case on the 
ground that there is no implied cause of action against a 
President either under Bivens or the statutes. But a 
majority of you argued that we had taken the case to decide 
the immunity question, and accordingly I have written it 
that way. Byron, however, has relied on the statutes in a 
way that I think both damaging and unjustified. I think it 
necessary to respond, and I have done so in footnote 27, p. 
16. 
As indicated above, I am not replying to Byron's 
"parade of horribles" as to what a President may do to 
innocent people. I was tempted to cite from some of his own 
language in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 u.s. 349, 355-356, in 
,. 
2. 
which he quoted from Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, at 347. 
But this seems profitless. My response, therefore, is 
confined primarily to the foregoinq T;>Oints. t think Rvron's 
criticism with respect to "public policy" was a constructive 
one. It has helped me, I think, to strengthen the opinion. 
I hope you agree. 
As you have joined, I will await your views before 
I recirculate. 












we know of no instance in which Congress ~ 6-;f~o. 
NIXON16 SALLY-POW 
explicitly has undertaken to expose the President to ~~~ 
damages liability. And in this case we have no occasion ~6jlzl / 
' 
to consider the serious constitutional issues that would 
arise if Congress should do so. We are reviewing this 
case under the "collateral order" doctrine, the issue 
submitted thereunder being only the immunity of a 
President. The dissenting opinion appears to argue that 
even though Congress has not spoken expressly, an 
intention to create a private cause of action against all 
officials nevertheless may be inferred both under Bivens 
and the two statutes in issue. For the purpose of 
reviewing this case under the collateral order before us, 
2. 
we may assume that causes of action may be inferred 
against some officials. It does not follow, however, that 
we must - in considering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a 
I' 
~ statute in light of the immunity doctrine - maAe a similar 
assumption with respect to the President. If, as we have 
concluded, a President enjoys absolute immunity from civil 
~liability in the absence of explicit affirmative 
action by Congress, the question raised by the dissent is 
answered. A damages remedy may not be implied against a 
President for his official acts. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~uvrtmt QJ11ttrt llf tqt 'Jnitth' ~tatt.a' 
Jla,gfriugtltn. ~.OJ. 2ll~~~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
May 19, 1982 
No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for the opportunity to review your proposed 
changes in the court's opinion. It is a major opinion, and a 
very significant one. You have tackled it well. 
I am concerned, however, about two major points. In 
footnote 27, the opinion seems to say that there are neither 
statutory nor First Amendment implied causes of action. However, 
if this is so, there is no need to reach the immunity issue. As 
you know, my first preference was to hold there is no implied 
cause of action. It seems to me the Court must make up its mind 
which issue to reach, but if we hold there is no implied cause of 
action, the rest is dicta. 
Second, if we hold the President enjoys absolute 
immunity from damage suits, then we are holding in effect that 
Congress may not enact a statute holding the President liable for 
civil damages. There is no express discussion, however, of the 
limitation we are impos~g on Congress. Inasmuch as the 
President is subject t~ub~na duces tecum in a crimianl case, zl and has been held subject ~njunction, there should be a 
~ clearer discussion of why Congress is restricted in this one 
~ 'fQ regard, and the extent to which it is restricted. 
:--::: 
Finally, you have opted not to expand the historical 
analysis. Byron made some good points in that regard and perhaps 
it would help the opinion to deal with it more fully. 
Justice Powell 







May 20, 1982 
PERSONAL 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Chief, Bill an~ John: 
As a result of ~iscussions with Sandra, I expect 
to rewrite - and condense - footnote 27 (pp. 16-17) of my 
third oraft sent you on May 19. 
This contains changes that seemed appropriate in 
light of Byron's dissent. As I indicated in my letter of 
transmittal, note 27 Has new. Sanclra has mane some helpful 
suggestions. 
I suggest, therefore, that you a'"'a it a change in 
this that I orob~bly will make, an~ recirculate. 
The Chief Justice 
Justice Rehnquist 
,Just ice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: Justice O'Connor 
Sincerely, 
,jnprnnt <!fltllri of tqt ~b .i\tattg 
~ag!finght~ 10. <ij. 2llp-'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 21, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lew is: 
I am glad you have moved away from the "policy" aspect and 
put the immunity holding squarely on the Constitution. This may 
lead me to modify my concurring opinion somewhat. 
I may be in a position to deal with some of Byron's 
opulent rhetoric. On some of it he is just dead wrong both as to 
history and the Court's early utterances. 
I'll get to work. 
Justice Powell 






.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
jltJlrttttt Qfltltrf ltf tqt 11fuUtb jbdt~ 
Jla,gltUtgton, ~. <If. 2llgt~~ 
May 21, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738~. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
In view of the importance of this op1n1on, I have 
continued to work at it in light of the concerns I expressed 
previously. Perhaps it would be possible to condense footnote 27 
even more so as to avoid some of the anomaly resulting from 
extend~absolute immunity and also finding no implied cause of 
action~ suggestion is attached for your consideration. 
With reference to my concern about the matter of other 
exercises of jurisdiction over the President, I am attaching a 
~suggested substitution of Section IV B, pages 21-24. The purpose 
of the substitution is my concern that the present section could 
confuse the reader regarding the courts' exercise of jurisdiction 
over the President. My suggested changes attempt to make clear 
that we are not subtly altering our past decisions. 
~ In addition to the changes in the text, I suggest 
~dfOi~ing footnotes 35 and 37. The citations in the first 
foo n te are dated and may be of limited value in light of 
Youngstown. The references in the second footnote are not needed 
because of references to Youngstown in the text. Because of the 
~()direct reference to United States v. Nixon in the text, I would 
~delete first sentence (and c1tation) in footnote 40. Finall~ suggest integrating the substance of footnote 36 with 
your historical discussion in footnote 31. 
I stand ready to discuss this further if it would be 
? helpful. This "end of term" drafting is not easy. 
Sincerely, 
Sandra D. O'Connor 
Attachment 
27. In the present case, therefore, we are presented only with 
implied causes of action, and we do not address directly the 
immunity issue in the context of express causes of action against 
the President. Consequently, our holding today extends to the 
President absolute immunity from civil damages liability in the 
absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. 
pp. 21-24 -B-
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's 
constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial deference and restraint. For example, while courts 
generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of 
an official's evidentiary privilege,[n. 38] in considering such 
claims by the President, we have recognized that presidential 
immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 683, 708 (1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the 
United States. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, supra (holding 
that under most circumstances the President must produce 
materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial); United States 
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 187, 191 (1807) (ordering the President to 
produce a letter subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial); 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 (1952) 
(holding invalid a presidential order to seize property because 
it was not authorized by either Congress or the Constitution) .[n. 
39] But in deciding to exercise jurisdiction, a court must 
balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served 
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions 
of the executive branch. See Nixon v. General Services 
Administration, 433 u.s. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 
418 u.s. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to 
serve broad public interests--as when the court acts to maintain 
the proper balance of the separation of powers cf., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to ensure that a criminal 
trial may proceed, United States v. Nixon, su~ra--the exercise of 
jurisdiction is warranted. In the case of th1s merely private 
suit for damages based on a President's official acts, we hold it 
is not. [n. 40] 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~ttvntttt <qonrt of tqt %titt~ ~tab.tr 
~a.s'fringtcn, ~· <q. 21l~Jl.~ 
May 21, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, .. 
In view of the importance of this opinion, I have 
continued to work at it in light of the conc~s I expressed 
previously. Perhaps it would be possible to condense foot o 
even more so as to avoid some of the anomaly resulting from 
extending absolute immunity and also finding no implied cause of 
action. A suggestion is attached for your consideration. 
With reference to~y concern about the matter of other 
exercises of jurisdiction~~er the President, I am attaching a 
suggested substitution of Section _IV B, pa~gl-24. The purpose 
of the substitution is my concern that the esent section could 
confuse the reader regarding the courts' e ercise of jurisdiction 
over the President. My suggested changes attempt to make clear 
that we are not subtly altering our past decisions. 
In additi~o the changes in the text, I suggest 
dropping footnotes~ and 37. The citations in the first 
footnote are dated and may be of limited value in light of 
Youngstown. The re erences in the second footnote are not needed 
because of referenc s to Youngstown in the text. Because of the 
direct reference to United States v. Nixon in the text, I would 
delete th~first s ntence (and citation) in footnote 40. 
Finally,~ suggest integrating the substance of footnote 36 with 
your historical d'scussion in footnote 31. 
I stan ready to discuss this further if it would be 
helpful. This "end of term" drafting is not easy. 
Sincerely, 
Sandra D. O'Connor 
Attachment 
·-
27. In the present case, therefore, we are presented only with 
implied causes of action, and we do not address directly the 
immunity issue in the context of express causes of action against 
the President. Consequently, our holding today extends to the 
President absolute immunity from civil damages liability in the 
absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. 
pp. 21-24 -B-
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's 
constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial d~ference and restraint. For example, while courts 
generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of 
an official's evidentiary privilege,[n. 38] in considering such 
claims by the President, we have recognized that presidential 
immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 683, 708 {1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the 
United States. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, supra (holding 
that under most circumstances the President must produce 
materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial); United States 
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 187, 191 {1807) {ordering the President to 
produce a letter subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial); 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 {1952) 
(holding invalid a presidential order to seize property because 
it was not authorized by either Congress or the Constitution) .[n. 
39] But in deciding to exercise jurisdiction, a court must 
balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served 
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions 
of the executive branch. See Nixon v. General Services 
Administration, 433 u.s. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 
418 u.s. 683, 703-713 {1974). When judicial action is needed to 
serve broad public interests--as when the Court acts to maintain 
the proper balance of the separation of powers cf., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to ensure that a criminal 
trial may proceed, United States v. Nixon, supra--the exercise of 
jurisdiction is warranted. In the case of this merely private 
suit for damages based on a President's official acts, we hold it 
is not. [n. 40] 
May 22, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Nixon Footnote 27 
Later this afternoon I'll show you draft language 
accommodating all of SOC's requests, as I understand them. 
This draft of Footnote 27 is an early installment--and more 
troubling than what will follow. 
As I don't "like" all of the language, I call your 
attention to three sentences included for particular 
purposes. Two are very minor rewrites of Justice O'Connor's 
suggested language. It may help if you can tell her they 
are included. They are the first sentence ("In the present 
case ••• " and the next to the last ("Consequently, our 
holding today •••. ). The last sentence, though somewhat 
redundant, is included for Justice Rehnquist and the Chief. 
It is intended to clarify that the decision is of a 
"constitutional issue" and is not a housekeeping rule of 
judicial policy. 
May 25, 1982 
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Sandra: 
I am grateful for your continued interest in this 
case. The enclosed draft - now ready for circulation -
substantially adopts each of the three suggestions made in 
your letter of May 21. 
On pages 21-23 I have "tracked• your draft 
language almost word-for-word. Footnote 31 now includeR the 
historical discusRion we both thought appropriate. In 
accord with the third paragraph of your letter, the 
substance of the former note 36 now has been "integrated" 
into footnote 31. 
I believe we now have footnote 27 in satisfactory 
form. I have accepted your two suggested sentences as 
explanations of the opinion's approach to the questions 
presented. Your first sentence hegi.ns the footnote. I then 
have added a few sentences of my own, explaining that the 
approach is consistent with the Court's prior practice. 
Your second sentence then provides a kind of summary. The 
last sentence has been added to make clear that our holding 
fairly can be called "constitutional" - a matter of great 
concern to the Chief Justice. 
As perhaps you sense, I am anxious to conclude 
work on this opinion - but only with a Court. Last Term, 
both Byron and I must have devoted the better part of two 
months to the question of presidential immunity. We ended 
up with a 4-4 ti.e, with WHR not participating. There are 
differences between the Kissinger case last Term and the 
present one as a wiretap was involved in it. But the basic 
question of absolute immunity was the centerpiece of our 
long debate. Potter, John and I worked directly together in 
support of the absolute immunity view, that was joined also 
by the Chief. At one point Thurgood agreed, but in the end 
he defected. I think, as does John, that this year's 
opinion is an improved and stronger exposition of the 
absolute immunity view for the President of the United 
States. 
I particularly appreciate your interest and 
support, and your suggestions have been constructive. 
very much hope you will renew your join. Certainly as 
as any other case this Term, it is necessary to have a 





Although I am ready to recirculate, I want to make 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,juvrtmt C!}ltltd o:f tqt 'Juitth ,jtatt.1l' 
Jia,gqmgtou. ~. C!}. 2llpJ!~ 
May 26, 1982 
Re: No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
In my view, you have strengthened and improved 
the opinion in this important case. I gladly continue 
to join it. I fear I have added to your burdens with 




P.S. On page 16 in footnote 27, second sentence from the 
end, I believe the word "immunity" may be a 
typographical error. Should it be "immune"? 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~ttpuntt <ij11url 1tf flrt ~b ~tlrlt~ 
1frudyhtghm. gl. <!f. 20~J!. $ 
No. 79-1738 -- Nixon v. Fitzgerald. 
Dear Byron, 
Please join me. 




W. J. B. , Jr. 
Justice White. 
Copies to the Conference. 
,.:%u:p-rttttt <!Jo-u:.rt ~f tire ~mtd j;tat.cg 
~ct~llrtn:gtcn. ~. <!J. 20,?'J.l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF May 31, 1982 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
I am writing a brief separate dissent . This will not 
hold you or Lewis up , for I suspect that you will be making 




cc: The Conference 
/ 
\ 
_ Stylistic changes throughout; 
pp. 5-6,9,14-15,19,28-29,31-33 
No. 79- 1738 








From: Justice \Yhite 
Circulated: __ 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER L' . 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON" WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE Ft\ITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982) 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The four dissenting members of the Court in B11tz v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), argued that all federal offi-
cials are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for any ac-
tion they take in connection with their official duties. That 
immunity would extend, eYen to actions taken with express 
knowledge that the conduct was clear!~· contrary to the con-
trolling statute or clearly violatiYe of the Constitution. For-
tunately, the majorit~· of the Com·t rejected that approach: 
We held that althoug·h public officials perform certain func-
tions that entitle them 0 absolute immunit~· , the immunit~· 
attaches to particular functions-not to particular offices. 
Officials performing functions for which immunit~· is not abso-
lute enjoy qualified immunity; they are liable in damages only 
if their conduct violated \Yell-established law and if the~· 
should have realized that their conduct was illegal. 
The Court now applies the dissenting view in B11tz to the 
office of the President: A President acting within the outer 
boundaries of what Presidents normall~· do ma:v , without li-
ability, deliberate!~· cause serious injury to any number of cit-
izens eYen though he kno"·s his conduct violates a statute or 
tramples on the constitutional rights of those who are in-
jured. EYen if the President in this case ordered Fitzgerald 
fired by means of a trumped-up reduction in force, knowing 
79-1738--DISSENT 
2 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
that such a discharge was contrary to the civil service laws, 
he would be absolutely immune from suit. By the same to-
ken, if a President, without following the statutory proce-
dures which he knows apply to himself as well as to other fed-
eral officials, orders his subordinates to wiretap or break into 
a home for the purpose of installing a listening device, and 
the officers comply with his request, the President would be 
absolutely immune from suit. He would be immune regard-
less of the damage he inflicts, regardless of how violative of 
the statute and of the Constitution he kne\\' his conduct to be, 
and regardless of his purpose. 1 
The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the 
Constitution. If that is the case, Congress can not provide a 
remedy against presidential misconduct and that the criminal 
laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the Pres-
ident. I find this approach completely unacceptable. I do 
not agree that if the office of President is to operate effec-
tively, the holder of that office must be permitted, without 
fear of liability and regardless of the function he is perform-
ing, deliberately to inflict injury on others by conduct that he 
knows violates the law. 
We have not taken such a scatter-gun approach in other 
cases. Butz held that absolute immunity did not attach to 
the office held by a member of the President's Cabinet but 
only to the specific functions performed by that officer for 
which absolute immunity is clearly essential. Members of 
Congress are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution, but the immunity extends only to 
their legislative acts. We have never held that in order for 
legislative work to be done, it is necessary to immunize all of 
the tasks that legislators must perform. Constitutional im-
munity does not extend to those many things that Senators 
and Representatives regularly and necessarily do that are 
not legislative acts. Members of Congress, for example, re-
'This, of course, is not simply a hypothetical example. See Kissinger v. 
Halpain, a.frd by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981). 
\ 
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peatedly importune the executive branch and administrative 
agencies outside hearing rooms and legislative halls, but they 
are not immune if in connection with such activity they delib-
erately violate the law. United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501 (1972), for example, makes this clear. Neither is a 
Member of Congress or his aide immune from damage suits if 
in order to secure information deemed relevant to a legisla-
tive investigation, he breaks into a house and carries away 
records. Gmvel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972). 
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but 
only when performing a judicial function, and even then they 
are subject to criminalliablity. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 
U. S. 24, 31 (1980), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503 
(1974). The absolute immunity of prosecutors is like\vise 
limited to the prosecutorial function. A prosecutor who di-
rects that an investigation be carried out in a way that is pa-
tently illegal is not immune. 
In Marbury v. Madison, the Court, speaking through the 
Chief Justice, observed that while there were "important po-
litical powers" committed to the President for the perfor-
mance of which neither he nor his appointees were account-
able in court, "the question, whether the legality of the act of 
the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice 
or not, must always depend on the nature of that act." 1 
Cranch, 137, 165 (1803). The Court nevertheless refuses to 
follow this course with respect to the President. It makes 
no effort to distinguish categories of presidential conduct that 
should be absolutely immune from other categories of con-
duct that should not qualify for that level of immunity. The 
Court instead concludes that whatever the President does 
and however contrary to law he knows his conduct to be, he 
may, without fear of liability, injure federal employees or any 
other person within or without the government. 
Attaching absolute immunity to the office of the President, 
rather than to particular activities that the President might 
perform, places the President above the law. It is a rever-
:\L\0:\ 1. FITZGEnALD 
sion to the olclnotion that the King can do no \\Tonp:. Until 
now. this concept hacl suniYed in thi~ country only in the 
form of soYereign immunit~·. That doctrine forecloses :mit 
against the goYernment ibelf and against go\'ernment offi-
cials. but on!~· \Yhen the suit ag·ainst the latter actuall~· seek-
relief against the soYereign. Lurs('ll \'. Doiii('Sfic u11d For-
ei_qll C'o1·p., 337 U.S. 682. 687 (1~1-1~1). Suit against an offi-
cer, ho\YeYer, ma~· be maintained "·here it seeks specific re-
lief against him for conduct contrar~· to hi~ statutory 
authorit~· or to the Constitution. Id .. at 69~. Now, how-
eYer, the Court clothes the office of the President \\'ith soYer-
eign immunit~·. placing it be~·oncl the law. 
In Jlatbi!J'.If Y. Madi.'WII. SIIJn·a. at 163. the Chief Justice. 
speaking for the Court. obsen-ed that the "Gowmment of 
the Unit eel States ha~ been emphaticall~· termed a goYern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It \Yill certain!~· cease to ob-
sene this high appellation. if the laws furnish no remed~· for 
the \'iolation of a ,·ested legal right." Until now. the Court 
has consistently adhered to thi~ proposition. In Sclte11C1· Y. 
Rlludes . 416 U. S. 2:32 (1~7-1). a unanimous Court held that 
the goYernor of a state was entitled on!~· to a qualified immu-
nit~·. We reached this position. e\·en though \\'e recognized 
that 
''[i]n the case of higher officers of the executi,·e branch-
the inquir~· is far more complex since the range of deci-
sions and choices-whether the formulation of polic~·. of 
legislation. of budget:;, or of da~·-to-day decisions-i" Yir-
tuall~· infinite-in short, since the options which the chief 
executiYe and his principal subonlinates must consider 
are far broader and far more subtle than those made b~· 
officials \Yith less re~ponsibilit~·. the range of discretion 
must be comparabl~· broad." !d., at 2-16, 2-17. 
As JCSTICE BRE!\!\AK obserYed in .1lcGallfl/({ Y. C'a//f(n·-
11 iu. -102 U. S. 18:3, 2;)2 (dissenting opinion). "The principle 
that our goYernment shall be of la\\·s ancl not of men is so 
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strong!~· \YOYen into our constitutional fabric that it has found 
recognition in not just one but seYeral proYisions of the Con-
stitution'' (footnote omitted). And as THE CHIEF JesTICE 
said in Co111plete Auto Tmnsit. l11c. Y. Reis . 451 U.S. 401, 
429 (1981) (dissenting opinion): 
"Accountabilit~· of each indiYiclual for indiYidual conduct 
lies at the core of all law-indeed. of all organized soci-
eties. The trend to eliminate or modify soYereign im-
munit~· is not an unrelated deYelopment: we haYe moYed 
awa~· from 'the king can do no \\Tong.' The principle of 
indiYidual accountabilit~· is fundamental if the structure 
of an organized societ~· is not to be eroded to anarch~· and 
impotence. and it remains essential in ciYil as \Yell as 
criminal justice.,. 
Unfortunately. the Court now abandons basic principles 
that ha,·e been po,Yerful guides to decision. It is particu-
lar!~· unfortunate since the judgment in this case has few. if 
an~·, indicia of a judicial decision: it is almost wholl~· a polic~· 
choice, a choice that is \Yithout substantial support and that 
in all e\'ents is ambig;uous in its reach and import. 
We haYe preYiously stated that "the la\Y of priYilege as a l 
defense to damage actions against officers of go,•ernment has 
'in large part been of judicial making."' B11t:: ' ' · Ecoi/011/0it, 
438 U. S. at 501-502 (1978), quoting BaiTY. Mateo, 360 U. S. 
564, 569 (1959). But this does not mean that the Court has 
simpl~· "enacted" its 0\\'11 \'iew of the best public polic~·. No 
doubt judicial conYictions about public policy-\Yhether and 
\Yhat kind of immunit~· is necessar~· or \Yise-ha\'e pla~·ed a 
part. but the courts haYe been guided and constrained by 
common-la\Y tradition. the releYant statutor~· backp:round 
and our constitutional structure and histor~·. Our cases deal-
ing \Yith the immunit~· of members of CongTess are construc-
tions of the Speech or Debate Clause and are guided b~· the 
histor~· of such priYileges at common law. The decisions 
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tion of whether and to what extent Congress intended to 
abolish the common law privileges by providing a remedy in 
the predecessor of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional viola-
tions by state officials. Our decisions respecting immunity 
for federal officials, including absolute immunity for judges, 
prosecutors and those officials doing similar work, also in 
large part reflect common law views, as well as judicial con-
clusions as to what privileges are necessary if particular func-
tions are to be performed in the public interest. 
Unfortunately, there is little of this approach in the Court's 
decision today. A footnote casually, but candidly, abandons 
the functional approach to immunity that has run through all 
of our decisions. Ante, at n. 34. Indeed, the majority turns 
this rule on its head by declaring that because the functions of 
the President's office are so varied and diverse and some of 
them so profoundly important, the office is unique and must 
be clothed with office-wide, absolute immunity. This is pol-
icy, not law, and in my view, very poor policy. 
I 
In declaring the President to be absolutely immune from 
suit for any deliberate and kno·wing violation of the Constitu-
tion or of a federal statute, the Court asserts that the immu-
nity is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation l 
of powers and supported by our history" 2 Ante, at 17. The 
decision thus has all the earmarks of a constitutional pro-
nouncement-absolute immunity for the President's office is 
mandated by the Constitution. Although the Court appears 
to disclaim this, ante at n. 27, it is difficult to read the opinion 
coherently as standing for any narrower proposition: At-
tempts to subject the President to liability either by Con-
gress through a statutory action or by the courts through a 
2 Although the majority opinion initially claims that its conclusion is \ 
based substantially on "our history," hi~cal analysis in fact plays virtu-
ally no part in the analysis that follows. U,n a footnote, the majority refers 
to the "unden;able paudty of documentary aouroe.." Ant•, at n' ~ 
~~-ta 
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Bh·e11s proceeding \Yould Yiolate the separation of powers. : 
Such a generalized absolute immunity cannot be su~tained 
when examined in the traditional manner and in light of the 
traditional judicial sources. 
The petitioner and the Solicitor General, as amicus; rel~· 
principally on t\YO arguments to support the claim of absolute 
immunity for the President from ciYil liabilit~·: absolute im-
munit~· is an "incidental pmYer" of the Presidency, histori-
call~· recognized as implicit in the Constitution. and absolute 
immunit~· is required b~· the separation of po\Yers doctrine. 
I will address each of these contentions. 
A 
The Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I. ~ 6, guarantees ab~o­
lute immunity to members of Con~n·ess: nowhere, howeYer. 
does the Constitution directl~· address the issue of presiden-
tial immunit~·. 0 Petitioner nevertheless argues that the de-
bates at the Constitutional Convention and the early histor~· 
of constitutional interpretation demonstrate an implicit as-
sumption of absolute presidential immunity. In support of 
this position, petitioner relies primaril~· on three separate 
items: First, preratification remarks made during the discus-
sion of presidential impeachment at the Convention and in 
The Fedemlist; second, remarks made during the meeting of 
the first Senate: and third, the views of Justice Story. 
The debate at the C01wention on \Yhether or not the Presi-
dent should be impeachable did touch on the potential dan-
' On this point. I am in agTeement \Yith the concurring memorandum of 
THE CHIEF Jt:STICE. 
' The Solicitor General relie !:' entirely upon the brief filed b~· hi ~ office in 
Kissi11ga Y. Halpai11, suprcr. 
·, In fact. in!:'ofar a;: the Con;;titution addres~es the issue of Pre~idential 
liabilit~· . its approach i!:' Yer~· different from that taken in the Speech or De-
bate Clause. The po!:'sibilit~· of impeachment assures that the President 
can be held accountable to the other branches of GoYernment for hi,- ac-
tions: the Constitution further states that impeachment does not bar crimi-
nal prosecution. 
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gers of subjecting the President to the control of another 
branch, the Legislature.'· GoYernor Morris, for example. 
complained of the potential for dependency and argued that 
"[the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutor,; 
who ma~· be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that 
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 7 Col. Mason re-
sponded to this b~· asking if "an~· man [shall] be aboYe Jus-
tice" and argued that this \Yas least appropriate for the man 
"\Yho can commit the most extensiYe injustice." · Madison 
agreed that "it [is] indispensable that some proYision should 
be made for defending the Community against the incapacit~·. 
negligence or perfid~· of the chief Magistrate."~ Pinkne~· re-
sponded on the other side. belieYing that if granted the 
power, the Legislature \YOuld hold impeachment "as a rocl 
oYer the Executi,·e and b~· that means effectuall~· destro~· his 
independence."'" 
Petitioner concludes from this that the delegates meant im-
peachment to be the exclusiYe means of holding the President 
personally responsible for his misdeeds, outside of electoral 
politics. This conclusion, howeYer, is harcll~· supported by 
the debate. Although some of the deleg·ates expressed con-
cern oYer limiting presidential independence, the delegates 
Yoted eight to two in faYor of impeachment. WhateYer the 
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another 
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently 
shared, to insulate the President from politicalliabilit~· in the 
impeachment process. 
MoreoYer, the ConYention debate did not focus on wrongs 
the President might commit against indiYiduals, but rather 
''The debate is recorded in 2 l\1. Fan·ancl. Record:- of the Federal Con-
vention of litl i. 6-1-ml OH3-1 !. 
: /d .. at 6-1 . 
' Jd .. at 65. 
"Ibid . 
, .. lei .. at 66. 
\ \ 
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on whether there should be a method of holding him account-
able for what might be termed v.Tongs against the state. 11 
Thus, examples of the abuses that concerned delegates were 
betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that 
the alternative to an impeachment mechanism would be "tu-
mults and insurrections" by the people in response to such 
abuses. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this 
debate are that the independence of the Executive was not 
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the 
other branches and that there was no general desire to insu-
late the President from the consequences of his improper 
acts. 12 
"In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton described impeachable offenses as fol-
lows: "They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denomi-
nated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the 
society itself." 
12 The majority's use of the historical record is in line with its other argu-
ments: It puts the burden on respondent to demonstrate no presidential 
immunity, rather than on petititoner to prove the appropriateness of this 
defense. Thus, while noting that the doubts of some of the Framers were 
.-. .J~ not sufficient to prevent the adoption of the Impeachment Clause, the ma-
t ~ r jority nevertheless states that "nothing in [the] debates suggests an expec-
rl/ tation that the President wou d be subjected to civil damages tio " 
h" t; . 3 om t 1s the ourt conclu es that e ebates of the 
\ ';,tJ"' ramers accord with our conclusions," and that the "best historical evi-
_/ e supports" its position. Ibid. 
If""- ans er o the maJ cu ation that litigation of this kind 
"may have been unthinkable in the era of the Constitutional Convention" is 
that such speculation ignores the documentary evidence. Not only was 
such litigation discussed at some of the state ratifying conventions, infra, 
but it was also discussed in the first major defense of the Constitution pub-
lished in the United States. In his essays on the Constitution, published 
in the Independent Gazetteer in September 1787, Tench Coxe included the 
folio-wing statement in his description of the limited power of the proposed 
office of the President: "His person is 1wt so much protected as that of a 
nwmber of the House of Representatives; for he m{ly be proceeded against 
like any other 111{11! in the ordinary course of law." Quoted in II The Doc-
umentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 141 (1976) (empha-
sis in original). 
1 
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Much the same can be said in response to petitioner's reli-
ance on The Federalist No. 77. In that essay, Hamilton 
asked whether the presidency combines "the requisites to 
safety in the republican sense-a due dependence on the peo-
ple-a due responsibility." He answered that the constitu-
tional plan met this test because it subjected the President to 
both the electoral process and the possibility of impeachment, 
including subsequent criminal prosecution. Petitioner con-
cludes from this that these were intended to be the exclusive 
means of restraining presidential abuses. This, by no means 
follows. Hamilton was concerned in Federalist No. 77, as 
were the delegates at the Convention, with the larger politi-
cal abuses,-"wrongs against the state"-that a President 
might commit. He did not consider what legal means might 
be available for redress of individualized grievances. 
That omission should not be taken to imply exclusion in 
these circumstances is well illustrated by comparing some of 
the remarks made in the state ratifying conventions ·with 
Hamilton's discussion in No. 77. In the North Carolina rati-
fying convention, for example, there was a discussion of the 
adequacy of the impeachment mechanism for holding execu-
tive officers accountable for their misdeeds. Governor John-
son defended the constitutional plan by distinguishing three 
legal mechanisms of accountability: 
"If an officer commits an offence against an individual, 
he is amenable to the courts of law. If he commits 
crimes against the state, he may be indicted and pun-
ished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and 
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial 
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public." 13 
Governor Johnson surely did not contemplate that the avail-
ability of an impeachment mechanism necessarily implied the 
exclusion of other forms of legal accountability; rather, the 
method of accountability was to be a function of the character 
'
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of the wrong. Mr. Maclaine, another delegate to the North 
Carolina Convention, clearly believed that the courts would 
remain open to individual citizens seeking redress from inju-
ries caused by presidential acts: 
"The President is the superior officer, who is to see the 
laws put in execution. He is amenable for any malad-
ministration in his office. Were it possible to suppose 
that the President should give wrong instructions to his 
deputies, whereby the citizens would be distressed, they 
would have redress in the ordinary courts of common 
law." 14 
A similar distinction between different possible forms of 
presidential accountability was drawn by Mr. Wilson at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
"(The President] is placed high, and is possessed of 
power far from being contemptible; yet not a single priv-
ilege is annexed to his character; far from being above 
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character 
as a citizen, and in his public character by 
impeachment." 15 
There is no more reason to respect the views of Hamilton 
than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitu-
tional convention; both were instrumental in securing the 
ratification of the Constitution. But more importantly, 
there is simply no express contradiction in their statements. 
Petitioner relies on an inference drawn from silence to create 
this contradiction. The surrounding history simply does not 
support this inference. 
The second piece of historical evidence cited by petitioner 
is an exchange at the first meeting of the Senate, involving 
Vice-President Adams and Senators Ellsworth and MacClay. 
The debate started over whether or not the words "the Presi-
"Id., at 47. 
"2 Elliot 480. 
\ 
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dent" should be included at the beginning of Federal writs, 
similar to the manner in which English writs ran in the King's 
name. Senator MacClay thought that this would improperly 
combine the executive and judicial branches. This, in turn, 
led to a discussion of the proper relation between the two. 
Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President Adams defended the 
proposition that 
"the President, personally, was not subject to any proc-
ess whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought 
against him; was above the power of judges, justices, 
&c. For [that] would put it in the power of a common 
justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the 
whole machine of government." 16 
In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive 
form of process available against the President. Senator 
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a 
President committing "murder in the street." In his view, 
in such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the 
exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather, 
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded 
the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none 
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amaz-
ingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 1; In his view, 
Senator Ellsworth and his supporters had not fully compre-
hended the difference in the political position of the American 
President and that of the British monarch. Again, nothing 
more can be concluded from this than that the proper scope of 
presidential accountability, including the questiu;1 whether 
the President should be subject to judicial process, was no 
clearer then than it is now. 
The final item cited by petitioner clearly supports his posi-
tion, but is of such late date that it contributes little to under-
16 W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United 
States in 1789-1791, 152 (1969). 
17 /bid . 
~ .. ,. -·~ "-·--·-..... -.... ~ ..... ~~, .- ~ ...... _,,_.,,.":"' __ , - ...... _ .. ___ .................... ---· ·- -· ... .. ·-
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standing the original intent. In his Commentaries on the 
Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described the 
"incidental powers" of the President: 
"Among these must necessarily be included the po\Yer to 
perform [his functions] without any obstruction or 
impediment whatsoeYer. The President cannot, there-
fore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention. 
\Yhile he is in the discharge of the duties of his office: ancl 
for this purpose his person must be deemed. in ciYil cases 
at least, to possess an official inviolabilit~·. In the exer-
cise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion, 
and he is accountable only to his country and to his own 
conscience. His decision in relation to these powers is 
subject to no control. and his discretion, when exercised, 
is conclusiYe." ,, 
While Justice Story rna~· have been firmly committed to 
this view in 1833, Senator Pinckney, a delegate to the Con-
vention, was as firm!~· committed to the opposite view in 
1800. ~~· 
Senator Pinckne~·, arguing on the floor of the Senate, con-
ti·asted the privileges extended to members of Congress b~· 
the Constitution \Yith the lack of an~· such privileges ex-
tended to the President. 2" He argued that this was a de lib-
,. 2 J. Stor~·. Commentaries on the Con!>titution 372 0873). 
, .. It is not possible to determine \\·hether this is the same Pinckne~· that 
l\1aclison recorded as Pinkne~·. " ·ho objected at the ConYention to granting 
a ]lO\Yer of impeachment to the Legi!>lature. T\\'O Charle!> Pinckne~·s at-
tended the ConYention. Both \\'ere from South Carolina. See 3 l\1. 
Farrand, Sllpi'CI. at 559. 
'" Senator Pinckney's comment!> are recorded at 10 Annals of Congre~i' 
69-83. Petitioner contends that these remarks are not releYant because 
they concerned only the authority of Congress to inquire into the origin of 
an alle11:edly libelous ne,,·spaper article. Rep!~· Brief for Petitioner. at 7. 
Although this \\'as the occasion for the remarks, Pinckney did di;:;cus~ the 
immunit~· of member;; of Cong-re;;:s as a priYileg-e embodied in the Speech or 
Debate Clause: "our Constitution suppo;;:es no man ... to be infallible. but 
con::iders them all as mere men. to be subject to all the passions and frail-
iH--1 i:3~DI::-;SE.:\T 
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erate choice of the delegates to the ConYention. \Yho "well 
kne\Y ho\Y oppressiYel~· the power of undefined priYileges had 
been exercised in Great Britain. and \Yere determined no 
such authorit~· should eYer be exercised here." Therefore. 
"[n]o pri,·ilege of this kind was intended for ~-our ExecutiYe. 
nor an~· except that ... for ~·our Legislature." ~~ 
In pre\·ious immunit~· cases the Court has emphasized the 
ties. and crimes. that men genera]]~· are. and according!~· proYide~ for tlw 
trial of such as ought to be trif:'d. and leaye;; the member;; of till.' Legi,.:la-
ture, for their proceedings. to be amenable to their constituent" and to 
public opinion .... " This. then. wa::: one of the priYile12:e;;. of Congre;:.~ that 
he was contrasting " ·ith those extended (or not exten~lei! l to the Pre~idc>nt . 
'
1 The ma.iorit~· cites one additional piece of histor~ eYidence. a letter 
by President Jefferson. which it contend;: demonstrate;: "that Jeffc>rson be-
lieYed the President not to be sub.iect to .iudicial proce;;.~." 1\ 
Thomas Jefferson's Yie\\·s on the relation of the President to the .iudicial 
process are. howeYer. not quite so clear as the ma,iorit~· suggests. J effer-
son took a Yariety of positions on the proper relation of executiYe and ,iudi-
cial authorit~·, at different points in his career. It would be suprising- if 
President J effer;:on had not argued strong]~· for such immunit~· from ,iudi-
cial process, particularly in a confrontation "·itll Chief Justice 1\lar;:.llall. 
Jefferson's Yie\\·s on this issue before he became President "·ould be of a 
good deal more sig-nificance. In thi:< regard. it is significant that in Jeffer-
son's second and third drafts of the \'irginia Constitution. which al;;o pro-
posed a separation of the po"·er;: of g-owrnment into three separate 
branches. he specificall~· proposed that the ExecutiYe be subject to ,iudicial 
process: "he shall be liable to action. tho' not to per;;onal restraint for pri-
Yate duties or \\Tong-s." I Papl.'r:< of Thomas Jefferson 351!. 360. Also sig-
nificant is the fact that \Yllen Jeffer><on's follo\Yers tried to impeach Justiel.' 
Chase in 180.J-180:J. one of tlw grounds of their attack on him " ·as that he 
had refused to subpoena President Adams durinrr the trial of Dr. Cooper 
for sedition. See ConYin. "The Pre;;.ident: Offil'e and Po\Yers" 11:). Fi-
naJJ~· . it is worth noting that eYen in the middle of the debate OYer Chief 
Justice 1\Iar:<llall'" po"·er to subpoena the Pre,-ident during the Burr trial. 
Jefferson looked to a legislatiYe ;;.olution of the confrontation: "I hope llmY-
eYer that ... at the ensuing ses;;ion of the legislature !the Chief Justiee) 
ma~· haYe means proYided for giYing to indiYiduab the benefit of the testi-
mon~· of the [Executiw] functionaries in proper cases ." X Work;;. of 
Thomas Jefferson . .JUi n. (P. Ford Eel. IHU.)l (quotin!! a letter from Pre;;i-
dent Jeffer;;on to George Ha~· . Cnited State;:. Di,.:trict Attorne~· for 
\'irginiaL 
L /kl.ft I llT (l. '!.I. 
(vnov~) 
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importance of the immunit~· afforded the particular goYern-
ment official at common la\Y. See l111/JIN Y. PocllfiiiClll, 42-1 
U. S. 409. 421 0976). Clearl~· this sort of anal~·sis is not pos-
sible when dealing \Yith an office. the presidenc~·. that did not 
exist at common la\Y. To the extent that historical inquir~· is 
appropriate in this context. it is constitutional histon·. not 
common la\Y. that is releYant. From the histor~· discussed 
aboYe, ho\YeYer. all that can be concluded is that absolute im-
munit~· from ciYil liability for the President finds no support \ 
in constitutional text or history. or in the explanations of the 
earliest commentators. This is too weak a ground to support 
a declaration by this Court that the President is absolute!~· 
immune from ciYil liabilit~·. regardless of the source of liabil-
it~· or the injur~· for which redress is sought. This much the 
majorit~· implicit!~· concedes since histor~· and text. tradi-
tional sources of judicial argument. merit only a footnote in 
the Court's opinion. A11te. at n. 31. 
B 
No bright line can be dra\m between arguments for abso-
lute immunit~· based on the constitutional principle of separa-
tion of powers and arguments based on \Yhat the Court refers 
to as "public polic~·." This necessaril~· follows from the 
Court's functional interpretation of the separation of powers 
doctrine: 
"[l]n determining \Yhether the Act disrupts the proper 
balance bet\Yeen the coordinate branches. the proper in-
quir~; focuses on the extent to which it pre\·ents the Ex-
ecutiYe Branch from accomplishing its constitutionall~· 
assigned functions.'' J.\'i.ron , .. Administmtor of Gen-
eml Sen·ices, 433 U. S. 425. 443 (1977). 
See also United Stotes Y. };i.ron, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707 
(jnl.t b,< <it tllQ of hreYit \' of it;: anal~·sis can the ma,iorit~· plau,:abl~· put 
forth the claim that thi;: histor~· prcmrl~r~ort for a proposition 
that it admit~ to being- demon;:trably untrue one pagela1er:---
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(l~fl-lJ: }'uiiii{J-'doll'l/ Sllccf l.\· Tul)(' Co. Y. SaiC,I/(' 1', 579. 635 
0902) (Jack~on. J .. concurring-). Petitioner argues that pub-
lic polic~- fa,·or~ absolute immunit~· because absent such im-
munity the Pre~ident's abilit~· to execute his constitutionall~­
mandated oblig-ations \\'ill be impaired. The conYergence of 
these t\YO lines of arg-ument is superficiall~- apparent from the 
Yer~- fact that in both instances the approach of the Court has 
been characterized as a "functional" analysis. 
The difference is onl~- one of degree. While absolute im-
munity might maximize executiYe efficienc~· and therefore be 
a \Yorthwhile polic~·, lack of such immunity ma~- not so dis-
rupt the functioning of the presidenc~· as to Yiolate the sepa-
ration of po\Yers doctrine. Insofar as liabilit~· in this case is 
of congressional origin. petitioner must demonstrate that 
subjecting the President to a priYate damages action \\'ill pre-
Yent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionall~· assig-ned 
functions." Insofar as liabilit~· is based on a Biz·ens action. 
perhaps a lower standard of functional disruption is appropri-
ate. Petitioner has surel~· not met the former burden; I do 
not belieYe that he has met the latter standard either. 
Taken at face Yalue. the Court's position that as a matter of 
constitutional la\Y the President is absolutely immune should 
mean that he is immune not onl~- from damages actions but 
also from suits for injunctiYe relief. criminal prosecutions 
and. indeed , from an~· kind of judicial process. But there i. 
no contention that the President is immune from criminal 
prosecution in the comts under the criminal laws enacted by 
Congress or b~- the states for that matter. Nor \YOuld such a 
claim be credible. The Constitution itself proYides that im-
peachment shall not bar "Indictment. Trial. Judgment. and 
Punishment. according· to La\Y." Article I, Section II. 
Clause \'II. Similarly. our cases indicate that immunity 
from damages actions carries no protection from criminal 
prosecution. Sup/'((, at 3. 
I\ either can there be a serious claim that the separation of 
po\\'ers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial re-
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view or insulates the President from judicial process. No ar-
gument is made here that the President. whateYer his liabil-
ity for money damages, is not subject to the courts' injunctiYe 
powers. See, e. g .. l'oll11gst01rn Sheet & Tube Co., supra: 
Koremats11 \'. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944): Panama 
Refining Co. \'. Rya11, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioner's at-
tempt to draw an analog~· to the Speech or Debate Clause, 
Brief, at 45, one purpose of which is "to prevent accountabil-
ity before a possibl~· hostile judiciar~·." Grat·el \'. United 
States, 408 U. S., 606, 617 (1972), breaks down at just this 
point. While the Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that 
"for any Speech or Debate'' congressmen "shall not be ques-
tioned in an~' other Place," and. thus, assures that congress-
men, in their official capacit~·, shall not be the subject of the 
courts' injunctive powers, no such protection is afforded the 
Executive. Indeed, as the cases cited abow indicate, it is 
the rule, not the exception. that executive actions-including 
those taken at the immediate direction of the President-are 
subject to judicial review.~~ Regardless of the possibility of 
money damages against the President, then, the constitution-
ality of the President's actions or their legality under the ap-
plicable statutes can and will be subject to revie\\', Indeed. 
in this very case, respondent Fitzgerald's dismissal was set 
aside b~' the Civil Service Commission as contrar~· to the ap-
plicable regulations issued pursuant to authority granted b~· 
Congress. 
Nor can priYate damages actions be distinguished on the 
ground that such claims would involve the President person-
all~· in the litigation in a wa~· not necessitated b~· suits seeking 
declaratory or injunctiYe relief against certain presidential 
" The Solicitor General. in fact. argues that the possibility of judicial re-
vie\\" of presidential action~ !'Upport!' the claim of absolute immunity: Judi-
cial re,·ie\\· "serws to contain and correct the unauthorized exercise of the 
President's po\\"er." making prh·ate damages actions unnecessary in order 
to achieYe the same end. Brief. at 31 (see n. 3). 
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actions. The President has been held to be subject to judi-
cial process at least since 1807. Am·o11 Blll'l' case. 25 Feel. 
Cas. 30 (1807) (Chief Justice 1\larshall. sitting as circuit jus-
tice). B111T "square}~· ruled that a subpoena ma~· be directed 
to the President." 1\'i.ron Y. Sil'ica, 487 F. 2d 700. 709 (DC 
Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Marshall fl.atl~· rejected any sug-
gestion that all judicial process, in and of itself, constitutes an 
unwarranted interference in the Presidency: 
"The guard, fumished to this high officer, to protect him 
from being harassed by 1'e:mtio11s and mmecessw·y sub-
poenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after 
those subpoenas haYe issued; not in an~· circumstance 
which i~ to precede their being issued." 25 Fed. Cas., 
at 3-1. 
This position was recently rearticulated by the Court in 
United States"· Ni.ron, 418 U. S. 683, 706 (1974): 
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the 
need for confidentiality ... without more, can sustain an 
absolute, unqualified presidential priYilege of immunit~· 
from judicial process under all circumstances." 
These tv,·o lines of cases establish then that neither sub-
jecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of their 
constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial 
process violates the separation of powers doctrine. Simi-
larly, neither has been held to be sufficient}~· intrusiYe to jus-
tify a judicially declared rule of immunit~· . With respect to 
intrusion b~· the judicial process itself on ExecutiYe functions, 
subjecting the President to priYate claim~ for money dam-
ages inYolYes no more than this. If there is a separation of 
powers problem here, it must be found in the nature of the 
remedy and not in the p1·ocess inYolYed. 
We said in But:: Y. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), that 
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official \Yho knows or should 
know he is acting outside the la\\'. and ... insisting on an 
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awareness of clearl~· established constitutional limits will not 
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment." I d. 
at 506-507. Today's decision in Harlozc \', Fitzgerald, No. 
80-945, makes clear that the President, were he subject to 
civil liability, could be held liable only for an action that he 
knew, or as an objective matter should have known, was ille-
gal and a clear abuse of his authority and power. In such 
circumstances, the question that must be ans\\·ered is \Yho 
should bear the cost of the resulting injury-the wrongdoer 
or the Yictim. 
The principle that should guide the Court in deciding this 
question was stated long ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "The 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
eYery indiYidual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injur~·.'' Marblll'lf \'. Madiso11, 1 Cranch 
137, 163 (1803). Much more recently, the Court considered 
the role of a damages remed~· in the performance of the 
courts' traditional function of enforcing federally guaranteed 
rights: "Historicall~·. damages have been regarded as the or-
dinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty." BiveHs v. Si.r U11kiiOlL'Il Federal Narcotics Age11ts, 
403 U. S. 388, 395 (1971). ~l To the extent that the Court de-
nies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim 
the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him "the 
protection of the laws."~~ 
"' See also Justice Harlan·~ discussion of the appropriateness of the dam-
ages remedy in order to redress the Yiolation of certain constitutional 
rights. Bire118 "· Si.r ['llkiiOit'll Fedeml Xarcotics Age11fs. 403 U. S. 388. 
407--HO (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
" Contrar~· to the sugp:e:::tion of the majorit~·. a11le, at n. 38. I do not 
sugg-est that there mu:::t alway~ be a remedy in ciYil damages for eYer~· 
legal wrong or that .l!arbury "· .lladiso11 stands for this proposition. 
JJ w·bu l'.lf does. hO\\'eYer, sugg-est the importance of the priYate interests at 
stake \\·ithin the b1·oader perspectin• of a political system based on the rule 
of law. The functional approach to immunit~· questions, \\·hich \\'e haw 
preYiously followed but which the majority toda~· discards. repref'.ented an 
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That the President should haYe the same remedial obliga-
tions toward those whom he in.iures as an~· other federal offi-
cer is not a surpnsmg: proposltlon. The fairness of the reme-
dial principle the Court has so far follo\Yed-that the 
wrongdoer. not the Yictim. should ordinarii~· bear the costs of 
the injur~·-has been found to be out\Yeighed onl~· in in-
stances where potentialliabilit~· is "thought to injure the goY-
ernmental decisionmaking process." Imbler Y. Pachtman, 
424 U. S. 409, 437 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). The ar-
gument for immunit~· is that the possibilit~· of a damages ac-
tion will, or at least should, haYe an effect on the performance 
of official responsibilities. That effect should be to deter un-
constitutional, or othenYise illegal. behaYior. This ma~·. 
how eYer, lead officers to be more careful and "less Yigorous" 
in the performance of their duties. Caution, of course, is not 
always a Yirtue and undue caution is to be aYoided. 
The possibility of liabilit~· ma~·, in some circumstances, dis-
tract officials from the performance of their duties and influ-
ence the performance of those duties in ways adYerse to the 
public interest. But when this "public polic~·" argument in 
fa\'01' of absolute immunity is cast in these broad terms, it ap-
plies to all officers, both state and federal: All officers should 
perform their responsibilities "·ithout regard to those per-
sonal interests threatened b~· the possibilit~· of a lawsuit. 
See Imbler, Sllpm, at 436 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring).~-. 
IneYitably, this reduces the public polic~· argument to noth-
ing more than an expression of judicial inclination as to which 
officers should be encouraged to perform their functions with 
'\·igor." although "·ith less care.~, , 
appropriate reconciliation of the conflicting- intere~t:> at !:'take. 
,., The Court ha:;; newr held that the "public polic~· " conclusion::' it 
reaches a!:' to the appropriatenes::' of absolute immunit~· in particular in-
stances are not subject to reYersal throug-h congressional action. Implic-
it~·. therefore. the Court ha,- ah·ead~· rejected a constitutionally-ba~ed. 
separation of po,Yers argument for immunit~· for federal officiab. 
,. Sure!~- the fact that officer:< of the court haw been the primar~· benefi-
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The Court's response. until toda~·. to this problem has been 
to appl~· the argument to indiYidual functions, not offices. and 
to eYaluate the effect of liabilit~· on goYernmental decision-
making within that function. in light of the substantive ends 
that are to be encouraged or discouraged. In this case. 
therefore, the Court should examine the functions implicated 
b~· the causes of action at issue here and the effect of poten-
tial liabilit~· on the performance of those functions. 
II 
The functional approach to the separation of pO\Yers doc-
trine and the Court's more recent immunit~· decisions ~: con-
verge on the follo\Ying principle: The scope of immunity is de-
termined b~· function, not office. The \Yholesale claim that 
the President is entitled to absolute immunit~· in all of his ac-
tions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all 
presidential communications are entitled to an absolute priYi-
lege, which was rejected in favor of a functional anal~·sis, b~· a 
unanimous Court in United States\', l\'i.ron, supra. There-
fore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a broad 
immunity in certain areas of executiYe responsibilit~·. "' the 
onl~· question that must be answered here is \Yhether the dis-
missal of emplo~'ees falls \Yithin a constitutionall~· assigned 
executive function, the performance of which would be sub-
stantia]]~· impaired by the possibilit~· of a priYate action for 
damages. I belieYe it does not. 
Respondent has so far proceeded in this action on the basis 
of three separate causes of action: two federal statutes-5 
U. S. C. ~ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. ~ 1505-ancl the First 
ciarie>- of this Court's pronounc:emenb of absolute immunit~· giYe>- !'Upport 
to this appearance of faYoriti~m. 
"See SII}JI'eme Coln·t of \ 'i1·gi11iCI "· Consumel's ['nion of tile ['nited 
States. -1-IG U.S. 719 0980}: H11t::. supra. at 511. 
,. I " ·ill not speculate on the pre:::idential function~ which ma~· require 
absolute immunit~·. but a clear example \Yould be instances in \Yhich the 
President participates in prosecutorial decisions. 
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Amendment. At this point in the litigation. the aYailability 
of these causes of action is not before us. Assuming the cor-
rectness of the the lo\Yer court's determination that the two 
federal statutes create a priYate right of action, I find the 
suggestion that the President is immune from those causes of 
action to be unc01wincing. The attempt to found such immu-
nity upon a separation of powers argument is particular!~· 
unconvincing. 
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. * 7211, states that 
"[t]he right of employees ... to ... fumish information to 
either House of Congress. or to a committee or a Member 
thereof, may not be interfered \Vith or denied." The second. 
18 U. S. C. * 1505, makes it a crime to obstruct congressional 
testimon~·. It does not take much insight to see that at least 
one purpose of these statutes is to assure congressional ac-
cess to information in the possession of the Executive 
Branch, which Congress belieYes it requires in order to carry 
out its responsibilities. ~!· Insofar as these statutes implicate 
a separation of po\vers argument, I \voulcl think it to be just 
the opposite of that suggested b~· petitioner and accepted b~· 
the majorit~·. In enacting these statutes. Congress sought 
, •. See. e. g .. 48 Cong. Rec. 4G53 (1912) (''During m~· first se!'sion of Con-
gress I ,,·as desirous of learning the needs of the po:::tal serYice and inquir-
ing into the conditions of the emplo~·ees. To m~· surprise I found that 
under an ExecutiYe order these ciYil sen·ice employees could not giYe me 
an~· information. ''J (remarks of Rep. Calder): id .. at 4656 ("I beliew it i::: 
high time that Congress should listen to the appeal. of these men and pro-
Yide a \Yay ,,·hereb~· the~· can proper!~· present a petition to the Member::: of 
Congress for a redress of grieYances without the fear of losing their official 
positions'') (remarks of Rep. Reill~·J: id .. at 5157 ("I haYe al\\·a~·s reque~ted 
employees to consult ,,·ith me on matters affecting their interest and be-
lieYe that it is my dut~· to listen to all respectful appeals and complaints.") 
(remarks of Rep. EYansJ. Indeed. it is for just this reason that petitioners 
in No. 80-9-15 argue that the statutes do not create a priYate right of action: 
"5 U. S. C.~ 7211 andl ~ C. S. C.~ 1505 were designed to protect the leg-
islatiYe process. not to giYe one such as Fitzgerald a right to seek dam-
ages." Brief for petitioners. at 26. n. 11. 
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to preserYe its own constitutionally mandated functions in 
the face of a recalcitrant ExecutiYe. ~.. Thus, the separation 
of pO\Yers problem addressed b~· these statutes was first of all 
presidential behaYior that intruded upon, or burdened, Con-
gress' performance of its 0\m constitutional responsibilities. 
It is no response to this to say that such a cause of action 
\Yould disrupt the President in the furtherance of his respon-
sibilities. That approach ignores the separation of pO\Yers 
problem that lies behind the congressional action: it assumes 
that presidential functions are to be \'alued oYer congres-
sional functions. 
The argument that b~· proYiding a damages action under 
these statutes (as is assumed in this case) Congress has 
adopted an unconstitutional means of furthering its ends. 
must rest on the premise that presidential control of execu-
th·e emplo~·ment decisions is a constitutional!~· assigned 
presidential function with which Congress may not signifi-
cant!~· interfere. This is a friYolous contention. In Ull ited 
States Y. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886), this Court held 
that "when Congress. b~- la\Y, Yests the appointment of infe-
rior officers in the heads of Departments it ma~· limit andre-
strict the power of remoYal as it deems best for the public in-
terest." What eYer the rule may be with respect to high 
officers, see H 11 mp/1 rey's E.recutor \'. l..:n ited States, 295 
U. S. 602 (1935). "·ith respect to those who fill traditional bu-
reaucratic po~itions. restrictions on executiYe authorit~· are 
the rule and not the exception. ~ ~ This case itself demon-
stl·ates, the seYere statutor~· restraints under which the 
President operates in this area . 
... Indeed. the impetu~ for pa,.:~age of "·hat i~ no\\' 5 l'. S. C. * 7211 \\'et:' 
the impo~ition of "gag rule;:" upon te;;timon~· of ciYi! ;;en·ant,.: before con-
)!res~ional committee,.:. See Exet. Order l'\o. 402 (Jan. 2.:>. 1901i): Exec. 
Order ~o. 11-1:~ (:\o\'. 2!3. HIOH). 
' Tllll:". adn•r;;e action ma~· general!~· be taken a)!ain~t ci\'il ;;en·ant,.: 
on!~· "for ;:uch cau,.:(· a,.: \\'ill promote the efficiency of the ,.:enite... .J 
l'. :'. C. ~~ 7.)11:} . 7.)}:; and 7.)4:3. 
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Fitzgerald was a ciYil senice emplo~·ee working in the Of-
fice of the Secretar~· of the Air Force. Although hio: position 
was such as to fall \Yithin the "excepted" sen·ice. which 
\Yould ordinarii~· mean that CiYil Sen·ice rules and regula-
tions applicable to remoYals \Yould not protect him. 5 CFR 
Part 6. * 6.4. his status as a Yeteran entitled him to special 
protections. Veterans are entitled to certain CiYil Senice 
benefits afforded to "preference eligibles." 5 U. S. C. 
* 2108. These benefits include that set forth in 5 U. S. C. 
*7513(a): "An agenc~· may take [adYerse action] against an 
emplo~·ee only for such cause as will promote the efficienc~· of 
the sen·ice." Similar!~-. his Yeteran status entitled Fitzger-
ald to the protection of the reduction in force procedures es-
tablished b~· ciYil sen·ice regulation. 5 U. S. C. 
** 3501-3502. It was precise!~· those procedures that the 
Chief Examiner for the CiYil Senice Commission found had 
been violated, in his 1973 recommendation that respondent 
be reappointed to his old position or to a job of comparable 
authority. 
This brief re\·ie\\· is enough to illustrate my point: Person-
nel decisions of the sort inYOlYed in this case are emphaticall~· 
not a constitutionall~· as~igned presidential function that will 
tolerate no interference b~· either of the other two branches 
of goYemment. More important than this "quantitatiYe '' 
anal~·sis of the degree of intrusion in presidential decision-
making permitted in this area. hO\YeYer, is the "qualitatiye" 
ana~·lsis suggested in * l(B) aboYe. 
Absolute immunit~· is appropriate when the threat of liabil-
ity ma~· bias the decisionmaker in \\·a~·s that are adYerse to 
the public interest. But as the Yarious regulations and stat-
utes protecting ciYil sen·ants from arbitrar~· executiYe action 
illustrate, this is an area in \Yhich the public interest is de-
monstrably on the side of encouraging less "yigor" and more 
"caution" on the part of decisionmakers. That is, the Yer~· 
steps that Congress has taken to assure that executiYe em-
ployees "·ill be able freel~· to testify in Congress and to assure 
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that the~· will not be subject to arbitrar~· adYerse actions incli-
cate that those policy arguments that have elsewhere justi-
fied absolute immunit~' are not applicable here. Absolute 
immunity would be nothing more than a judicial declaration 
of policy that directly contradicts the policy of protecting ciYil 
servants reflected in the statutes and regulations. 
If respondent could, in fact. have proceeded on his t\\·o 
statutor~' claims, the Bit•ens action would be superfluous. 
Respondent rna~· not collect damages twice, and the same in-
juries are put forward by respondent a::. the basis for both the 
statutory and constitutional claims. As we have said before. 
"were Congress to create equal!~· effective alternative reme-
dies, the need for damages relief [direct!~· under the Con-
stitution] might be obviated." Da ris Y. Passmw1, 442 U. S. 
228, 248 (1979). Nevertheless, because the majority decides 
that the President is absolutely immune from a Birens action 
as well, I shall express b~· disagreement with that conclusion. 
In Bil'ens v. Si.r Unknow11 Federal l\'arcotics Agents, 403 
U. S. 388 (1971), we held that individuals \Yho have suffered 
a compensable injury through a violation of the rights guar-
anteed them by the Fourth Amendment ma~' invoke the gen-
eral federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts in a 
suit for damages. That conclusion rested on two principles: 
First, "[ t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
la\\·s," 403 U. S., at 397. quoting Marblll'.lf '"· Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 163 (1803): second, "[h]istorically, damages have 
been regarded as the ordinar~· remedy for an invasion of per-
sonal interests in liberty.'' 403 U. S., at 395. In B11t:: v. 
Economo11, 438 U. S. 478 (1977), we rejected the argument 
of the federal government that federal officers, including cab-
inet officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for 
such constitutional violations-a position that we recognized 
would substantial!~· undercut our conclusion in Birens. We 
held there that although the performance of certain limited 
functions will be protected by the shield of absolute immu-
>i 
79-1731'--DISSE~T 
26 1'\IXO:\ r . .FITZGERALD 
nity, the general rule is that federal officers, like state offi-
cers, have only a qualified immunity. Finally, in Daris v. 
Passma 11, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we held that a Congressman 
could be held liable for damages in a Bivens-t~·pe suit brought 
in federal court alleging a violation of individual rights guar-
anteed the plaintiff by the Due Process Clause. In my view, 
these cases have largely settled the issues raised by the 
Bivens apsect of this case. 
These cases established the following principles. First, it 
is not the exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch to 
create a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation. 
In the absence of adequate legislativel~r prescribed remedies, 
the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts 
permits the courts to create remedies, both legal and equita-
ble, appropriate to the character of the injury. Second, ex-
ercise of this "judicial" function does not create a separation 
of powers problem: We have held both executive and legisla-
tive officers subject to this judicially created cause of action 
and in each instance we have rejected separation of powers 
arguments. Holding federal officers liable for damages for 
constitutional injuries no more violates separation of powers 
principles than do the equitable remedies that result from the 
traditional function of judicial reviev•. Third, federal offi-
cials will generally have a "qualified immunity" from such 
suits; absolute immunity will be extended to certain functions 
only on the basis of a showing that exposure to liability is in-
consistent with the proper performance of the official's duties 
and responsibilities. Finally, Congress retains the power to 
restrict exposure to liability, and the policy judgments im-
plicit in this decision should properly be made by Congress. 
The majority fails to recognize the force of what the Court 
has already done in this area. Under the above principles, 
the President could not claim that there are no circumstances 
under which he would be subject to a Bivens-type action for 
violating respondent's constitutional rights. Rather, he 
must assert that the absence of absolute immunity will sub-
stantially impair his abilit~· to carry out particular functions 
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that are his constitutional responsibilit~·. For the reasons I 
have presented above, I do not believe that this argument 
can be successfully made under the circumstances of this 
case. 
It is, of course, theoretically possible, that the President 
should be held to be absolutely immune because each of the 
functions for which he has constitutional responsibilit~· would 
be substantially impaired b~· the possibility of civil liabilit~·. 
I do not think this argument is valid for the simple reason 
that the function iln'olved here does not have this character. 
Which side of the line other presidential functions \\'ould fall 
on need not be decided in this case. 
The majority opinion suggests a variant of this argument. 
It argues, not that ever~· presidential function has this char-
acter, but that distinguishing the particular functions in-
volved in any given case would be "difficult." Ante, at n. 
34. a~ Even if this were true. it would not necessarily follo"· 
that the President is entitled to absolute immunit~·: That 
would still depend on whether, in those unclear instancec::., it 
is likel~: to be the case that one of the functions implicated de-
serves the protection of abc::.olute immunity. In this particu-
lar case, I see no such function. :: 
"' The majority also seems to beliew that b~· "function" the Court ha;: in 
the past referred to "subjectiYe purpose... See 011le. at n. 34 ("judges fre-
quently ,,·ould need to inquire into the ]Jill'pose for which acts \\·ere 
taken."). I do not read our cases that way. In Sl11mp , .. Spcrl'kiiW/1, 435 
U. S. 349, 362 09711). we held that the factors determining "·hether a 
judge's act \\·as a "judicial action" entitled to absolute immunit~· "relate to 
the nature of the act itself. i.e. \\·hether it is a function normall~· performed 
b~· a judge. and to the expectations of the parties." :!\either of these fac-
tors required any analysis of the purpose the judge ma~· haYe had in carr~·­
ing out the particular action. Similar!~· in B11t: \'. Econumo11. 438 U. S. 
4711, 512-516 (1977). when we determined that certain executiYe functions 
\rere entitled to absolute immunity because the~· shared "enough of the 
characteristics of the judicial process." we looked to objectiw qualities and 
not subjectiw purpose. 
• The majority seems to suggest that responsibilit~· for gO\·emmentalre-
organizations is one such function. A11te, at n. 34. I fail to see wh~· this 
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I do not belieYe that subjecting the President to a Biz·e11s 
action would create separation of po\Yers problems or "public 
policy" problems different from those inYolYed in subjecting 
the President to a statutor~- cause of action. '1j Rel~·ing upon 
the history and text of the Constitution. as well as the ana-
lytic method of our prior cases, I conclude that these prob-
lems are not sufficient to justify absolute immunity for the 
President in general. nor under the circumstances of this case 
in particular. 
III 
Because of the importance of this case, it is appropriate to 
examine the reasoning of the majorit~· opinion. 
The opinion suffers from serious ambiguit~· eYen \Yith re-
spect to the most fundamental point: Ho\\' broad is the immu-
nit~· granted the President? The opinion sugg·ests that it~ 
scope is limited by the fact that under none of the as<:.ertecl 
causes of action "has Congress taken express legislatiYe ac-
tion to subject the President to ciYil liabilit~· for his official 
acts.'' A11te, at 16. We are neYer told, howeYer. hO\\' or 
wh~- Congressional action could make a difference. It is not 
apparent that any of the propositions relied upon b~- the ma-
jority to immunize the President would not appl~· equall~- to 
such a statutor~· cau<:.e of action: nor does the majority incli-
cate what new principles would operate to undercut those 
propositions. 
In the end, the majorit~· seems to oYercome its initial hesi-
tation, for it announces that. "[ w]e consider [absolute] immu-
nit~· a functionall~· mandated incident of the President's 
unique office. rooted in the constitutional tradition of the I 
separation of po\Yers and supported b~· our histor~·." ibid. 
should be so. 
'" Although our conclusion~ differ. the majorit~· opinion reflect:> a similar 
,·ie\Y as to the relationship bet\\'een the t\\'O sources of the cau::;es of action 
in this case: It does not belieYe it necessary to differentiate in its O\\'n anal-
ysis bet\\'een the statutor~· and constitutional causes of action. 
\ 
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See also id., at 24 ("A rule of absolute immunity for the Presi-
dent will not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for 
misconduct on the part of the chief executive."). 35 While the 
majority opinion recognizes that "[i]t is settled law that the 
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States," it bases 
its conclusion, at least in part, on a suggestion that there is a 
special jurisprudence of the presidency. Ante, at 22-23. 36 
But in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), we up-
held the power of a federal district court to issue a subpoena 
duces tecum against the President. In other cases we have 
enjoined executive officials from carrying out presidential 
35 THE CHIEF JUSTICE leaves no doubt that he, at least, reads the major-
ity opinion as standing for the broad proposition that the President is abso-
lutely immune under the Constitution: 
"I write separately to emphasize that the presidential immunity spelled out 
today derives from and is mandated by the Constitution. Absolute immu-
nity for a President is either implicit in the constitutional doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers or it does not exist." Memorandum of Concurrence, at 1. 
36 Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 
U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of whether a court may 
compel the President himself to perform ministerial executive functions: 
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection, 
without expressing any opinion on the broader isseus ... whether, in any 
case, the President, ... may be required, by the process of this court, to 
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held ame-
nable , in any case, othen;se than by impeachment for crime." 
Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by the 
majority, did not indicate that the President could never be subject to judi-
cial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument 
that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional judicial infringe-
ment upon the Executive Branch: 
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general 
in the discharage of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an execu-
tive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act , 
which neither he nor the president had any authority to deny or control." 
ld., at 610. 
79-1738---DISSEi\T 
30 NIXOi\ t'. FITZGERALD 
directiYes. See e. g., l'ollngsfolCII Sh eet & Tube Co. v. Sazc-
yer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Not until this case has there ever 
been a suggestion that the mere formalism of the name ap-
pearing on the complaint was more important in resolving 
separation of powers problems than the substantive charac-
ter of the judicial intrusion upon executive functions. 
The majority suggests that the separation of powers doc-
trine permits exercising jurisdiction over the President only 
in those instances where "judicial action is needed to serve 
broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in dero-
gation of the separation of powers. but to maintain their 
proper balance." Ante. at 23. Without explanation, the 
majorit~· contends that a "merel~· private suit for damages" 
does not sen·e this function. 
The suggestion that enforcement of the rule of law-i. e., 
subjecting the President to rules of general applicabilit~·­
does not further the separation of powers, but rather is in 
derogation of this purpose, is bizarre. At stake in a suit of 
this sort, to the extent that it is based upon a statutoril~· cre-
ated cause of action, is the ability of Congress to assert legal 
restraints upon the Executive and of the courts to perform 
their function of providing redress for legal harm. Regard-
less of what the Court might think of the merits of Mr. Fitz-
gerald's claim, the idea that pursuit of legal redress offends 
the doctrine of separation of powers is a frivolous contention 
passing as legal argument. 
Similarly, the majority implies that the assertion of a con-
stitutional cause of action-the whole point of which is to as-
sure that an officer does not transgress the constutitionallim-
its on his authority-may offend separation of powers 
concerns. This is surel~· a perverse approach to the Con-
stitution: Whatever the arguments in favor of absolute immu-
nit~· may be, it is untenable to argue that subjecting the Pres-
ident to constitutional restrictions will undercut his "unique" 
role in our system of government. It cannot be seriousl~· ar-
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beyond judicial enforcement of constitutional restraints upon 
executive officers in order to implement the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. 
Focusing on the actual arguments the majority offers for 
its holding of absolute immunity for the President, one finds 
suprisingly little. As I read the relevant section of the 
Court's opinion, I find just three contentions from which the 
majority draws this conclusion. Each of them is little more 
than a makeweight; together they hardly suffice to justify the 
wholesale disregard of our traditional approach to immunity 
questions. 
First, the majority informs us that the President occupies 
a "unique position in the constitutional scheme," including 
responsibilities for the administration of justice, foreign af-
fairs, and management of the Executive Branch. Ante, at 
17-18. True as this may be, it says nothing about why a 
"unique" rule of immunity should apply to the President. 
The President's unique role may indeed encompass functions 
for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It 
does not follow from that, however, that he is entitled to ab-
solute immunity either in general or in this case in particular. 
For some reason, the majority believes that this unique-
ness of the President shifts the burden to respondent to 
prove that a rule of absolute immunity does not apply. The 
respondent has failed in this effort, the Court suggests, be-
cause the President's uniqueness makes "inapposite" any 
analogy to our cases dealing with other executive officers. 
Ante, at 18. Even if this were true, it would not follow that 
the President is entitled to absolute immunity; it would only 
mean that a particular argument is out of place. But the fact 
is that it is not true. There is nothing in the President's 
unique role that makes the arguments used in those other 
cases inappropriate. 
Second, the majority contends that because the President's l 
"visibility" makes him particularly vulnerable to suits for civil 
damages, ante, at 20, a rule of absolute immunity is required. 
' \ 
I 
' ' \ 
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The force of this argument is surely undercut by the major-
ity's admission that "there is no historical record of numerous 
suits against the President." I d, at n. 33. Even granting 
that a Bivens cause of action did not becomes available until 
1971, in the eleven years since then there have been only a 
handful of suits. Many of these are frivolous and dealt with 
in a routine manner by the courts and the Justice Depart-
ment. There is no reason to think that, in the future, the 
protection afforded by summary judgment procedures would 
not be adequate to protect the President, as they currently 
protect other executive officers from unfounded litigation. 
Indeed, given the decision today in Harlow & Butterfield v. 
Fitzgerald, No. 8~945, there is even more reason to believe 
that frivolous claims ·will not intrude upon the President's 
time. Even if judicial procedures were found not to be suffi-
cient, Congress remains free to address this problem if and 
when it develops. 
Finally, the Court suggests that potential liability "fre- \ 
quently could distract a President from his public duties." 
Ante, at 20. Unless one assumes that the President himself 
makes the countless high level executive decisions required 
in the administration of government, this rule will not do 
much to insulate such decisions from the threat of liability. 
The logic of the proposition cannot be limited to the Presi-
dent; its extension, however, has been uniformly rejected by 
this Court. See Butz, supra; Harlow & Butterfield, supra. 
Furthermore, in no instance have we previously held legal 
accountability in itself to be an unjustifiable cost. The avail-
ability of the courts to vindicate .constitutional and statutory 
wrongs has been perceived and protected as one of the vir-
tues of our system of delegated and limited powers. As I ar-
gued in §I, our concern in fashioning absolute immunity rules 
has been that liability may pervert the decisionmaking proc-
ess in a particular function by undercutting the values we ex-
pect to guide those decisions. Except for the empty general- \ 
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deal fearlessly and impartially ·with' the duties of his office," \ 
ante at 20, the majority nowhere suggests a particular, dis-
advantageous effect on a specific presidential function. The 
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas 
that may intrude on individuals' legally protected rights has 
never before been counted as a cost. 
IV 
The majority may be correct in its conclusion that "a rule of 
absolute immunity will not leave the Nation without suffi-
cient remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief execu-
tive." Ante, at 24. Such a rule will, however, leave Mr. 
Fitzgerald without an adequate remedy for the harms that he 
may have suffered. More importantly, it will leave future 
plaintiffs without a remedy, regardless of the substantiality 
of their claims. The remedies in which the Court finds com-
fort were never designed to afford relief for individual harms. 
Rather, they were designed as political safety-valves. Poli-
tics and history, however, are not the domain of the courts; 
the courts exist to assure each individual that he, as an indi-
vidual, has enforcable rights that he may pursue to achieve a 
peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances. 
I find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the Court would so 
casually discard its own role of assuring "the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws," Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), in the name of protecting 
the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken during the former President's 
tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the im-
munity possessed by the President of the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional .testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on N ovem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm. , 91st Cong. , 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116, 
App., at 177-179. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
retention by the Defense Department. 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander 
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no 
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low 
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the 
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We 
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi-
'App. 228. 
5 See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). 
9 I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra, 
App., at 83: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subse-
quent to the Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." 
10 See CSC Decision, App., at 61. 
11 See id., at 83-84. 
12 See ibid. 
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should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, App., at 60. The Exam-
iner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable 
civil service regulations. App. 86--87. 15 The Examiner 
based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental re-
organization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purport-
edly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact moti-
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
14 App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John 
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra 
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the 
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (re-
corded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id. , at 220. It was after this 
conversation that the retraction was ordered. 
15 Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F . 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App. , at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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vated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 
86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in 
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappoint-
ment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow 
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suf-
fered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by 
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support 
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and 
that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having re-
vealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Prox-
mire Committee on November 13, 1968." I d., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision, 
App., at 8fH37. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was 
not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without 
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse 
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 
id., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action proce-
dures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air 
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent 
for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
17 The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
CSC Decision, App., at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respond-
ent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equiva-
lent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he 
therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
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ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. ld., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
•• The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally 
20 See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court 
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a pri-
vate right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. 
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... fur-
nish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Mem-
ber thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congres-
sional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action 
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. Nei-
ther is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the 
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for 
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct 
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our con-
stitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappro-
priate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 
396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages rem-
edy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special fac-
tors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order" 
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. 
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the 
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently 
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemen-
tal Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this· Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at 
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the chal-
lenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . ... 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement, 
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling'' decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
24 Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. --,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
79--1738--0PINION 
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." 
Id., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials--no-
tably judges and prosecutors--required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
25 Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the 
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a 
constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493-495. 
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a 
straight line of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, a con-
sistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims 
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that 
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against 
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial mak-
ing,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quot-
ing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMil-
lan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are 
... competent to determine the appropriate level of immu-
nity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 503. Our decisions of course have been guided 
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under 
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See, 
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other de-
cisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g., 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing 
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause), 
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional lan-
guage and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a con-
gressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental 
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 50~17. Nonetheless, at 
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in 
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on con-
sideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally 
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have exam-
ined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to par-
ticular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 
421 (1976). 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical 
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presi-
dency did not exist through most of the development of com-
mon law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence pri-
marily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From 
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort 
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the 
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core 
of our inquiry involving those considerations of "public policy 
and convenience" traditionally weighed by courts at common 
law. 
26 At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials. 
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from enter-
ing public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages li-
ability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public 
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be dis-
tracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See 
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Viola-
tions: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529--530 (1977). 
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IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant 
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory 
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In nei-
ther case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject t}w President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public 
policy. 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
administration of justice-it is the President who is charged 
constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in which the 
Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable that 
courts, without the relevant information, should review and 
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information 
27 We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress 
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a 
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious con-
stitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case. 
28 U. S. Const. , Art II, § 3. 
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properly held secret"; 29 and management of the personnel of 
the Executive branch-a task for which "imperative reasons 
requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, 31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The 
President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32 
29 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
80 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Under the "good faith" standard, as it has been formulated in such 
cases as Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be 
held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should 
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibil-
ity" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... " 
32 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers af-
firmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the 
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace pe-
titioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's 
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a 
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with 
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
branch). 
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's pow-
ers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for 
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his of-
fice and the effect of his actions on countless people, the Pres-
ident would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions 
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a Presi-
dent must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most in-
tense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest 
public interest in providing the President "the maximum abil-
ity to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his 
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (foot-
note omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill 
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even dis-
loyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages ac-
tions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the 
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating law-
suits against the President, the President and his advisers 
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy, 
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation 
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability. 
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties, 
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits 
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35 
ss Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.): 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, 
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are 
confided to it. Among these , must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, 
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his 
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." 
34 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
36 Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court 
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance 
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B 
In deference to the President's singular constitutional man-
date, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction 
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court 
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the 
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a se-
lective approach. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to 
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges fre-
quently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken. 
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court re-
peatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would sup-
port. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege ex-
tends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or 
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the ac-
tion here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is 
enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); Stump v. Sparkman, 
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts 
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In 
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think 
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions 
based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official 
responsibility. 
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted 
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent 
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Re-
spondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has 
granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official 
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without sat-
isfying this standard of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
den purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
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never has held that courts may compel the President to per-
form even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions 
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37 
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
36 Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there 
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity 
of the President from judicial orders. In M is sis sippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has 
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his 
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in 
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The execu-
tive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived 
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, ex-
cept in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching 
power." 
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluc-
tance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress, 
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecti-
cut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not sub-
ject to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought 
against him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since other-
wise a court could "stop the whole machine of Government." 167 W. 
Maclay, Journal ofW. Maclay (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered 
a similar argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). 
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be 
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be 
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader 
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary 
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common 
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In con-
sidering claims by the President, however, we have recog-
nized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation 
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of 
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, 
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, be-
fore exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of in-
trusion on the authority and functions of the executive 
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad pub-
lic interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the 
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 320--325 (1974). 
37 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (in-
junction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States, 
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
3IJ See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 323--324 (DDC 1966), aff'd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
39 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
40 See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439 
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). 
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cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra-the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of 
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's 
official acts, we hold it is not. 41 
v 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the 
part of the chief executive. 42 There remains first the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, Presi-
41 It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious 
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge 
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950): 
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of 
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive 
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the inju-
ries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such 
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The 
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know 
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to sub-
mit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and 
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but 
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found 
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative." 
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a 
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in 
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal 
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not pre-
sented for decision). 
'
2 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immu-
nity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
"'The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
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dents may be prosecuted criminally, at least after they leave 
office. Moreover, there are informal checks on Presidential 
action that do not apply with equal force to other executive 
officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by 
Congress and by the press. The vigilance of these institu-
tions may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well 
as to make credible the threat of impeachment. 44 Other in-
centives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-
election, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presi-
dential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his 
historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and pros-
ecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular pri-
vate remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance com-
pelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
44 Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
\ 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly takenliuring the former President's 
tenure in office. The issue be?ore us is the scope of the im-
munity possessed by the President of the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on N ovem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116, 
App., at 177-179. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
retention by the Defense Department. 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander 
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no 
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low 
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the 
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We 
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi-
'App. 228. 
3 See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). 
9 I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra, 
App., at 83: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subse-
quent to the Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F . 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. " 
10 See CSC Decision, App. , at 61. 
11 See id. , at 83-84. 
12 See ibid. 
79-1738-0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 5 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, App., at 60. The Exam-
iner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable 
civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 The Examiner 
based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental re-
organization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purport-
edly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact moti-
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of J!m. 31, 1973). 
14 App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John 
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra 
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the 
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (re-
corded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this 
conversation that the retraction was ordered. 
'~ Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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vated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 
86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in 
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappoint-
ment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow 
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suf-
fered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by 
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support 
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and 
that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having re-
vealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Prox-
mire Committee on November 13, 1968." I d., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision, 
App., at 86--87. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was 
not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without 
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse 
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 
id., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action proce-
dures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air 
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent 
for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
17 The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
CSC Decision, App., at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respond-
ent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equiva-
lent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he 
therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
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ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. Id., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. '9 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
19 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally 
20 See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court 
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 
U. S. C. § 7211 and -18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a pri-
vate right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. 
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... fur-
nish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Mem-
ber thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congres-
sional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action 
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. N ei-
ther is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the 
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for 
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct 
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our con-
stitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappro-
priate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 
396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages rem-
edy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special fac-
tors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order" 
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. 
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the 
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently 
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemen-
tal Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Bene.fi-
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at 
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the chal-
lenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree .. . . 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 54~547. As an additional requirement, 
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 5~0 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
. rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g. , Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U.S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
" Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for da.@age~ based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognitiOn of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
79-1738-0PINION 
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously crippl~ the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." 
Id., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for t~ benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of ~blic 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualifie im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
2S Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the 
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a 
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a 
straight line of doctrinal development. onetheless, a con-
sistent approach has run throughout. f In addressing claims 
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that 
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against 
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial mak-
ing,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quot-
ing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMil-
lan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are 
. . . competent to determine the appropriate level of immu-
nity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 50~. t Our decisions of course have been guided 
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under 
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See, 
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other de-
cisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g., 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing 
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause), 
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional lan-
guage and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a con-
gressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental 
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-517. Nonetheless, at 
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in 
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on con-
sideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally 
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have exam-
ined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to par-
ticular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 
421 (1976). 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical 
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presi-
dency did not exist through most of the development of com-
mon law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence pri-
marily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From 
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort 
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the 
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core 
of our inquiry involving those considerations of "public policy 
and convenience" traditionally weighed by courts at common 
law. 
2\; At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials. 
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from enter-
ing public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages li-
ability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public 
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be dis-
tracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See 
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Viola-
tions: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977). 
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IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant 
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory 
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In nei-
ther case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. -n 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
§tates, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public 
policy. 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is \ 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable · 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
27 We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress 
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a 
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious con-
stitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case. 
28 U. S. Const., Art II, §3. 
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formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
personnel of the Executive branch-a task for which "imper-
ative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the Presi-
dent] to remove the most important of his subordinates in 
their most important duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, 31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The 
President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32 
29 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
30 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Under the "good faith" standard, as it has been formulated in such 
cases as Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be 
held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should 
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibil-
ity" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... " 
32 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers af-
firmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the 
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace pe-
titioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's 
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a 
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with 
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
branch). 
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's pow-
ers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for 
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his of-
fice and the effect of his actions on countless people, the Pres-
ident would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions 
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a Presi-
dent must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most in-
tense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest 
public interest in providing the President "the maximum abil-
ity to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his 
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (foot-
note omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill 
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even dis-
loyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages ac-
tions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the 
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating law-
suits against the President, the President and his advisers 
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy, 
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation 
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability. 
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties, 
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits 
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35 
"'Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.): 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, 
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are 
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, 
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his 
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." 
34 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
35 Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court 
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance 
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B 
In deference to the President's singular constitutional man-
date, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction 
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court 
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
501H517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the 
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a se-
lective approach. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to 
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges fre-
quently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken. 
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court re-
peatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would sup-
port. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege ex-
tends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or 
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the ac-
tion here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is 
enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); Stump v. Sparkman, 
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts 
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In 
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think 
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions 
based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official 
responsibility. 
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted 
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent 
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Re-
spondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has 
granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official 
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without sat-
isfying this standard of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
den purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
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never has held that courts may compel the President to per-
form even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions 
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37 
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
36 Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there 
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity 
of the President from judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has 
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his 
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in 
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The execu-
tive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived 
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, ex-
cept in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching 
power." 
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluc-
tance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress, 
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecti-
cut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not sub-
ject to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought 
against him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since other-
wise a court could "stop the whole machine of Government." 167 W. 
Maclay, Journal ofW. Maclay (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered 
a similar argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). 
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be 
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be 
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader 
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary 
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common 
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In con-
sidering claims by the President, however, we have recog-
nized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation 
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of 
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, 
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, be-
fore exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of in-
trusion on the authority and functions of the executive 
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad pub-
lic interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the 
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974). 
37 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (in-
junction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States, 
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
38 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), aff'd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
39 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
""See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439 
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). 
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cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra,-the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of 
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's 
official acts, we hold it is not. 41 
v 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 42 There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, there are 
"It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious 
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge 
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA21949), 
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950): 
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of 
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive 
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the inju-
ries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such 
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The 
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know 
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to sub-
mit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and 
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but 
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found 
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative." 
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a 
lesser public interest in· actions for civil damages than, for example, in 
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal 
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not pre-
sented for decision). 
42 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immu-
nity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
"'The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
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formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not I 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter 
Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 44 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to 
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and 
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and pros-
ecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular pri-
vate remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance com-
pelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2 . 
.... Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken during the former President's 
tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the im-
munity possessed by the President of the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
1 See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on Novem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." Id., at 115-116, 
App. , at 177-179. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
retention by the Defense Department. 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander 
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no 
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low 
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the 
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We 
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi-
' App. 228. 
5 See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H. R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). 
9 I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]. " Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra, 
App., at 83: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subse-
quent to the Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton , 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had · re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dis.missal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
.not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. " 
'" See CSC Decision, App. , at 61. 
" See id. , at 83--84. 
12 See ibid. 
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should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, App., at 60. The Exam-
iner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable 
civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 The Examiner 
based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental re-
organization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purport-
edly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact moti-
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
14 App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John 
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra 
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the 
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (re-
corded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this 
conversation that the retraction was ordered. 
15 Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
75~ 768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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vated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 
86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in 
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappoint-
ment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow 
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suf-
fered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by 
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support 
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and 
that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having re-
vealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Prox-
mire Committee on November 13, 1968." Id., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision, 
App., at 86-87. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was 
not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without 
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse 
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 
id. , at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action proce-
dures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air 
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent 
for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
17 The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
CSC Decision, App., at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respond-
ent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equiva-
lent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he 
therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
79-1738-0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 7 
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
'
9 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally 
20 See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court 
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a pri-
vate right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. 
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... fur-
nish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Mem-
ber thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congres-
sional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action 
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. Nei-
ther is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the 
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for 
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct 
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our con-
stitutional scheme . . . judicially created remedies . . . might be inappro-
priate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 
396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages rem-
edy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special fac-
tors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order'' 
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. 
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the 
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently 
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemen-
tal Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.2' We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at 
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the chal-
lenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . ... 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 54&-547. As an additional requirement, 
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 54 7. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 5~0 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283--1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling'' decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
" Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
79--1738-0PINION 
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." 
Id., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
I d., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
z:, Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the 
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a 
constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493--495. 
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a 
straight line of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, a con-
sistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims 
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that 
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against 
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial mak-
ing,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quot-
ing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMil-
lan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are 
. . . competent to determine the appropriate level of immu-
nity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 503. Our decisions of course have been guided 
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under 
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See, 
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other de-
cisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g., 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing 
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause), 
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional lan-
guage and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a con-
gressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental 
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-517. Nonetheless, at 
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in 
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on con-
sideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally 
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have exam-
ined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to par-
ticular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 
421 (1976). 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical 
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presi-
dency did not exist through most of the development of com-
mon law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence pri-
marily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From 
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort 
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the 
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core 
of our inquiry involving those considerations of "public policy 
and convenience" traditionally weighed by courts at common 
law. 
26 At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials. 
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from enter-
ing public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages li-
ability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public 
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F . 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be dis-
tracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See 
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Viola-
tions: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977). 
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IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant 
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory 
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In nei-
ther case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public 
policy. 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the \ 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
27 We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress 
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a 
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious con-
stitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case. 
28 U. S. Const., Art II , §3. 
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formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
personnel of the Executive branch-a task for which "imper-
ative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the Presi-
dent] to remove the most important of his subordinates in 
their most important duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity,31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The 
President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32 
29 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp ., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
30 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Under the "good faith" standard, as it has been formulated in such 
cases as Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be 
held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should 
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibil-
ity" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... " 
32 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers af-
firmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the 
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace pe-
titioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's 
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a 
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with 
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
branch). 
79-1738--0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 19 
Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's pow-
ers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for 
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his of-
fice and the effect of his actions on countless people, the Pres-
ident would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions 
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a Presi-
dent must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most in-
tense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. 8., at 554. 
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest 
public interest in providing the President "the maximum abil-
ity to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his 
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (foot-
note omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill 
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even dis-
loyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages ac-
tions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the 
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating law-
suits against the President, the President and his advisers 
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy, 
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation 
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability. 
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties, 
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits 
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35 
33 Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.): 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, 
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are 
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, 
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his 
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." 
34 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
ao Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court 
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance 
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B 
In deference to the President's singular constitutional man-
date, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction 
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court 
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the 
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a se-
lective approach. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to 
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges fre-
quently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken. 
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court re-
peatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would sup-
port. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege ex-
tends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or 
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the ac-
tion here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is 
enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); Stump v. Sparkman, 
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts 
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In 
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think 
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions 
based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official 
responsibility. 
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted 
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent 
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Re-
spondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has 
granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official 
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without sat-
isfying this standard of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
den purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
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never has held that courts may compel the President to per-
form even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions 
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37 
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
36 Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there 
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity 
of the President from judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has 
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his 
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in 
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The execu-
tive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived 
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, ex-
cept in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching 
power." 
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluc-
tance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress, 
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecti-
cut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not sub-
ject to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought 
against him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since other-
wise a court could "stop the whole machine of Government." 167 W. 
Maclay, Journal ofW. Maclay (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered 
a similar argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). 
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be 
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be 
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader 
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary 
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common 
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In con-
sidering claims by the President, however, we have recog-
nized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation 
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of 
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, 
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, be-
fore exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of in-
trusion on the authority and functions of the executive 
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad pub-
lic interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the 
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 321}-325 (1974). 
37 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (in-
junction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States, 
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
38 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 32~24 (DDC 1966), aff'd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
39 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
"'See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439 
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). 
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cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra-the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of 
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's 
official acts, we hold it is not. 41 
v 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave ~ 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 42 There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, there are 
" It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious 
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge 
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950): 
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of 
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive 
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the inju-
ries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such 
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The 
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know 
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to sub-
mit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and 
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but 
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found 
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative." 
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a 
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in 
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal 
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not pre-
sented for decision). 
'
2 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immu-
nity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
43 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
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formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter 
Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 44 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to 
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and 
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and pros-
ecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular pri-
vate remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance com-
pelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
""'Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
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RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER, v. ~ '2<.--
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 2..- 7 J 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~ ~._,; ~ 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT  v V 
[May-, 1982] ~
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's offi-
cial capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us 
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of 
the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
I~ 
~
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on N ovem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." I d. , at 11fr-116. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander But-
terfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a 
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks 
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8 
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him 
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White 
retention by the Defense Department. 
' App. 228. 
5 See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
' See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to 
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix). 
• I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the 
Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished." But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." App. 83. 
10 !d., at 61. 
" See id., at 83--84. 
'
2 See ibid. 
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at 
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had of-
fended applicable civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the de-
partmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, 
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
"App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlich-
man, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13, 
the Pbesident again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. 
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the Presi-
dent concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded 
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this con-
versation that the retraction was ordered. 
15 Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, 
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" re-
spondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis 
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitz-
gerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of com-
parable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly dis-
tinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding 
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to 
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in 
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his 
position was abolished and that he was separated ... in re-
taliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in tes-
timony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 
1968." !d., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87. 
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team 
player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without deciding 
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action" 
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at 
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, 
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to 
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for rea-
sons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
" The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he 
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former 
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought 
an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. ld., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
19 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
. ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally 
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
20 See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was enti-
tled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in dam-
ages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally 
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either 
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be 
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal 
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The cor-
rectness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under { • 
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infm, this case is 0 II"'\ ·, G S 1 fJ ~ 
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he en-
joyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that 
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Co-
lumbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of 
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement, 
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has 
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and 
we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree. . . . 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
u Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. 8. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." 
Id., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
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fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
/d., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
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stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." /d., at 508. 
20 Spalding v. Vilas , supra, was distinguished on the ground that the 
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a 
constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493--495. 
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In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damages liability have been guided by the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at 
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional 
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the 
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court neces-
sarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as 
illuminated by our history and the structure of our govern-
ment. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 
498. 26 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries 
into history and policy, though mandated independently by 
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not 
exist through most of the development of common law, any 
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our 
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry 
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public 
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. 
This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be con-
sidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a 
26 Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the 
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accu-
rately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assump-
tions of our scheme of government. 
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system structured to achieve effective government under a 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 
IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant 
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory 
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In nei-
ther case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
21 The Court previously has suggested that separation-of-powers con-
cerns might make it inappropriate for a court to "infer" a Bivens cause of 
action against an official of the President's constitutional stature. See 
Carlson v. Green, supra, at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against offi-
cials with independent status in our constitutional scheme . .. judicially 
created remedies ... might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, supra, at 396 (inference of a constitutional dam-
ages remedy would be inappropriate in a case involving "special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress"). 
Similar concerns, discussed in text infra, counsel hesitation in concluding 
that Congress intended a statute of general reference to subject the Presi-
dent to damages liability for his official acts. We know of no instance in 
which Congress explicitly has undertaken to expose the President to dam-
ages liability, and we have no occasion to consider the serious constitu-
tional issues that would arise if Congress should do so. 
Whether Congress intended a statute to create a damages remedy 
against the President is by definition a question of congressional intent. 
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,-- U. S. 
-- (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers 
Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287 (1981). 
Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, this Court must 
assume that causes of action may be inferred at least against some officials 
under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. See note 20 supra. But 
it does not follow that we must-in interpreting a statute in light of immu-
nity doctrine-infer an intent to impose damages liability on the President 
of the United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) 
(construing a federal statute not to have imposed damages liability on legis-
lators, for whom "history and reason" supported immunity from suit, "by 
covert inclusion in .. . general language"). 
Citing the purpose and legislative history of the two statutes in issue, 
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Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
the dissenting opinion appears to argue that Congress did intend them to 
create a cause of action against the President. See post, at 20-21. The 
evidence, however, is overwhelmingly to the contrary. The pertinent leg-
islative history principally involves the enactment of Section 6 of the Post 
Office Appropriations Act of 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539. The predecessor 
of 5 U. S. C. § 7211, this legislation was passed by Congress partly to over-
ride "gag rules" imposed by executive orders prior to that time. In terms, 
the statute provided that civil service employees had a right to report to 
Congress and that they should not be punished for doing so. Yet there is 
no indication on the face of the statute that Congress intended to impose 
damages liability on the President. And, in the historical context, it is im-
plausible that Congress in 1912 could have intended to create a damages 
remedy against the President by mere implication. Only a few years ear-
lier, in 1896, this Court had held that the Postmaster General was abso-
lutely immune from civil suits arising from "action having more or less con-
nection with the general matters committed by law to his control or 
supervision." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896). The rationale 
of Spalding, see id., at 498--499, would have applied to the President a for-
tiori. Because "our evaluation of congressional action ... must take into 
account its contemporary legal context," Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
441 U. S. 677, 69~99 (1979), any argument that Congress intended its 
general language to impose liability on the President must fail in the 
absence of further evidence. Nor does such support emerge from the leg-
islative debates. On the contrary, these suggest that congressional over-
sight-not a remedy in damages from the President-would be the princi-
pal enforcement mechanism. See 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) ("Supervisory 
officials will hesitate to trump up charges . . . , as all cases of removals and 
reductions will be submitted to Congress each year, and if an employee can 
produce satisfactory evidence that he has not received the protection af-
forded in this bill his case can be made the subject of a special inquiry if 
Congress so decides.") (remarks of Rep. Calder); id., at 4656 ("Men in offi-
cial position will hesitate to trump up charges against an employee . . . , as 
all the cases of removals and reductions will be submitted to Congress each 
year .... ")(Remarks of Rep. Reilly). 
The other section from which respondent would infer a cause of action 
against the President is a criminal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, originally 
enacted in 1940. It of course does not refer expressly to the President. 
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and consistent with our history. Jus-
tice Story's analysis remains generally persuasive: 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the exec-
utive department, which are necessarily implied from 
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. 
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, 
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he 
is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." Cf. J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.): 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
And even the respondent fails to argue that the legislative history suggests 
any intent to create a damages remedy enforceable against the President 
on the basis of his official acts. 
ZB U. S. Const., Art II, § 3. 
79-1738-0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 19 
formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re-
quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." :ro 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The 
President's unique status under the Constitution distin-
guishes him from other executive officials. 31 
Because of the singular importance of the President's du-
ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private law-
suits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of 
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges--
for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President 
29 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
30 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers af-
firmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the 
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace pe-
titioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's 
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a 
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with 
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
Branch). 
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most 
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such 
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in provid-
ing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and im-
partially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is 
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensi-
tive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under 
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence 
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility 
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, 
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits 
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability 
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, 
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but 
also the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 34 
32 Among the most powerful reasons supporting official immunity is the 
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in 
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S. 
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impos-
sible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been 
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute .... " 
33 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
3-1 In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has 
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to 
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held 
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in perfor-
mance of particular functions . See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., 
at 508-517; cf. Imblerv. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S. , at 430-431. But the 
Court also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would 
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Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial deference and restraint. This Court never has held 
support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege 
extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or super-
vision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here 
taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough 
to render the privilege applicable ... . ");Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435 
U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring out-
side "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In view of the spe-
cial nature of the President's constitutional office, we think it appropriate 
to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions based on acts 
within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official responsibility. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for 
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his tes-
timony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorga-
nization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the peti-
tioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, 
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the 
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in 
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, 
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts 
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside 
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitz-
gerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legisla-
tive protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within his au-
thority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard 
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
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that courts may compel the President to perform even minis-
terial functions of his office,35 much less subject a President to 
damages liability for action taken within the scope of his of-
fice. 35 By contrast, injunctions compelling action by other of-
den purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts Jay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
35 See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are fully / 
satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President 
in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be 
received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) ("The / 
executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are de-
rived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other depart-
ment, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the im-
peaching power."). 
36 Strong historical evidence supports judicial restraint with respect to 
any action against a President. At the time of the first Congress, Vice 
President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, 
were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not subject 
to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought against 
him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since otherwise a 
court could "stop the whole machine of Government." W. Maclay, Journal 
of W. Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered a similar 
argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). 
Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not subject to judi-
cial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a 
President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the 
proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
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ficials long have been upheld. 37 A similar distinction is re-
flected in the approach of this Court to cases in which various 
officials have claimed an evidentiary privilege. The courts 
generally have looked to the common law to determine the 
scope of an official's privilege. 38 In considering claims by the 
President, however, we have recognized that Presidential 
immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 
(1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of 
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, 
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, be-
fore exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of in-
trusion on the authority and functions of the executive 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974). 
37 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (in-
junction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States , 
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
:lll See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6--7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss , Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
"" Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343 
U. S. , at 583. 
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branch. See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 
U. S. 425, 439 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 
(1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public 
interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the 
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra--the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of 
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's 
official acts, we hold it is not. 40 
40 In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there 
is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in 
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal 
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not pre-
sented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity 
may impose a regrettable cost on individuals whose rights have been vio-
lated. But, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, it is not true that 
our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every 
legal wrong. The dissent's objections on this ground would weigh equally 
against absolute immunity for any official. Yet the dissent makes no at-
tack on the absolute immunity recognized for judges and prosecutors. 
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in 
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases 
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal 
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a dam-
ages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, supm; Sea Clammers, supra; 
California v. Sierra Club, supra. The dissent does not refer to the juris-
prudence of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no 
discussion of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that 
that there would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesita-
tion" by the judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 
supra, 403 U. S., at 396; Carlson v. Green, supra, 446 U. S., at 19 (in di-
rect constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our 
constitutional scheme . . . judicially created remedies . . . might be 
inappropriate"). 
Even the case on which the dissent places principal reliance, Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at best. The dis-
sent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil lib-
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 41 There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 42 In addition, there are 
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant-oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Pres-
idential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 43 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to 
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and 
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. 
erty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury." !d., at 163. Yet Marbury does 
not establish that the individual's protection must come in the form of a 
particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost his case in 
the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that 
he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it was clear at 
least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the Civil Serv-
ice Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See supra, at 4-6 
and n. 17. 
"The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immu-
nity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
'
2 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
Canst., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
-13 Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
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The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." 44 For the President, as for judges and I 
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particu-
lar private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance 
compelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered . 
.... The dissent's contrary argument that our decision places the President 
"above the law," ante, at 3-4, is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified. 
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains ac-
countable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a 
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for 
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent 
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judg-
ment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a pros-
ecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is 
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is sim-
ple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular 
remedy is not available against him. 
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A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 'CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's offi-
cial capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us 
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of 
the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
. . 
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost:-oveiTUns on the C-5A 
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1~1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on Novem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander But-
terfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a 
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks 
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8 
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him 
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White 
retention by the Defense Department. 
'App. 22&. . 
~See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to 
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix). 
9 Id., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the 
Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." App. 83. 
10 I d., at 61. 
11 See id., at 83-84. 
12 See ibid. 
;: 
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at 
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had of-
fended applicable civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the de-
partmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, 
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
"App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlich-
man, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13, 
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. 
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the Presi-
dent concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded 
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this con-
versation that the retraction was ordered. 
16 Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63--64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, 
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" re-
spondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis 
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitz-
gerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of com-
parable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly dis-
tinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding 
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to 
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in 
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his 
position was abolished and that he was separated ... in re-
taliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in tes-
timony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 
1968." ld., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised . essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86--87. 
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team 
player' and 'not on the Air Force team."' App. 83. Without deciding 
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action" 
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at 
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, 
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to 
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for rea-
sons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
17 The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he 
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former 
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought 
an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
79-173~PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 7 
cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. !d., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute or' limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
19 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally 
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
20 See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was enti-
tled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in dam-
ages. The first , 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally 
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either 
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be 
interfered with or denied. " The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal 
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The cor-
rectness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under \ 0~ \ 5~ ·, o .-1 these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is 
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he en-
joyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that 
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Co-
lumbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of 
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.2' We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority to re-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement, 
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has 
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and 
we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree .... 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
79-1738-0PINION 
10 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
titled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
24 Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. --, -- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. !d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." 
!d., at 498. 
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Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
ld., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Econ-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
u Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the 
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a 
constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493-495. 
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damages liability have been guided by the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at 
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional 
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the 
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court neces-
sarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as 
illuminated by our history and the structure of our govern-
ment. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 
498. 26 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries 
into history and policy, though mandated independently by 
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not 
exist through most of the development of common law, any 
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our 
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry 
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public 
26 Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the 
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accu-
rately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assump-
tions of our scheme of government. 
7~1738----0PINION 
16 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. 
This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be con-
, sidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a 
system structured to achieve effective government under a 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 
IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defend-
ant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statu-
tory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In 
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
27 In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied" 
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question 
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action 
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with 
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional 
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order'' doctrine, see 
supra, we assume for purposes of this opinion that p ivate causes of action 
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on 
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in consid-
ering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity 
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the 
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (con-
struing§ 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept 
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity] 
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general 
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would 
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute 
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the Presi-
dent IS a so ute y · from civil damages liability; in the absence of 
explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide onl/lhis constitutional 
issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before us. 
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice 
Story's analysis remains persuasive: 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the exec-
utive department, which are necessarily implied from 
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. 
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, 
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he 
is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.). 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States. . . . " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost d acretion and sensitivity. These include the 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re-
28 U. S. Const., Art II, § 3. 
21 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc . v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
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quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Econorrwu, supra; Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The 
President's unique status under the Constitution distin-
guishes him from other executive officials. 31 
30 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). -{ 0~~ Y1 ok- O'""~· , +fe o{ 
31 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This \ 
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., at 511-512; see Imblerv. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred 
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liabil-
ity. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed con-
cern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his 
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor 
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course 
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates sug-
gests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distrac-
tion of suits by disappointed private citizens. Litigation of this kind sim-
ply may have been unthinkable in the era of the Constitutional Convention. 
Senator Maclay has recorded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-
President John Adams-both delegates to the Convention-that "the Pres-
ident, personally, was not subject to any process whatever. . . . For 
[that] would put it in the power of a common justice to exercise any author-
ity over him, and stop the whole machine of government." W. Maclay, 
Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890). And Justice Story, writ-
ing in 1833, held it implicit in the separation of powers that the President 
7~17~PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 19 
Because of the singular importance of the President's du-
ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private law-
suits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of 
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges-
must be permitted to discharge his duties undistracted by private lawsuits. 
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,§ 1563, at 
418-419 (1833 ed.) (quoted supra). 
Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not subject to judi-
cial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a 
President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the 
proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 320--325 (1974). 
Attempting to minimize the significance of this evidence, the dissent 
claims that the historical support for absolute Presidential immunity is not 
"firm." Post, at 13. Although it cites some ambiguous comments made 
at two state ratifying Conventions, the dissent's chief argument appears to 
be that the documentary materials are too fragmentary to be conclusive. 
Our view is not wholly to the contrary. In light of the undeniable paucity 
of documentary sources, we think the most compelling arguments for abso-
lute Presidential immunity arise from the separation of powers and the ju-
diciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But 
our reliance on those factors should not be misunderstood. The best his-
torical evidence supports the Presidential immunity we have upheld. Not 
only do the debates of the Framers accord with our conclusions; other pow-
erful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits against the 
President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with this Court's 
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for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President 
must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most 
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such 
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in provid-
ing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and im-
partially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is 
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensi-
tive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under 
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence 
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility 
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, 
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits 
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability 
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, 
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but 
also the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 34 
1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages action ever were \ 
filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to judgment 
on the merits. 
32 Among the most powerful reasons supporting official immunity is the 
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in 
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S. 
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impos-
sible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been 
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute .... " 
38 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
34 In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has 
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to 
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held 
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Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-~ . 
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts 
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in perfor-
mance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., 
at 508-517; cf.lmblerv. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the 
Court also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would 
support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege 
extends to all matters "committed by law to (an official's] control or super-
vision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here 
taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough 
to render the privilege applicable ... . ");Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435 
U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring out-
side "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In view of the spe-
cial nature of the President's constitutional office, we think it appropriate 
to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions based on acts 
within the "outer perimeter'' of the area of his official responsibility. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for 
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his tes-
timony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorga-
nization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the peti-
tioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, 
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the 
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in 
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, 
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts 
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside 
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitz-
gerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legisla-
tive protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within his au-
thority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard 
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generally have looked to the common law to determine the 
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 36 we have recog-
nized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separa-
tion of powers under the Constitution." United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the 
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, 
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 37 But our cases also 
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, 
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be 
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
den purpose: Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
36 This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history. 
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are 
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the Presi-
dent in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to 
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) 
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are 
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other depart-
ment, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the im-
peaching power."). 
36 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
37 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
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served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and 
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General I 
Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judi-
cial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when 
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, 
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstoum Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest 
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. 
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held war-
ranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages 
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 38 
38 The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in 
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See 
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371--373 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special 
importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as 
raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been 
denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individ-
uals whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of 
the dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a rem-
edy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's objections on 
this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for any official. 
Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity recognized for 
judges and prosecutors. 
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in 
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases 
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal 
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a dam-
ages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran,-- U.S.-- (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 
451 U. S. 287 (1981). The dissent does not refer to the jurisprudence of 
implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion of 
cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there 
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the 
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 396; Carlson v. Green, supra, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional 
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 39 There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 40 In addition, there are 
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Pres-
idential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 41 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
actions against officials with ''independent status in our constitutional 
scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"). 
Even the case on which the dissent places principal reliance, Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at best. The dis-
sent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil lib-
erty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury." /d., at 163. Yet Marbury does 
not establish that the individual's protection must come in the form of a 
particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost his case in 
the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that 
he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it was clear at 
least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the Civil Serv-
ice Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See supra, at 4-6 
and n. 17. 
1111 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E . g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immu-
nity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
40 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
41 Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
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duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to 
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and 
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." 42 For the President, as for judges and' 
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particu-
lar private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance 
compelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court. of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
42 The dissent's contrary argument that our decision places the President 
"above the law," ante, at 3-4, is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified. 
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains ac-
countable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a 
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for 
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent 
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judg-
ment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a pros-
ecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is 
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is sim-
ple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular 
remedy is not available against him. 
4th DRAFT 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ~ 3 1982 
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1738 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's offi-
cial capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us 
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of 
the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissatz The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (196&-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on Novem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
' See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzger·ald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." I d., at 115-116. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander But-
terfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a 
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks 
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8 
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him 
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White 
retention by the Defense Department. 
'App. 228. 
"See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
; Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
' Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to 
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix). 
• I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the 
Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. " App. 83. 
10 !d., at 61. 
" See id., at 83-84. 
12 See i bid. 
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at 
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had of-
fended applicable civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the de-
partmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, 
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
"App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlich-
man, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13, 
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. 
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the Presi-
dent concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded 
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this con-
versation that the retraction was ordered. 
'"Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
75&-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
-----------·- ~- ---
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, 
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" re-
spondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis 
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitz-
gerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of com-
parable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly dis-
tinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding 
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to 
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in 
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his 
position was abolished and that he was separated . . . in re-
taliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in tes-
timony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 
1968." !d., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87. 
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team 
player' and 'not on the Air Force team."' App. 83. Without deciding 
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action" 
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at 
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, 
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to 
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for rea-
sons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
"The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he 
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former 
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought 
an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
'9 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally 
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-: 
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
:ro See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was enti-
tled to "infer'' a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in dam-
ages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally 
that "The right of employees ... to . . . furnish information to either 
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be 
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal 
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The cor-
rectness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under 
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is 
here under the "collateral order'' doctrine, for review of the District 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he en-
joyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that 
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Co-
lumbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of 
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 54~547. As an additional requirement, 
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has 
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and 
we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree .... 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283--1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely , 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
titled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974) , we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
"' There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g. , Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
24 Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. --, -- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. !d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." ld., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
79-173&--0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 13 
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examil).ing § 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
I d., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a § 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.' " I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of§ 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officet:s Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
~ Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the 
ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a com-
mon law-and not a constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 493-495 (1978). 
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." !d., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damages liability have been guided by the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at 
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional 
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the 
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court neces-
sarily also .has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as 
illuminated by our history and the structure of our govern-
ment. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 
498. 25 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries 
into history and policy, though mandated independently by 
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not 
exist through most of the development of common law, any 
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our 
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry 
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public 
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. 
26 Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the 
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accu-
rately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assump-
tions of our scheme of government. 
· --·· ·-· - --- -- --
A congressional tternpt to impose ~ 
would present a 8 rious constitutional issue that we 
have no occasion .o consider in this case. 
I 
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This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be con-
sidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a 
system structured to achieve effective government under a 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 
IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defend-
ant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statu-
tory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In 
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil- I ( 
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
27 In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied" 
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question 
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action 
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with 
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional 
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, see 
supra, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action 
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on 
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in consid-
ering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity 
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the 
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (con-
struing § 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept 
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity] 
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general 
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would 
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute 
dent is absolutely immune from civil damages liability in the absence of ex- /A 
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the Presi-~
plicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only this constitutional rJ 
issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before us~
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unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice 
Story's analysis remains persuasive: 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the exec-
utive department, which are necessarily implied from 
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. 
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, 
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he 
is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.). 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re-
quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
28 U. S. Canst., Art II, § 3. 
"' Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
, . 
OIA.I ~StOI"l I 
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the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478; Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. We find these cases to be inappo-
site. The President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31 
90 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This 
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., at 511-512; see Imblerv. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred 
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liabil-
ity. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed con-
cern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his 
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Fan nd, Records of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor 
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course 
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates sug-
gests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distrac-
tion of suits by disappointed private citizens. Senator Maclay has re-
corded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President John Adams-
both delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not 
subject to any process whatever. . . . For [that] would put it in the power 
of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole 
machine of government." W. Maclay, Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E. 
Maclay ed. 1890). And Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in 
the separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge 
his duties undistracted by private lawsuits. J. Story, Commentaries on 
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Because of the singular importance of the President's du-
ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private law-
suits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of 
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges-
the Constitution of the United States, § 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.) (quoted 
supra). 
Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not subject to judi-
cial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a 
President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the 
proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 320--325 (1974). 
JUSTICE WHITE's di 3ent intimates that the significance of this historical 
evidence somehow is minimized by its location in a footnote, rather than in 
text. See, post, at 6 n. 2, and at 15. We had not supposed that the merit 
either of argument or of documentation depends upon its location in a 
Court opinion. In light of the fragmentary character of the most impor-
tant materials reflecting the Framers' intent, we do think that the most 
compelling arguments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers 
and the judiciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text 
supra. But our primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial 
precedent should not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence 
clearly supports the Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice 
White's dissent cites some other materials, including ambiguous comments 
made at state ratifying conventions and the remarks of a single publicist. 
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for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President 
must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most 
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such 
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in provid-
ing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and im-
partially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is 
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensi-
tive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under 
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence 
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility 
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, 
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits 
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability 
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, 
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but 
also the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 34 
weight of evidence is considered, we think we must place our reliance on 
the contemporary understanding of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and 
Oliver Ellsworth. Other powerful support derives from the actual history 
of private lawsuits against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion 
commencing with this Court's 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of 
damages action ever were filed against the President. None appears to 
have proceeded to judgment on the merits. 
32 Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the 
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in 
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S. 
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impos-
sible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been 
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute .... " 
33 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
34 In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has 
I 
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B 
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts 
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to 
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held 
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in perfor-
mance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the Court 
also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support. 
See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all 
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the 
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege 
applicable ... . ");Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial 
privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a 
judicial proceeding"). In view of the special nature of the President's con-
stitutional office, we think it appropriate to extend to him absolute immu-
nity from damage actions based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the 
area of his official responsibility. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for 
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his tes-
timony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorga-
nization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the peti-
tioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, 
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the 
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in 
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, 
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts 
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside 
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitz-
gerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legisla-
tive protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within his au-
thority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard 
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generally have looked to the common law to determine the T ~ ~ 
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege,36 we have recog-
nized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separa-
-.... ---'f"T tion of powers under the Constitution." united States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the 
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, 
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 37 But our cases also \ 
have ~ed tpat a court, before exercising jurisdiction, @ ~alance th constitutional weight of the interest to be 
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
den purpose; Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
'"' This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history. 
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are 
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the Presi-
dent in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to 
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) 
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are 
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other depart-
ment, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the im-
peaching power."). 
36 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
37 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343 
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served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and 
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General 
Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judi-
cial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when 
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, 
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest 
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. 
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held war-
ranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages 
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 38 
38 The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in 
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See 
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special impor-
tance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as rais-
ing different questions not presented for decision). It never has been de-
nied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals 
whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of Jus-
TICE WHITE's dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily sup-
plies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's ob-
jections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for 
any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity 
recognized for judges and prosecutors. 
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in 
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases 
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal 
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a dam-
ages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran, -- U. S. -- (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JuSTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence 
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion 
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there 
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the 
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U. S., at 396; 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against 
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judi-
I 
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 39 There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 40 In addition, there are 
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Pres-
idential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 41 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
cially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"). 
Even the case on which JusTICE WHITE places principal reliance, 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at 
best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very es-
sence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." !d., at 163. Yet 
Marbury does not establish that the individual's protection must come in 
the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost 
his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the sug-
gestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it 
was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the 
Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See 
supra, at 4-6 and n. 17. 
39 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of 
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public 
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
40 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
- Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
''Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
I 
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The dissent, reaching for authority to support 
its position, cites a current edition of Time magazine to 
p ~~ ?-(... 2 .I p '-i. 
the effect that "no President is above the law"./\ With due 
respect to this prominent publication, we have not 
heretofore considered it a citable authority in a Court 
opinion on constitutional law. Nor indeed was the 
magazine article referring at all to private damage suit 
liability. Rather, its statement reflected the judgment 
of this Court in the Nixon tapes case and the impreachment 
resolution of the House Judiciary Committee. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1738 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's offi-
cial capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us 
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of 
the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
1 0 198~ 
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
1 See Economics of Militaty Pmcurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Con g., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on Novem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Befot·e the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
79-1738--0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 3 
look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander But-
terfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a 
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks 
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8 
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him 
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White 
retention by the Defense Department. 
'App. 228. 
5 See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgemld (CSC Deci-
sion), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to 
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix). 
' I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost ovelTUns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
7 
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the 
Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished.'' But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." App. 83. 
10 !d., at 61. 
" See id., at 83-84. 
12 See ibid. 
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 11 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgemld, as reprinted in App., at 
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had of-
fended applicable civil service regulations. App. 8&--87. 15 
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the de-
partmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, 
13 App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
1
' App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlich-
man, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13, 
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. 
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the Presi-
dent concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded 
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this con-
versation that the retraction was ordered. 
1
" Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, 
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" re-
spondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis 
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitz-
gerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of com-
parable authority. 1' The Examiner, however, explicitly dis-
tinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding 
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to 
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in 
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his 
position was abolished and that he vvas separated ... in re-
taliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in tes-
timony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 
1968." Id., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87. 
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team 
player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without deciding 
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action" 
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 'id., at 
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, 
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to 
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for rea-
sons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
17 The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he 
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former 
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought 
an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
19 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint 6. 
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally 
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
"" See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was enti-
tled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in dam-
ages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally 
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either 
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be 
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal 
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The cor-
rectness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under 
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is 
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he en-
joyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that 
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Co-
lumbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of 
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[ c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement, 
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has 
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and 
we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree .... 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
titled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
"' Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." Id., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
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fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. 8., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
20 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the 
ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a com-
mon law-and not a constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 493-495 (1978). 
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damages liability have been guided by the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at 
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional 
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the 
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court neces-
sarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as 
illuminated by our history and the structure of our govern-
ment. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 
498. 26 
This. case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries 
into history and policy, though mandated independently by 
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not 
exist through most of the development of common law, any 
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our 
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry 
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public 
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. 
26 Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the 
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accu-
rately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assump-
tions of our scheme of government. 
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This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be con-
sidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a 
system structured to achieve effective government under a 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 
IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defend-
ant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statu-
tory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In 
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
27 In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied" 
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question 
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action 
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with 
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional 
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, see 
supra, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action 
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on 
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in consid-
ering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity 
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the 
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Bmndhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (con-
struing§ 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept 
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity] 
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general 
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would 
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute 
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the Presi-
dent is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in l 
the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only 
this constitutional issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before 
us. 
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice 
Story's analysis remains persuasive: 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the exec-
utive department, which are necessarily implied from 
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. 
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them. . . . The president cannot, therefore, be 
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is 
in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 eel.). 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re-
"" U.S. Const., Art II, §3. 
""Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
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quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478; Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. We find these cases to be inappo-
site. The President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31 
Because of the singular importance of the President's du-
"" Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This 
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bmdley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred 
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liabil-
ity. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed con-
cern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his 
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor 
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course 
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates sug-
gests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distrac-
tion of suits by disappointed private citizens. And Senator Maclay has re-
corded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President John Adams-
both delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not 
subject to any process whatever. . . . For [that] would put it in the power 
of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole 
machine of government." W. Maclay, Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E. 
Maclay eel. 1890). Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the 
separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge his 
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ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private law-
suits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of 
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges-
for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President 
duties undistracted by private lawsuits. J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, § 1563, at 418-419 (1833 eel.) (quoted 
supra). Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not in-
tended to be subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held 
in United States v. Burr, 25 Feel. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces 
tecum can be issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and 
stated his broader view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary 
and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974). 
In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials re-
flecting the Framers' intent, we do think that the most compelling argu-
ments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers and the judi-
ciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But our 
primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial precedent should 
not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence clearly supports the 
Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice White's dissent cites some 
other materials , including ambiguous comments made at state ratifying 
conventions and the remarks of a single publicist. But historical evidence 
must be weighed as well as cited. When the weight of evidence is consid-
ered, we think we must place our reliance on the contemporary under-
standing of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Ellsworth. Other 
powerful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits 
against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with 
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most 
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supTa, 386 U. 8., at 554. 
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such 
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in provid-
ing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and im-
partially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U. 8. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is 
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensi-
tive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under 
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence 
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility 
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, 
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits 
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability 
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, 
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but 
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 31 
this Court's 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages action 
ever were filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to 
judgment on the merits. 
'"' Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the 
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in 
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S. 
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impos-
sible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been 
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute .... " 
'~' These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
""' In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has 
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to 
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held 
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in perfor-
mance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 
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B 
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts 
508-517; cf. Imble?· v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the Court 
also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support. 
See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all 
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the 
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege 
applicable ... . ");Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial 
privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a 
judicial proceeding"). In view of the special nature of the President's con-
stitutional office, we think it appropriate to extend to him absolute immu-
nity from damages actions based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of 
the area of his official responsibility. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for 
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his tes-
timony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorga-
nization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the peti-
tioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, 
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the 
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in 
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, 
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts 
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside 
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitz-
gerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legisla-
tive protection, respondent argues , no federal official could, within his au-
thority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard 
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings. 
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial 
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generally have looked to the common law to determine the 
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 36 we have recog-
nized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separa-
tion of powers under the Constitution." United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the 
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, 
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 37 But our cases also 
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, 
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be 
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and 
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General 
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
den purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute 
immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
35 This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history. 
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are 
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the Presi-
dent in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to 
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) 
("The executive power is vested in a President: and as far as his powers are 
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other depart-
ment, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the im-
peaching power."). 
w See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stifhmg v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affcl, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
37 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343 
U.S., at 583. 
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Services Administration, 433 U. 8. 425, 443 (1977); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U. 8. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judi-
cial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when 
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, 
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest 
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. 
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held war-
ranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages 
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. as 
"' The Comt has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in 
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See 
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special impor-
tance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as rais-
ing different questions not presented for decision). It never has been de-
nied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals 
whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of Jus-
TICE WHITE's dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily sup-
plies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's ob-
jections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for 
any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity 
recognized for judges and prosecutors. 
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in 
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases 
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal 
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a clam-
ages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran,-- U. S. -- (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JUSTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence 
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion 
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there 
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the 
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fedeml Agents, 403 U. S., at 396; 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against 
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judi-
cially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"). 
Even the case on which JUSTICE WHITE places principal reliance, 
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v 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 39 There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 40 In addition, there are 
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Pres-
idential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 41 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at 
best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very es-
sence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id., at 163. Yet 
Marbury does not establish that the individual's protection must come in 
the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost 
his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the sug-
gestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it 
was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the 
Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See 
supra, at 4-6 and n. 17. 
a9 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428--429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of 
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public 
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
'
0 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690--706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
'
1 Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
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maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and 
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." 42 For the President, as for judges and 
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particu-
lar private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance 
compelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
"The argument of the dissenting opinions, that our decision places the 
President "above the law," is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified. 
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains ac-
countable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a 
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for 
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent 
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judg-
ment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a pros-
ecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is 
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is sim-
ple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular 
remedy is not available against him. 
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From: Justice Powell 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1738 
RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v . . 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's offi-
cial capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us 
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of 
the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national . 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the evident 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
1 See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211 
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among 
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ulti-
mately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon 
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on N ovem-
ber 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force 
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
'See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App. 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
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look into the matter.~ Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. i In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander But-
terfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a 
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks 
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8 
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him 
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White 
retention by the Defense Department. 
' App. 228. 
5 See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137- 141 (Depo-
sition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275. 
6 See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (De-
position of Robert Mayo); App. 146--147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to 
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix). 
9 I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the 
Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public 
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings 
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testi-
mony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he 
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for 
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had re-
ceived "some advice" from the White House before Fitzger-
ald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be 
more specific. He responded to several questions by invok-
ing "executive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. " App. 83. 
10 !d., at 61. 
" See id., at 83--84. 
12 See ibid. 
79-1738--0PINION 
NIXON v. FITZGERALD 5 
not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 1~ 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at 
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had of-
fended applicable civil service regulations. App. 8&-87. 15 
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the de-
partmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, 
1
" App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). 
1
' App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlich-
man, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13, 
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. 
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the Presi-
dent concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded 
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this con-
versation that the retraction was ordered. 
15 Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, 
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" re-
spondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis 
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitz-
gerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of com-
parable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly dis-
tinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding 
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to 
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in 
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his 
position was abolished and that he was separated ... in re-
taliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in tes-
timony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 
1968." Id., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87. 
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team 
player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without deciding 
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action" 
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at 
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, 
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to 
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for rea-
sons "personal to" him. App. 87. 
17 The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
App. 87-88. Following the Commission's order, respondent was offered a 
new position with the Defense Department, but not one that he regarded 
as equivalent to his former employment. Fitzgerald accordingly filed an 
enforcement action in the District Court. This litigation ultimately culmi-
nated in a settlement agreement. Under its terms the United States Air 
Force agreed to reassign Fitzgerald to his former position as Management 
Systems Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, effective 
June 21, 1982. See Settlement Agreement in Fitzgerald v. Hampton, et · . 
al., Civ. No. 76-1486 (DDC June 15, 1982). 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229. 
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the 
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the ac-
tion against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). 
19 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint 6. 
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and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must pro-
ceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had 
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also 
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presi-
dential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally 
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
20 See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was enti-
tled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in dam-
ages. The first , 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally 
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either 
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be 
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal 
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The cor-
rectness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under 
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is 
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District 
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he en-
joyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that 
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Co-
lumbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of 
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing 
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, 
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an 
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within 
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has 
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and 
we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Gases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . . .. 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, at 546-547. As an additional requirement, Cohen es-
tablished that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order 
must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals · appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
titled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
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691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U.S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
24 Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. !d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." ld., at 498. 
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Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
79-1738-0PINION 
14 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "func-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E con-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
zs Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the 
ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a com-
mon law-and not a constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, v. 
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 493-495 (1978). 
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damages liability have been guided by the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at 
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional 
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the 
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court neces-
sarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as 
illuminated by our history and the structure of our govern-
ment. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler 
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 
498. 26 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries 
into history and policy, though mandated independently by 
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not 
exist through most of the development of common law, any 
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our 
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry 
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public 
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. 
26 Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the 
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accu-
rately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assump-
tions of our scheme of government. 
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This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be con-
sidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a 
system structured to achieve effective government under a 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 
IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defend-
ant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statu-
tory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In 
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
'
7 In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied" 
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question 
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action 
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with 
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional 
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, see 
supr-a, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action 
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on 
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in consid-
ering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity 
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the 
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (con-
struing § 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept 
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity] 
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general 
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would 
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute 
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the Presi-
dent is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in 
the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only 
this constitutional issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before 
us. 
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice 
Story's analysis remains persuasive: 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the exec-
utive department, which are necessarily implied from 
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. 
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them. . . . The president cannot, therefore, be 
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is 
in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.). 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States. . . . " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is 
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in 
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in-
formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the 
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re-
28 U. S. Const., Art II, §3. 
"" Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
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quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478; Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. We find these cases to be inappo-
site. The President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31 
Because of the singular importance of the President's du-
30 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This 
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S. , at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred 
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liabil-
ity. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed con-
cern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his 
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor 
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course 
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates sug-
gests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distrac-
tion of suits by disappointed private citizens. And Senator Maclay has re-
corded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President John Adams-
both delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not 
subject to any process whatever. . . . For [that] would put it in the power 
of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole 
machine of government." W. Maclay, Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E. 
Maclay eel. 1890). Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the 
separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge his 
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ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private law-
suits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of 
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges-
for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President 
duties undistracted by private lawsuits. J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, § 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.) (quoted 
supra). Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not in-
tended to be subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held 
in United States v. Burr, 25 Feel. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces 
tecum can be issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and 
stated his broader view of the proper relationship between the J ucliciary 
and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works ofThomasJefferson 404. (P. Ford eel. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 32()....325 (1974). 
In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials re-
flecting the Framers' intent, we do think that the most compelling argu-
ments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers and the judi-
ciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But our 
primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial precedent should 
not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence clearly supports the 
Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice White's dissent cites some 
other materials, including ambiguous comments made at state ratifying 
conventions and the remarks of a single publicist. But historical evidence 
must be weighed as well as cited. When the weight of evidence is consid-
ered, we think we must place our reliance on the contemporary under-
standing of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Ellsworth. Other 
powerful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits 
against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with 
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most 
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such 
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in provid-
ing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and im-
partially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is 
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensi-
tive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under 
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence 
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility 
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, 
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits 
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability 
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, 
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but 
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 
B 
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling 
this Court's 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages action 
ever were filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to 
judgment on the merits. 
32 Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the 
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in 
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S. 
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impos-
sible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been 
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute .... " 
33 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
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judicial deference and restraint. 34 For example, while courts 
generally have looked to the common law to determine the 
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 30 we have recog-
nized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separa-
tion of powers under the Constitution." United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the 
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, 
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 36 But our cases also 
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, 
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be 
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and 
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General 
Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judi-
cial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when 
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, 
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & 
34 This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history. 
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are 
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the Presi-
dent in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to 
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) 
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are 
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other depart-
ment, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the im-
peaching power."). 
35 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, &-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 32:>--324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
36 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
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Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest 
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. 
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held war-
ranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages 
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 37 
37 The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in 
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See 
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special impor-
tance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as rais-
ing different questions not presented for decision). It never has been de-
nied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals 
whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of Jus-
TICE WHITE's dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily sup-
plies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's ob-
jections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for 
any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity 
recognized for judges and prosecutors. 
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in 
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases 
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal 
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a dam-
ages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran,-- U. S. -- (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JuSTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence 
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion 
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there 
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the 
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U. S., at 396; 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against 
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judi-
cially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"). 
Even the case on which JUSTICE WHITE places principal reliance, 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at 
best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very es-
sence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." !d., at 163. Yet 
Marbury does not establish that the individual's protection must come in 
the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost 
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c 
In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this 
Court has recognized that the sphere of protected action 
must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes. 
Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute 
immunity should extend only to acts in performance of par- \ 
ticular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438 
U. S., at 508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 
430--431. But the Court also has refused to draw lines finer 
than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding 
v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters 
"committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here 
taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of 
duty is enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial 
privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal 
attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In view of the special 
nature of the President's constitutional office and functions, 
we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential im-
munity from damages liability for acts within the "outer pe-
rimeter'' of his official responsibility. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the 
President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety 
of areas, many of them highly sensitive. In many cases it 
would be difficult to determine which Presidential "function" 
encompassed a particular action. In this case, for example, 
respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his 
testimony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 
his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the sug-
gestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it 
was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek a remedy before the 
Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See- . 
supra, at 4-6 and n. 17. 
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18 U. S. C. § 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed 
that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to pro-
mote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon or-
dered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, an 
inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided 
under the kind of "functional" theory asserted both by re- I 
0 
m i ss'• c?V\ 
spondent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be 
highly intrusive. 
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have 
acted outside the outer perimeter of his duties by ordering 
the discharge of an employee who was lawfully entitled to re-
tain his job in the absence of "such cause as will promote the 
efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 39, citing 5 
U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legis-
lative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, 
within the outer perimeter of his authority, cause Fitzgerald 
to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed 
statutory proceedings. 
This construction would subject the President to trial on 
virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was 
taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction 
thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's constitutional and statu- \ 
tory authority to "prescribe" the manner in which the Secre-
tary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. See 10 \ 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate must include the 
authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in 
force, we conclude that petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay 
well within the outm: perimeter of his authority. 
v 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct 
on the part of the chief executive. 38 There remains the con-,. 
38 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
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stitutional remedy of impeachment. 39 In addition, there are 
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. 
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Pres-
idential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. 40 Other incentives to avoid miscon-
duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to 
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and 
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." 41 For the President, as for judges and 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of 
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public 
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
39 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
Canst., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
40 Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
" The argument of the dissenting opinions, that our decision places the 
President "above the law," is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified. 
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains ac-
countable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a 
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for 
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent 
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judg-
ment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a pros-
ecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is 
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is sim-
ple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular 
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prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particu-
lar private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance 
compelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
remedy is not available against him. 





The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil 
damages from a former President of the United States. The 
claim rests on actions allegedly taken during the former 
President's tenure in office. The issue before us is the 15 
scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the 
United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald 
lost his job as a management analyst with the Department 20 
of the Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the 
r 2. 
context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in 
force, in which his job was eliminated. In announcing the 
reorganization, the the Air Force characterized the action 
as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed 25 
forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained 
national prominence approximately one year earlier, during 
the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. 30 
On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the 
Subcommittee for Economy in Government of the Joint 
Economic Committee of the United States Congress. To the 
apparent embarrassment of his superiors in the Department 
of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the 35 
C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He 
lsee Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-201 (1968-
1969). It is not disputed that officials in the 
Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by 
Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of 
respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared 
a memorandum for the outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, 
Harold Brown, listing three ways in which Fitzgerald might 
be removed from his position. See Joint Appendix (JA), at 
209-211 (Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 
1969) • Among these was a "reduction in force" --the means 
by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's 
successor in office under the new Nixon administration. 
3. 
also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had 
arisen during the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered 
retaliation for his congressional testimony, the 40 
Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public 
hearings on Fitzgerald's dismissal. 2 The press reported 
those hearings prominently, as it had the earlier 
announcement of his impending separation from the 
Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 45 
8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was queried about 
Fitzgerald's impending separation from government 
service. 3 The President responded by promising to look 
into the matter. 4 Evidence in the record establishes that 
2see The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the 
Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Econom in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 9lst 
Cong. , 1st Sess. (1969) . Some 6 Mem er s of Congress also 
signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." 
Ibid., at 115, JA, at 177-179. 
3A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had 
been prepared by White House staff in anticipation of a 
possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. 
Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced the view 
that the Air Force was "firing .•. a good public servant." 
JA, at 269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard 
Nixon, December 5, 1969). The memorandum suggested that 
the President order Fitzgerald's retention by the Defense 
Department. 
4 JA, at 228. 
4. 
this pledge was kept. Shortly after the news conference 50 
the President asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. 
Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another 
job within the Administration. 5 It also appears that the 
President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that 
Fitzgerald might be offered a position in the Bureau of 55 
the Budget.6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered 
resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal 
memordandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide 
Alexander Butterfield reported to chief-of staff Haldeman 60 
that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a top-notch cost expert, but 
he must be given very low marks in loyalty; and after all, 
5see JA, at 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman, 
February 7, 1980); JA, at 137-141 (Deposition of 
petitioner Richard Nixon, October 2-3, 1979). Haldeman's 
deposed testimony was based on his handwritten notes of 
December 12, 1969. JA, at 275. 
6see JA, at 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); JA, at 
141 (Deposition of Richard Nixon). 
7Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, 
appear to have resisted at least partly due to a suspicion 
that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty to Executive 
policies and that he spoke too freely in communications 
with friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high 
level positions were presently unavailable within the 
Bureau of the Budget. See JA, at 126 (Deposition of 
Robert Mayo); JA, at 146-147 (Deposition 1 of James 
Schlesinger). 
5. 
loyalty is the name of the game." 8 Butterfield therefore 
recommended that "We should let him bleed, for a while at 
least." 9 There is no evidence of White House efforts to 65 
reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield 
memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, 
Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission 
(CSC) . In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that 
his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his 
truthful testomony before a congressional committee. 10 
8Quoted in Decision of Civil Service Commission 
--~----~~~~~~~------~----~~~--~ Chief Appeals Examiner (CSC Decision), JA, at 60, 84 
(September 18, 1973). 
9Id., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 
'first-choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and 
others who tried so hard to make him a hero [for exposing 
the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the 
White House and in the Defense Department. According to 
the CSC Decision, supra, JA, at 83: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 
'Senator Proxmire 's boy in the Air Force,' and 
he may honestly believe it, we find this 
statement difficult to accept. It is evident 
that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
specifically saying so, considered him to be 
just that .... We also note that upon leaving the 
Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a 
consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that 
Senator Proxmire appeared at the Commission 
hearing as a character witness for 
[Fitzgerald]." 
10see CSC Decision, JA, at 61. 
70 
6. 
The esc convened a closed hearing on Fitzgerald's 
allegations on May 4, 1971. Fitzgerald, however, 
preferred to present his grievances in public. After he 75 
had won a judicial injunction, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 
F.2d 755 (1972), public hearings commenced on January 26, 
1973. The hearings again generated publicity, much of it 
devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert 
Seamans. Although he denied that Fitzgerald had lost his 80 
position in retaliation for congressional testimony, 
Seamans testified that he had discussed Fitzgerald's loss 
of employment with one or more White House officials . 11 
But the Secretary declined to be more specific. He 
responded to several questions by invoking "executive 85 
privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the 
President was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. 
Nixon took the opportunity to assume 
responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal: 




"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would 
be fired or discharged or asked to resign. I 
approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been 
talking to someone who had discussed the matter 
with me. No, this was not a case of some person 
down the line deciding he should go. It was a 
decision that was :fJibmi tted to me. I made it 
and I stick by it." 
7. 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued 
a retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald 




President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon d-i-d not 105 
ha~ "put before him the decision concerning Mr. 
Fitzgerald. "14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the 
chief examiner for the esc issued his decision in the 
Fitzgerald case on September , 18, 1973. Decision on the 
Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, JA, at 60. The Examiner 
held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable 
civil service regulations. Ibid., JA, at 86-87. The 
13JA, at 185. 
14JA, at 196 (transcription of statement of White 
House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). 
110 
8. 
Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the 
Departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his 115 
job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, 
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" 
respondent. Id. As this was an impermissible basis for a 
reduction in force, 15 the Examiner recommended 
Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job 120 
of comparable authority. The Examiner, however, 
explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a 
suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation 
for his testimony to Congress. As found by the 
Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support 125 
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished 
and that he was separated in retaliation for his 
15The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was 
dismissed because of his superiors' dissatisfaction with 
his job performance. CSC Decision, JA, at 86-87. Their 
attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 
'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team. '" Ibid. , 
JA, at 83. Without deciding whether this would have been 
an adequate basis for an "adverse action" against 
Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 
ibid., at 68, the Examiner held that the CSC's adverse 
act1on procedures, current version codified at 5 C.F.R. § 
752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to employ a 
"reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent 
for reasons "personal to" him. Ibid., JA, at 87. As the 
Air Force had used this forbidden means of securing 
Fitzgerald's separation from the service, he was found 
entitled to reinstatement. 
1' 9. 
having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before 
the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." Ibid., at 
81. 130 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed 
a suit for damages in the district court. In it he raised 
essentially the same claims presented to the csc. 16 As 
defendants he named eight officials of the Defense 
Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and 135 
"one or More" unnamed "White House Aides" styled only as 
"John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the 
District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and 140 
the Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, 
White House aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 553 F.2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White 
16The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to 
deprive him of his job and sully his reputation. 
Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued 
through the esc hearings and remained in existence at the 
initiation of the lawsuit. See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 
supra, 384 F. Supp., at 690-691. 
10. 
House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In 145 
that year, reasonable~r suspicion had arisen, most 
notably through publication of the internal White House 
memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that 
Fitzgerald at least should be made to "bleed for a while" 
before being offered another job in the Administration. 150 
553 F.2d, at 225, 229. Holding that concealment of 
illegal activity would toll the statute of limitations, 
the Court of Appeals remanded the action against 
Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery 155 
thereafter, Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in 
the District Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this 
amended complaint--more than eight years after he had 
first complained of his discharge to the Civil Service 
Commission--that Fitzgerald first named the petitioner 160 
Nixon as a party defendant. 17 Also included as defendants 
---r--~ 
17Th general allegations of the complaint remained 
~unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in 
the alleged conspiracy against him, the complaint quoted 
petitioner's press conference statement that he was 
"totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6. 
11. 
were White House aide Bryce Harlow and other officials of 
the Nixon administration. Additional discovery ensued. 
By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the 
petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides Bryce 165 
Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Denying a motion for 
summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action 
must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that 
Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under ~ 
two federal statutes and the First Amendment to the 170 
Constitution. 18 The Court also ruled that petitioner was 
not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity 
18see Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at la-2a. 
The District Court held that respondent was entitled to 
"infer" a cause of action under 5 u.s.c. § 7211 (Supp. III 
1979) and 18 u.s.c. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a 
private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 
U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that 
"The right of employees ... to •.• provide information to 
either House of Congress, or a committee or a Member 
thereof shall not be interfered with or denied." The 
second, 18 u.s.c. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it 
a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The 
correctness of the decision that a cause of action could 
be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before 
us. s explained infra, this case is here under the 
"colla eral order" doctrine, for review of the District 
Court 1 s denial of petitioner 1 s motion to dismiss on the 
ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. 
The Di trict Court also held that respondent had stated a 
claim nder the common law of the District of Columbia b...._r 
espondent subsequently abandoned his common law claim? 
owever and we are not presented with any issue of ( 
mmunity~nder the co~mon law of District of Columbia • . _,J 
:;;~ ~ nJ~r~i~~~~ 
~ ,y~ ~ 0 ~ 
·f!J!J. p  t' ~ 
~~~ 
12. 
decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 175 
summarily. It apparently did so on the ground that its 
recent decision in Halper in v. Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 
(CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided vote, u.s. 
____ (1981), had decisively rejected this claimed immunity 
defense and that the appeal therefore failed to present a 180 
substantial question under the law of the Circuit. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity 
available to a President of the United States, we granted 
certiori to decide this important issue. ----u.s. 
(1981). 185 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must 
consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his 
opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondent 190 
argued that the District Court had not yet entered any 
E""'fA"~' r;,.,~ ~ ... t +h..... Co""-<t tJt llf ~ I~ l-,C\o( ~ 
appealable..,. order. ..fn the absence crt-a fin-al -j-udqme
0 
r;A,·~"""", ss. ~J f-t i1 h o ~., .,-s, i..., ~ r/o t.r •• d-o 7 c. f f'-4' "'-I ~r J-,rt_ 
contended that there was no "case1_ ~ ripe 
~lot,. t ct~, · d·•'t.) ""'J h.e_ C• L I ~I ~~t;;:;~=~~~~bi. 
this Court. 19 We also must consider an argument that an 





agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy. 195 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court 
under 28 U.S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with 
authority to review~s~he Court of Appeals. 20 ~~ 
·~~===~)')~...,.=·....-~J .) s C)"'~ ~t ' ( ~· ~.,..; tJ-f ~ ...... ., ,._ k d~Je."'" to rr ~ 
appeal for 
the Court of Appeals dismissed pe'oiH:r:-C:Y~ ~ 
~ P· shltio- Ct>wrfl .-<t ~ '1 
lack of Emphasizing the ~
~~ ~ ~ , ,. 
e Court of Appeals' decision, ~, 
.......,,...... ~ AL Y' +- lo n• .... ~~ 4-z:?l-~. ,., .I ~~~~""a. ~~ill;~ 
thi' s caset\~ never/( in" the 
II 
Court of Appeals within the meaning of § 1254. As a , ~ 
...._.....,~.  ..... .,.~-..p;_; __ ::t::~;_  
juris rev ew the • +-.....i....... f ac..,... ~on o ~~~ 
This is without merit. iue ol..t s. ~ e> 
19see Brief for Respondent in Opposition, at 2. 
Although respondent has not repeated this argument in his 
brief on the merits, the challenge was jurisdictional. As 
jurisdictional questions cannot be waived by the parties, 
we think it appropriate to discuss the issue raised at 
that stage of the litigation. 
20The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court by the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the 
petition of any party to any civil or criminal 
case, before or after rendition of judgment or 
decree ••.• 
28 u.s.c. § 1254. 
14. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), a 
small class of interlocutory orders are immediately 210 
appealable to the courts of appeals. This class embraces 
orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, 
resolve an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment." Cooper & Lybrand v. 215 
Livesay, 437 u.s. 463, 464 (1978); see Cohen, supra, 337 
u.s., at 546-547. At least twice before this Court has 
held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are 
appealable under these criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 
442 U.S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech 220 
and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 
(1977) (claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). 
Because the denial of petitioner's claim of immunity 
represented a collateral order appealable under the Cohen 
doctrine, this case was "in" the Court of Appeals within 225 
the meaning of the statute and is currently ripe for our 
review. 21 
Footnote(s) 21 will appear on following pages. 
15. 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for 
ceriorari in this respondent had entered his 230 
opposition, the parties reached an agreement to liquidate 
damages. 22 Under its terms, the petitioner Nixon paid the 
respondent Fitzgerald of $142,000. In 
consideration, Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated 
damages in the sum of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 235 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute 
immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's 
. . 1. f h ldk~. 1mmun1ty c a1m, no urt er payments wou ~. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both 
petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial 240 
21There can be no serious doubt concerning our power 
to review a court of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction--a power we have exercised routinely. 
See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 
U.S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, 
decisions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction would be 
insulated entirely from review by this Court. 
22Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the 
Clerk of this Court on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to 
his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of Morton, Ina, David, 
Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other Relief. 
On June 10, 1980--pr ior to the Court's action on the 
petition for certiorari, counsel to the parties had 
advised the Court that their clients had reached an 
agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the 
agreement in their initial submission. 
16. 
stake in the resolution of the question presented in this 
Court. As we recently concluded in a case involving a 
similar contract, "Given respondents' continued active 
pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite 
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties 245 
having adverse legal interests.'" Havens Realty Co. v. 
Coleman, draft op., at 6, quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 u.s. 227, 240-241 (1937). 
III 
This Court consistently has recognized that 250 
government officials are entitled to some form of immunity 
from suits for civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 
u.s. 483 (1896), the Court considered the immunity 
available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages 
based upon his official acts. Relying heavily on English 255 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he 
interests of the people," id., at 498, required a grant of 
absolute immunity to public officers. In the absence of 
immunity, the Court reasoned, executive officials would 
hesitate to exercise their discretion in a way 260 
"injuriously affect[ing] the claims of particular 
17. 
individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest 
required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of 
"public policy and convenience" therefore compelled a 
judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from 265 
official acts. 
"In exerc1s1ng the functions of his office, the 
head of an Executive Department, keeping within 
the limits of his authority, should not be under 
an apprehension that the motives that control 
his official conduct may, at any time, become 
the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper 
and effective administration of public affairs 
as entrusted to the executive branch of the 
government, if he were subject to any such 
restraint." 
Id., at 498. 
270 
275 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the 280 
defense of immunity to actions besides those at common 
law. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 u.s. 367 (1951), held that 
the passage of 42 u.s.c. § 1983 had not abrogated the 
r VV1 W\ &.t "' , f..y 
common-law !H!'ivix-f!)e accorded to state legislators. And 










Pierson also held that police officers possess a qualified 
immunity protecting them from suit when their official 
cts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 556. 
285 
290 
/}u.lt_ ... ~,--y,.._c_ ~r ~ 7 ,4 
k ~1-fT ~(V.. 
18. 
In u.s. 232 (1974), the Court 
considered the immunity properly afforded state executive 
d I /; 
officials in a § 1983 suit alleging the violation of 
constitutional rights. In that case we rejected the 
officials' claim to absolute immunity under the doctrine 295 
of Spalding v. Vilas, holding that state executive 
officials possessed only a "good faith" immunity from 
suits alleging constitutional violations. 
The approach adopted in Scheuer and subsequent cases 
arguably narrowed the "official acts" doctrine recognized 300 
-t 
in Spalding v. Vilas. As consrued by subsequent cases, 
Scheuer mandated a two-tiered division of immunity 
defenses. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded 
qualified immunity. For them the scope of the defense 
varied in proportion to the nature of their official 305 
functions and the range of decisions that conceivably 
might be taken in "good faith": "[S]ince the options which 
a chief executive and his principal subordinates must 
consider are far broader and far more subtle than those 
J ~ made by officials with less responsibility, the rf..._nge of 310 
discf retion must be comparably broad." This "functional" 
19. 
approach also defined a second tier, however, at which the 
especially sensitive functions of a few officials--notably 
judges and prosecutors--required the continued recognition 
of absolute immunity. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 315 
u.s. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of 
prosecutions)~ Stump v. Sparkman, 435 u.s. 349 (1978) 
(state judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial 
acts) . 320 
In Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978), the Court 
considered for the first time the kind of immunity 
possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for 
constitutional violations. In Butz, the Court rejected an 
argument, based on decisions involving federal officials 325 
charged with common law torts, that all high federal 
officials should be accorded absolute immunity from 
constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket 
grant of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive 330 
-
officials, 438 u.s.' at 504, and "would seriously erode 
the protection provided by basic constitutional 
20. 
guarantees," id., at 508, we extended the approach to 
immunity questions that we had applied in suits against 
state officials in cases under § 198 3. In so doing we 335 
reaffirmed our holdings that some officials, notably 
judges and prosecutors, have "special functions 
requir [ing] a full exemption from liability." Id., at 
508. In Butz itself we accorded absolute immunity to 
administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to 340 
those of judges and prosecutors. Id. We also left open 
the ;:;.::::~ ~~er federal officials ~show 
~ ~ 
that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." jd. a_f-- -
This case now presents the claim that pnhlic;: pol ipy 
re<jYi«•• ~~~abs~11 te i~the 345 
President of the united State~ ~~~ 
~~ ~ d4~4..Ctlt.~~~ 
IV 
In addressing claims of entitlement to immunity, this 
Court has recognized that "the law of privilege as a 
defense to damage actions against officers of Government 350 
has 1 in large part been of j ud ic ial making. 1 " But z v. 
Economou, supra, 438 u.s., at 501-502, quoting Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 u.s. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
21. 
u.s. 306, 318 (1973). This is not to say that our 
decisions have not been rooted in federal statutes or the 355 
Constitution. Our cases under § 1983 formally have 
involved eneFei~es ttYs tatutory construction. See, e.g. , 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 u.s. 367 (1951). Other decisions 
-r~s~ 
have beeR Foote~ither ~n the literal text of the 
~nstitution. , e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 u.s. 486, 360 -
506 (1969) (recognizing immunity of Congressmen under 
Speech and Debate Clause), or On inferences of 
constitutional purpose drawn from constitutional language 
and structure, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 606, 418 
(1972) (extending congressional immunity to a 
congressional aide, in order to "implement [the] 
fundamental purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause)~ cf. 
Butz v. Economou, 
Nonetheless, at least 
supra, 438 u.s. , at 508-517. 
4f2~f 
in the absence of ~ guidance 
A. 
365 
from the Congress, in deciding immunity questions we have 370 
followed in the tradition of common law courts by freely 
weighing considerations of public policy. 23 As a second 
23Four basic rationales support immunity for public 
officials. First, the prospect of damages liability may 
Footnote continued on next page. 
22. 
element of our immunity inquiries we also have examined 
the scope of the immunity historically afforded to 
particular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou, 375 
supra, 438 u.s., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 409, 
421 (1976). 
In the case of the President the ._ historical and 
policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the presidency 
did not exist through most of the development of commC?n 380 
law, any historical analysis must draw its evide~ 
4~~~ Ro~ loo ~o\ottf-'J 
constitutional A heritage • 2 4 ( "l'he r e lev ant pi s ~e •Y <!' 1dc..u.. our 
render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their 
public responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 
2 d 5 7 9 , 5 81 ( CA 2 19 4 9 ) , c e r t • denied , 3 3 9 U . S • 9 4 9 ( 19 50 ) . 
Second, competent and responsible individuals may be 
deterred from entering public service in the first place. 
Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties 
by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. Finally, as this 
case illustrates, there is a danger of unfairness when 
officials face personal liability for decisions made in 
areas of legal uncertainty that are reviewed by courts 
years later, under evolving legal standards. See 
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for 
Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 
Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977). 
24 , j d'fitd>.. ~~ 
Although there ha~' been some over this 
issue, it generally is agreed that igh executive 
officials enjoyed absolute immunity at common law. See, 
e.g., Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 
Mich. L. Rev. 201, 202 (1959) ; Developments in the Law--
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1210 
n.l21 (1977); but cf. A. Dicey, Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution 193 (lOth ed. 1959) {prime 
Minister of Great Britain historically liable for official 
misconduct); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for 
Positive Government Wrongs, 44 u. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 14-21, 
52 (1972) (executives in 19th century America subject to 
"draconian" liability, but this was a departure from the 
traditional common law rule). 
~~v ~ ~~~~~~:z.­
~ ~  
~f. '1-h~-I.T(~ bt... .S . ~
l')...~'lt9.:~~ .. I '!;>~ 
1 K~ .u-Ij ,_ ,· dt~.,nt)" Q... ~ ...,,,~~..,,..,~ 
o ~ ~~ ~ • ,lr .. _ 'TU )~o,- be 'veek:LI( 12.. 
tbereros( fm;fr5:4i cifris1&i~mf .-. • thefs~~;:~r~·~ 
-- ~..., ~ ,6( ji J)L 
of powers among the branches of government~ooRei~eraeieAe 
I"\ f-.r~ O..V\iii'YI ... ~D/ ~ ol \"" f•rt (?!,.(l...,,.cJ b)l ~""" 
~e£iA: eRe :impo r tant.. aepe.<;;:.t. of tb~ re~~isie~ inquiry ,..._..t;.-3~ 
publ~ policy. J The importance of individual 
rights also identifies a powerful policy concern in suits 
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
~,.,..,., <t'" /-./ 
But we consistently have held that JJg~e·~ of ........, ""'e,ho., .. f 
policy justify the immunity of some officials even from 390 
~-~-
suits of ~ kind. 
In this case a former President ~55 f! t .S immunity 
from civil damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as 
d f d . d' . d h . , ---; d a e en ant 1n a 1rect act1on un er t e Const1tut1on an 
two statutory actions under federal laws of general 395 
applicability In neither case has Congress taken express 
legislative action to subject the President to civil 
I 
* liability for his official acts. 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of 
this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President 
of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity 
from damages liability predicated on his acts in office. 
We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident 
( 
24. 
/ 25 of the President's unique position, rooted in the 
doctrine of the separation of powers and justified by 405 
considerations of public policy. 
v 
A 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to 
qualified immunity, 26 the respondent relies on cases in 410 
which we have granted immunity of this scope to governors 
and cabinet officers.27 we find these cases to be 
inapposite. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
25 Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States,§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.): 
"There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to 
the executive department, which are necessarily 
implied from the nature of the functions, which 
are confided to it. Among these, must 
necessarily be included the power to perform 
them • • • • The president cannot, therefore, be 
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, 
while he is in the discharge of the duties of 
his office~ and for this purpose his person must 
be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess 
an official inviolability." 
26under the "good faith" standard, an official will 
be held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or 
reasonably should have know that the action he took within 
his sphere of official responsibility" was 
unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious 
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights 
or other injury .... " wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 322 
(1975). 
27 E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978) ~ 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
25. 
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .•.. " This grant of authority establishes 415 
the President as the chief constitutional officer of the 
Executive branch. 28 The President's unique status 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 
Further, the President's supervisory and policy 
responsibilities encompass areas of utmost discretionary 420 
authority. These include the administration of justice--
it is the President who is charged constitutionally to 
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed" ; 29 the 
~~~ 
28Noting that the "Speech Debate Clause" 
provides a textual basis for co gressional immunity, 
respondent argues that the Framers st be assumed to have 
rejected any the propriety of Executive immunity. 
Petitione , on the other hand, offe s historical arguments 
that the Framers affirmatively assumed presidential 
immunity to have been established by the adoption of the 
constitutional scheme. Althoug we need not embrace 
petitioner's argument in order t decide this case, we do ~~ 
reject respondent's sugsQetioR that the constitutional~~ 
\/ text S'?!(ehow prohibit;( a judicia recognition of absolute 
it?muni ty;...a S""-±~et ~e--. abc..e~ ef;: a c=~~~ ~~Ag~=~:io~a.l -.... 
'- ~~ :::::::: ~ contr~:::-,~ ordeL~ ~:r=~~e!at1on -_5? ;:;f::>:;i£e:eti% ~~;;;__~&~ th;~e-tT~~;~;iOf\ar O.aeF~ 
' ~ There are two difficulties with respondent's argument. 
First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a 
prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision 
expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of 
judges is well settled. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 
_wa-il{J5 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this 
Cour has established that 1\ irnrnuni ty may be extended to ~ 
cert in officials of the Executive Branch. Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 u.s., at 511-512; see Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, (extending immunity to prosecutorial 
officials within the Executive branch). 
29 u.s. Canst., Art II, § 3. 
.. 
26. 
conduct of foreign affairs--a realm in which the Court has 
recognized that "It would be intolerable that courts, 425 
without relevant information, should review and perhaps 
nullify actions of the Executive taken on information 
properly held secret"; 30 and management of the personnel 
of the Executive branch--a task for which "imperative 
reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] 430 
to remove the most important of his subordinates in their 
most important duties." 31 
B 
In deference to the President's singular 
constitutional mandate, the courts traditionally have 435 





This Court has never held that courts may 
President to perform even ministerial 
functions. 32 By contrast, injunctions compelling action 
30chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp., 333 u.s. 103, 111 (1948). 
31Myers v. United States, 272 u.s. 52, 134-135 
(1926). 
32Although this issue has not been faced squarely by 
the Court, there have been strong statements in previous 
opinions asserting the immunity of the President from 
judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 u.s. 475, 
501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied 
Footnote continued on next page. 
27. 
by other officials long have been upheld. 33 A similar 440 
that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enJOin 
the President in the performance of his official duties; 
and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in 
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (18 38) , it is 
stated: "The executive power is vested in a President; .l-
and as far as his powers are derived from the consitution, ~ 
he is beyond the reach of any other department, e~cept in 
the mode prescribed by the constitution through the 
.... _ ~~ ,. impeaching power.") . m wv·- u . , . 2d 587, 616 (1974) (concluding tha 
~
~ court possesses .the "authority to mandamus the. Presiden 
w- o perform the ministerial duty" of effectuating a pay 
aise). 
. ven in United States v. Nixon, the court held that 
Presidential conversations and correspondence enjoy a 
tA.~~ "presumptive privilege" that is "inextricably rooted in 
r":- the separation of powers." 418 u.s., at 708. we 
9 ·tl:~.;,../ suggested that this privilege may be more absolute when 
~Y. matters of diplomacy or national security are involved. 
l Id., at 706, 710-711. 
Strong historical considerations support the 
r ~r~ ~~=~~~!~~~1 j:tdict~~l ~:;~ct~~c\h~o :;~~tin c~~~!~~s~y vi~: 
~
~ .. 
;v-: -, President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from 
Connecticut~ were reported as stating that "the President, 
personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could 
J J./ ,H have no action, whatever, brought against him; and above 
v1 the power of all judge, justices, etc." since otherwise a 
court could "stop the whole machinery of government." 2 
W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the tA United States 152 (Harris ed. 1880). Justice Story 
~ offered a similar argument somewhat later See 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Staets § 
1563, at 418-519 (1st ed. 1833). 
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the 
President not to be subject to judicial process. When 
Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 25 
Fed. Cas. 30 (1807) , that a subpoena duces tecum can be 
issued to a President, Jefferson protested srongly, and 
stated his broader view of the proper relationship between 
the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the 
independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary 
of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the 
judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the 
judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the 
latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several 
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him 
constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, 
and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? 
The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should 
be independent of the others, is further manifested by the 
means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from 
enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 33 will appear on following pages. 
• I 28 • 
J 
,./ 
distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court to 
cases in which various officials have claimed an 
evidentiary privilege. The courts generally have looked 
to the common law to determine the scope of an official's 
privilege. 34 In ~~ims by the President, 445 
however, we have recognized that presidential immunity is 
"rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 
(1974). 
~~ 
The separation of powers of course does not bar every 450 
1\ 
exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United 
States. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 
than to the executive." 10 The works of Thomas Jefferson 
404n. (P. Ford ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from 
President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) 
(emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, 
Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the President 320-325 
(1974). 
33see Youn1stwon Sheet & Tile Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
u.s. 579 (1952 (injunction directed to Secretary of 
Commerce) ' Kendall v. United States, supra (mandamus to 
enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
34see united States v. Reynolds, 345 u.s. 1, 6-7 
(1952) (Secretary of Defense); carl Zeiss Stiftung v. 
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 323-324 (D.D.C. 
1966) ' aff I a 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC) ' cert denied' 389 u.s. 
952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
29. 
(1952). 35 But it does mandate that a court, before 455 
exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of 
intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive 
branch. 36 In cases in which judicial action is needed to 
serve broad public interests--as when the court acts, not ~ 460 ... ... 
in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain 
their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, supra--the exercise of jurisdiction has been held 
warranted. In the case of a merely private suit for 
damages based on a President's official acts, 37 we hold 465 
35Although the President was not a party, the Court 
enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct 
presidential order. See 343 u.s., at 583. 
36see Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 
U.S. 425, 433 (1977): United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 683 
(1974). 
37Even in the case of officials possessing absolute 
immunity, this Court sometimes has held that this immunity 
extends only to acts in performance of particular 
functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., at 508-
517: cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S., at 430-431. 
In the case of the President, however, powerful prudential 
reasons counsel our rejection of this selective approach. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
~ the President has discretionary respousibilities in a 
~- ~u.RiEJt~e VtH'"".i:-et} ef sensitjue arQas. His constitutional ~ 
 mandate 5'tlns-~/\civil and criminal litigation policy,  
national security, and organization and assignment of 
t1 ~ Executive personnel. In many cases it would be difficult: 
 vf to determine which presidential "function" encompassed a 
~ particular action. Thus, in order to administer 
functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges 
frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for 
~~ which acts were taken. Inquiries of this kind would be 
· . Footnote continued on next page. 
30. 
~ it is not. 38 
c~ 
~e•~~}as intrusive as inquiries into the possible malice 
of the President under a standard of qualified immunity. 
In determining the proper scope of an absolute 
privilege, this Court repeatedly has refused to draw lines 
finer than concerns of policy would support. See, e.g., 
Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 u.s., at 498 (privilege 
extends to all matters "committed by law to [an 
official's] superv1s1on or control"); Barr v. Matteo, 
supra, 360 u.s., at 575 (fact "that the action taken here 
was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of 
duty is enough to render the privilege applicable •.•• "); 
Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435 u.s., at 363 & n. 12 
(judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside 
"the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding"). In view 
of the special nature of the President's constitutional 
office, we think it appropriate to extend to him absolute 
immunity from damage actions based on acts with in the 
"outer perimeter" ot~ area o7A official responsibility. 
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon 
would have acted outside the perimeter of his duties by 
ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was 
lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the 
service." Brief for Respondent, at 39, citing 5 u.s.c. § 
7512 (a). Because Congress has granted this legislative 
protection, petitioner argues, no federal official could, 
within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed 
without satisfying this standard of proof. This 
construction of the President's authority would subject 
him to trial on every allegation of tortious illegality 
and thereby deprive absolute immunity o,f its intended 
effect. It clearly is within the Presidentr's to "prescribe" ~~ 
the manner in which the Secretary wil h "conduct the 
business" of the Air Force. 10 u.s.c. § 8012(b). Because 
this grant includes the authority to prescribe 
reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's 
alleged wrongful acts layA( within the outer perimeter of 
his authority. . "---~ 
38 It \ne~ been denied that absolute immunity,('~ 
imposed a ~ ~~~t~9Te cost on the individuals whose rights 
have been violated. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 5 79, 581 (CA2 1949) , cer t 
denied, 339 u.s. 949 (1950): 
"It does indeed go without saying that an 
oficial, who is in fact guilty of using his 
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for 
any personal motive not connected with the 
public good, should not escape liability for the 
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were 
possible in practice to confine such complaints 
to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny 
recovery. The justification for [denying 
recovery] is that it is impossible to know 
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xample, instill an pnwanted hesitancy to remove 
· neffecient or even disloyal personnel, tb enforc~ the -
ws against groups or individuals prone to litigation, or 
pursue efficiencies disadvantageous to those benefited ~ 
prevailing poliq:i:e~. 3f Exposure of the President to 
whether the claim is well founded until the case 
has been tried, and to submit all officials, the 
innoncent as well as the guilty, to the burden 
of trial and to the inevitable danger of its 
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the 
most resolute •..• As is so often the case, the 
answer must be found in a balance between the 
evils inevitable in either alternative." 
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has 
found that there is a lesser public interest in actions 
for civil damages than, for example, in criminal 
prosecutions, United States v. Gillock, 100 S. Ct. 1185, 
1193 (1980); see United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S., 
at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance 
of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil 
actions as raising different questions not presented for 
decision). ~~ 
39 ~h/ argument that frivolous lawsuit~ can be 1 
ba~Glea ~ummarily has only limited force.~) Lawsuits) 
'nvolving- a qual-ified-immunity sta1)"'Ct~r!"d enercrr1y require 
ourts to inquire in~ the mot±v~ of the defendants, anq /' 
Footnote continued on next page. 1 
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L, / ' /. )·lc. 
action~ valse could distort 
32. 
'1 
the process of 
decisionmaking .at the highest levels of the executive 480 
branch. Anticipating lawsuits, the President and his 
~ 
advisers naturally would  an incentive to devote 
scarce energy, not to performance of their public duties, 
but to compilation of a record insulating the President 
against subsequent liability. 
VI 
such matters are difficult to resolve short of prolonged 
discovery or trial. This case itself has been in the 
courts since 1974. As Judge Gesell stated in his 
concurring opinion in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra: 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that 
with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction 
and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing 
suits seeking damage awards against high 
government officials in their personal 
capacities based on alleged constitutional 
torts. Each such suit almost invariably results 
in these officials and their colleagues being 
subjected to extensive discovery into 
traditionally protected areas.... Such 
discovery is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and 
not without considerable cost to the officials 
involved. It is not difficult for ingenious 
plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue 
of fact on some element of the immunity defense 
where subtle questions of constitutional law and 
a decision maker's mental processes are 
involved... . In short, if these standards are 
those to be followed in these cases, trial 
judges will almost automatically have to send 
such cases to full trials on the merits. 11 606 
F.2d, at 1214. 
These dangers are significant even though there is no 
historical record of numerous suits against the President, 
since a right to sue federal officials for damages for 
constitutional violations was not even recognized until 




A rule of absolute immunity for the President will 
not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for 
misconduct on the part of the chief executive. 40 There 
remains first the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 41 490 
In addition, Presidents may be prosecuted criminally, at 
least after they leave office. Moreover, there are 
informal checks on Presidential misconduct that do not 
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The 
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by Congress 495 
and by the press. Their vigilance may serve to deter 
Presidential misconduct, as well as to make credible the 
threat of impeachment. Other incentives to avoid 
misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the 
need to maintain prestige as an element of presidential 500 
influence, and a President's traditional concern for his 
40The presence of alternative remedies has played an 
important role in our previous decisions in the area of 
official immunity. E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 
428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors 
from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish tha 
which occurs.") 
41The same remedy plays a central role with respect 
to the misconduct of federal judges, who also possess 
absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial 
Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979)/ 
Congressman may be removed from office by a vote of their 
colleagues. u.s. Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
' ... 34. 
historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents 
clearly establishes that absolute immunity will not place 
the President "above the law." For the President, as for 505 
judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes 
~f~~~ ~~ 
a particular k, remedy for 1\ misconduct in order to advance 
compelling public ends. 
VII 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision 510 
of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded 
for action consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 
lfp/ss 05/14/82 Rider A, p. 1 (Nixon) 
NIXONl SALLY-POW 
Note to Dick: In addition to adding "in his official 
capacity" in the third line of our opinion, consider a 
footnote keyed to the end of the first paragraph on page 
1: 
We consider only the scope of a President's 
immunity in a civil suit seeking to impose a damages 
liability for an official act claimed to have violated the 
statutory or constitutional rights of a person. We are 
not concerned, as one might infer from language in the 
dissenting opinion, with violation of criminal laws by a 
President or with tortuous conduct not within the scope of 
a President's authority. 
lfp/ss 05/15/82 Rider A, p. (Nixon) 
NIXONB SALLY-POW 
The dissent argues that the "scope of immunity 
is determined by function, not office". Ante, at 19, et 
seq. The distinction between "function" and "office" can 
be relevant - indeed controlling in many situations. We 
long have recognized, however, that the distinction does 
not exist where certain officers act within the scope of 
their authority. For example, the "office" all that is 
required for a judicial officer to be protected by 
absolute immunity when he performs a judicial act. He is 
immune without regard to whether he "knows his conduct 
violates a statute or tramples on the constitutional 
rights of those who are injured." (see dissenting opinion, 
at 1). Writing for the Court in Stumpf v. Sparkman, 435 
u.s. 349, 355, 356, Justice White quoted with approval the 
often cited language from Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 
351 (1872) that judges "are not liable to civil actions 
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess 
of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done 
maliciously or corruptly". Similarly, the absolute 
2. 
immunity of a prosecuting attorney is not forfeited even 
when he institutes a prosecution for political purposes, 
and the result is imprisonment of an innocent person. 
(Cite Imbler) Again, a member of Congress, who by virtue 
of his office introduces legislation for the purpose of 
destroying the reputation of a private citizen, retains 
absolute immunity. A President, vested by the 
Constitution with "the executive power" of the United 
States, likewise should be absolutely immune from civil 
danage liability for executive action taken within the 
scope of his authority. 
Th. i.s 
(' ~ vi 5 ,· 0 ..., 
f'he ~vto.. ly 1-t'c~ I 
o..(. l~st 
0 ("0\. .f+ Yf 1 
In a consistent line of decisions, this Court has 
recognized that when governmental officials are sued for 
damages arising from alleged violations of constitutional 
rights, they are entitled to some form of immunity in 
order to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and excessive exposure to liability. In Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 u.s. 367 {1951}, the Court held that the 
passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had not abrogated the common- 1 
law privilege accorded to state legislators for acts 
within their legislative roles. The decision in Pierson 
v. Ray, 386 u.s. 547 {1967}, involving a constitutional 
suit against a state judge, recognized the continued 
validity of the absolute immunity accorded to judges at 1 
common law for acts within the judicial role. Pierson 
also held that police officers possess a qualified 
immunity protecting them from suits when their official 
acts are performed in good faith. Id., at 556. This 
qualified immunity was extended to state executive 2 
officals in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 {1974}, where 
2. 
we held that the immunity varied in scope, "the variation 
being dependent upon the scope of discretion and 
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances 
as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on 25 
which liability is sought to be based," id., at 237. 
The functional approach adopted in Scheuer led to 
differing results when the Court held that school-board 
officials possess only qualified immunity, wood v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975), but state prosecutors 30 
possess absolute immunity with respect to the initiation 
and pursuit of prosecutions, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 
409 (1976) • See also 0' Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 
(1975) (qualified immunity accorded to state hospital 
superintendent); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555 35 
(1978) (prison administrators accorded qualified 
immunity); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 
u.s. (1980) (in suit for declaratory relief 
involving rules governing lawyers, state supreme court 
held immune from suit for legislative actions, but not 40 
immune from challenges to enforcement activities): Dennis 
v. Sparks, __ U.S. __ (1980) (no immunity accorded to 
3. 
private parties who conspire with an immune judge to 
deprive others of civil rights). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. 45 
Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978), where we considered for the 
first time the kind of immunity possessed by federal 
executive officials who, like petitioners here, are sued 
for constitutional violations. 1 In Butz, the Court 
rejected an argument, based on several decisions involving 50 
federal officials charged with common-law torts, 2 that all 
high federal officials should be accorded absolute 
immunity from constitutional damage suits. In so holding, 
we concluded that such a blanket grant of absolute 
immunity would be anomalous in light of the qualified- 55 
immunity standard applied to state officials, 438 U.S., at 
504, and "would seriously erode the protection provided by 
basic constitutional guarantees." id., at 505. 
Nevertheless, we noted that under our decisions some 
1such suits are based, not on § 1983, but on general 
federal-question jurisdiction and the remedial powers of 
the federal courts. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
2Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s. 564 (1959); Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 u.s. 483 (1896). 
4. 
officials, notably judges and prosecutors, have "special 60 
functions requir [ ing] a full exemption from liability." 
Id., at 508. We therefore recognized that some federal 
officials may show that "public policy requires an 
exemption from liability." Id., at 508. 
This case now presents the claim that the President 65 
of the United States falls into the category of federal 
officials who should be accorded absolute immunity from 
damage suits based on constitutional violations. 
IV 
Our decision in Scheuer, supra, discussing the 70 
qualified immunity possessed by state executive officials, 
recognized that the extent of protection afforded an 
official may vary with the responsibilities and discretion 
of his office. 416 u.s., at 247. We explained that the 
"range of decisions and choices" required of a high 75 
executive official is "virtually infinite," yet such an 
official often must act quickly lest "action deferred will 
be futile or constitute virtual abdication of office." 
Id., at 246. In addition, these officials must "rely on 
traditional sources for the factual information on which 80 
5. 
they decide and act," ibid., and, in times of emergency, 
~ay make decisions in an "atmosphere of confusion, 
~biguity, and swiftly moving events," id., at 247. "In 
short," we concluded, "since the options which a chief 
executive and his principal subordinates must consider are 85 
far broader and far more subtle than those made by 
officials with less responsibility, the range of 
discretion must be comparably broad." Ibid. In the Butz 
decision applying qualified immunity to high federal 
executive officials, we noted that, as compared with the 90 
opportunities for abuses by lower federal employees, the 
"greater power of such officials affords a greater 
potential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 u.s., at 
506. We did not, however, reject Scheuer's perception 
that such higher officials will receive greater protection 95 
under a good-faith standard because of their broader range 
of responsibilities and choices. Indeed, the Butz opinion 
applied the "governing principles," id., at 503, of 
Scheuer to federal officials, and recognized that the 
special functions of some officials require absolute 100 
immunity,, id., at 508-517. 3 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
6. 
When applied to the office of President of the United 
States, these principles require due consideration of the 
characteristics of that unique office. Our prior 
~ecisions require a protective shield around presidential 105 
decision-making that is commensurate with the unequalled 
breadth and gravity of the President's duties. we cannot 
ignore the fact that he is the official required by the 
Constitution to play a major role in nearly all aspects of 





make critical decisions, some of which implicate the very 
survival of the Nation. In performing these functions, 
the President does not work solely thorugh formal 
( procedural 





the lawmaking process. 
responsibility for the 
3Four basic rationales support immunity for public 
officials. First, the prospect of damages liability may 
render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their 
public responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 
2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 u.s. 949 (1950). 
Second, competent and responsible individuals may be 
deterred from entering public service in the first place. 
Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties 
by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. Finally, as this 
case illustrates, there is a danger of unfairness when 
officials face personal liability for decisions made in 
areas of legal uncertainty that are reviewed by courts 
years later, under evolving legal standards. See 
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for 
Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 








*arious informal aspects of governing - with discretion to 
act on his own when the national interest requires a 
result that cannot be legislated or adjudicated. In 
short, the President is responsible for a vast array of 
"executive" functions which he cannot avoid but which 120 
expose him to countless potential damage suits. Moreover, 
as the natural focal point for so many of the perceived 
grievances against the Federal Government, he is unlikely 
to be overlooked as a potential defendant. 4 
4The likelihood that Presidents will face large 
numbers of constitutional damage suits creates a risk that 
Presidential decisionmaking will be interfered with 
unduly. Presidents may be daunted by their exposure to 
huge damage recoveries, including some that are 
disproportionate responses to perceived grievances. 
Courts and juries, after all, may tend to judge emergency 
executive decisions harshly in the clear light of 
hindsight. Moreover, leaving aside the risk of 
substantial judgments, a sitting President may be diverted 
from the pressing duties of his office by the requirements 
of defending numerous lawsuits - including the answering 
of interrogatories and giving of testimony. The argument 
that frivolous lawsuits can be handled summarily has only 
limited force. Lawsuits involving a qualified-immunity 
standard generally require courts to inquire into the 
motives of the defendants, and such matters are difficult 
to resolve short of prolonged discovery or trial. This 
case itself has been in the courts since 1973. As Judge 
Gesell stated in his concurring opinion below: 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that 
with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction 
and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing 
suits seeking damage awards against high 
government officials in their personal 
capacities based on alleged constitutional 
torts. Each such suit almost invariably results 
in these officials and their colleagues being 
subjected to extensive discovery into 
traditionally protected areas.... Such 
discovery is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
v 
The unique nature of the presidential office, as 
established by our Constitution, requires a level of 
immunity higher than that of any other executive 
official. 5 The President is the head of the Executive 
not without considerable cost to the officials 
involved. It is not difficult for ingenious 
plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue 
of fact on some element of the immunity defense 
where subtle questions of constitutional law and 
a decision maker's mental processes are 
involved.... In short, if these standards are 
those to be followed in these cases, trial 
judges will almost automatically have to send 
such cases to full trials on the merits." 
U.S. App. D.C., at ___ , 606 F.2d, at 1214. 
These dangers are significant even though there is no 
historical record of numerous suits against the President, 
since a right to sue federal officials for damages for 
constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388 
~1971). 
There are prudential reasons as well for rejecting a 
selective approach differentiating among various 
presidential functions. In many cases, it would be 
difficult to determine which area encompassed a particular 
action. In this sense, a President is quite different 
from a prosecutor, whose functions fall relatively easily 
into categories investigation, initiation of a 
prosecution, presentation of a case, etc. Any similar 
line-drawing in the area of Presidential action would 
necessarily require an inquiry into the purpose of an 
action. Such an inquiry by a court would be nearly as 
intrusive as an inquiry into the possible malice of the 
President under a qualified-immunity standard. Indeed, it 
has been argued that even prosecutors should be given 
absolute immunity regardless of the particular function 
involved, because of the intrusiveness of an inquiry into 
intent. See Note, Delimiting the Scope of Prosecutorial 
Immunity from § 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 173, 
200 {1977). 
For similar reasons, I would not adopt a rule 
granting absolute immunity only where the President has 
acted in order to furtehr the national interest - i.e., 
except where he has acted to further purely personal 
interests. Such a rule also would require an inquiry into 
motive. Here, for example, it might require a remand for 
a determination whether the wiretap remained a matter of 
national security throughout its duration. 
125 
9. 
Branch in whom are invested all of the powers specified by 130 
Article II of the Constitution. 6 As his status, duties, 
and responsibilities therefore are qualitatively different 
from other officials, it is proper to accord him absolute 
immunity from damage suit liability for all of his 
official acts. 135 
Such a rule is mandated by our constitutional 
structure and is faithful to the assumptions that have 
prevailed since the founding of the Nation. The 
Constitution itself is silent on this question, while it 
exempts Members of Congress explicitly under the Speech or 140 
Debate Clause. U.S. Cons t. Art. I , § 6. But there are 
historical reasons for the concern that prompted the 
adoption of Art. I, - §6. The Founding Fathers were aware 
of the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in 
England. See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 u.s. 145 
169, 177-182 {1966). A similar reason for concern did not 
exist with respect to the chief of state. Although the 
structure of the Constitution was carefully designed by 
6 U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1 {"The executive Power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States."). 
10. 
the checks and balances of the separation of powers to 
prevent an imperial President, the importance of the role 150 
of the chief executive officer of the Nation was clearly 
recognized and preserved. Indeed, the Founders gave the 
President, as an individual official, a separate and equal 
footing with Congress and this Court as corporate bodies. 
The omission of an explicit exemption of the President 155 
from personal damages suits may be explained by a general 
understanding at the time that no explicit exemption was 
necessry. 
One reflection of the prevailing historical 
assumption is the general reluctance on the part of the 160 
courts to exercise their power against the President 
personally. Although the President may, in some limited 
circumstances, be compelled by a court to produce 
materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal prosecution, 
United States v. Nixon, supra, this Court has never held 165 
that courts may compel the President himself to perform 
even ministerial executive functions, 7 and statements from 
7Although this issue has not been faced squarely by 
the Court, there have been strong statements in previous 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the early days of the Republic support such a limitation 
on judicial power. 8 This reluctance to enjoin 
opinions asserting the immunity of the President from 
judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 u.s. 475, 
501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied 
that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin 
the President in the performance of his official duties; 
and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in 
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is 
stated: "The executive power is vested in a President; 
and as far as his powers are derived from the consitution, 
he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in 
the mode prescribed by the constitution through the 
impeaching power."). But see National Treasury Em~loyees 
Union v. Nixon, u.s. App. D.C. , , 492 F. d 587, 
616 (1974) (concluding that a -court possesses the 
"authority to mandamus the President to perform the 
ministerial duty" of effectuating a pay raise). 
Even in United States v. Nixon, the court held that 
Presidential conversations and correspondence enjoy a 
"presumptive privilege" that is "inextricably rooted in 
the separation of powers." 418 u.s., at 708. we 
suggested that this privilege may be more absolute when 
matters of diplomacy or national security are involved. 
Id., at 706, 710-711. 
8At the time of the first Congress, Vice President 
John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, 
were reported as stating that "the President, personally, 
was not subject to any process whatever; could have no 
action, whatever, brought against him; and above the power 
of all judge, justices, etc." since otherwise a court 
could "stop the whole machinery of government." 2 W. 
Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the 
United States 152 (Harris ed. 1880). Justice Story 
offered a similar argument somewhat later See 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Staets § 
1563, at 418-519 (1st ed. 1833). 
Few historical facts are clearer than Thomas 
Jefferson's view that the President was not subject to 
judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in 
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a 
subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a President, 
Jefferson protested srongly, and stated his broader view 
of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the 
President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the 
independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary 
of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the 
judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the 
judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the 
latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several 
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him 
constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, 
and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? 
Footnote continued on next page. 
12. 
Presidential action contrasts markedly with the ready 170 
acceptance of court orders compelling action on the part 
of other executive officials.9 A similar distinction 
between Presidents and their subordinates has been drawn 
by some commentators with respect to the possibility of 
criminal prosecutions while in office. 10 175 
The threat of damages suits, along with the 
requirements of litigating such suits while in office, 
could have a significant effect on a President's 
performance in office. This fact is one of the reasons 
for providing such a remedy, as well as one of the major 180 
The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should 
be independent of the others, is further manifested by the 
means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from 
enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means 
than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
404n. {P. Ford ed. 1905) {quoting a letter from 
President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) 
{emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, 
Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the President 320-325 
{1974). 
The statements quoted here concerning a President's 
amenability to process apply only to sitting Presidents, 
and may not accord with present views of jujdicial power, 
but they do indicate the historical recognition given to 
the President's special constitutional status. 
9see Youngstwon Sheet & Tile Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 
579 {1952) {injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce)' 
Kendall v. United States, supra {mandamus to enforce 
ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
10see Bickel, The Constitutional Tangle, The New 
Republic, October 6, 1973, at 14; P. Kurland, watergate 
and The Constitution 135 {1978). 
13. 
reasons for the creation of official immunities. In 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a damage 
remedy against the President himself, the unique 
constitutional status of this particular official, as 
recognized throughout our history becomes the 185 
determinative factor. It simply is inconsistent with our 
system to leave Presidents exposed to open-ended 
litigation by every disgruntled citizen and to potentially 
devastating liability in damages, imposed by order of a 
separate branch of government. 190 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will 
not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for 
misconduct on the part of the chief executive •11 There 
remains, first of all, the remedy of impeachment. 12 In 
additiion, Presidents may be prosecuted criminally, at 195 
11The presence of alternative remedies has played an 
important role in our previous decisions in teh area of 
official immunity. E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 
428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors 
from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public power less to deter misconduct or to punish tha 
which occurs.") 
12The same remedy plays a central role with respect to 
the misconduct of federal judges, who also possess 
absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial 
Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979)/ 
Congressman may be removed from office by a vote of their 
colleagues. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
14. 
least after they leave office. The existence of these 
alternative remedies is not alone, determinative because 
they also apply to numerous executive officials who are 
accorded only qualified immunity under our decision in 
Butz v. Economou, supra. Yet the balance of competing 200 
considerations is different with respect to the President 
than it is for any other executive official. In addition, 
there are various less formal checks on Presidential 
misconduct that do not apply with equal force to other 
executive officials. The President is subjected 205 
constantly to intense public and congressional scrutiny. 
Such scrutiny may serve to deter Presidential misconduct, 
as well as to make the sanction of impeachment a real 
threat. The President has other incentives to avoid 
misconduct that result from his possible desire to seek 210 
re-election, his need to maintain his prestige and 
influence over other governmental officials, and his 
traditional concern for his place in history. All of 
these factors make clear that absolute Preaidential 
immunity will not place the President "above the law. nl3 215 
Footnote(s) 13 will appear on following pages. 
15. 
Instead, such a rule merely rejects a particular remedy of 
misconduct in order to further the broader public good. 14 
13As Judge Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 
177 F.2d 579 581 (CA 2 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 949 
(1950), "to submit all officials, the innocent as well as 
the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable 
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but 
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.... In this 
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave 
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to 
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant 
dread of retaliation." 
14The idea that some governmental officials should be 
shielded absolutely from 1 iabili ty in damages is hardly 
new or unusual. Under our decisions, absolute immunity 
from suit extends to judges, Pierson v. Ray, supra, 
prosecutors Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, and state 
legislators, Tenney v. Brandhove, supra. In addition, 
such immunity covers a large number of administrative 
officials under our decision in Butz v. Economou, supra. 
In Butz, we held that federal agency "officials who are 
respons1ble for the decision to initiate or continue [an 
administrative] proceeding subject to agency adjudication 
are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability 
for their parts in that decision." 438 u.s., at 516. 
Butz also accorded absolute immunity to the lawyers who 
prosecute and the administrative law judges who hear them. 
Id., at 514-517. There are at least 30 federal agencies 
and departments with authority to initiate such 
proceedings. Although the number of immunized officials 
and lawyers is unknown, there were 1,146 law judges 
serving these agencies in 1980, Administrative Conference 
of the United States, Federal Administrative Law Judge 
Hearings: Statistical Report for 1976-1978, p. 21 (1980). 
Moreover, in 1978, 216843 new agency proceedings were 
begun, id, at 33, although these include cases that were 
not initiated by the government and thus cannot be viewed 
as "prosecutorial." 
In granting this immunity to numerous administrative 
officials, we reasoned that they performed Eunctions 
analgous to those of prosecutors and judges. But unlike 
judges, publicly appointed or elected prosecutors, and 
legislators, many of these officials are unkown and often 
may be difficult to identify. Many of the informal 
constraints applicable to highly visible judges, 
prosecutors and legislators are far less likely to apply 
to these individuals. Yet, it is argued here that the 
President of the United States should have less immunity. 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages 
from a former President of the United States. The claim 
rests on actions allegedly taken during the former President's 
tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the im-
munity possessed by the President of the United States. 
I 
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost 
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the 
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of 
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in 
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganiza-
tion, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to pro-
mote economy and efficiency in the armed forces. 
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in 
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national 
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the wan-
ing months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On No-
vember 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent 
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A 
/ 
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also re-
vealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen dur-
ing the development of the aircraft. 
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation 
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Econ-
omy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's 
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, 
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being 
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news con-
ference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was 
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from gov-
ernment service. 3 The President responded by promising to 
1 See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed 
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and an-
gered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respond-
ent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the 
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in 
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See Joint Appendix 
(JA), at 209-211 (Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 
1969). Among these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitz-
gerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the 
new Nixon administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly 
on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the 
Air Force upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. 
2 See The Dismissal of A . Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of De-
fense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members 
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of 
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." I bid., at 115-116, 
JA, at 177-179. 
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared 
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcom-
ing press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced 
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." JA, at 
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5, 
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's 
retention by the Defense Department. 
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the 
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman 
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within 
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President sug-
gested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald 
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resis-
tance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memoran-
dum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander 
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no 
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low 
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the 
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We 
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi-
'JA, at 228. 
• See JA, at 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); JA, at 137-141 (De-
position of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was 
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. JA, at 275. 
• See JA, at 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); JA, at 141 (Deposition of 
Richard Nixon). 
7 Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted 
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty 
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with 
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were 
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See JA, at 126 
(Deposition of Robert Mayo); JA, at 146-147 (Deposition of James 
Schlesinger). 
8 Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Deci-
sion), JA, at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). 
' !d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitz-
gerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a 
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed 
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House 
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra, 
JA, at 83: 
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in 
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement diffi-
cult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without 
79-1738-0PINION 
4 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subse-
quent to the Butterfield memorandum. 
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitz-
gerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a let-
ter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation repre-
sented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a 
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a 
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. 
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in 
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, 
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (1972), public hearings 
commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings again gener-
ated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air 
Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he denied that 
Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for congres-
sional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received 
"some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job 
was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be more spe-
cific. He responded to several questions by invoking "execu-
tive privilege." 12 
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President 
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took 
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitz-
gerald's dismissal: 
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be 
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it 
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone 
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was 
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note 
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consul-
tant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at 
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." 
10 See CSC Decision, JA, at 61. 
"See ibid., JA, at 83--84. 
12 See id. 
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he 
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. 
I made it and I stick by it." 13 
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a 
retraction of the President's statement. According to a 
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with 
another former executive employee. On behalf of the Presi-
dent, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had 
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Ex-
aminer for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision 
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on 
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, JA, at 60. The Exam-
iner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable 
civil service regulations. Ibid., JA, at 86-87. 15 The Exam-
iner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental 
18 JA, at 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re-
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered 
Fitzgerald's firing. JA., at 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 
1973). 
1'JA, at 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary 
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John 
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra 
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the 
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." JA, at 218 (re-
corded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this 
conversation that the retraction was ordered. 
15 Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and 
therefore not covered by civil service rules at:~d regulations for the competi-
tive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see 
CSC Decision, JA, at 63--64. In Hampton, however, the court held that 
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection," 
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory 
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at 
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force proce-
dures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758. 
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reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though pur-
portedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact 
motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., 
at 86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in 
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappoint-
ment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow 
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suf-
fered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by 
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support 
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and 
that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having re-
vealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Prox-
mire Committee on November 13, 1968." Ibid., at 81. 
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a 
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it 
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil 
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi-
16 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of 
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision, JA, 
at 86-87. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 
'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" Ibid., JA, at 83. Without 
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse 
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 
ibid., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action proce-
dures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air 
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent 
for reasons "personal to" him. JA, at 87. 
"The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay. 
CSC Decision, at 20-21, JA, at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, 
respondent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position 
equivalent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that 
he therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court. 
18 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his 
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzger-
ald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission 
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See 
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, supra, 384 F. Supp., at 690-692. 
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex-
ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House 
Aides" styled only as "John Does." 
The District Court dismissed the action under the District 
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. 
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House 
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House in-
volvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year, 
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably 
through publication of the internal White House memoran-
dum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald 
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being 
offered another job in the Administration. 553 F. 2d, at 225, 
229. Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll 
the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the 
action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court. 
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, 
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District 
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint-
more than eight years after he had complained of his dis-
charge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first 
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also in-
cluded as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow 
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional 
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants re-
mained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides 
19 The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially un-
changed. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy 
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement 
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dis-
missal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6. 
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Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Denying a motion 
for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the ac-
tion must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that 
Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under two fed-
eral statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 
The Court also ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim 
absolute presidential immunity. 
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently 
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally 
"'See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court 
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a pri-
vate right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. 
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees .. . to ... fur-
nish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Mem-
ber thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congres-
sional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action 
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. N ei-
ther is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the 
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for 
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct 
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our con-
stitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappro-
priate."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 
388, 396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special 
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order" 
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. 
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the 
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently 
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemen-
tal Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980). 
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed 
immunity defense. 
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity avail-
able to a President of the United States, we granted certio-
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 
II 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must con-
sider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to 
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court 
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which 
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute im-
munity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agree-
ment between the parties has mooted the controversy. 
A 
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority tore-
view "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the peti-
tioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order de-
nying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Emphasizing the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Ap-
peals' decision, respondent argued that the District Court's 
order was not an appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of 
Appeals within the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. 
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi-
21 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at 
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the chal-
lenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it. 
22 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any 
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . ... 
28 u. s. c. § 1254. 
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small 
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to 
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class em-
braces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, 
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement, 
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory 
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337 
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable 
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and De-
bate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) 
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In pre-
vious cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as 
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d 
10, 5~0 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for 
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en 
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 128~1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed 
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). 
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Ap-
peals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay 
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and 
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by 
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss 
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin 
v. Kissinger, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that 
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and 
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had 
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held. 
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this 
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light 
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened 
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the sepa-
ration of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-
rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the 
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the 
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-
rari jurisdiction. 23 
B 
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari 
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the 
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under 
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald 
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac-
23 There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court 
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have ex-
ercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss 
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this 
Court. 
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to 
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question 
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Espe-
cially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue pre-
sented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the im-
portant question presented. 
"' Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court 
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of 
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other 
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for 
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients 
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a 
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their 
initial submission. 
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by 
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity 
claim, no further payments would be made. 
The limited agreement between the parties left both peti-
tioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in 
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As 
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract, 
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re-
lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."' 
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. --,-- (1982), 




This Court consistently has recognized that government of-
ficials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for 
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), 
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmas-
ter General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "(t]he inter-
ests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to 
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the 
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise 
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public in-
terest required bold and unhesitating action. Consider-
ations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled 
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from offi-
cial acts. 
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an 
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his 
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the 
motives that control his official conduct may, at any 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for 
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and ef-
fective administration of public affairs as entrusted to 
the executive branch of the government, if he were sub-
jected to any such restraint." 
Id., at 498. 
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court con-
sidered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which 
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had 
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at com-
mon law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in 
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our 
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible 
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well 
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of 
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. 
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 
· U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge, 
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of 
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine 
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt 
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is 
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions 
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d., 
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The 
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a 
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their offi-
cial acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court con-
sidered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In 
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity 
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that 
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity 
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balanc-
ing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public 
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based." /d., at 247. 
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a 
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To 
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. 
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the 
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions 
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "ftmc-
tional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at 
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-no-
tably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recog-
nition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pacht-
man, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute 
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of pros-
ecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state 
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). 
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Econ-
omou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first 
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive of-
ficials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz 
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving 
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high 
25 Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the 
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a 
constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493-495. 
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from con-
stitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recog-
nition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of 
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive of-
ficials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials gener-
ally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state offi-
cials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our 
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, 
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., 
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508. 
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for ad-
ministrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those 
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the 
question whether other federal officials could show that "pub-
lic policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506. 
B 
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government offi-
cials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a 
straight line of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, a con-
sistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims 
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that 
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against 
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial mak-
ing,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quot-
ing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMil-
lan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are 
. . . competent to determine the appropriate level of immu-
nity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 503. Our decisions of course have been guided 
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under 
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See, 
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other de-
cisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g., 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing 
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause), 
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional lan-
guage and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a con-
gressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental 
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-517. Nonetheless, at 
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in 
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on con-
sideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally 
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have exam-
ined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to par-
ticular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 
421 (1976). 
This case now presents the claim that the President of the 
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil 
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical 
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presi-
dency did not exist through most of the development of com-
mon law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence pri-
marily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From 
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort 
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the 
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core 
of our inquiry involving those considerations of public policy 
traditionally weighed by courts at common law. 
26 At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials. 
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from enter-
ing public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages li-
ability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public 
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be dis-
tracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See 
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Viola-
tions: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977). 
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IV 
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil 
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant 
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory 
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In nei-
ther case has Congress taken express legislative action to 
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. <a 
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, 
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United 
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu-
nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's 
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the 
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public 
policy. 
A 
The President occupies a unique position in the constitu-
tional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that 
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the 
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive 
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the 
administration of justice-it is the President who is charged 
constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in which the 
Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable that 
courts, without the relevant information, should review and 
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information 
27 We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress 
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a 
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious con-
stitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case. 
28 U. S. Const., Art II, § 3. 
79-1738-0PINION 
18 NIXON v. FITZGERALD 
properly held secret"; 29 and management of the personnel of 
the Executive branch-a task for which "imperative reasons 
requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove 
the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties." 30 
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified 
immunity,31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have 
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet 
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The 
President's unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32 
29 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948). 
ao Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). 
31 Under the "good faith" standard, as formulated in such cases as Wood 
v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be held immune 
from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should have known 
that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was un-
constitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to cause a 
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury . ... " 
32 Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis 
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Peti-
tioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers af-
firmatively assumed presidential immunity to have been established by the 
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace pe-
titioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's 
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a 
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with 
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been con-
sidered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision ex-
pressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well set-
tled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Spark-
man, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute 
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. 
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 
supra, (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive 
branch). 
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's pow-
ers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for 
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his of-
fice and the effect of his actions on countless people, the Pres-
ident would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions 
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a Presi-
dent must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most in-
tense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554. 
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest 
public interest in providing the President "the maximum abil-
ity to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his 
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (foot-
note omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill 
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even dis-
loyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages ac-
tions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the 
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating law-
suits against the President, the President and his advisers 
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy, 
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation 
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability. 
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties, 
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits 
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35 
33 Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
§ 1563, at 418--419 (1833 ed.): 
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, 
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are 
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to 
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, 
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his 
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at 
least, to possess an official inviolability." 
34 These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record 
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal offi-
cials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents , 403 U. S. 388 (1971). 
35 Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court 
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance 
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B 
In deference to the President's singular constitutional man-
date, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction 
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court 
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the 
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a se-
lective approach. 
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has 
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are 
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which 
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to 
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges fre-
quently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken. 
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. 
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court re-
peatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would sup-
port. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege ex-
tends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or 
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the ac-
tion here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is 
enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); Stump v. Sparkman, 
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts 
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding"). In 
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think 
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions 
based on acts within the "outer perimeter'' of the area of his official 
responsibility. 
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted 
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent 
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Re-
spondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has 
granted this legislative protection, petitioner argues, no federal official 
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without sat-
isfying this standard of proof. This construction of the President's author-
ity would subject him to trial on every allegation that an allegedly tortious 
action was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction 
thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect. 
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in 
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10 
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never has held that courts may compel the President to per-
form even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions 
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37 
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court 
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to pre-
scribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrong-
ful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. 
36 Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there 
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity 
of the President from judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has 
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his 
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in 
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The execu-
tive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived 
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, ex-
cept in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching 
power." 
Even in United States v. Nixon, the court held that Presidential con-
versations and correspondence enjoy a "presumptive privilege" that is "in-
extricably rooted in the separation of powers." 418 U. S., at 708. We 
suggested that this privilege may be more absolute when matters of diplo-
macy or national security are involved. /d., at 706, 710-711. 
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluc-
tance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress, 
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecti-
cut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not sub-
ject to any process whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought 
against him; and above the power of all judge, justices, etc." since other-
wise a court could "stop the whole machinery of government." 2 W. 
Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United States 152 
(Harris ed. 1880). Justice Story offered a similar argument somewhat 
later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). 
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be 
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be 
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader 
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: 
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the 
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jeal-
ous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of 
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary 
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common 
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In con-
sidering claims by the President, however, we have recog-
nized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation 
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974). 
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does 
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of 
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, 
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, be-
fore exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of in-
trusion on the authority and functions of the executive 
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad pub-
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to 
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from 
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to 
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The in-
tention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the 
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to pro-
tect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and 
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the execu-
tive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quot-
ing a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (em-
phasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: 
Jefferson the President 32~25 (1974). 
37 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (in-
junction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States, 
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General). 
38 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of 
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 
318, 32~24 (DDC 1966), aff'd 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389 
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). 
39 Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secre-
tary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343 
U. S., at 583. 
40 See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439 
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lie interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the 
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, 
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra-the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of 
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's 
official acts, we hold it is not. 41 
v 
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave 
the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the 
part of the chief executive. 42 There remains first the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, Presi-
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). 
41 It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious 
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge 
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), 
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950): 
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of 
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive 
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the inju-
ries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such 
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The 
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know 
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to sub-
mit ali officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and 
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of ali but 
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found 
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative." 
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a 
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in 
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal 
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not pre-
sented for decision). 
42 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in 
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. 
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immu-
nity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
43 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of 
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dents may be prosecuted criminally, at least after they leave 
office. Moreover, there are informal checks on Presidential 
action that do not apply with equal force to other executive 
officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by 
Congress and by the press. The vigilance of these institu-
tions may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well 
as to make credible the threat of impeachment. 44 Other in-
centives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-
election, the need to maintain prestige as an element of presi-
dential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his 
historical stature. 
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents es-
tablishes that absolute immunity will not place the President 
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and pros-
ecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular pri-
vate remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance com-
pelling public ends. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for ac-
tion consistent with this opinion. 
j 
So ordered. 
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chill-
ing Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690--706 (1979). Congress-
men may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. 
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
"'Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary 
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1305 (1974). 
